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The call  for public engagement with science and the call  for ethics have both be‐come  commonplaces  in  contemporary  public  policy  around  science,  innovation and emerging technologies. Public engagement and ethics go beyond more classi‐cal notions of the state in decision‐making processes, as well as of the role of sci‐ence and citizens in society, and have largely replaced traditional risk concepts of assessing  the  probability  of  harm  arising  from  determinable  causes  (Jasanoff 1999). The rise of these new “technologies” of governance has been triggered to a large degree by advances in new genetics that pose new and challenging questions about their social and ethical  impacts, creating a source of new public controver‐sies—for example regarding GM food. However, there are huge differences in the way science, politics and citizens are enacted in public participation and by ethics. While public participation aims to extend the range of knowledge, experiences and interests relevant to political decision‐making, ethics, in particular in its dominant practice  as  institutionalized  expert  deliberations,  is  mostly  characterized  by  a rather ambivalent relationship to the public. On one hand, it rests on the exclusion of  lay people  from ethical opinion making. On  the other hand, ethical authorities cannot deny that public legitimacy is required for politics today.  A  nice  example  for  this  ambivalent  relationship with  the  public  is  the European 
Group  on Ethics  in  Science  and New Technologies  (EGE), which  advises  the Euro‐pean Commission.  The EGE  is  a  pure  expert  committee  of  recognized  academics from different fields, whose deliberations, its mandate notes, “shall not be open to the public”. The EGE members are appointed as persons and not as representatives of social institutions, groups or interests, in order to provide “independent” exper‐tise, and thus are responsible only to their own consciences. Hence,  their  institu‐tional practice rests on a broad exclusion of what  is called the “public”; however, 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their reports (so‐called “Opinions”) emphasize that “Public participation is of vital concern in democratic states”, and ask “How can we ensure that the public partici‐pates not  only  in discussions  associated with nanotechnology  and nanomedicine but  in  the overall design of  research and development policy?”  (European Group on  Ethics  in  Science  and  New  Technologies  to  the  European  Commission  (EGE) 2007, 44). Here, the EGE calls for public participation not only in concrete issues, but much more basically  in  the way current  innovation regimes are constructed. The question is how this call for opening up deliberations about innovation proc‐esses in science and research to more bottom‐up approaches relates to the EGE’s own practice of predetermining relevant ethical  issues  in the form of recommen‐dations which aim to define what  is an ethical  issues  for a particular subject  in a very exclusive way. And what  is  the  role of  the EGE  in governing  the  innovation processes which it aims to democratize?  This and other striking antagonisms and ambivalences in the current governance of science and technology were among the central motives for writing this disser‐tation. The question is,  if public engagement  is politically  legitimized and already practiced for a wide range of issues—be they scientific or not—why is ethics still a nearly  exclusive domain  for  experts?  Should public  participation not  be possible for  ethics  too,  in  particular  if  ethics means  how  current  and  future  technologies interact with our moral  imaginations and everyday practices?1 Ethics experts de‐liver some answers to these questions: A recurrent theme in their claims that the public  cannot  participate  in  ethical  issues  is  that  it  lacks  the  ability  to  articulate “reasoned” arguments. In this claim, “ethics” is seen as the “reflective” and “theo‐retically informed” way of engaging with morality with the end of producing nor‐mative  judgments.  Ethicists  often  argue  that  ethical  decision‐making  has  to  be based on both  informedness on  the matter  itself  and  the  ability  to provide well‐argued, “sophisticated” ethical reasons. Hence, the call for “reason” in public ethi‐cal debates is often a means to exclude certain positions from the discussion and to maintain expert authority over certain issues.  The way science governance deals with public participation  is characterized,  too, by a range of ambivalences that become especially visible in EU policy statements. There—as well  as  in  national  contexts  implementing  these  policies—public  par‐ticipation is celebrated as a new and more stable way of political decision‐making, able  to restore  lost public confidence  in  institutions and authorities as well as  to overcome the crisis of legitimacy in political decision‐making. However, if science is  understood  in  terms  of  “innovation” within  an  economic  rationale,  the  role  of citizens  in decision‐making processes  is often quickly marginalized.  If citizens do not  place  enough  value  on  the  economic  benefits  they  might  gain  from  an  in‐creased investment in R&D, the public has to be made “aware” of this “fact”—thus 
                                                1   These questions were in the focus of an article my colleagues Ulrike Felt, Maximilian Fochler, Annina  Müller  and  I  wrote  together  and  submitted  to  Public  Understanding  of  Science  in 2006, and which will be published in 2009 (Felt et al. 2009). Taking this article’s basic ques‐tions as a starting point, I aim to analyze these questions more broadly and in more detail in this dissertation. 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constructing  the  scientific  citizen  as  a  consumer,  worshipper  or  follower whose task  is  to  provide  an  innovation‐friendly  environment  for  businesses.  Here,  the citizen loses the role of a “sovereign” of political decision‐making that is assigned to him or her in other contexts.  These  different  narratives  stand  side  by  side,  often  in  the  same  documents (Hagendijk  2004).  The  question,  however,  is  how  these  different  visions  of  the “scientific citizen” relate to each other as well as to more technocratic governance regimes  that  highlight  the  role  of  experts  in  political  decision‐making  processes. How are the more technocratic visions of science governance in ethics politics and innovation‐framed science governance compatible with the more democratic ten‐ets of political decision‐making embodied by “public participation”, which rest nei‐ther on informedness nor on the ability to articulate sophisticated opinions? So far, answers have not been provided. Despite  the  striking  ambivalences  and  unanswered  questions  inherent  in  public participation  and  ethics,  both  have  become  “business”  in  many  contexts.  Public participation  events  are  organized  routinely  on  a wide  range  of  issues; methods and models are  imported and exported from one country to another. The call  for standardization  and  “best  practices”  becomes  louder  (e.g.,  Österreichisches Lebensministerium  and  Bundeskanzleramt  der  Republik  Österreich  2008),  and increasingly the organization of public participation events is “outsourced” to pro‐fessional Public Relations agencies “discovering” science communication as a new business  area.  More  and  more,  public  participation  has  be‐come  “business  as usual”,  and governments  and policymakers quickly  return  to  their daily  routines after such events end (Hagendijk and Irwin 2006; Irwin 2006). Thus, some observ‐ers perceive a danger that participation is treated as a one‐size‐fits‐all solution for all  kind of problems,  thus engendering a  “technocracy of participation”  (Chilvers 2008) or even a “tyranny of participation” (Cooke and Kothari 2001).  Ethics, too, has gone business, for example in biotech companies that operate their own  ethics  committees  to  morally  “approve”  their  businesses.  National  ethics committees  have  become  “political machines”  that  produce moral  opinions  on  a wide range of issues and then inform national as well as international policies, of‐ten bypassing wider debates as well as the usual legislation processes by installing some kind of  “soft  law”  (Tallacchini  2006).  For  the EU’s  Framework Programme research proposals,  enterprises offer  so‐called  “Ethical Review Red Teaming”2  in order to test research proposals for the worst case and thus to produce the “ethi‐cally safe” research proposal which will make it through the review process. Ethics and participation, while seeking to remedy shortcomings of more traditional con‐cepts of science governance, open up a series of questions which science policy has not even attempted to address, and thus also challenge assumptions about democ‐racy. 
                                                2   See http://www.efpconsulting.com (accessed July 7, 2008). 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A  further  feature of both  the participation  “business” as well  as  the ethics  “busi‐ness” is that they have become increasingly more internationalized and globalized. With regard to public participation, nationally successful models such as the Dan‐ish consensus conferences have been exported and introduced in different national contexts and cultures. They also serve  to create a  “European society” and public, though often with problematic outcomes and visions. A paramount example is the 
Meeting of Minds consensus conference on brain research,3 which assembled rep‐resentatives  of  the  “public”  from many  different  EU member  states.  However,  a danger may be  that  a  conception of  a European  society  or public  is  created  that does not correspond to the heterogeneity of the public’s cultural and national con‐cerns  towards  emerging  technologies.  Nevertheless,  the  emphasis  on  a  single European  society  is  reiterated  in  recent  European  science  policy  documents (European Commission 2004a, 2005a, 2007c). Ethics,  too, has become  important in global politics of science and technology, suggesting that morality regarding sci‐ence and technology has a common global basis. For example,  the UNESCO alone operates  three  ethics  committees  on  science  and  technology:  the  International Bioethics Committee  (IBC),4  the  Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee  (IGBC),5 and the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST).6 The  increasing  institutionalization of such committees contributes to the assumption that values are tradable between cultures, and thus creates what Brian Salter has termed a “global moral economy” (Salter and Salter 2007). In my personal experiences and encounters with “ethics”, these ambivalences have also become visible. In a research project which is not part of this dissertation, we engaged with the question of informed consent—one of the core issues of ethics—at a hospital that used skin tissue remaining from plastic surgery in basic research. Since we had no experience with practices and routines  in hospitals hospital be‐fore  the  beginning  of  the  project,  much  of  our  knowledge  of  informed  consent came from ethicists’ accounts of the issue, as well as guidelines for the appropriate informed  consent  procedure.  What  was  surprising  was  the  distance  between bioethical  ideals  accounts  and what  happened  in  the  hospital  between  patients, researchers, doctors, administration and us as social scientists. How informed con‐sent was performed in these complex relations had not much to do with the way informed consent is framed in the ethical literature. While ethics frames this issues rather  narrowly,  as  a  problem  of  doctor‐patient  relations  often  based  on  a  few principles  such as  “autonomy” or  “benevolence”,  in  fact,  in  the moment of giving consent, there is much more at play than the rational provision of information and the  free  consent  of  patients.  In  our  interviews,  patients,  researchers  and  other 
                                                3  http://www.meetingmindseurope.org/europe_default_site.aspx?SGREF=14  (accessed  May 27, 2008).  4  http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php‐URL_ID=1879&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed May 27, 2008). 5  http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php‐URL_ID=1878&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed May 27, 2008). 6  http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php‐URL_ID=6193&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed May 27, 2008). 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hospital  professionals  accounted  for  the  possibilities  and  limits  of  trust  in  the medical  system  as  such,  the  way  research  is  entangled  with  the  production  of therapies that might be useful to patients, the imagined roles of patients as citizens in  this  system  and  so  forth  (Bister  et  al.  2009).  Much more  interestingly,  many ethicists seem fully aware of  this gap between theory and practice, but  it doesn’t make a difference  for  them in their professional engagement with the  issue. This has  to  do  with  the  meta‐ethical  assumption  that  what  “is”  cannot  inform  what “ought to be”. Ethics provides a normative vision of human relations which do not exist  and probably never will. Of  course, what ought  to be  cannot necessarily be justified by what is. However, the “is” could indicate the complexities of social rela‐tions, and thus should caution against simple normative recipes. For example, the very practice of informed consent in biomedical contexts follows textbook visions, and thus imposes a certain framework on both patients and doctors that they are unable to comply with in most of the cases. Thus,  informed consent presented it‐self to me as a “technology of disillusion”, where all parties involved never believe that the explicit content of informed consent is meant seriously. While ethics pro‐vides fixed solutions based on norms that guide the relationship between doctors and patients, it is open what the question actually is in the first place. Is “informed consent” the problem (and the solution), or are there other concerns that are much more important to all involved actors? The case of  informed consent hints at  the  fact  that ethics has become a powerful means of moral ordering in society, permeating society in more and more contexts but often bypassing “official” and democratic ways of rule‐making. While both eth‐ics  and  public  participation  could  be  powerful  instruments  to  challenge  estab‐lished regimes that govern science‐society relations, both have been incorporated into bureaucracy to a large degree. Despite the aim of both approaches to address the shortcomings of traditional regimes that emphasize the quasi‐natural authority of science to provide solutions to society’s problems, ethics and participation have been  treated  so  far  rather  separately.  Experts  in  institutionalized  bodies  handle ethics, in which the public has no voice, and where in most cases there is no trans‐parency.  Public  engagement,  on  the  other  hand,  at  least  rhetorically,  opens  up  a range of  legitimate experiences  that  could  contribute  to  a more  “socially  robust” decision‐making process. The question is, what happens if the public more directly engages with ethical issues? Will this fail, as ethicists sometimes suggest, because non‐professionals  in  ethics  are  not  able  to  provide  “reasoned”  accounts  of  their moral  judgments?  Or will  the  public  prove  to  be  better  “ethicists”  because  their ethical  judgments are based on experience? The answers, however, are—as I will show in this thesis—far more complex.  
1.2.   Empirical setting and research questions 
In  this  thesis  I will  address  the possibilities and  limits of discussing  “ethics”  in a participatory setting where ethical non‐experts—lay people and researchers from 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a genomics project—met in order to discuss ethical and social aspects of genomics as well as science and research in general.  I will argue that the participants were able to discuss ethical  issues  in an advanced way, but often by framing the prob‐lems  rather  differently  than  professional  ethicists would  do.  These  accounts  are not simply “other” than in “official ethics”, but respond in a particular way to exist‐ing regimes.  The data for this thesis stem from the research project Let’s talk about GOLD! Ana­
lyzing  the  interactions between genome­research(ers) and  the public  as a  learning 
process, carried out at the Department of Social Studies of Science at the University of Vienna.7 In this project we staged an experiment in public participation wherein citizens with different backgrounds met with researchers on a particular genomics research  project  for  six whole‐day  “Round  Table”  discussions where  ethical  and social aspects of (genome) research were discussed (see Chapter 6 for a more de‐tailed account of the setting). When designing the project, we assumed that a dif‐ferent  kind  of  ethical  debate would  take  place when  ethics  experts were  not  in‐volved.  Furthermore,  through  the  symmetrical  involvement  of  citizens  and  re‐searchers, not only would the public have the opportunity to “talk back to science”, but  researchers would  also  be  able  to  respond  directly  to  the  citizens  and  their concerns, as well as raise the own concerns.  Because “public participation in ethics” has rarely been done empirically and sel‐dom been addressed  in  social  science analysis,8  I will provide a broad picture of the  ethical debates  at  the Round Table discussions.  First,  I will  ask what kind of ethical  issues were  given  importance  by  the  participants.  As  such,  this  question relates to the context of ethics in wider society: On one hand, ethics often justifies expert authority over ethical issues by assuming that the public is ignorant of “rea‐soned  ethical  judgments”  and  “scientific  facts”  (Levitt  2003).  On  the  other  hand, “official ethics” is criticized because of its narrow framing of ethical issues and its ignorance of public concerns (Wynne 2001). Thus, the questions are, what ethical issues do the participants emphasize, and how are these issues framed? Second,  we  regarded  the  Round  Table much more  as  a  developing  process  and learning  setting  than a mechanism  to produce  certain outcomes—as  is  often  the case in a range of public engagement exercises. The discursive processes that take place  in  such settings are widely neglected both by policy makers—who are pri‐marily  interested  in  a  “digestible”  output—and  by  social  scientists  (Rowe  and Frewer 2000, 2004) evaluating such exercises (Harvey 2008). Thus, I will ask what kind of discursive processes are at work in the discussion around ethical issues of genomics,  and  science  and  technology  in  general.  As  ethics  sometimes  describes 
                                                7  Project  leader: Ulrike  Felt;  research  collaborators: Maximilian  Fochler,  Annina Müller  (De‐partment of Social Studies of Science), Sandra Karner, and Bernhard Wieser (IFZ Graz).  8  My colleagues Ulrike Felt, Maximilian Fochler, Annina Müller and I aimed to fill this gap in an article forthcoming in Public Understanding of Science (Felt et al. 2009). Only a few other ar‐ticle  have  also  engaged with  this  question,  see  Levitt  (2003)  and Banks,  Leach  Scully,  and Shakespeare (2006). 
 ‐ 13 ‐ 




As I will discuss  later,  the participants  in our setting did not  talk about ethics by explicitly using this term and referring to approaches and theories common in pro‐fessional  ethics.  Thus,  tracing  ethics  at  the Round Table  did  not  simply work  by importing definitions from this context. What is called “ethics” here by the partici‐pants often has little in common with the way the term is used by ethical experts. However, I decided to use the term “ethics” when making value‐based arguments because I understand “ethics” not only as an epistemological term used by a spe‐cific academic discipline, but also in its political dimension. Indeed, my use of the term  “ethics”  for  the discussion  at  the Round Table has  a  political  impetus,  as  it aims  to  pose  the  question  of  who  should  participate  in  the  definition  of  what counts as an “ethical” issue.  Following Thomas Gieryn (1999; 1995), the work of ethicists and their institutions can be seen as “boundary‐work” by attributing selected characteristics to what  it means to account  for ethics (being educated as ethicist;  forms of  institutionaliza‐tion and thus public legitimacy; methods used, etc.) (Kelly 2003). Through “bound‐ary‐work”,  ethics  is  segregated  from  other  societal  domains—for  example,  from the public ways of thinking about ethical issues, or from science as a domain con‐
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cerned with  the  fabrication  of  facts—and  thus  a  social  boundary  is  constructed that distinguishes professionalized ethics  from other  cultural  and  intellectual  ac‐tivities that are regarded as non‐ethics. The main feature of ethical boundary‐work is the constitution of the distinction between “ethics” and “morality”, which creates two separated spheres for dealing with value questions. The former is theoretically informed  and  said  to  be  rational,  systematic  and  reflective,  as  well  as  detached from  social  contexts;  the  latter  is  said  to  be  informed  by  social  experiences,  af‐fected by emotions, bound to the context in which it is produced and partly “irra‐tional”. This can frequently be observed in public discussions on highly controver‐sial  issues such as embryonic stem cell  research or euthanasia, where ethical ex‐perts criticize the debate as too emotional and call for a more informed and more rational debate. As  I do not want  to  re‐enact  cultural boundaries between ethics and  the  rest  of  society,  I  abandon  the  ethicists’  distinction  between  “ethics”  and “morality” for my analysis of the discussions at the Round Table, but keep in it well in mind as an actual practice by institutionalized ethics. This is crucial, as the par‐ticipants in the Round Table implicitly and explicitly re‐introduced this distinction by denying their own ability to engage in a “real” ethical debate.  While  institutionalized  ethics,  as  the  dominant  form  of  “ethics”  in  public  policy, implies  the  exclusion  of  a wide  range  of  actors  from  an  ethical  discourse  and  a rather top‐down definition and framing of what counts as an ethical issue, our aim in the project was to open up this question to a wider range of actors and allow for an alternative framing of ethical issues. A common objection of bioethicists to the inclusion of “the public” is that “normal” people only hold moral attitudes and do not reflect on and scrutinize the basis on which these attitudes are built. Although this may be true for particular “mechanisms of voicing” (Michael and Brown 2005) such as quantitative surveys,  the Round Table discussions demonstrated that  the participants were able to reflect critically on their own and others’ value assump‐tions. It is also true that the ethical discussion at the Round Table was not as “so‐phisticated” as academic ethical discussions; however, the question remains, who defines which arguments are  sophisticated and  theoretically  informed enough  to really be ethics? While institutionalized ethics frames issues rather narrowly (Evans 2002; Wynne 2001) by  a  given  set  of  predefined principles  and a particular way of  thinking,  I will strive for a more open meaning of ethics which seeks to take up how different actors—in my case the lay participants and the researchers—deal with value ques‐tions related to science and technology. In particular,  in order to get “bottom‐up” definitions, I will not assume a predefined way in which issues must be addressed to count as “ethics”. I will use a modest working definition of ethics as all negotia‐tions  on  values  that  allow  for  an  exploration  of  the  reasons why  the  participants 
have promoted these values, which provides insights into the underlying narratives that guide personal and collective opinion‐making. In many cases no single person provided  such  a  narratives;  hence,  I  will  focus  rather  on  discourses  between  the 
participants. By focusing on discourses and the distributed manufacture of ethical argumentation,  I  will  circumvent  an  objection  against  lay  participation  in  ethics 
 ‐ 15 ‐ 
that is raised by professional ethicists. Furthermore, I will also take into considera‐tion the discursive politics the participants employed when they talked about ethi‐cal  issues  as  an  important  dimension  of  an  ethical  discussion.  This  is,  however, contrary to the assumption of ethicists that the “best reasoned argument” will and should  prevail.  To  be  taken  “seriously”  in  a  public  discourse, much more  than  a rational argument is required. It is more the context than the argument itself that defines  the  “validity” and acceptability of a moral argument  (Jasanoff 2005, 171‐202; Fox and DeVries 1998; Fox and Swazey 1984).  
1.4.   Outline of the thesis 
I start by describing changes in the relationship between science and society along different aspects which are  the background  for  the  thesis’s main  theme of public participation in ethics (Chapter 2.1). I then analyze the notion of the responsibility of science and scientists, as “responsibility” has been one of  the main buzzwords that accompanies transformations in science‐society relations, and involves a new aspect of the governance of science (Chapter 2.2). In Chapter 3,  I describe public participation and ethics as  two approaches of sci‐ence governance  that aim  to address particular problems  in science‐society  rela‐tions. I focus first on the different narratives of public participation that have been high on the political agenda during recent years, and engage in particular with the kinds  of  conceptions  and  values  that  are  promoted  through  different  visions  of public participation (Chapter 3.1).  In Chapter 3.2,  I  turn  to ethics and  identify  its dominant form, which aims to manage value questions of science and technology. The dominance of a particular form of ethics that rests on the expertise of profes‐sionals  excludes  alternative  forms  of  addressing  the moral  questions  of  techno‐sciences, particularly  those present  in  citizens’  imaginations.  I  explain why more attention should be paid to researching lay ethics. I then describe some basic char‐acteristics  of  the  dominant  form of  ethics  and  its  political  context  (Chapter  3.3), and ask how ethics and public engagement can be brought together (Chapter 3.4).  As this dissertation engages with ethics empirically, I analyze other attempts to do so. Here, the field of “empirical ethics” is of particular relevance, and is discussed in Chapter  4.  I  analyze  the  basic  assumptions  of  empirical  ethics,  critically  engage with  it  from a social science perspective and aim to situate  it  in a wider political context. In order to contextualize the ethical debates of the Round Table, I draw on the Austrian discourses and institutional practices of public participation and eth‐ics in Chapter 5.  In Chapter 6, I engage with the methodological setting of the Round Table, and ex‐plain in more detail what assumptions were built into the empirical setting in or‐der to investigate how ethical lay deal with ethics beyond expert discourses. Fur‐thermore,  I  explain  how  I  analyzed  the  material  produced  at  the  Round  Table 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Currently, we  are witnessing wide debates  about  the  role  of  science/research  in society, with special emphasis placed on  “change” and  “transformation”.  In  these multilayered  debates,  concepts  that  are  presented  as  “new”  confront  visions  of science and research which are thought of as more traditional. As such, normative expectations and political visions meet with more realistic accounts of current sci‐entific practices, which make it difficult to sort things out in these debates. In this section, I will not engage with the question of whether the transformation from the traditional  conceptualization of what  science means  towards new  conceptualiza‐tions is “real” or is only due to political rhetoric. I will address this issue primarily as a passage of perspectives—that is, as changes in the way in we look at “scientific” knowledge production. Thus, the question is, what aspects, features and character‐istics of “science”—a term that is itself at stake in this debate—are emphasized in current discussions? What societal role is ascribed to science/research—which is an important feature of this debate, as the social role of science defines science as much  as  accounts  that  remain  purely  self‐referential.  However, when  looking  at the passage of perspectives of science/research, this does not mean that these nec‐essarily remain on the level of language while scientific practice goes on unaltered. The  new  imaginations  of  what  “science”  today  is  in  relation  to  society  provide powerful narratives and frames, which science policy on all levels—from suprana‐tional governance down to  the management of scientific  institutions—makes use of, and which thus also shape the “realities” of research practices. However, these links  and  impacts  are  less  causal  and  less  direct  than  often  imagined  by  science policy, and what these narratives actually do in research practices must not neces‐sarily be coherent with larger science policy concepts.  Why  do  I  engage  with  these  “changes”  and  “shifts”  in  our  views  on  sci‐ence/research,  particularly when  this  thesis  is  on  an  ethical  discussion  between lay participants and researchers in an engagement setting? Centrally, as addressed already  in  the  introduction,  public  engagement  and  ethics  are  two  different  and rather  new  ways  in  which  society  aims  to  deal  with  the  impacts  of  sci‐ence/research on society. However, participation and ethics are not only compen‐sation mechanisms for the consequences science/research have on society. On the contrary, both public engagement and ethics do something with science/research. For example, a new way of talking has to be appropriated by those in research who take care of science communication; research proposals have to anticipate ethical concerns  and  at  least  rhetorically  deal  with  them;  and,  often,  certain  research fields, such as human embryonic stem cells or GMOs, are avoided if public opinion does not seem to favor these issues. However, the question is if and how the new regimes of science in society penetrate what is thought to be the core of scientific practice—the work  in  the  laboratory.  A  second  reason  that  these  changing  con‐
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The  first  tension between mode 1 and 2  is on outcome vs. process. Mode 1 sci‐ence puts special emphasis on the outcome of research, while the production proc‐ess  often  remains  obscure  and  black‐boxed.  Typically,  the  focus  is  on  textbook knowledge and ready‐made facts that account for “science”. As the focus is on the outcome,  the knowledge  is purified of  its  local production  conditions  and  claims universal  validity.  The  other  perspective  on  “science”  highlights  its  procedural character, as research: Science is a special kind of craft that takes place at particu‐lar  sites.  It  needs  people,  instruments,  money,  buildings,  experiences  and much more, all of which must be brought together in a particular and carefully managed way, so that in the end, after long negotiations, a more or less stable “fact” is pro‐duced that the scientific community considers as true—at least for a certain time (Latour 1987). In mode 1 science, the social acceptability of true knowledge is not of importance. It makes no difference if the public acknowledges a scientific fact or not. While the provision of facts is still a major feature of science communication, for  example  in  the media,  there  is  also  increasing  interest  in  looking  behind  the closed doors of the laboratory, as the ideal‐typical site of knowledge production, in order to make more transparent what researchers actually do when they produce knowledge. This  renewed  interest  in  the process of knowledge production, how‐ever, is partly triggered by science policy, as it is hoped that trust in science can be (re‐)established by making science more transparent to the public.  Another difference between mode 1 and 2 science regards  the venue of science that  is prioritized.  In mode 1 science,  the place of  “scientific” knowledge produc‐tion is primarily academia, and, even more ideal‐typical, the university. For exam‐ple,  in Vannevar Bush’s seminal and influential report to the US president, which outlined  the US  research policy  for many  centuries  after  the  Second World War, Bush stated that “The responsibility for basic research in medicine and the under‐lying  sciences,  so essential  to progress  in  the war against disease,  falls primarily upon the medical schools and universities”  (Bush 1945).  It was clear  to him that the  “natural”  space of basic knowledge production was universities,  colleges and research  institutes.  Industry,  in  his  eyes,  only made  use  of  scientific  knowledge, and was not seen as a genuine space of scientific knowledge production. In mode 2 science, the contexts in which knowledge is produced are much more diverse. Sci‐entific knowledge production is not seen as limited to a particular domain, but can take place virtually everywhere. While the universities lose their monopoly in pro‐ducing  “scientific” knowledge,  they  still  have a dominant  role  in mode 2  science. However,  universities  have  to  change  their  roles  accordingly,  through  different forms  of  cooperation with  non‐academic  institutions  such  as  industry.  Clear  de‐marcations  between  inside  and  outside  become  blurred  (Nowotny,  Scott,  and 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Gibbons 2001). Another change of perspective with regard to the question where science  takes place  comes  from  the notion of Realexperimente. These are  experi‐ments  that  leave  the  laboratory and are carried out  in  “society”. Realexperimente intermingle  intervention  and  knowledge  production.  Thus,  in mode  2  the  tradi‐tional innovation regime, from laboratory experiments to field tests to societal ap‐plication,  is  shortcut  as  the  laboratory  is  expanded  to  the  whole  society  (Groß, Hoffmann‐Riem, and Krohn 2005).  The  innovation  regimes  between mode  1  and  2  science  differ  in  several ways. The innovation concept of mode 1 science rests on a strict separation between “ba‐sic  science”  and  application.  For  the  outline  of  the mode 1  innovation  concept,  I will refer to the already classic account of Robert K. Merton. He wrote his analysis of the social and normative order of science during the approach of World War II and the rise of the racial politics of Nazi Germany, where he observed that scien‐tific significance was subordinated to the utility of knowledge, “with its deprecia‐tion of the theorist and its glorification of the man of action” (Merton 1938, 323). He observed anti‐science movements that only valued “beneficial” applications and devalued knowledge production for its own sake. However, he argued that what he called  “pure  science”  was  an  important  source  of  societal  advancement.  He  re‐garded knowledge production for its own sake not as a dispensable cultural activ‐ity, but rather as the absolute necessary condition for the possibility of later tech‐nological applications, because “[e]xperience has shown that the most esoteric re‐searches have found important applications” (Merton 1938, 324). In a similar fash‐ion, Vannevar Bush argues  that  “Basic  research  is  performed without  thought of practical ends”; however, It creates the fund from which the practical applications of knowledge must be drawn. New products and new processes do not appear full‐grown. They are  founded  on  new  principles  and  new  conceptions,  which  in  turn  are painstakingly developed by research  in  the purest  realms of  science.  (Bush 1945) Bush and other relevant actors established a linear model of innovation by linking applied research with basic science and introducing the concept of innovation as a linear flow: Basic science provides a pool of knowledge, concepts and ideas, which are taken up by applied research by working on a concrete “solution”, and which are  then  further exploited  in development  for commercial use and societal diffu‐sion. This model was a  commonly  shared  fiction  (Godin 2006), which  serves  the interest of basic researchers as it attributes social meaning to their way of knowl‐edge production without contesting the researchers’ authority and autonomy over their domain. The claim behind the importance of “basic science” in the innovation process is that it is so useful because of its rather strict renunciation of applications and technologies.  The  perspective  of mode  2  science  on  innovation  is  a  different  one,  as  the  clear distinction  between  basic  knowledge  production  and  successive  steps  towards application is given up in favor of a more integrated innovation model. In this, the 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context of application is present from the very beginning—in fact it is seen as the main driving  force  that  initiates  the research process, and knowledge  is not pro‐duced until all interests are accounted for. Thus, knowledge in mode 2 is produced in  the  context  of  application  (Gibbons 1994; Nowotny,  Scott,  and Gibbons 2001). Research in mode 2 always has an agenda towards society, and must be “market‐able” in some way (to industry, governments or defined user groups). In particular, research and economy are seen as more integrated in mode 2 science. It is not only that research has to adapt itself to a market; the economy must also be more ori‐ented  towards  “knowledge”  and  research.  This  is  suggested  in  the  EU’s  Lisbon Agenda by the concept of the “knowledge‐based economy” (Godin 2003) which has developed further, becoming a “knowledge‐driven economy”, “emphasizing the fact that  the  current  contribution  of  knowledge  is  very much  as  the  dynamo  of  our economy” (European Commission 2004b, 5). While the  linear model  is seen as  in need of change towards an integrated model of innovation, the question is who is integrated in the innovation process, and under which conditions; and who is ex‐cluded from this process? The  two  modes  of  knowledge  production  also  have  different  stances  regarding 
uncertainty. In mode 1, scientific knowledge production is seen as a remedy and panacea  for all kinds of uncertainties  that are “externally”  imposed on society or caused  by  it.  Within  this  regime  of  uncertainty,  science  is  seen  to  “insure  our health, prosperity, and security as a nation in the modern world” within the overall narrative of progress (Bush 1945). While this citation of Bush’s Science—The End­
less Frontier of 1945 suggests that this is an outdated narrative which was valid in historical  times,  the  idea  that  science  as  innovation  is  the  appropriate means  to address  social  uncertainty  is  still  frequently  encountered  in  strategic  papers  on science  policy  (see  for  example  Rat  für  Forschung  und  Technologieentwicklung 2001). Especially in the Austrian context, but also on the European level, R&D and innovation are only marginally identified as a source of uncertainty but rather as its remedies.  In mode 2 science, uncertainty is a narrative to describe the overall state of society (Beck 1992) and is not limited to society as distinct from science. Much more, “science” is regarded as a central source of uncertainty. For example, while  Chernobyl,  BSE  and  GMOs  still  represent  a  very  small  proportion  of  “sci‐ence”, these perceived crises have contributed to an increase the general sense of uncertainty related to science and technology, and facilitated skeptical and critical positions  towards  technosciences  and  scientific  expertise.  Hence,  it  is  concluded that  the management of uncertainties must not be  left  to scientists alone; rather, new social  innovations are needed to enable individuals and groups to cope with the uncertainties which  are  expected  to  arise  in mode 2  society  (Nowotny,  Scott, and Gibbons 2001; Gibbons 2000). However, uncertainty is not a state society can overcome;  the  tendency  towards uncertainty and complexity  is  regarded as  irre‐versible.  Mode 2 knowledge production, then, does not simply mean that science is or must be rethought, but also that society has undergone changes towards a mode 2 soci‐ety.  Both  science  and  society  are not  thought  of  in  separated  categories,  but  are 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“transgressive” (Nowotny 2000; Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001). Thus, mode 1 and 2 science and society imply different conceptions of citizens and the public. As this is discussed in a later section (see chapter 3.1.), I will be brief here. In mode 1 science, because of its exclusive authority to speak truth to society, the public is seen as being constantly in need of “proper” education, that is, in a “deficit” of ade‐quate information. For example in Merton’s (1973) concept of science, because of the complexities of research, scientific theories seem “esoteric” to lay people. Thus, Merton  imputed  the  tendency  to  follow totalitarian spokespersons  to  the people, as they are seducible by the more common‐sense explanations of political ideolo‐gies. In the mode 1 imagination of citizenship, the public is not seen as having its own capacity to deal with science in a rational way. In mode 2 science and society, the public is on the one hand regarded as capable of dealing with science and tech‐nology (even if they are “ignorant”, see Michael 1996) in a reasonable way based on  their  experiences with  science,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  lay  are  discovered  as valuable resources of a kind of knowledge that contributes to a greater social ro‐bustness of scientific knowledge (Epstein 1995). The transgressive nature of mode 2  knowledge  production  is  demonstrated  by  its  transdisciplinary  character,  in which society participates in the production process (Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001).  Citizens  have  the  chance,  or  even  the  responsibility,  to  participate  in  the production, implementation and governance of knowledge, and thus contribute to a more “socially robust” knowledge. However, modes 1 and 2 each have their own normative visions of how citizens should deal with science/research.  Further differences in the perspectives on “science” in mode 1 and mode 2 can be identified in the moral governance of science, that is, what values are employed to govern individual scientists, the scientific community and relations with society. Mode  1  science  is  concerned  nearly  exclusively  with  ethical  self‐regulation  that does not consider outside moral values. The seminal example  for this moral gov‐ernance of science is the scientific ethos as described by Merton (1973). In his so‐ciological analysis, Merton provided four norms which are internally shared by the community  and  which  guide  the  behavior  of  researchers.  These  norms  are:  (1) universalism: science has an impersonal character because validity claims of scien‐tific knowledge do not depend on individual and social characters of its advocates. Thus,  science  demands  access  to  research  beyond  race  and  class  thinking.  (2) Communism:  science  is  seen  as  a  collaborative  endeavor,  and  knowledge  is  re‐garded  as  public  domain.  Scientists  can  claim  symbolic  acknowledgement  of  the efforts, but not ownership of financial rewards. The norm of communism also de‐mands  open  access  to  all  knowledge.  (3)  Disinterestedness:  the  quest  for  new knowledge does not rest on individual interests. (4) Finally, organized skepticism: the  “enlightenment”‐function  of  science.  This  methodological  as  well  as  institu‐tional command requires that the scientific community question claims on the ba‐sis of shared methods. The ethos as such  is concerned with the question of what ethical principles scientists (should) follow in order to ensure that true knowledge prevails and is not compromised by personal attributes of the scientists involved. The ethos, however, is not concerned with what happens with knowledge in socie‐
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tal  contexts  and how  it  is  possibly  (mis)used  there. Hence,  responsibility  is  only attributed to the knowledge production itself and not to the societal consequences of this knowledge. In mode 2 science, moral governance is more broadly conceptu‐alized. In particular, the institutionalization of ethics (discussed in a later chapter) on  many  different  levels  reflects  that  an  ethos  that  ensures  the  objectivity  of knowledge does not suffice. In mode 2, knowledge must not only be “true”, it also must not violate existing societal moral norms, either in the production of knowl‐edge (animal experiments, the use of embryos in research, etc.) or in its  later ap‐plication (reproductive human cloning, etc.). To account for this changed perspec‐tive, a wide range of  institutions that consider both social  interests and scientific standards  in  the moral governance of science are created. Additionally, scientists are  themselves  “responsibilized”  to  critically engage with  societal values and  the consequences their knowledge might bear. Thus, in mode 2 science, responsibility is much more socially distributed between science and society. A clear division of moral labor is not foreseen in mode 2, while in mode 1 scientists only have to fol‐low the scientific ethos while society is concerned with coping with the ethical im‐plications  that  emerge  from  technologically  applied  knowledge.  The  emphasis  of “basic research” in mode 1 knowledge production, and the clear demarcation from applied knowledge,  imply  that  responsibility  for  technological application can be attributed to “society”. As mode 2 claims a transdisciplinary and thus more socially inclusive  way  of  knowledge  production,  research  has  to  be  socially  accountable from the start. However, what does it mean that “society” is better represented in mode 2 knowledge production? While science increasingly makes reference to “so‐ciety” to legitimate research, in most of the cases only a few interests are actually represented. This raises serious questions of power and hierarchy with regard to who can be represented when scientists aim to be “social accountable” (Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001). Often, economic interests are better “represented” than wider public concerns of groups that lack the ability of being heard.  In  mode  1  and  2,  different models  of  success  and  failure  apply,  and  thus  the means of constructing, assessing, justifying and managing “quality” differ. In mode 1 science, the most important criterion for quality is acknowledgement by the sci‐entific community  for  instance  in peer review. The assumption  is  that only peers have the appropriate expertise to allow for an assessment of the quality of a scien‐tific  contribution.  “Success”  means  having  a  number  of  recognized  publications that  have  been  approved  by  the  community  as  contributing  new  insights  to  the already  existing  body  of  scientific  knowledge.  In mode  2  knowledge  production, models of success and failure often become far more complex and even contradic‐tory. While peer review remains a relevant criterion—for example with the talk of “scientific excellence” that has become seminal over recent years—the knowledge produced must also be “socially accepted” and “socially robust” in the context of its application. Hence, not only “peers” decide on the success and failure of a contribu‐tion, but also a range of other stakeholders that follow different rationales. For ex‐ample,  “successful”  research  is  increasingly  required  to  communicate  with  the public or produce marketable products. One can be quite successful with regard to 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these two aspects without gaining acknowledgement by the scientific community in  the peer review processes. Moreover, success  in  the media and  in public com‐munication is sometimes regarded as negative for the scientific credibility of a re‐searcher (Weingart and Pansegrau 1999). The same holds for those who are per‐ceived to sell out science to commercial interests. On the other hand, particularly in biology, relations with  industry are crucial  in order  to acquire  funding. Hence, researchers are required to balance carefully between selling themselves and sell‐ing themselves out.  As models of success and failure are different between mode 1 and 2, so is the oc­
cupational image researchers have. The perspective of mode 1 emphasizes doing research  as  a  vocation,  while  in  the mode  2  perspective,  conducting  research  is regarded  as  a  profession.  The  tendency  towards  science  as  a  profession  can  be traced in the increasing orientation of university curricula towards labor markets and not only towards the production of academic scientists or intellectuals. Hence, in mode 2, career perspectives are regarded as much more heterogeneous and di‐verse,  while  mode  1  has  a  rather  restricted  idea  of  career  trajectories,  namely those of academic scientists. Of course, there are huge cultural differences in what is  regarded as  the  ideal model of a  scientific  career,  as Max Weber already men‐tioned (Weber 1995); however,  there are shared codes within cultures  for  ideal‐typical career patterns. This, however, does not suggest that in a mode 2 perspec‐tive career trajectories are less normative than in mode 1. The “inward calling for science”, as Max Weber termed it, is a narrative that has become less desirable and rewarding in a mode 2 environment. The places where science can be practiced as a profession have diversified, which is both an opportunity for researchers to real‐ize individual careers and also an imposition, as “flexibility” is required, as a new norm, in order to be able to switch between different work environments. Thus, a range of additional abilities have to be learned by researchers. It does not suffice to be  excellent  at  the  bench;  researchers  are  expected  to  appropriate  managerial abilities,  as  “excellent”  researchers  are  expected  to  assume  leading  positions.  In mode 2, researchers have to reconcile diverse or even contradictory demands, for example,  being  both  an  “excellent”  researcher  and  a  charismatic  manager.  Re‐searchers  have  to  become  “entrepreneurial  scientists”  (Etzkowitz  1998;  see  also Latour 1996).  The  relation  between  mode  1  and  2  knowledge  production  is  often  seen  as  a change and transition from mode 1 towards mode 2 knowledge production, imply‐ing a historical order. A series of authors have described the transition processes and  the emergence of a new kind of knowledge production with different  labels. For  example,  Silvio  Funtowicz  and  Jerome  Ravetz  described  the  emergence  of  a 
post­normal science that no longer ensures certainty but rather has to manage un‐certainty (Ravetz 1999; Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). Bruno Latour (1998) argues that we have  two distinct  traditions of  accounting  for  science/research,  and  that we currently witness a transition process from the culture of science—to which he attributes certainty, being cold, straight and detached, and objectivity—towards a 
culture of research—which stands for uncertainty, being warm, involving and risky. 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His argument is that the old culture of science can no longer be upheld. John Ziman claims  that we are witnessing a  transition  from academic  towards post­academic 
science (Ziman 1998, 2003). Hence, besides Nowotny and co‐authors and the con‐cept  of  “mode  2  knowledge  production”,  there  is  a  series  of  other  authors  who claim  that  science  is  undergoing  fundamental  changes  in  the  way  “scientific” knowledge is produced.  As the number of advocates for a mode 2 knowledge production is large, so is the number  of  its  critics.  Their  main  argument  is  that  the  assumed  “change”  and “transformation”  takes place only at a rhetorical  level while existing “real” struc‐tures of how science operates are barely touched by these changes—and, if at all, only in a small segment of science. For example, Lenhard et al. (2006) argue that the demand for transdisciplinary knowledge production does not weaken discipli‐nary  structures  in  science.  Transdisciplinary  research  fields  are  seen  as  only emerging  in  “policy‐related”  fields such as Technology Assessment or climate re‐search. While research projects appear transdisciplinary to the outside, they main‐tain  disciplinary  boundaries  within  the  internal  organization  (Weingart  1997, 1999);  hence,  being  “transdisciplinary”  is  primarily  a  political  stance  to  attract funding.  Another critique of mode 2 is that it is not clear about its writing impetus; that is, do they provide a “realistic” description or a normative program? Terry Shinn ar‐gues that mode 2 advocates “work actively in its favour and seek to persuade oth‐ers to think likewise” (Shinn 2002, 604), and,  in particular,  that The New Produc­
tion of Knowledge, by Gibbons et al., (1994) “can be likened to political manifestos, whose expository  form  is  rhetoric”  (Shinn 2002, 610). Benoît Godin  (1998, 467) states  that  this  text  “is  first and  foremost a political plea, mixing descriptive and normative perspectives”. He concludes that mode 2  is a “performative discourse” with which  it  is  too easy  to criticize  the  “old”  system with  the claims of  the new modes of knowledge production that can easily be translated into normative poli‐cies. While I agree that the  idea of change, as well as the assertion of newness of certain elements of mode 2,  is exaggerated, particularly  in  the work of Nowotny, Gibbons and co‐authors, to locate mode 2 only on a rhetorical level while the “real” processes go on unaltered falls short and underestimates the potential of “talk” to change practices in research. Mode 2 provides a set of norms which—taking each element alone—are of course not new. But in sum, they provide a convincing pro‐gram  that  is  subsequently  implemented by  science policy. Thus, mode 2  is not  a description  of what  contemporary  knowledge production  is  “really”  about,  but  a rhetorical  device  through  which  decision  makers  in  science  policy  increasingly learn to see science/research. This does not necessarily mean that institutions and researchers mechanically  incorporate  these  norms  and  act  accordingly,  but  that these perspectives are  subject  to a wide  range of  translation processes  that may ultimately  trigger  changes  in  the  practices  of  scientists.  On  the  other  hand,  they may only adapt  to  the  rhetoric, using  it  as an additional  resource  to  justify what they are doing. 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Empirically, based on our experiences in the “Let’s talk about GOLD!” project, the researchers  did  not  follow  one  particular mode  of  knowledge  production. What “mode” they employed was highly dependent on the actual context of the discus‐sion. When  the  issue was responsibility  for  the outcomes of  the research,  for ex‐ample, the researchers tended towards the “pure science for its own sake” narra‐tive in order to deflect ethical objections that might come from society. When the issue  was  on  the  legitimacy  of  public  funding,  the  researchers  often  employed mode 2 arguments that hint at the potential societal utility of their knowledge. Dif‐ferent  researchers  held  different  priorities,  but  one  particular  researcher  could also easily subscribe to both narratives. The same holds  for the evaluation of  the new forms of knowledge production: In particular, the more established research‐ers made a clear plea for mode 1 science, and regarded it as an ideal form of doing research. However, they did not hesitate to employ arguments that are attributed to mode 2 if they were urged to legitimate their research. The way the researchers at the Round Table accounted for “science” raises some question regarding mode 2. In particular, it is difficult to ascribe a particular chronology to different modes of knowledge production,  that  is,  to say that mode 1 precedes mode 2. Both per‐spectives  on  scientific  knowledge  production  may  be  present  simultaneously. Rather than one replacing the other, different narratives of knowledge production were important resources for the researchers to legitimate their research to soci‐ety, as well as to their own community and to themselves. Another characteristic is that  the norm of mode 2 does not determine how these norms actually  translate into  practice.  For  example,  the  new  production  of  knowledge  holds  “social  ac‐countability” as a key  feature. My claim  is  that  science  today  is more socially ac‐countable by virtue of being more aware that “accountability”, “responsibility” and “reflexivity” are  important societal narratives towards which researchers have to position themselves in some way. However, there is a wide spectrum of ways for researchers to meet these demands. They may be met by giving up certain meth‐ods in animal experimentation. Or they may be met by ticking boxes in forms for ethics committees during  the proposal phase of  the research and  then  forgetting about it. Hence, it is—seen from a macro perspective—impossible to decide if re‐searchers really have become more “reflexive” or if they have learned to respond to society in the language that is expected from them. Like “transparency” (Power 1994), “social accountability” has become an ambivalent term.  That the line between mode 1 and mode 2 knowledge is not as clear as some litera‐ture suggests can be observed not only in the particular engagement setting which was the basis for our research project, but also in research policy. A seminal exam‐ple is the recent invention of frontier research in European research policy. This concept was introduced in 2005 by a report that sought to outline future research policy in the European Research Area, and is one of the key concepts of the Euro‐pean Research Council (ERC), a newly founded institution that funds research un‐der the Seventh Framework Programme. The key feature of the ERC is that the EU now supports bottom‐up research that hitherto has been solely under the author‐ity of the member states. Frontier research takes up the two perspectives—mode 1 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and mode 2—and aims to merge them into a single narrative. On one hand, fron‐tier research takes up the notion of “basic research”; that is, it “stands at the fore‐front of creating new knowledge and developing new understanding”, and possibly “achieving the occasional revolutionary breakthrough that completely changes our knowledge of the world”. On the other hand, the “traditional distinction” between basic and applied research is abandoned: “With frontier research researchers may well be concerned with both new knowledge about the world and with generating potentially useful knowledge at the same time” (European Commission 2005a, 18).  The question  is whether  the  label  of  “frontier  research”  is  a  rhetorical means  to “sell” basic science to society by connecting it to its potential utility for technologi‐cal development, or whether it is an attempt to import values that come from “ap‐plied  science”  into basic  research,  and  thus  to  redefine basic  research. However, interestingly,  frontier  research  seeks  to  reconcile  different  notions  of  research rather than to replace one with the other.  In my opinion,  the creation of  the ERC and its notion of frontier research further suggests that mode 1 and mode 2 cannot be ordered along a chronological timeline, but describe two distinct perspectives—each with its own politics—which are deployed depending on the context . What is also interesting is that, with the introduction of “frontier research”, a dis‐cussion has been started within European policy that has not arisen explicitly be‐fore.  In prior European policy discourses on “science and/in society”, no attempt was  made  to  define  “science”  in  a  detailed  way;  “science”  and  “research”  were mainly used in a generic sense, and their meanings were taken for granted. How‐ever, the introduction of the term “frontier research”, along with changed funding practices,  introduced  a  new  debate  into  the  European  policy  discourse;  that  is, about  the distinction between “basic science” and “applied science”, and thus the relation between “knowledge for its own sake” or as “cultural good” and the orien‐tation towards the applicability and marketability of knowledge. The advocates are fully aware of this problem, as they hope to bypass it by the use of the term “fron‐tier  research”.  In a way,  “frontier  research”  is used  to shortcut wide‐ranging and long debates between “basic research” and “applied research” which have charac‐terized post‐war  science and which  science policy was not  able  to  reconcile  in  a sufficient way.  Frontier  research  also  aims  to  compensate  for  the  supposed  shortcomings  of European innovation policy, the so‐called “European paradox”. This is the assump‐tion that EU countries play a leading role in terms of “excellent” scientific output, while lagging behind the ability to use scientific knowledge for industrial exploita‐tion compared to the US (Dosi, Llerena, and Labini 2006). While seeking to recon‐cile  economic  and  scientific  demands,  the  question  is  how  this may  happen,  be‐yond fashionable labels. On one hand, it  is claimed that research must be socially and economic relevant. On the other hand, ERC only funds research that is “based exclusively on scientific excellence” … “The pursuit of excellence needs an autono‐mous  space, where  curiosity  is  the  driving  force,  pursued  by  individual  creative minds” (Nowotny 2006). As between mode 1 and mode 2, there are different mod‐
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els of  success and  failure  that come  together  in  the notion of  “frontier  research”. What might  be  successful  and  excellent  research  in  purely  “scientific”  terms—a number of highly‐rated publications—does not sufficiently provide the grounds for technological and economic success on the market. However, such differences are neglected in the paradigm of “frontier research”, and the question is what alterna‐tive rationales will be used in the evaluation of frontier research in the future.  There  is a  long  learned  tradition of having at  least  two different perspectives on research, which we have learned to regard as opposing. The latest attempt by the ERC  to  reconcile  these different  visions by  introducing  the notion of  frontier  re‐search  neglects  that  behind  these  different  perspectives  on  research  are  diverse social interests which are not easy to reconcile. In recent years, increased attention has been paid to knowledge production that transgresses the notion of “basic re‐search”; however, this does not necessarily mean that mode 2 knowledge produc‐tion has replaced (or will  replace)  “science”  in  its  classical  sense. The ERC presi‐dent, Fotis C. Kafatos, argued that “frontier research” is needed because “this is an essential  part  of  our  civilisation”  and  culture,  and  it  is  “a matter  of  competitive‐ness” (Kafatos 2007). Here, two notions of what science is—a cultural good and an economic  resource—are brought  together  in  the notion of  “frontier  research” by not even acknowledging  that  these  two notions have been a source of  conflict  in many instances. The most problematic feature of frontier research is that “social” interests seem to be equated with economic  interests. However,  it  remains  to be seen  if  the European vision of  “society”  in  the  idea of  “frontier research”  is  suffi‐ciently accounted for. There may be alternative visions of “research in society” that have a different vision of a socially accountable research, beyond its economic im‐petus.  These  contain  enough  potential  to  produce  wide‐ranging  conflicts  in  the European Union. It also remains to be seen if new models, such as the recently em‐ployed  “frontier  research”,  which  is  high  on  the  political  agenda  throughout Europe,  are  able  to  account  for  “research  in  society”.  The  question  is whether  it provides  a  new  quality  of  research  practice  that  is  able  to  absorb  the  “speaking back of society”. Currently, only a few voices of “society” seem to be heard, in par‐ticular those of industry and economy.   
2.2.   Making science “responsible”: The moral govern­
ance of research  
“Responsibility” has become one of the key buzzwords coined by science policy to describe  and  enforce  transformations  in  science‐society  relations.  I  will  engage with this concept for two reasons: First, with “responsibility”, science‐society rela‐tions  are  problematized,  and  thus  the  transformation  of  the  perspectives  from mode 1 to mode 2, or, put differently,  from “science” to “research”, are further il‐luminated (Latour 1998). Second, for the participants at the Round Table, the issue of responsibility was a prime token to debate science‐society relations by putting 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forward mutual expectations, hopes and concerns. The term is flexible and vague enough to absorb a multitude of different meanings.  Theoretically, the term refers to a shift in governance regimes that seeks to move top‐down regulation of science towards an uncoerced commitment of science with regard  to  societal  values  and  interests  that  are  not  codified by  legal  regulations. Nikolas  Rose  (1999b)  has  described  techniques  of  “responsibilization”  as  a  key feature of advanced liberal democracies in general—thus, the call for responsibil‐ity  is not a particular  feature of science policy as such. Rose argues  that with re‐sponsibilization  “Politics  is  to  be  returned  to  citizens  themselves,  in  the  form  of individual morality and community responsibility” (Rose 1999a, 11). Responsibil‐ity as  “moral governance” aims  to  “replace  top‐down regulation and  juridical  ac‐countability” (Shamir 2008, 13), and implies that social actors are expected to as‐sume a reflexive moral capacity that goes beyond mere compliance with legal rules and “presupposes one’s care  for one’s duties and one’s un‐coerced application of certain values as a root motivation for action” (Shamir 2008, 7). Hence, the call for science to be more responsible transcends the legal liability that is superimposed by  state  policy,  and  seeks  to  cause  collectives  to  develop  internal  and  informal codes of conduct that govern their relation to society in terms of a collective wel‐fare.  However, the call for more responsibility in and of science must not be understood in purely moral  or  ethical  terms, but  as  “ethopolitics” which  “works  through  the values, beliefs, and sentiments thought to underpin the techniques of responsible self‐government and the management of one’s obligations to others” (Rose 2000). The demand that science has to act more responsibly towards society goes beyond the ethicization of science, that is, making scientific research subject to ethical con‐cerns.  Responsibilization  has  a  clear  political  goal  of making  communities.  With regard  to  science,  one  can  observe  a  transformed  perception  from  science  as  a “system” with certain “functions” in society (producing true knowledge, for exam‐ple  in  Luhmann’s  system  theory  (Luhmann  1992)  towards  a  “community”  with “responsibilities” towards an imaged collective (society) that shares the same val‐ues. In ethopolitics, a simple orientation along the code true/false is replaced by a concept of science as a citizen in civil society (Irwin 1995).  An  important  feature of  the responsibilization process  is  that  the current call  for responsibility goes beyond the notion of being penalized if negative consequences for  society  occur.  This  is  typically  the  scheme  of  science  understood  as mode  1: The question is whether or not science can be held responsible for producing cer‐tain knowledge that may have harmful  impacts on society when turned  into tech­
nologies. Of  course,  this  scheme  is  still present  in  contemporary narratives—and also in the accounts of the participants at the Round Table (see chapter 8.2). How‐ever, responsibility has been recast as a “positive” concept that seeks to align the interests of science with societal values. Hence, “responsibility” is a genuine politi‐
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cal term that creates science as a civil “community” where “responsibilization” and “communitization”9 go hand in hand.  This shift in the understanding of “responsibility” can be traced, for example, in the 2001 Eurobarometer10 (European Commission 2001a)—a regular survey commis‐sioned by the EU which aims to measure Europeans’ attitudes towards diverse as‐pects of European policy—where people were asked whether scientists were re‐sponsible for the potential negative consequences of their research. The question was asked in two different ways: First,  “As members of society, scientists share  in the  responsibility  of  any  use—whether  good  or  bad—of  their  discoveries”  (em‐phasis added). The other version was: “Scientists are responsible for the misuse of their discoveries by others” (emphasis added). While the respondents were unde‐cided  about  the  second  statement,  nearly  70%  agreed with  the  first.  The  agree‐ment of more than two‐thirds of the respondents with the first statement could be interpreted  to mean  that  scientists  are  regarded  as  citizens who  should  “share” responsibilities with other members of society. The second statement, which high‐lights a more direct  and  individualistic version of  responsibility,  found  fewer ac‐ceptances. However, “responsibility” was regarded as both an individual and a col‐lective issue.  The inclusion of the topic in Eurobarometer, as well as the emphasis on social re‐sponsibility in other EU policy documents, shows that it has become an important science policy issue, particularly on the European level. For example the EU’s Sci­
ence and Society Action Plan states that “Because of their knowledge, researchers, research organizations and industry now have a particular responsibility vis‐à‐vis society  in  terms of providing scientific and technological  information to Europe’s citizens”  (European  Commission  2002,  11).  Science  is  no  longer  regarded  as  an unproblematic field of knowledge production, but has become subject of a range of ethical and social concerns which include not only the products of science but also the very methods of conducting research. The question of the social responsibility of  science  and  scientists  can  be  read  as manifestations  of more  general  (public) concerns regarding the relations between science and society. One place in research were we can witness responsibilization is the emergence of the  language  of  (social)  responsibility within  codes  of  conduct  for  research  that hitherto have been dominated by science‐internal norms that mostly ignored rela‐tions to the wider societal environment in which research takes place.11 “Good sci‐
                                                9  But  note  that  “communitization”  here  has  a  different meaning  than  in  EU  speech,  namely, political means to make “communities” with certain rights and duties.  10  The Eurobarometer surveys have been  carried out by  the EU  since  the 1970s.  Science  and technology were subject to a series of Special Eurobarometer surveys. For more detailed in‐formation,  see  http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm.  The  Eurobarometer  re‐ports can be downloaded at http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/  11   For example, the German fraud case of the physicist Jan Henrik Schön (see, for example, Felt 2005), where the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) (1998) reacted with recommenda‐tions  for  good  scientific  practice.  These  codes  of  conduct,  however,  defined  responsibility only as  internal norms and did not  relate  the conduct of  scientists  to  their  responsibilities towards society. 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entific practice” is now often seen not only as a prerequisite to scientific progress but also as a precondition for a trustworthy relationship with society.12 Scientific misconduct is seen as violating a responsibility towards society,13 and thus as en‐dangering a fragile trust relationship between science and society. While  in  codes  of  conduct  the  compliance with  internal  scientific  norms  itself  is seen  as  a  way  to  act  responsible  towards  society,  the  European  Charter  for  Re­
searchers  issued  by  the  European  Commission  requires more  direct  feedback  to society in the conduct of research. Under the heading of “Professional responsibil‐ity”,  the charter states that “Researchers should make every effort  to ensure that their research  is relevant  to society”  (European Commission 2005b, 11, emphasis added).  The  charter  no  longer  regards  research  as  a  self‐legitimizing  activity  of basic knowledge production, i.e., of “science”, but rather as an enterprise which has to align its activities with societal demands and interests. The Charter further re‐minds  researchers  that  they  are  accountable  not  only  to  those who  provide  the financial means but to the whole society: “Researchers need to be aware that they are accountable  towards  their  employers,  funders or other  related public or pri‐vate  bodies  as  well  as,  on  more  ethical  grounds,  towards  society  as  a  whole” (European Commission 2005b, 13). However, one could argue that the orientation towards societal relevance is an intervention in the autonomy of research to define research  subjects.  Though,  in  another  EU  report  entitled Codes  of  conduct.  Stan­
dards  for  ethics  in  research,  the  author  emphasizes  the  need  for more  social  re‐sponsibility by scientists  in order  to re‐establish a more stable  trust  relationship between science and society, increasing the autonomy and authority of science:  It seems to me that scientists’ acceptance of social responsibility … can serve to increase their power and support their autonomy. To the extent that a re‐lationship of mutual dependence exists between science and society, science benefits from accepting accountability and the need to contribute, e.g. by re‐ceiving in return increased political,  financial, and public support and trust. The  latter  strengthens  science  and  increases  its  capacity  for  autonomous pursuits. Lack of support and—not least—lack of trust could be correspond‐ingly harmful. (Evers 2003, 15) “Social  responsibility”  is  related  to  the  establishment  of  a  trust  relationship  be‐tween science and society. Public trust in science is seen as a prerequisite for con‐ducting  research  in  contemporary  society,  and  thus  the  enactment  of  social  re‐sponsibility by science establishes a new kind of trust relationship.  The new  language of  responsibility  that  increasingly becomes an  integral part of the  descriptions  and  accounts  of  how  science  and  research  (should) work,  how‐ever, creates great challenges for those who have to practice responsibility in con‐crete situations. Research still faces an increasing differentiation of disciplines and sub‐fields, so that “Individual scientists  increasingly  ‘know more and more about less and less,’ and thus can hardly foresee the consequences of their discoveries for 
                                                12  Principles for good scientific practice, Universität für Bodenkultur (2004). 13  Principles for good scientific practice, Karl‐Franzens‐Universität Graz (2004). 
 ‐ 32 ‐ 
related fields, let alone the possible applications that could result from interactions with  other  fields”  (von  Schomberg  2007,  6).  The  particularization  of  the  knowl‐edge production process makes it difficult for researchers to see the “big picture”, that  is,  the overall  societal development  to which  the  respective knowledge  con‐tributes. In a similar fashion, the International Council of Science14 states:  Knowledge and awareness about the consequences of scientific and techno‐logical development are now widely distributed in society. Scientists have no monopoly on evaluating the ethical implications of their work. Nor do scien‐tists  necessarily  have  the  knowledge  or  capacity  to  forecast  the  full  social implications  of  innovation.  Given  the  distributed  character  of  expertise  on science and society, where does the social responsibility of science end, and what is the role of other actors in assessing the impacts and consequences of scientific and technological change? (International Council for Science (ICSU) 2005, 20) This report argues, too, that scientists do not have the capacity to foresee the full range of consequences the knowledge produced might yield. Furthermore, the ar‐gument is that the boundaries of “science” are less clear, and thus it is difficult to assign responsibility.  It  is argued  that knowledge  is now more distributed  in sci‐ence and society. Thus, science alone should not have the role of assessing the con‐sequences;  other  actors must  be  involved  too.  The  latter  argument  is  related  to those put forward by Helga Nowotny, Michael Gibbons and co‐authors on the co‐evolution of science and society and new forms of knowledge production (Gibbons et al. 1994; Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001). In mode 2 knowledge production, research is increasingly interwoven with the context of application, so that respon‐sibility, or, as Nowotny and co‐authors term it, social accountability, is an intrinsic element of these new kind of knowledge production. The “new norm” of social ac‐countability should remedy the shortcomings of the peer review system, and thus ensure  the  quality  of  the  knowledge  production  process  (Nowotny,  Scott,  and Gibbons  2001,  61).  It  is,  for  example,  reflected  in  publication  policies  where authors are required to take responsibility for the full content of their papers, or in the requirement that all research involving human subjects needs to go through an ethical  review  process.  The  increasing  number  of  dedicated  research  programs that often focus on issues regarded as socially relevant, too, exemplifies the intru‐sion of the responsibility and accountability narrative in science policy.  The growing awareness of  the  impacts of scientific and technological advances  is also reflected by the composition of research teams working under mode 2 science regimes. Here, different academic disciplines and non‐scientific professions work together on a commonly defined problem. These new kinds of cooperation, as well as  other  characteristics  of mode  2  science,  “increase  the  sensitivity  of  scientists and technologists to the broader implications of what they are doing” (Gibbons et 
                                                14   The  International  Council  for  Science  is  a  non‐governmental  organization  representing  a global membership  that  includes both national scientific bodies and  international scientific unions. See http://www.icsu.org 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al.  1994,  7).  New  forms  of  collaboration,  for  example with  industry  or  self‐help groups, introduce different values in the knowledge production process that have to be integrated into the daily research practice. In mode 2 science, notions of “so‐cial responsibility” are already incorporated into the knowledge production proc‐ess, as the problem definition and the research process are carried out in the con‐text  of  application.  Within  this  knowledge  production  regime,  scientists  are  no longer accountable only to their own community and its norms, but have to cope with  and  adapt  to multiple  value  systems.  Thus,  in mode  2  the  consequences  of knowledge  are much more  directly  enacted—and  experienced—than  in mode  1 science.  Mode 2 science  is also described as a “socially distributed knowledge production system”. Hence,  responsibility and accountability also  take place within  this new institutional framework. This creates great opportunities as well as dangers. As the Mertonian  idea  of  science  neglects  all  responsibilities  for  social  consequences, casting “science” as true and thus indisputable knowledge, the inclusion of a wider set of actors, and thus of interests, values, and preferences, creates the opportunity to consider possible consequences in the knowledge production process—that is, “upstream”. However, the clarity of mode 1 with regard to the institutional struc‐tures and  the actors and  interests  involved also makes  it  easier  for  the public  to attribute responsibility. Mode 2, on the other hand, removes strict boundaries be‐tween public and private, university and  industry, producer and user,  etc.  Some‐times, anticipated resistance is already incorporated in the knowledge production process, making it harder for opponents to reject applications later or to attribute responsibility to identifiable actors.  Different  forms  of  knowledge  production  elicit  different  ideas  about  the  “social responsibility”  of  science/research  and  researchers.  In  mode  1,  the  question  of social responsibility is dominantly posed ex post. As discussed above, mode 1 sci‐ence is characterized by a strict separation between pure and academic knowledge production and its application, as well as a linear process of innovation from early basic research to technologies applied in social contexts. In this innovation regime, responsibility only comes into play if socially applied technologies turn out to chal‐lenge current social values. If, on the contrary, knowledge remains in the realm of “pure science” and does not  lead to any application, responsibility questions can‐not be posed without contesting the strict boundaries between basic research and technological application as well as the autonomy of research. Thus, in mode 1, the question  of  social  responsibility  leaves  untouched  the  epistemic  core  of  basic knowledge production.  In mode 2 knowledge production, which is characterized by an interwovenness of research and contexts of application from the very beginning, the whole research process is accompanied by different aspects of “social responsibility”. Researchers and societal actors alike who are involved in the transdisciplinary research proc‐ess have to reflect continually on the impacts of their work on the societal contexts they work in. “Did we define our problem according to the social environment of 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its intended use? What are the impacts of our solutions for the societal contexts we imagine? Did we  sufficiently  acknowledge  the  feedback  of  our  users  and  did we meet their concerns?” These are questions that accompany the ideal transdiscipli‐nary research process as typically depicted in mode 2. Thus, the “social responsi‐bility” of  research has  rather different  faces  in different  regimes  that govern sci‐ence‐society interactions. One need not even go far into the claims of a true trans‐disciplinary research process to observe the changing face of responsibility of sci‐ence and scientists. For example, in branches of science that are considered central to  national  economies,  fraud  cases  are  often  depicted  as  catastrophic  for  whole branches  of  industry  in  national  economies,  having  the  potential  to weaken  na‐tional  welfare  and  competitiveness.  See,  for  example,  the  Hwang  fraud  case  in South Korea involving human embryonic stems cells. While on one hand attributed to  the  failure  of  the  scientific  peer  review  system  and  to  the  criminal  energy  of Hwang, the case moves beyond the science system as such by creating an uncertain environment  for  investors  in  South  Korea’s  growing  biotech  industry  (Gottweis and Triendl 2006). Here, it seems that scientists are not only regarded as respon‐sible to their own community, but also—in particular branches—as committed to national economy and prosperity.  In line with the transformations science has undergone with the increasing impor‐tance  of  new modes  of  knowledge  production,  the  “role”  of  the  scientist  has  be‐come multiple. Still, science as a vocation (Weber 1995) plays an important role in the self‐descriptions of researchers. However, today they have to fulfill a range of additional roles. They have to align their actions according to the multitude of dif‐ferent  interests  involved,  for  example,  those  of  the  funding  agency,  those  of  the narrower scientific community, those of themselves as citizens, those of the repre‐sentatives and advocates of  science  to  the public,  etc. This  raises  the question of the (in)coherence of the image the researchers present to themselves as well as to the public, and it raises some questions about researchers’  identities that are not easy to answer. Claire Waterton argues that researchers are “learning to live with multiple versions of actively negotiated science‐policy boundaries, many of which seem to have different qualities and make different demands on them as scientists” (Waterton 2005, 443). Coherence of self‐image and role may be a desirable goal for researchers. On the other hand, “coherence” of one’s own self‐image might impede the  advancement  of  one’s  career,  as  the  current  environment  often  demands “flexibility”, the ability to switch between multiple repertoires in front of different “audiences”.  University  researchers  are  increasingly  asked  to  raise  third‐party funding and to cooperate with industry to create additional symbolic and financial value. The question is how researchers, both individually and collectively, can deal with new demands that question their traditional roles.  The  different  accounts  that  emphasize  responsibility  are  part  of  what  Rose (1999b)  has  termed  process  or  “technologies  of  responsibilization”.  Researchers become  “responsibilized”  by  becoming  alert  to  the  fragile  economic  setting  they work  in or  to  the danger of  losing public  trust  and  legitimacy.  It  is  not  the  state anymore  that  has  to  take  care  of  a  stable  science‐society  relation;  scientists  are 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The starting point for many changes in the relationship between science and soci‐ety, and the move away from “science” towards a more socially embedded knowl‐edge production, has been a series of  incidents that have gained a certain promi‐nence  in  public  debate,  so  that  many  observers—including  those  coming  from STS—speak about a veritable “crisis” of public trust in science. The BSE outbreaks and conflicts over GMOs in agriculture are the outstanding examples of this crisis. What is interesting is that events that result in a crisis of public trust only concern a remarkably small proportion of “science”;  that  is, most of research and techno‐logical developments are done without being criticized. Furthermore, BSE and ag‐ricultural  GMOs  have  often  been  interpreted  as  a  crisis  of  public  trust  towards “science” in a more general sense, while in fact they have been a failure of political institutions  to adequately deal with  the risks. Hence,  it  is  interesting  that BSE or GMOs were not prominent incidents in the crisis of public confidence in politics, as politics is much more used to dealing with a lack of public trust. For “science”, the few  incidents  assumed  a  kind  of warning  role.  It was  feared  that  particular  and often  legitimate  concerns  towards  certain  technologies  (“science”  in  the  sense of basic research was only marginally at stake in these crises) spread over “science” in general. Critical concerns have been  interpreted  in  terms of a general crisis of public trust in “science”.15 On the other hand, events such as BSE and GMOs have been  “seeds”  around  which  other  concerns  could  crystallize  in  the  public  dis‐course. Hence, when science politics and institutions talk about the “crisis of public trust in science”, the issue may be something else which is obscured by the crisis narrative.  In this chapter, I will analyze two different approaches that aim to counter the as‐sumed  public  crises  over  “science”  and  new  technologies.  These  are  “public  en‐gagement” and “ethics”. From a distance, both seem to address the same problems and  issues: What  is  the  relationship of  (public) values and concerns  to emerging technologies? How should society deal with new technologies, particularly if they are in conflict with existing value systems? “Public engagement” and “ethics” both address these questions implicitly and explicitly. However, despite some similari‐ties with  regard  to  the more general  aims of  establishing a  socially and ethically more robust knowledge politics, “public engagement” and “ethics” are quite differ‐ent ways to address science‐society relations.  
                                                15   See  for example  the statement of  the British House of Lords Select Committee Science and Technology (Third report, 2000), cited and discussed by A. Irwin (2001): “Society’s relation‐ship with science is in a critical phase. Science today is exciting, and full of opportunities. Yet public confidence in scientific advice to Government has been rocked by BSE; and many peo‐ple are uneasy about the rapid advance of areas such as biotechnology and IT—even though for everyday purposes they take science and technology for granted. This crisis of confidence is of great importance both to British society and to British science.“ 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ing  of  science  (PUS).  A  seminal  report  that  triggered  a  series  of  initiatives  and framed the debate for a rather long time was a report commissioned by the Royal Society  in  the mid‐1980s  (The Royal  Society 1985)  that was  also  the  eponym of this  strand  in  science  policy.  The  report  concluded  that  science  and  technology play a major role in many aspects of daily life. Thus, the assumption of the report was that a “proper” understanding of science and technology was needed for every single  citizen  in  order  to  cope with  the  challenges  of modern  society. While  the report  stated  that  public  attitudes  regarding  science  showed  that  the public  had “considerable interest” in science, the “understanding” of science was seen as quite low in the general public. The poor understanding of science and its methods was seen as a danger on many different levels: First, it was seen as an obstacle for peo‐ple in coping with their everyday lives. Second, poor scientific literacy was seen as endangering national economic welfare. And  third,  it was  seen as problematic  in terms of participation in democratic processes.  In  the Royal  Society  report  and  the political  activities  that  followed,  the  “public” was conceptualized  in a very passive role.  It was seen as  in need of education  in order  to  meet  the  requirements  of  modern  democratic  knowledge‐society.  The public was characterized by having a deficit of proper scientific knowledge, which prevented them from recognizing the benefits of science and technology. Termed as the “deficit model” of PUS, the process of communication between science and society was thought of as a one‐directional flow of information from the scientific experts to lay people: Scientists, as the producers of genuine knowledge, make use of “translators”, such as media, which popularize scientific knowledge. At the other end of the pipe, the public, as recipient, receives this knowledge, and, if the knowl‐edge is appropriately incorporated,  is then able to better handle everyday issues, as well as to better contribute to a political decision‐making process.  On a political  level, the deficit model became the dominant model of how politics addressed  the  relationship  between  science  and  society  for  quite  some  time. On the European level, the public understanding of science was subject to a range of large‐scale  comparative  surveys,  within  the  established  instrument  of  the 
Eurobarometer, that initially aimed to measure the attitudes of the population to‐wards  European  policy.  In  these  quantitative  surveys,  people  were  asked  about their  factual  scientific  knowledge  as well  as  their  attitudes  towards  science  and technology in general. This, then, is taken as an account for the “scientific literacy” of Europeans. The bottom line that runs through all Eurobarometer surveys on sci‐
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ence and technology is that people indicate that they are rather interested in sci‐ence, but feel poorly‐informed regarding the matter. This  is  further confirmed by questions on scientific facts that the surveys posed, where people were quite often unable to provide the “correct” answer in scientific terms. The Eurobarometer sur‐veys,  then, assumed a strong relation between a high degree of understanding of science  and  a  generally  positive  attitude  towards  science  (Durant,  Evans,  and Thomas 1989). In the wake of the deficit model of public understanding of science, which increas‐ingly pervaded the way politics addressed science‐society relations, a series of crit‐ics raised their voices and challenged many assumptions embedded in the classical notion of PUS. The Royal Society report, as well as the Eurobarometer surveys, con‐tained specific, however often implicit, normative assumptions about “the public”, “understanding” and “science”. “The public” was mostly depicted as an amorphous and  de‐situated  mass  of  people.  “Understanding”  mainly  referred  to  a  sender‐receiver model of communication where “to understand” means to reproduce facts in a scientist’s fashion. And “science”, too, was perceived as a more or less uniform institution with a univocal message. Among the critics of the assumptions embed‐ded in traditional PUS, Mike Michael (1992) analyzed how people perceived “sci‐ence” within their everyday lives, and came to the conclusion that laypersons de‐velop quite complex understandings of what science is, depending on the particu‐lar context. People often hold two different repertoires of what counts as “science” for them: “Science‐in‐general” is an entity of abstract knowledge, to which people see themselves in distinction, while “science‐in‐particular” is seen as open for mu‐tual interaction and participation. People simultaneously are able to state that they are ignorant of science‐in‐general while having particular knowledge of a science‐in‐particular.  “Ignorance” of science and scientific knowledge, however, must not be read as simply a deficit of knowledge and understanding that has to be compen‐sated for by educational means—as political measures in PUS often suggest—but rather  as  a  legitimate  resource  for  people  to  cope  with  the  complexities  of  a knowledge society (Michael 1996; see also Henwood et al. 2003). For many people, science seems like a distant entity that  is barely experienced as such in everyday life.  This points to the fact that scientific knowledge cannot be regarded as an abstract and universal body of uncontestable  facts, but  is  rather a  situated assemblage of different experiences. Helen Lambert and Hilary Rose (1996) described,  in a case study of people  affected with  familial  hyperlipidaemia,  how people develop  situ‐ated understandings of (medical) science. In contrast to what the deficit model of public understanding of science suggests, to “understand” is an active process that aims to reconcile prior experiences with the knowledge provided in direct encoun‐ters with scientists. Brian Wynne (1996b) suggests that what is more important to people than a correct factual provision of scientific knowledge is the “institutional body language” of science and scientists when engaging with the public. Studying the  encounters  of  Cumbrian  sheep  farmers with nuclear  scientists  and other  ex‐perts  from government  institutions after  the Chernobyl disaster,  he  showed  that 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trust‐relations between lay persons and experts cannot simply taken for granted, but  trust‐relations  are  far  more  complex  and  more  continually  negotiated  than previously assumed: “trust and credibility are contingent variables which depend upon evolving relationships and identities” (Wynne 1996b, 20). Trust and credibil‐ity in expert systems do have a strong social dimension, which depends on the par‐ticular  conduct  of  experts  in  their  interactions with  the  lay  public.  Thus, Wynne opposes  the  rather  simplistic  notions  of  public  trust  in  science  present  in  the 
Eurobarometer  surveys, where  trust  is  often measured  in  a quantitative way. He shows that trust is not a question of numbers. but one of the quality of experiential relationships and local encounters between science and the public.  While the particular notions within the traditional concept “public understanding of science” were thoroughly questioned and juxtaposed with experiences in every‐day life with a range of empirical studies, they were also criticized for their inher‐ent assumptions of democratic politics. Beginning with the Royal Society report on PUS, up to recent governance papers on national and supranational levels, there is an  assumption  that  true participation of  citizens  in democratic  governance  rests on appropriate knowledge of scientific and technological  issues. For example, the EU’s Science and Society Action Plan states that “In a knowledge society, democracy requires  citizens  to  have  a  certain  scientific  and  technical  knowledge  as  part  of their basic skills” (European Commission 2002, 11). This approach, which became intrinsic to many science policy regimes after the public was discovered as a rele‐vant actor in science policy in the 1980s, is criticized by Lévy‐Leblond:  For  the  requirement  ...  that  people  should  be  experts,  or  at  least  fluent,  in science and medicine before giving their view about it, after all, is contrary to the basic tenet of our democratic societies. Democracy is a bet:  the bet that conscience should take precedence over competence. We do not  require an expert, nor even an  ‘amateur’  level of knowledge in constitutional or crimi‐nal law before allowing citizens to use their voting rights or participate in a jury. Why should we be more demanding concerning technical and scientific matters? In other words, the problem we face is not so much that of a knowl‐edge  gap which  separates  laypeople  from  scientists,  but  that  of  the  power gap which puts scientific and technical developments outside of democratic control. (Lévy‐Leblond 1992, 20) Lévy‐Leblond  argues  that  science—for  reasons  not  provided—enjoys  different criteria  for  participation  than  other  domains.  However,  expert‐shaped  citizens contradict  the basic principles of democratic  societies, and he wonders why par‐ticipation in science and technology requires special skills that are not required in equally important social affairs. However,  in the practice of traditional public un‐derstanding of science, the expert‐shaped citizen has never been realized. Despite the many measures through which science policy sought to “educate” the public to act  and  think  like  scientists,  little has  changed  in  the Europeans’  knowledge  and attitudes  towards  science  and  technology.  The  assumptions  of  traditional  public understanding of science, as well as the its enactment in practice, help to constitute 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the public as an “ignorant mass” (Bensaude‐Vincent 2001), which in turn justifies leaving the governance of science and technology in the hands of experts and tech‐nocrats.  Despite the criticism traditional PUS model received over the years, this particular model  of  science‐society  interaction  remained  important  in  science  communica‐tion.  The  linear model  of  science  communication  reinforced  the  authority  of  sci‐ence as well as  the role of a passive public as mere receivers of scientific knowl‐edge. However, in recent times, science policy—beyond the recurrent emphasis on the scientifically literate citizen as a prerequisite for democratic participation and economic prosperity—has begun to experiment with different roles for the public, depicting them in a more active way. To a certain degree, the discourse of the citi‐zen in need of education before being able to participate in democratic governance has been sidelined by alternative visions of the role of citizens that emphasize “dia‐logue” rather than “education”. In light of a series of critical incidents in public sci‐ence policy,  such as GMOs and BSE,  the  re‐establishment of public  confidence  in science governance was a central goal for policy makers (Irwin 2001).  This language is particularly present on the European level, where the relationship between  science  and  society  is  increasingly  characterized  by  references  to  “dia‐logue” with and  “participation” of  the public,  suggesting a  “new partnership” be‐tween  science  and  society  (European  Commission  2002).  This  new  language  is triggered by a more general crisis of governance that the European Union and its nation states are  facing. The need for changes  in the governance regimes are,  for example, reflected in the EU’s White Paper on Governance (European Commission 2001b), where  it  is  concluded  that  “many Europeans  feel  alienated  from  the Un‐ion’s work”. This alienation is seen as rooted in the ineffective action of the EU on a series of  issues, and thus  in a crisis of trust, credibility and the democratic  legiti‐macy of its institutions. As a consequence, changes in the style of governance of the EU are  seen as needed,  in which  “participation” and  “involvement” of  the  citizen are  important  factors. Among other  issues,  the call  for participation and  involve‐ment should also be reflected  in  the way the EU deals with  issues of science and technology:  “The  EU’s  multi‐disciplinary  expert  system  will  be  opened  up  to greater public scrutiny and debate. This is needed to manage the challenges, risks and  ethical  questions  thrown  up  by  science  and  technology”  (European Commission 2001b, 33). The  call  for  dialogue  and  participation  has  manifested  in  a  series  of  public  en‐gagement exercises throughout Europe. These have been carried out on local, na‐tional  and  supranational  (e.g.,  “Meeting  of Minds”16)  levels.  They  can  be  catego‐rized by the intensity of citizen participation; process or output orientation; over‐all  embedding  in a political process  (“communication”,  “consultation”,  “participa‐tion”); the composition of the citizen group (“representativeness”); and many more parameters. As accounting  for  the  full  range of public participation methods  that have been developed  and deployed over  recent  years  is  far  beyond  the  scope of 
                                                16     See http://www.meetingmindseurope.org (accessed July 8, 2008). 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this dissertation, I have to refer to the work of others who have more fully engaged with the issue (e.g., Felt, Fochler, and Müller 2003b; Rowe and Frewer 2005; Joss and Bellucci 2002; Steyaert and Lisoir 2005). In what comes next, I will highlight some central aspects of the so‐called “participatory turn” in science policy and the issue of public participation in technosciences that represent a departure from the traditional models of public understanding of science that conceptualized the citi‐zen as a lay person lacking expertise and thus unable to participate more in politi‐cal  decision‐making  processes  on  technoscientific  issues.  I  will  focus  on  two  as‐pects of this new regime of science governance, because they contrast nicely with the dominant  form of how ethics deals with  the governance of  science and  tech‐nology—which I will discuss afterwards. First, the participatory turn brought for‐ward  alternative  resources  of  knowledge,  in  particular  those  of  citizens,  increas‐ingly  considered  as  valuable  and  legitimate  resources  of  knowledge  and  experi‐ences.  Second,  not  only  the  knowledge  but  also  the  processes  of  how  a  society comes to decisions on technoscientific issues were increasingly regarded as perti‐nent to the legitimacy of decision‐making.  In  traditional  PUS,  lay  people  were  not  recognized  as  equal  partners  in  science communication. They were regarded as mere receivers and consumers of scientific knowledge provided by scientists and experts. The idea that lay people could hold particular knowledge that could be relevant in decision‐making processes on tech‐noscientific issues was completely absent. The case of the Cumbrian sheep farmers after the Chernobyl fallout demonstrated experts’ ignorance of local and experien‐tial  knowledge,  as well  as  the  farmers’  resourcefulness  in  dealing with  the  con‐tamination  problem  in  their  own way  (Wynne  1996a).  This  and  other  instances where lay knowledge and experiences collided with epistemic cultures of scientific experts led to the increasing contestation of scientific expertise. The UK (and else‐where) BSE crisis is a pivotal example of the crisis of public trust in the ability of governments  and  experts  to  cope  with  problems.  During  the  crisis,  regulations were  imposed  “in  haste  and  secrecy”,  as  the  UK  BSE  Inquiry  Report  noted.  The public was not informed of the huge disagreement between experts about what to do. Many experts believed for a rather  long time that BSE posed no threat to hu‐man health. Once additional data indicated the health risks of BSE, the authorities’ assumption was that  the public would react  in an “irrational” way;  thus,  the offi‐cials  in  charge  exhibited  considerable  mistrust  towards  the  public.  This  in  turn triggered the people’s mistrust in the ability of experts and officials to tell the truth and inform them about the full extent of the crisis.17 In the wake of the BSE crisis and in light of the upcoming GM controversy, the UK House of Lords Select Commit­
tee on Science and Technology  reconsidered established modes of  science‐society relations.  They  concluded  that  “public  confidence  in  scientific  advice  to  Govern‐ment has been rocked by a series of events.” Public trust in science could no longer be taken for granted, but must be established in the first place by a greater “open‐ness”  of  scientific  institutions.  The  committee  identified  a  “new  mood  for  dia‐
                                                17     http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/ (accessed July 8, 2008). 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logue”: “Today’s public expects not merely to know what is going on, but to be con‐sulted; science is beginning to see the wisdom of this, and to move ‘out of the labo‐ratory and into the community’ to engage in dialogue aimed at mutual understand‐ing.”  In order  to practice  the new mood  for dialogue,  the  committee  suggested a series of public engagement events, from focus groups to citizens’ juries, to remedy the  crisis  of  trust  and  the  shortcomings  of  the  then‐current  regime  of  scientific governance  (all  quotes  UK  House  of  Lords  Select  Committee  on  Science  and Technology 2000).  The policy statements in the aftermath of the BSE crisis suggest that the assumed crisis of public trust was not ascribed to public ignorance of scientific knowledge, but to the very method of experts’ knowledge production, and that the way it was entangled  with  decision‐making  processes  was  under  heavy  scrutiny.  Expertise and  experts were  increasingly  contested.  Science was  not  longer  seen  as  having one  clear  voice which  speaks  truth  to power,  and  the  image of  the disinterested expert was  shattered. The  report  suggests also a  series of measures  that  involve the public more closely in decision‐making processes on technoscientific issues. To a certain degree,  lay and stakeholder knowledge was acknowledged as an impor‐tant factor in dealing with large‐scale technoscientific crises, and this new way of dealing—at least as it  is suggested in the Committee’s report—marked an impor‐tant difference from the Chernobyl crisis, with quite different roles for lay people and experts. Also on the European level, different voices called for a “democratiza‐tion of expertise.” In an EU report (Gerold and Liberatore 2001) that is associated with the central White Paper on Governance, the authors also refer to the BSE crisis and the GM controversy, and state that expertise is increasingly contested. In order to counter this development, they argue for a pluralism of expertise, no longer to be seen as a weakness of scientific authority, but rather as a strength. They state that efforts to re‐establish public confidence in governance “cannot be confined to ‘educating the public’: the very process of developing and using expertise needs to be made more  transparent and accountable,  and sustained dialogue between ex‐perts, public and policy makers needs to be pursued” (Gerold and Liberatore 2001, 2). In sum, the BSE crisis and the anticipation of the GM debate triggered a series of changes in the rhetoric and language of science policy. Expert knowledge and pub‐lic concerns were no longer regarded as opposing each other, but had to be recon‐ciled in some way. As such, the paradigm of the knowledge deficit was largely dis‐missed from the official language. Apart from the discussion of the role of public knowledge and experience in large‐scale crises and controversies,  there has been another area where lay knowledge has  been  acknowledged,  and  in  some  instances  has  deeply  changed  the way  re‐search  is  conducted.  In  particular,  patient  movements  around  certain  diseases have managed to put  forward  their concerns, experience and knowledge. For ex‐ample,  lay participation of AIDS activists has  changed epistemic practices  in bio‐medical research (Epstein 1995). Another case of participatory knowledge‐making in  the  biomedical  domain  is  the  case  of  the Association  Française  contre  les My­
opathies (AFM, French Association to Fight Muscular Dystrophy), which “played a 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key part  in the orientation of research, that  is,  in the definition of a research and innovation policy in the full sense of the term”(Callon and Rabeharisoa 2008, 239). Especially  in  biomedicine,  there  are  a  number  of  examples where  organized  lay citizens managed to challenge existing regimes of scientific expertise. These forms of lay knowledge, within their particular concerns and with regard to very specific domains of science, namely biomedical research for drugs, were able to exercise a great deal of influence.  Policy‐makers,  however,  also  see  the  activist  character  of  lay  participation  as  a problem with regard to the engagement of the wider public with science and tech‐nology. One of the bigger public participation exercises that followed the House of Lords’ call for greater openness and dialogue has been GM Nation? in the UK. It has been the UK’s largest experiment with public consultation, with numerous national and  local  events attended by more  than 1000 people  (Horlick‐Jones et  al. 2004). Alan Irwin (2006) has aptly discussed this case in light of the assumptions implicit in public participation.  In  the  case of GM Nation?,  the organizers have been  con‐cerned about the “capture” of the events by “special interests” and activists. They enacted special measures to avoid the participation of stakeholders who have al‐ready been actively involved in the discussion. Afterwards, the event was criticized for failing to address a “wider array of people”: “The suggestion is that by circum‐navigating the usual stakeholders,  it  is possible to tap into a  less prejudiced (and more ‘representative’) public opinion” (Irwin 2006, 312).  There  is a general acknowledgement  in  science policy  that  citizens  should be  in‐volved  in debates around science and technology. However, what remains rather unclear are the expectations of citizen involvement regarding the question of what the citizens can contribute to the deliberation process. If  lay knowledge is sought for and appreciated in public engagement exercises, whose knowledge is meant? In the case of GM Nation?, organized citizens with a clear opinion and stake were ex‐cluded from the discussion process, which aimed instead to address citizens who were “innocent” and more “representative”. The marginalization of “activists” with already existing views, and the prioritization of the “open‐minded” citizen, suggest that science policy‐makers assume that the open‐minded citizen is rather suscep‐tible to the views of experts and thus that conflicts can be avoided. However, there is no clear boundary between “activist” and “disinterested” citizens, and the ques‐tion is, who can legitimately decide whether specific citizens are “allowed” to par‐ticipate  in  public  engagement  exercises?18  Thus,  on  one  hand  the  “participatory turn”  abandoned  the  old  paradigm  of  citizens  as  mere  consumers  of  scientific knowledge and  facts, and suggested  that  lay people hold knowledge, experiences and values  relevant  for  the governance of  science. On  the other hand,  the public 
                                                18   In STS, Alan Irwin (2006) has particularly critiqued such a regime of participation. However, Robert Evans  (Evans  and Plows 2007),  based on his  and H.M.  Collins’s model  of  expertise (Collins  and  Evans  2002),  advocates  the  advantages  of  the  involvement  of  “disinterested”, that  is “non‐expert” and “non‐activist” citizen  in public engagement exercises. By “disinter‐ested” the authors mean “lack of engagement and detailed knowledge”. The question is how to enroll these citizens and demand some commitment to the engagement process if the re‐quirement is complete absence of engagement. 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cannot  be  considered  as  a mass  of  “average”  people  sharing  the  same  attitudes, and it has not yet been determined how different forms of knowledge in the public relate to each other and to scientific expertise.  Another idea of many organizers of public engagement events is that these settings are  politically  neutral  spaces  in which  different  forms  of  knowledge  and  experi‐ence can mutually engage with each other. Thus, the setting itself would not influ‐ence what  kind  of  knowledge would  prevail,  but  rather  allow  each  argument  to stand  on  its  own.  Brian  Wynne  frequently  emphasizes  that  “invited”  public  in‐volvement often imposes a normative frame on public issues, and thus influences what knowledge is more acknowledged in debates and what falls outside the scope of  the  debate  (Wynne  2001,  2003,  2007).  An  example  of  this  “framing work”  of experts  is  the  framing of  ethical  aspects  of  emerging  technologies with  accepted formal principles that have been already enacted in a wide range of issues; for ex‐ample, “informed consent” or “privacy” as the standard repertoire of ethicists’ re‐sponses.  The  prevalence  of  formal  argumentation  in  ethical  debates  leads  to  an exclusion of other ways of knowing which are not germane to this kind of thinking. In this regard, Sheila Jasanoff (2003a, 397‐398) argues that “public engagement is needed in order to test and contest the framing of the issues that experts are asked to resolve. Without such critical supervision, experts have often found themselves offering  irrelevant  advice  on  wrong  or  misguided  questions.”  Thus,  lay  involve‐ment contributes to the legitimacy of expert advice as well as to the social robust‐ness of expertise. What is most important in public participation exercises is thus not that citizens “contribute” to the expertise of experts, as suggested for example by Harry  Collins  and Robert  Evans  (2002),  but  that  they  challenge  the  basic  as‐sumptions that guide experts’ way of thinking; for example; the role of science and research in society; how innovation processes work and should work; the role of governance, regulation and politics in the conduct of science and so forth. The task of citizens to challenge expert framings, thus, goes well beyond the idea that citi‐zens should contribute to “technical decision making” as suggested by Collins and Evans, because this stance is already a narrowly framed concept of what is at stake when lay people and experts meet.  The  second  aspect  of  the  “participatory  turn”  is  that  public  participation  can  be regarded  as  an  “exercise  in  democracy”  as  such.  Beyond  the  discussion  of  what knowledge and experience lay people may contribute to the governance of science and  technology—however closely connected  to  it—is another narrative of public participation, present  in  the discourse as well  as  enacted  in practice. Public par‐ticipation is often justified not with reference to the matters at stake, but as an in‐trinsic value of democratic orders. Put bluntly,  the emphasis of a more participa‐tory culture of governance aims to construct citizens, with regard to their partici‐pation in science and technology, as “scientific citizens” (Horst 2007; Irwin 2001; Michael and Brown 2005; Michael 1998). Thus, public participation events can be understood not only as engaging with science and technology as such, but also as “exercises in democracy”.  
 ‐ 47 ‐ 
The  exercise  character  of  public  participation  becomes  visible  in  the way  public policy makers deal with  it, especially on  the European  level. On one hand, public participation is held high in a number of EU policy documents. The White Paper on 
Governance,  for  example,  asserts  that  the  “quality,  relevance  and effectiveness of EU policies depend on ensuring wide participation  throughout  the policy chain – from  conception  to  implementation”  because  “legitimacy  today  depends  on  in‐volvement and participation. This means that the linear model of dispensing poli‐cies from above must be replaced by a virtuous circle, based on feedback, networks and  involvement  from policy creation  to  implementation at all  levels”  (European Commission 2001b, 10‐11). This vision of the role of participation in governance is all‐embracing,  and  concerns  not  only  matters  of  (dis)agreeing  with  ready‐made decisions  but,  in  particular,  “upstream”  involvement  in  the  conceptualization  of issues  and  problems.  The  EU’s  Science  and  Society  Action  Plan  (European Commission 2002) argues in a similar fashion, and suggests a greater involvement of the public at all stages of science and technology.  This narrative of public participation is, however, in contrast to the role of the pub‐lic  in  light  of  innovation  policies.  For  example,  the  central  Lisbon  Agenda  of  the European Union clearly aims to make the EU the “most dynamic and competitive knowledge‐based economy in the world”. The so‐called Aho Report further speci‐fies European  innovation policy by emphasizing  “the need  for Europe  to provide an  innovation‐friendly market  for  its businesses”,  because our  economic  “way of life is under threat” (Aho 2006, VII). Within the regime of economic innovation, the role of citizens in science governance has quite a different tone than for example in the Science and Society Action Plan. Public participation and dialogue are not ad‐dressed anymore; rather, what is needed is “a cultural shift which celebrates inno‐vation, using the media and other means to encourage citizens to embrace innova­
tive goods and services” (Aho 2006, 24, emphasis added). The envisioned “true dia‐logue”  in the Science and Society Action Plan  is abandoned in favor of the promo‐tion of innovation to the public as a prerequisite for a market economy. The ques‐tion  is  how  the  envisioned  creation  of  “an  innovation‐friendly  environment”,  in which public debate and controversies hardly have a place, relates to the tenets of “dialogue” and “participation”. This dilemma, however, has not been addressed so far, and often became obvious when these conflicting demands are translated into national policies. Particularly in the Austrian case, where the governance paradigm of  the  provision  of  an  innovation‐friendly  environment  is  comparatively  strong, participatory  events  often  have  the  character  of  a  staged  exercise  in  democracy. One might argue that the innovation regime advocated by the Lisbon Agenda and the Aho Report only concerns applied technology production, and thus leaves un‐touched  a  possible  “dialogue” with what we may  call  “basic  research”. However, the  EU  recently  redefined  their  R&D  policies,  and  is  now  also  funding  research, formerly  known  as  “basic  research”  and  now  labeled  “frontier  research”,  which abstains from the  traditional distinction between ‘basic’ and ‘applied’ research [which] implies that research can be either one or  the other but not both. With  frontier re‐
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search researchers may well be concerned with both new knowledge about the  world  and  with  generating  potentially  useful  knowledge  at  the  same time.  Therefore,  there  is  a  much  closer  and more  intimate  connection  be‐tween  the  resulting  science  and  technology,  with  few  of  the  barriers  that arise when basic  research and applied  research are  carried out  separately. (European Commission 2005a, 18) While this report takes into account the transformation of science and research in light  of  new  ways  of  knowledge  production—for  example,  its  transdisciplinary character and the more prominent links between what we used to understand as “basic”  and  “applied”  research—the  economic  imperative  of  the  new  European research landscape is obvious. Consequently,  the role of citizens—if addressed at all—is limited to that of followers:  Rolemodel researchers created by a highly visible ERC grants system should contribute to making science more attractive to the general public as well as to students deciding whether to study science or engineering or pursue ca‐reers in research. Enhanced visibility will thus raise the status of research it‐self among policy‐makers, politicians and the public. (European Commission 2005a, 36, emphasis added) Particularly with  regard  to  the more  recent policy  statements on  innovation,  the role of  citizens has been  redefined  in  terms of  their  contributions  to building an innovation‐friendly  environment. How  this model  of  governance  relates  to  those which aim to be more “inclusive” with regard to the concerns of the public remains unclear. It is as if “two voices are struggling to be heard” (Hagendijk 2004, 46). In‐terestingly, the description of the public as suffering severe knowledge deficits, so present  in  traditional  PUS  regimes,  has  largely  vanished  in  policy  discussions.  It has been replaced either by the language of “dialogue”, “involvement” and “partici‐pation”, or by the description of the public as in need of an increased “awareness” of  the  benefits  of  research  and  innovation  for  the  competitivity  of  Europe  in  a globalized market economy. Thus, the wider educational  impetus of science com‐munication has lost its dominance and been replaced by other motives for the pub‐lic to engage with science, that is, to exercise democratic virtues and to allow tech‐nology‐oriented businesses to flourish for the sake of economic prosperity.  The  exercise  character  of  public  participation  also  becomes  visible  in  the way  it deals with different methods of public participation. There is often thought to be a “neutral” means that can be easily displaced from one cultural setting to another, as well as be applied on a range of issues (Fochler 2007). For example, when Aus‐tria organized its first consensus conference in the field of biomedicine (2003, on genetic  data),  there  were  barely  any  local  experiences  of  this method  available. Despite  the  missing  public  responses  in  this  exercise  (Bogner,  Puchrucker,  and Zimmer  2004),  the  head  of  the  organizing  institution  celebrated  the  event  as  a great success and advocated “to make the citizen conference to a fixed instrument in  the  treatment  of  explosive  issues”  (ORF  ON  Science  2003)i  .  The  participants were provided with the vague promise that the organizer would try to promote the 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outcome of the citizen conference to political decision‐makers. There were several features of this story that gave the impression that public engagement was under‐stood  as  a mere  exercise  in  “democracy”.  First,  the  participants were  left  in  the dark about how their deliberations would relate  to an overall political process—that is, where did the outcomes feed into, and what was the overall political pur‐pose of this exercise? Second, the organizers were quick to note that this standard‐ized way of practicing democratic virtues could be applied to a range of different issues, without considering that other subjects might necessitate different forms of engagement depending on the respective technology discussed (see also Felt et al. 2008). Third, despite the commitments, this event did not have a successor, giving the impression that citizen conferences in particular and public participation more generally are ticked off without joining a serious debate on what matters, in what ways,  and  with  the  participation  of  whom  public  engagement  in  science  would make sense.  Summing  up,  I  analyzed  “public  participation”  along  two  dimensions:  First,  lay publics have been discovered as alternative sources of knowledge to those of tradi‐tional expert decision‐making. However, the public does not share a common body of knowledge of and interest in science. The knowledge of lay activists in biomedi‐cine might  be  quite  different  than  the  knowledge  and  experience  envisioned  by organizers of public deliberation events. These large‐scale “invited” public partici‐pation  exercises  enact  a  specific  vision  of  the  scientific  citizen  that  prefers  the “open‐minded” rather than the activist. The conflicting visions of the contributions of  lay knowledge  to  the  technoscientific decision process  reveal  the unanswered question  of  how  lay  experiences  and  knowledge  relate  to  more  expert‐oriented deliberations.  While  some  suggest  that  lay  knowledge  may  supplement  expert knowledge (“contributory expertise”), others foreground the role of lay publics in challenging  expert  framings  that  often  neglect  public meaning  in  debates.  In my dissertation,  through  analysis  of  the  discussion  at  the  Round  Table  between  lay members  and  genomics  researchers,  I  opt  for  the  latter  view,  following  Brian Wynne and Sheila Jasanoff.  Second, the inclusion of lay publics in the technoscientific decision‐making process (and beyond) may be grounded  in  the  transformation  in classical statehood over the  last  decades,  marking  a  transition  from  state‐oriented  government  towards “governance”.  In  this  new  paradigm,  participation  is  often  celebrated  as  such  in “exercises  in democracy”. While  there are  surely good  reasons  to welcome more open political decision‐making, the question remains how these new forms relate to  more  top‐down  decision‐making  processes  in  particular  areas.  As  discussed above,  the current priority of  research and  innovation  in order  to  render  the EU the most  competitive  “knowledge‐economy”  in  the  world  is  seen  as  outside  the scope of broader participation processes. Here, the public must be made aware of the  importance of  innovation  in order to  facilitate an  innovation‐friendly market. The question  is who decides what  issues  allow public participation  and what  is‐sues are not subject to public debate. The character of public participation as mere “exercises  in  democracy”  has  been  further  emphasized  by  the  assumption  that 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methods  can  be  easily  imported  and  exported,  and  thus  that  they  are  neutral means. My assumption for this thesis is, following my colleagues’ work (Felt et al. 2008; Felt, Fochler, and Müller 2003b), that public participation must be sensitive to its contexts—the political cultures in which it emerges and is carried out, as well as the matters and problems at stake.  As I will show in the next section, “ethics” has provided a quite different answer to the way society should deal with the governance of science and society. The many questions that emerged around the discussion of public participation and the role of citizens in this process seem answered rather definitely by ethics. 
3.2.   Ethics in the public sphere: Moral expertise and 
lay ‘ethical’ knowledge 
Alongside  the  increasing  importance of public  engagement  in  the policy process, “ethics” has been developed as a means to respond to societal challenges of emerg‐ing technologies, resulting in an “increasingly moralized politics of science policy” (Kelly 2003, 340). The moralization and ethicization of  science policy hint at  the fact  that  technological  progress,  especially with  regard  to  the  life  sciences,  is  no longer regarded as unproblematic in terms of societal values. Former science pol‐icy regimes focused on technical risk management, but gradually the governance of innovation was foregrounded (Felt and Wynne 2007). Here, the point is that new technologies have to be assessed regarding their impact and consequences on so‐ciety and its values, and that these impacts can no longer be treated only with re‐gard to their technical risk. Technological issues are increasingly interwoven with moral issues, so that the one cannot be answered without engaging with the other. In part, blind belief  in technological progress has become suspect.  In anticipation of  public  conflict  and  rejection  of  emerging  technologies,  “ethics”  as  a means  to govern  societal  values  in  relation  to  technoscientific  innovation  has  been  intro‐duced on local and national levels of governance, as well as on the European level. Thus,  today we are confronted with a range of ethical practices  that  intervene  in and govern our interactions with technologies.  While ethics is regarded by politics as a panacea for a wide range of problems re‐lated to technosciences, and the “ethics talk” is widely spread in societal areas, the term  “ethics”  is  also  a  cause of  confusion,  because  it  summarizes many different practices. Thus,  I will  first attempt to classify different ways of ethical knowing  in society in order to more sharply accentuate the basic problem this dissertation is addressing. For this purpose I will distinguish between two different forms of ethi‐cal knowing in society: On one hand, official or institutionalized ethics, and, in con‐trast, public or lay ‘ethical’ knowledge. 19  
                                                19   A more  specific definition of my understanding of  ethics  in analyzing  the empirical data  is provided in a later chapter (6.2). I also talk about “ethics” rather than about “bioethics”, be‐cause “bio” as a term delimiting the application of ethics to a specific subject is difficult to de‐
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In  official  or  institutionalized  ethics20  I  include  moral  knowledge  and  normative practices  produced  by  institutionalized  bodies  that  are  publicly  authorized  to speak  ethically,  and  that  therefore  set  norms  that  are  authorative  in  some way. Official ethics can be broadly arranged according to its main functions: ethics as a provider  of  advice  to  politics  in  matters  of  science  and  technology  that  are  re‐garded as ethically sensitive; ethics as a means of (self)‐regulation in research, for example  in  institutional review boards; and academic ethics as a way of authora‐tive knowledge production  that  aims  to  theorize moral behavior with  the end of making  normative  statements  of  what  “ought”  to  be.  The  boundaries  between these  different  roles—providing  advice,  regulation,  production  of  normative knowledge—are permeable, especially with regard to the actors that are involved in these three forms. However, these actors need not necessarily be academically trained ethicists, but may have a broad range of disciplinary backgrounds. “Institu‐tionalized  ethics”  refers  to  the  form of  the  discourse  and  the  institutional  struc‐tures in which this discourse is produced and made sense of.  Furthermore, the umbrella term of “official” ethics does not mean that there are no conflicts and differences within this area, and that it  forms a homogenous episte‐mological and institutional body. Rather, conflicts are quite common; for example academic  bioethicists  often  view  political  ethics  committees  critically.  However, their  common ground  is  the production of  an authorative body of knowledge on moral  issues that claims to transcend  individual moral experiences.  Institutional‐ized and professionalized ethics can be understood as an “epistemic community” following Peter Haas:  An epistemic  community  is  a network of professionals with  recognized ex‐pertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy‐relevant  knowledge  within  that  domain  or  issue‐area.  Although  an epistemic  community may  consist  of  professionals  from  a  variety  of  disci‐plines and backgrounds, they have (1) a shared set of normative and princi‐pled  beliefs, which  provide  a  value‐based  rationale  for  the  social  action  of community members; (2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices  leading or contributing  to a central  set of problems  in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes;  (3)  shared notions  of  validity  that  is,  intersubjective,  internally  defined  criteria  for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a  common policy enterprise—that  is,  a  set of  common practices associated with  a  set  of  problems  to which  their  professional  competence  is  directed, 
                                                fine. In practice, ethics bodies sometimes explicitly abstain from using the term “bio” to de‐scribe their field of action in order to be able to address a wider range of issues. 20   The term “official ethics” is derived from Sheila Jasanoff (2005). Susan Kelly (2003) and John H. Evans (2002) use the term “public bioethics“  for  the same matter.  I rather prefer  to use “official ethics”, since “public bioethics” could be misleading in terms of the aim of this dis‐sertation to analyze how members of the public—laypersons and scientists—deal with ethics in a public engagement setting. 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presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence. (Haas 1992, 3) The claim of official ethics is that its knowledge follows a certain kind of epistemic rationality that often serves to exclude other forms of ethical thinking. Thus, offi‐cial ethics claims that the engagement with morality necessitates a special kind of expertise that is not accessible to those lacking a certain kind of professional edu‐cation. Everyday moral experience is seen as insufficient in order to be a member of the epistemic community of official ethics. It demands a special kind of training and education, either in ethical theory (moral philosophy, theology) or  in a disci‐pline to which ethics refers regarding its subject (biomedicine, genetics, etc.). Thus, official ethics constitutes an interdisciplinary field of experts that shares a common language and rationality (Evans 2002). Of course, the involvement of experts and the use of  expertise  in modern governance  is nothing new, and  the  relations be‐tween expertise and democratic orders have been widely discussed  in social  sci‐ence and politics  (e.g., Wynne 1992, 1996a, 2001, 2003; Collins and Evans 2002; Gerold  and Liberatore  2001).  The newness  of  official  ethics  lies  in  its  claim  that societal values that govern everyday practices cannot be appropriately addressed and promoted, negotiated and defended by those who hold these values, but need the authority and guidance of experts in order to legitimately subscribe to certain moral principles. While morality  is  seen as a  common property of  all human be‐ings,  the  reflection on morality  is  seen as demanding a  special  kind of  expertise. Official  ethics  gets  its  justification  from  the  belief  that  there  is  something  like 
“moral expertise” that provides “better” knowledge and arguments than a “normal” citizen could provide.  The assumption of moral  expertise  is  that moral  experts not only provide moral opinions (“X is wrong”) but also give reasoned arguments that are superior to sub‐jective  opinions;  that  is,  “moral  judgement  is  a  reason‐governed  activity” (Crosthwaite 1995, 370). In ethics, the reason‐guided engagement with ethical is‐sues  is  often  juxtaposed with  a moral  decision‐making  process  that  is  based  on “counting”  different  moral  opinions:  “Moral  decision‐making  at  the  social  level could be no more than counting votes. … I want to reject the idea that moral deci‐sions  should  be  reached  by  counting  heads,  even  given  democratic  values” (Crosthwaite 1995, 370, 378). Thus,  “moral  expertise” derives  its  value  from  the strict  boundary  between  those who  are  regarded  as  simply  holding  certain  atti‐tudes  towards  bioethical  issues  and  those who  are  seen  as  able  to  provide  rea‐soned arguments  for  their positions. While  such a difference may make  sense,  it becomes problematic when reasoned reflection is only ascribed to professionals in ethics, while members of the public are seen as only holding moral positions with‐out being able to provide reasons for them: “there is surely a difference between what the general public is able to say about complex moral issues and what profes‐sional  philosophers  are  able  to  say  (as  is  evident  in  the  professional  journals)” (Crosthwaite 1995, 371). Here, the ways of ethical knowing of the public are sub‐ordinated  to  the body of  knowledge of  learned ethicists,  and  thus,  a hierarchical difference is constructed between these two forms of knowledge. It is rather easy 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to play this game, because institutionalized ethics has established mechanisms of communication within and outside the community. By referring to  journals, ethi‐cists can easily “prove” that their knowledge is much more sophisticated than that of “the general public”. The latter only exists here as an undifferentiated mass that has no voice of  its  own but  is  only heard  through opinion polls. This  frames  the responses of the public in a particular way. Of course, the account of the cited ethi‐cist is not representative of the opinions of all ethicists on this issue. Some of them are rather critical regarding the claim of moral expertise of professionals (Powers 2005). However, the practice of official ethics as the dominant mode of how ethics is performed in society hints that the presumption of the existence of moral exper‐tise is widely institutionalized, as for example the provenience of members of eth‐ics commissions demonstrates.  It is far beyond my scope to analyze the full range of reasons why today the exis‐tence  and  legitimacy  of moral  expertise  is widely  accepted,  and  is  the  dominant way ethics is enacted in society. However, it is relevant to highlight the fact that, in spite of the contestations expertise is facing today, ethics has been established as a largely uncontested field of expertise over the last decade. The move towards the democratization of expertise as addressed in the previous section does not seem to have touched “official ethics”. The dominance of official ethics led to the failure to consider  that  a  wider  range  of  members  of  society,  such  as  citizens  and stakeholders, could hold ethical arguments that are relevant to policy‐making. The subtext of official ethics is that “the public” is not sufficiently able to provide a rea‐soned  articulation  of  “societal”  values.  Considering  this  argumentation,  it  seems interesting  to ask  to what official ethics  is referring  to when  it  talks about “com‐mon” or “societal” values, because seemingly they do not mean the moral attitudes of citizens. Thus, investigating to what extent members of the wider public are able to provide substantial arguments on ethical  issues has not been on the agenda of official ethics. Even in social sciences such analyses have been rare.  In  order  to  consider  the  possibility  that  the  public  has  a  repertoire  of  well‐reasoned articulations of the ethical issues of technosciences—and not just moral opinions that only discriminate between right and wrong—I will use the notion of 
public or  lay  ‘ethical’  knowledge. This means  the way ethical non‐professionals—citizens and scientists alike—articulate value judgments based on explicit reasons and  justifications  for  moral  assumptions.  My  basic  assumption  is  that  non‐professionals  in ethics are able  to provide reasoned articulations of ethical prob‐lems  that  concern  technoscientific  developments.  Its  “reasoning”,  however,  often remains invisible, as lay ‘ethical’ knowledge is mostly a matter of non‐verbal prac‐tices and ad hoc talk that is not made manifest in the form of texts as official ethics is.  That  official  ethics  is  considered  “more  reasoned”  than  lay  engagement  with ethics is the effect of particular practices of official ethics that strongly focus on the production of texts (be it guidelines, “opinions” or academic papers). Official eth‐ics,  thus,  has  established  the means  to make  visible  its  way  of  reasoning,  while public ethics has not. However, in ethicists’ judgments, the lack of technologies for making  visible public  ethical  reasoning  is  equated with  the  incapability  of mem‐
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In this section I will explore in more detail the features and characteristics of insti‐tutionalized ethics by analyzing institutionalized ethics as a “trading zone” of val‐ues within a “moral economy”. Peter Galison (1999)—however in the entirely dif‐ferent  context  of  physics—has  outlined  the  concept  of  “trading  zones”  as  spaces where action and belief are coordinated: Like two cultures, distinct but living nearby enough to trade, they can share some  activities while  diverging  on many  others.  In  particular,  the  two  cul‐tures may bring  to what  I will call  the  trading zone objects  that carry radi‐cally different significance for the donor and recipient. What is crucial is that in the highly local context of the trading zone, despite the differences in clas‐sification, significance, and standards of demonstration, the two groups can collaborate. They can come to a consensus about the procedure of' exchange, about the mechanisms to determine when the goods are “equal”  to one an‐other. They can even both understand that the continuation of exchange is a prerequisite  to  the  survival  of  the  larger  culture  of  which  they  are  part. (Galison 1999, 146) The different sites where institutionalized ethics takes place can be understood as such  “trading  zones”  in  which  action  (of  researchers  in  the  labs,  of  politicians working out a  law, etc.)  is balanced and coordinated with  “belief”,  that  is,  values and  morals.  In  institutionalized  ethics,  scientific  practitioners  often  meet  with moral experts  in order  to negotiate what scientists  should do with regard  to hu‐man, societal and cultural values. However, these different “trading zones”, such as ethics committees, IRB (Institutional Review Board) meetings or conferences and journals  on  ethics,  are  not  isolated  instances,  but  contribute  to  what  Brian  and Charlotte Salter have termed a (global) “moral economy”. They understand bioeth‐ics as a “political means” to create “a global moral economy where the trading and exchange  of  values  is  normalized  and  legitimated”  (Salter  and  Salter  2007,  555) between conflicting cultural positions.  The  necessity  to  establish  a moral  economy of  ethics  emerges  from  the  political need to reconcile the promises and expectations of emerging technologies with the cultural costs of scientific advance; that is, when economic values meet more cul‐tural  values.  Thus,  a  political  technology  is  necessary  to  adapt  technological  and economic regimes to public values and vice versa. Institutionalized ethics has been introduced  to  fill  this  gap  and  to  remedy  the  loss  of  public  confidence  in  the authority of science and politics  to govern knowledge production and  innovation in relation to given cultural values. The increasing demand for the social account‐ability of science in a mode 2 science and society demanded that knowledge pro‐duction  and  technological  development  commit  not  only  to  their  own  ethos  but also  to  “social  values”. While on one hand politics put great emphasis on  “public participation”, accounting for societal values was put in the hands of a new type of 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expert—ethicists with expertise  in morality. Ethics was regarded as an appropri‐ate means  to  provide  a  rather  friction‐free  environment  for  the  development  of innovation, which was seen as endangered by a largely assumed but partially real public  resistance  towards  technology.  Institutionalized  ethics  is  a  means  to  ac‐count for “social values” without involving citizen in this deliberation process, and thus  also  serves  to  legitimate  decision‐making  on  science  and  technology  to  the public by referring to ethics.  Institutionalized ethics—and this  is one of  its prime functions—makes the outcomes of balancing processes between technological and economic progress and given cultural values calculable. With institutionalized eth‐ics, politics can define the parameters of the calculation process and thus define, to a certain degree, desirable outcomes. In short, it is clear to politics how ethical ex‐perts work, how they think and what kind of suggestions they will produce, while the transfer of an ethical debate to the public is regarded as unpredictable from a political perspective. Referring to Salter and Salter (2007), the public might intro‐duce  a  “currency”  in  the  global moral  economy  that  is  inappropriate  as  cash be‐cause  it  cannot  be  exchanged with  other  currencies  in  the moral  economy,  thus fragmenting the global moral economy and providing a less favorable environment for businesses and research.  In what follows, I will briefly discuss four main characteristics of official ethics that contribute to the creation of a wider moral economy where values—and,  in their wake, knowledge—can be traded across cultural boundaries. I will sum up by high‐lighting some impacts of ethics research, the governance of innovation and the role of ethics in society. First,  in  order  to  imagine  a  space  where  values  can  be  traded  across  multiple boundaries (be they cultural, legal or technological), it is assumed that we inhabit a moral space  that at  least shares basic ethical principles. Such a common morality plays a prominent role in some of the most influential theories of biomedical ethics (Rauprich 2008; Turner 2003). The assumption of a common morality is particu‐larly pivotal  for  the  influential Principles of Biomedical Ethics  by Beauchamp and Childress  (1994). While  of  course  the  claim  of  common morality  has  been  chal‐lenged  often within  ethics,  the  very  practices  of  ethics  committees  hint  that  the assumption  of  a  common morality  is  a  guiding  principle  for  the  work  of  ethics committees. Common morality has become a self‐fulfilling prophecy, and based on the assumption that there is a common morality,  the recommendations of ethical authorities suggest norms that claim a wide‐ranging validity. This becomes evident in virtually every ethical opinion provided by these committees, where “the” ethi‐cal  issues  for  a  given  technology are defined with  the  assumption  that  these  are based on a societal consensus about “socially approved norms of human conduct’’ (Beauchamp and Childress 1994, 6). Ethical judgments from ethics bodies as well as  academic ethicists  are mostly deprived of  their  cultural  context of production (Hoffmaster  2001),  and  thus  seem  to  reflect  a  common  morality  that  is  widely shared. This belief in a common morality is crucial to allow for ethics to become a trading  zone  of  values  across  cultural  boundaries.  It  is  also  useful  to  innovation 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regimes that aim to create a free market for scientific knowledge and technologies, as a common moral economy allows for the free exchange of research.  Second,  the  authority  a  common morality  can wield  is  bound  to  the  question  of how it  is  institutionalized on a political  level. Here, recent years have seen an  in­
creasing  institutionalization  of  ethics  on  a  political  level.  All Western  states  now have a least one ethics committee that advises the government on ethical issues of science  and  technologies.  In  the meantime,  national  ethics  committees have  also started networking activities. The Forum of National Ethics Councils (NEC Forum), for  example,  consists  of  the  chairpersons  and  secretaries  of  the  national  ethics councils of member countries of the EU, and understands itself as an open coordi‐nator of the activities of national ethics committees.21 The European Conference of 
National Ethics Committees (COMETH)  is composed of representatives of national ethics  committees  (or  equivalent  bodies)  in  member  states  of  the  Council  of Europe.22 The EU itself also operates an ethics body, the European Group on Ethics 
(EGE). Additionally, there are a number of further ethics bodies on an international level,  for  example  the UNESCO’s  International  Bioethics  Committee.23 While  these bodies have been created  in order  to advise national as well as EU policies,  they increasingly go beyond their role of counseling and deliberation towards becoming powerful political players  in  legislation processes on science and technology,;  for example, Yesley (2005, 8) notes that we currently “witness several ongoing transi‐tions in bioethics: from a philosophical to a legal orientation, from national to in‐ternational standards, and from professional to political policymaking.” It is impor‐tant to note that the intensification of exchange between single ethics bodies estab‐lishes a (global) moral economy where values can be traded, and at the same time constitutes  these  ethics  bodies  as  serious  political  players  by  making  them  an “obligatory passage point” (Callon 1986) for national and supranational legislation on science and technology.  Third,  alongside  the  institutionalization of  ethics  in  the political decision‐making process on  science and  technology,  it  also  is  increasingly  “integrated”  in  the  very 
processes of research. Ethics has become a substantial part of  the current  innova‐tion  regime  in  Europe.  The  term  “integrated  ethics”  (European  Commission 2007b)  was  used  by  the  European  Commission  in  its  latest  Framework  Pro‐gramme 7. The practice of ethics in FP7 is closely related to the goals formulated in the Lisbon Agenda, with its clear economic imperative for research. While ethical clearance is required for research involving human subjects and human material, the EU regards ethics not as “hindering scientific progress”, but as trying to be “col‐laborative and constructive”. Ethics is not seen as in opposition to the free conduct of  research;  rather,  “By considering ethical  issues  from  the conceptual  stage of a 
                                                21   http://ec.europa.eu/research/science‐society/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.topic&id=75 (accessed July 8, 2008). 22   http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_Affairs/Legal_co‐operation/Bioethics/COMETH/  (accessed July 8, 2008). 23   http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php‐URL_ID=1879&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed July 8, 2008). 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proposal,  the quality of  research  is  enhanced”  (European Commission 2007a, 8). While one could argue that this is evidence for a new mode of knowledge produc‐tion that much more strongly  integrates social values  into  the conduct of science and does not regard science and society as antagonistic, the ethical review process is strongly shaped by the narrative of scientific and economic progress (European Commission  2007a),  as  public  concerns  beyond  the  limited  set  of  criteria  in  the ethical  review are not  considered.  Ethical  review processes,  thus,  publicly  signal that if research has been approved, everything is in order.  Ethics  has  become  inevitable  for  researchers.  It  accompanies  research  from  the writing  of  the  proposal  to  the  final  publication  of  an  article,  when  for  example journal  editors  ask  for  information  on  the  ethical  approval  of  the  research.  The term “integrated ethics” reflects that, in the parlance of European politics, “ethics” is seen not as alien to research but as an integral part of it. Increasingly, ethics is also taught at universities as part of the normal curriculum, thus promoting a spe‐cific frame within which researchers have to deal with the moral questions of their research.  Suggestions  to  develop  a  “European  core  curriculum  for  teaching  re‐search  ethics”  have  already  been made  (Lanzerath  2006),  pointing  again  to  the first point I made on the assumption of a “common morality”.24 The integration of ethics  into  research  signals  a  multiplication  and  expansion  of  “moral  trading zones” that are increasingly linked through common sets of ethical standards and thus constitute a wider moral market on which “values” are traded.  Finally, ethics  is  increasingly practiced  in a bureaucratic and  formalized way. The tendency towards bureaucratization can be observed both  in research ethics and in  the  political  ethics which  guides  legislation  activities.  For  the  seventh  Frame‐work Programme, the European Commission has designed a particular procedure that  every  research  proposal  must  go  through,  termed  “management  of  ethics”. The proposal must first discuss foreseeable ethical issues and how these are to be “managed”. After scientific evaluation,  the scientific panel decides  if  the proposal has to go through an ethical assessment process. Similar standard procedures can be  found  in  other  funding  agencies. What  is  interesting  is  the  standardization of the  process  of  “ethics”,  as  well  as  the  language  associated  with  it,  such  as  the phrase  “management  of  ethics”.  Furthermore, what  counts  as  an  ethical  issue  is predefined in the form of a “checklist” (European Commission 2007b), where sin‐gle ethical issues can be ticked off one by one. These formalized processes contrib‐ute to the exclusion of ethical issues that are not within the scope of the checklist. Here  is  a  vivid  example  of  this  “checkbox  ethics”  taken  from  the  ethical  review process of the UK’s ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council): 
                                                24   Another question that can be raised concerning ethics curricula for scientists is what under‐standing of ethics is promoted in the courses and how do the students perceive and deal with ethics in relation to what they understand as the „epistemic core“ of knowledge production. 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(Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) 2005, 34)  The ESRC Research Ethics Framework from which the above figure is taken states that “The study should not begin until all boxes are ticked” (Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) 2005, 34). “Ethics” here is performed in a particular way which displaces moral reflection from the minds and practices of researchers into a  form and the  ticking off of possible ethical  issues.  It suggests  that ethical ques‐tions can be  treated as yes or no questions, providing no  indication, however, of what it actually means—in a moral as well as practical sense.  The formalization of ethics in research is also demonstrated by the pre‐definition of what counts as an ethical  issue. As such, a quasi‐standard repertoire of ethical issues  in  research  has  been  developed.  These  are,  in  particular,  “informed  con‐sent”,  “privacy  and  data  protection”,  “animal  use”  and  “dual  use”  (European Commission 2008). These issues provide a fixed repertoire of responses to ethical concerns  and  are  regarded  as  a  panacea  for  moral  concerns  about  research. Moreover, these “solutions” are often not only seen as possible responses to ethical concerns (where maybe others are possible) but actually taken as ethical concerns themselves. These issues can be regarded as a “currency” in the moral economy of ethics, as  they appear  in most of  the ethical guidelines  for research and codes of conduct.  This  standard  repertoire  of  ethical  issues  in  research was developed  in the  past  in  the  context  of  certain  technologies.  This,  however,  possibly  led  to  a blindness to ethical aspects that come up in new technologies. An example is how the  Austrian Bioethikkommission  beim  Bundeskanzleramt  assessed  the  ethical  is‐
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sues of nanotechnology. After having discussed nanotechnology using the standard repertoire of ethical responses, it stated that “Nanotechnology as a new technology does not  raise  fundamentally new ethical questions”ii  (Bioethikkommission beim Bundeskanlzeramt  2007,  4).  A  certain  framing  starts  to  shape  perceptions,  and thus promotes a systematic blindness to alternative views. The frame of the fixed repertoire  of  ethical  responses  to  technologies  may  impede  the  introduction  of different ethical  issues  into  the debate. The assumption of a common morality  is further  demonstrated  by  the  standardized  responses  to  ethical  concerns,  which help to establish a common “currency” in the moral economy, making it is easier to trade  values  across  cultural  boundaries.  Such  formalization processes  often  con‐tradict the claim of ethics to be a space for advanced reflection, as the “ethical ma‐chine” is processing research from different domains and in different cultures us‐ing a limited set of formal criteria such as “informed consent” and “privacy”. How‐ever,  it makes  the  outcome  of  ethical  assessments  calculable  for  research  appli‐cants  as well  as policy makers. The  formalization of  ethical  assessments  guaran‐tees  that no new—and hence possibly  conflict‐triggering—ethical  issues emerge, and it allows researchers and politics to anticipate and respond in advance to ethi‐cal concerns. What are the consequences of the moral economy of ethics based on the idea of a common morality, its increasing institutionalization and integration into research, its  formalization  and  its  bureaucratization?  I  will  briefly  discuss  four  levels  on which the impacts of the dominant way of performing ethics are articulated. First, the “legitimate” space where ethics has to be negotiated is displaced to ethics committees.  This  narrative  was  also  prominent  in  the  discussions  at  the  Round Tables, where the researchers and lay participants often shifted authorative ethical expertise  to  institutional  bodies,  although  for  different  reasons.  The  researchers insisted on a division of labor between ethics and science in order to ensure their autonomy in knowledge production. The lay participants, buying into the idea that ethics needs  a  kind of  expertise,  and  thus  seeing  themselves  as poorly‐equipped for a real engagement in an ethical debate, regarded ethics committees as a coun‐terweight  to  the  values  promoted  by  progress  and  advancement  in  science.  Not only at the Round Table but more generally, ethics committees are imagined to be exclusive checkpoints  for  controlling  the social and moral  implications of knowl‐edge production in research. Responsibility for the overall trajectories of progress is displaced hence to a few institutions.  Second, on the level of research and researchers’ practices, institutionalized ethics appears  to be an “ironic” dealing with ethical questions of research—“ironic” be‐cause  ethics  is  taken  rather  seriously while  simultaneously  it  is  not.  It  has  to be taken very seriously by researchers, because to engage with it is crucial when ap‐plying  for  funding, which has  increasingly become  the dominant regime of doing research. Ethical engagement has become an obligatory passage point for conduct‐ing research in many disciplines. On the other hand, researchers are fully aware of the formal and bureaucratic nature of ethics in research proposals. Ethics has be‐
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come a routine feature of research, and thus often impedes a more reflective deal‐ing with one’s own practice (Bister et al. 2009). Laurel Smith‐Doerr (2004, 2008) has  argued  that  the wider  deployment  of  ethics  education  of  scientists  helps  to deflect  ethical  concerns  and  public  discourses  from  science,  because  the  formal‐ized methods of ethics provide quick answers rather than permitting a discussion of what the problem might be. Thus, “ethics”, like a Janus head, communicates two different messages to researchers, which are characterized by certain ambivalence. On one hand, the very practice of ethics as ticking off boxes in forms strongly sug‐gests that it is nothing but an administrative feature. On the other hand, ethics in a more open sense is perceived as a reflective way to deal with research and its con‐sequences that cannot be easily formalized.25 Third, the institutionalization processes of ethics also lead to the constitution of a space of “moral expertise” (Crosthwaite 1995; Powers 2005). While many domains of expertise of public science policy have been contested over recent decades, eth‐ics  has  managed  to  create  a  field  of  expertise  that  has  hitherto  gone  rather uncontested in the public. While the internal discussions of ethicists often address the  limitations  of moral  expertise,  or whether  the  possibility  of moral  expertise exists in principle, the practices of the dominant form of ethics in the public sphere prove that there is a fairly powerful field of expertise on moral questions of science and  technology. The moral  experts have gained authority over  the  framing of  is‐sues  in  public  debate,  and  often  practice  boundary  work  of  what  counts  as  an “ethical”  issue,  thus defining  to a  large degree  the way social concerns about sci‐ence and technology must be addressed. What “moral expertise” further does is to maintain  and  reinforce  the  distinction  between  “fact”  and  “values”,  or  as  Brian Wynne  (2001)  expressed  it,  “maintaining  a  distinction  between  science  and  its ethical  consequences”.  Dominant  institutionalized  ethics  is  preoccupied with  the ethical  consequences  that  emerge  from  (existing  or  anticipated)  applications  of scientific knowledge. Its focus on what technologies do when applied in the human domain,  however,  contributes  to  a  careful  separation of  the  scientific  knowledge production process from the domain of values. Thus, dominant ethical regimes can be described as an ethics of  implementation, or as an ethics of  compensation,  as Levidow and Carr (1997) term it—that is, as compensating for past value‐choices. Hence, current innovation regimes are barely challenged, because ethics is integral to securing this way of governing science. Because of this dominant form of ethics, “commitments  and  assumptions  are  protected  from  critical  collective  public  ex‐amination including critical self‐reflection on the part of those institutions defining and dominating the policy agenda” (Wynne 2001, 453). The quasi‐naturalized view of the fact/value distinction has turned out to be a powerful politics to guarantee the autonomy and free conduct of science as well as  linear models of  innovation. Steven Shapin (1995, 403) noted that “Our technical knowledge is only as secure as the moral economy in which it is produced. The ‘scientific portion’ of any ethical 
                                                25   I will  discuss  the  ambivalent  approach  to  ethics  in  a  later  chapter,  suggesting  that  the  re‐searchers’ way of dealing with ethics is much more complex than guidelines on research eth‐ics often suggest. 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decision contains  institutionalized moral  judgements, and the fact that we do not recognize  them as  such  is  itself  an aspect of  the modern  condition.” Taking  seri‐ously  the  critique by  these  scholars,  ethics needs  to  challenge more  strongly  the assumptions that are built into current innovation regimes, the concepts we have of how research  is and should be conducted and how science and society are co‐produced,  and  regard  these  as  fundamental  ethical  questions,  that  is,  as  open  to collective decision‐making, and not as given facts about how the world works.26 On a more general political  level,  state‐sponsored  institutionalized ethics  “separated ‘risk’  from ‘ethics’, while reducing both realms to specialist  tasks. The risk/ethics boundary was designed to gain public deference to the expert assessment of both safety regulators and professional ethicists” (Levidow 2001, 76; see also Levidow and Carr 1997; Wynne 2001). This separation of technical risks and societal values is central  to  the dominant regime of science governance  in Europe, as  it helps  to facilitate an innovation‐friendly policy by isolating value questions from technical questions. It suggests that technology can advance (and be safe) while traditional societal values are preserved. Hence, it provides the ground for separating techni‐cal and social innovation.  The  last point  I want  to raise here  is  that  “ethics”  is  increasingly associated with political  rule‐making  in  the  governance  of  science  and  technology.  Tallacchini (2006)  argues  that  ethics  has  become  a  self‐legitimating way  of making  politics and  law, but without  the usual guarantees of  the  legal  system  to protect  citizens from  state  power  or  particular  private  interests.  Ethics,  thus,  often  serves  as  a means  to  introduce norms beyond  those of  traditional political  rule‐making. The political assumption is that ethics is a more flexible version of law, able to speed up as well as simplify legislation processes. Expressions like “ethical legislation” in EU policy documents reflect the  institutional confusion that often renders ethics and legal  norms  hard  to  differentiate  in  practice.  The  use  of  IRBs  as  a  form  of  self‐regulation  of  science  exemplifies  the  entanglement  of  ethics  and  law.  Fleetwood and  Unger  (1994)  argue  that  IRBs  have  been  partly  established  as  “alternative courts”, lacking, however, the democratic legitimacy as well as the procedural rigor and transparency of official law systems. While the normative impetus of ethics is nothing new, it becomes problematic because of its institutionalization on the po‐litical level, its integration into the conduct of research and its increasingly formal‐istic nature. Thus, ethics has become a trading zone of what future norms should govern science and society, mostly without the opportunity for democratic partici‐pation in the decision‐making processes.  




In  this  chapter,  I  have discussed  two approaches  to  the  governance of  science—public participation and ethics—that  try  to  remedy  the  shortcomings of  classical centralized  state  politics.  While  both  have  in  common  the  orientation  towards “values”, and thus abstain from pure technical decision‐making,  there are a num‐ber of differences between the approaches. First, public participation aims to ex‐tend the range of opinions, attitudes and values to be included in deliberation and decision‐making  processes.  Thus,  new  kinds  of  knowledge  and  framings  are brought into the debate. Institutionalized ethics, on the other hand, pursues a poli‐tics of exclusion; that is, only a few experts—particularly those with a background in ethics, theology, philosophy, biomedical science and law—are entitled to define what  counts  as  “common morality”  and  thus  how  technoscientific  issues  are  ad‐dressed. Second, while bioethics began as a open dialogue between different disci‐plines concerning the moral challenges of new medical technologies,  it has domi‐nantly become a bureaucratic and  formalized  instrument  to “manage ethics” effi‐ciently—that is, to guarantee the basic rights of  individuals but give high priority to the free conduct of research within the regime of a knowledge‐based economy. Thus, ethics is more amenable to “progressive” innovation regimes than to societal concerns  about  the  consequences  of  research  and  emerging  technologies.  Public engagement  is  able—at  least  in  principle,  though  often  used  otherwise  (Irwin 2006)—to challenge the way issues are framed by experts and thus open up new and  more  socially  robust  ways  of  dealing  with  emerging  technologies  (Jasanoff 2003c).  Third,  there  is  a misunderstanding  about  the  “values”  over which  ethics and  public  participation  deliberate.  While  in  politics  “ethics”  is  (mis‐)taken  for public concerns, the terms do not refer to the same object. Ethics uses the concept of a  “common morality”, which  is assumed as a given ethical consensus, while  in public participation “public concerns” refers to practically articulated moral posi‐tions of citizens. Because it is not the same object, the latter plays virtually no role in mainstream ethics. Furthermore, it is often emphasized in ethics that the opin‐ion of the public on ethical issues must not inform what is good or bad in norma‐tive ethical reasoning.  While I basically advocate a wider public participation in ethical issues of science and  technology,  I  have  also  hinted  at  the  open  questions  and  problems  that  are created by the “participatory turn”;  in particular,  the often problematic construc‐tion of the “public”—and thus who is entitled to participate and who not—as well as the relation between public participation and other governance regimes, espe‐cially those of technocratic expertise and “commitology”. Furthermore, while some issues  are  regarded  as  open  for  a wider  involvement  of  the  public,  others  seem strictly  excluded;  for  example,  the  objectives  defined  in  the  EU’s  Lisbon Agenda, which  gave  high  priority  to  knowledge‐driven  economic  growth.  Under  this agenda, the public is not seen as able to participate in decision‐making processes—and  thus  possibly  to  challenge  some  of  the  developments—but  has  to  be  made 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“aware” of the benefits, in a top‐down process, in order to provide an “innovation‐friendly” environment for businesses and the free flow of knowledge. Thus, what is needed  is a more general  reflection on  the relation between citizens, democracy, science,  innovation  and politics, which defines more  explicitly  the  role  of  citizen participation in governance beyond being a politics of talk (Irwin 2006).  Only a few studies have hitherto—practically and theoretically—engaged with the question of public engagement with ethics, and those have been dominantly from the social sciences.  In ethics—although it  is  in part occupied with “empirical eth‐ics”, which addresses the role of social science research in relation to normatively informed ethical reasoning—public participation itself has not been an issue. Mairi Levitt,  herself  a  social  scientist,  reports  from  a  European  project where medical scientists and philosophers discussed the role of the public with regard to bioeth‐ics:   The view was expressed  that  there was not much point  in public  consulta‐tion about ethical issues in science and technology. The scientists agreed that the public are  ignorant about science and that  they need more  information presented  in  a  clear  and  simple  way.  The  philosophers  accepted  this  and talked about  the need  for  science  to present  the  facts while  they  (the ethi‐cists)  highlight  and  discuss  the  ethical  issues.  For  them  finding  out  what people think is not furthering ethical research which, instead, aims to clarify what  ought  to  be  done.  However,  scientific  ‘facts’  were  seen  as  relevant background. (Levitt 2003, 15‐16) The  reliance of ethics on scientific  facts,  as well  as  the disregard of public moral concerns for ethical reasoning and decision‐making, is akin to rather narrow tech‐nical risk‐assessment, in which public fears have been ignored as “irrational”. The assumption of the “ignorant public” by expert ethics, however, rests on prejudices that have never been explored in detail, as well as on the way the “public” is con‐structed through large‐scale quantitative surveys like the Eurobarometer. The ab‐sence of “factual knowledge” of a scientific type is interpreted as an exclusion cri‐terion for wider public participation in ethical deliberation. However, some studies have engaged with  the question of public engagement with ethics and come  to a rather different conclusion: The issues that lay people ﬁnd important, and the ways they express and de‐velop  their  opinions  and  arguments,  constitute  an  important  dimension  in policy decisions about  the use of new genetic  technologies. The richness of this lay contribution is best captured not by opinion surveys … but rather by deliberative processes that take place in groups—for example, focus groups, citizen’s  juries  or  Socratic  dialogue.  Such  deliberations  can  generate  a  so‐phisticated  discussion  that  goes  beyond  mere  unreﬂecting  prejudice  and adds  texture  to  often  abstract  and  principle‐based  philosophical  debates. (Banks, Leach Scully, and Shakespeare 2006, 300) 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What  Banks  and  co‐authors  suggest  is  that  the  “ignorance”  of  the  public—often taken by professional ethics as a justification for its exclusion—is a product of the absence of a mechanism of voicing that would reveal a more differentiated level of public  engagement  with  ethics.  The  public  is made  ill‐informed  because  of  the dominant ways  through which  it  is given voice,  that  is, quantitative surveys. The experts’  disregard  of  public  ethics  also  implicitly  assumes  that  there  is  only  one way  to address ethical questions of science and  technology. Mike Burgess (2004, 6), however, argues that  the “expert‐driven approach to ethics,  like that  found  in risk assessment and science, neglects the fact that ethical analysis of practical and policy matters is far from a univocal or uncontroversial practice.” Brian Wynne (2001) has argued that  institutionalized ethics  frames moral  issues of  science  and  technology  assumed  to  “represent  public  concerns”  in  a way  that can easily be digested and domesticated within the framework of the existing insti‐tutional culture of science governance. Instead, public engagement in ethics could reveal wider issues at stake. This is particularly important as the existence of eth‐ics is legitimated by public concerns and public interest. Mike Burgess argues that “policy  decisions  governing  what  options  are  available  to  health  care  providers and patients ultimately presume some perspective on what is in the interest of the ‘public’ … Since public policy in health and all other areas is inevitably justified in terms of the public interest, what is the relevance of personal experiences of injus‐tice to fair policy?” (Burgess 2004, 5). Because expert ethics argues about “public interest”, citizens should be involved in the process of ethical deliberation. Burgess goes even further by arguing that involvement in ethics is not only a right of citi‐zens, but also a civic duty, because  Overemphasis on the need to become “expert” in a particular application ne‐glects the expertise and responsibility we all have as citizens to consider the effects of our actions on others, and to participate and respect the stakes of others in the kind of society we become. (Burgess 2003, 15) Only a  few studies so  far have engaged with  the possibilities and  limits of public engagement with ethics in a more intense way that would shed light on how citi‐zens construct moral aspects of science and technology,  in particular with regard to the way they provide reasons for certain moral positions. This is because official ethics has assumed that they are not able to do so. This is particularly astonishing as ethics often argues that judgments should be based on facts and evidence. With regard  to  the  possibilities  and  limits  of  public  participation,  these  “facts”  are largely missing, and thus the neglect of the public as having a role in ethical delib‐eration is mostly based on pure guessing.  Engaging the public with ethics and allowing a greater role for citizens in the shap‐ing of how ethical questions of science and technology are addressed seems impor‐tant in light of the participatory turn science governance has undergone in recent years. However, it is also necessary to consider carefully how the public’s engage‐ment with ethics, and thus the knowledge and assessments produced in these set‐tings,  relates  to  professional  ethics  in  its  institutionalized  forms.  In  order  that  it 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I  have  so  far  discussed  “ethics”  and  “public  engagement”  as  separate  strands  in public  policy,  as well  as  in  academic  discussions,  that  have  been  barely  brought together so far. However, there exists a certain area in ethics that has the potential to  reconcile  these different  strands:  “empirical  ethics”.  In  recent years,  there has been an increasing engagement of academic ethics with the “empirical” in general and the possible links between ethics and social science in particular. At the same time,  the  social  sciences  have  engaged  more  intensely  with  issues  formally  as‐signed to the domain of ethics (e.g., Hedgecoe 2006; Corrigan 2003; Henwood et al. 2003). To a certain degree the debate is a “virtual” discussion, as it often revolves around assumptions of “what would happen if…”, while in fact the empirical ethics studies are rather scarce (Borry, Schotsmans, and Dierickx 2006). The mutual  in‐volvement  of  social  scientists  and  ethicists,  however,  presents  tremendous  chal‐lenges to both with regard to basic methodologies and epistemologies, as well as with regard to “politics”. As this dissertation is also engaging with ethical issues—how lay participants and scientists negotiate on ethical issues of genomics and sci‐ence/research in general—it is relevant to engage with this discourse in order to shed some light on my position in this debate and to situate this work within the debate. Contrary to some other social scientists who have engaged with the issue of collaborative work between social scientists and ethicists (Haimes and Williams 2007; Hedgecoe 2004), I do not straightforwardly argue for a closer and improved collaboration  or  dialogue  between  these  two  disciplines.  My  argument  here  is rather,  If ethics  is addressing the relation to social science (methods)  in order  to enhance  its  ethical  reasoning,  is  this  really  the  problem we  should  discuss?  Put differently, is the problem one of interdisciplinary cooperation, or does this debate raise much deeper questions about the status of experts in society, their legitimacy and the role of expertise in democratic society, as well as leading to power strug‐gles regarding who has the right to “represent” the public and society and its val‐ues? In  ethicists’  accounts  of  the  relation  between  the  social  sciences  and  ethics,  the relation between the disciplines is framed as a methodological debate. A definition of “empirical ethics” often cited in the literature comes from Sugarman, Faden and Weinstein  (2001),  who  define  “empirical  ethics”  as  the  application  of  research 
methods in the social sciences to the direct examination of bioethical issues. They call attention to contexts of morality, and the way the inclusion of social science meth‐ods in bioethics aims to enhance and enrich ethical analysis.  The arguments that ethics should engage with empirical research dominantly note the traditional inter‐ and multidisciplinary nature of ethics, and thus the question, 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Why not  include  social  science methods  and  findings? However, while  empirical ethics has existed for a rather  long time,  it has become subject to a wider debate only  with  the  last  decade.  Since  then,  the  social  sciences  have  begun  to  engage more intensively with issues that were dominantly in the domain of ethics, partly because  of  the  ELSA/ELSI  programs  of  the  Human  Genome  Project,  which  se‐quenced  the  entire  human  genome  in  the  period  between  1990  and  2003.  The large‐scale genome programs made biomedical research an issue of public policy, in  particular  by  incorporating  ideas  for  future  applications  from  the  very  begin‐ning. Further, universities have been increasingly subject to evaluation processes that  in  part  demand  greater  social  relevance  and  accountability  of  teaching  and research. Thus,  there  is  in  fact  a  competition between humanities  and  the  social sciences over resources and for public legitimacy, to which ethics too must increas‐ingly pay attention in order not to loose its financial basis. Hence the question is, Is “empirical  ethics”  a  site  of  the  struggle  for  public  and  political  legitimacy  and authority? While the inclusion of empirical data in ethics journals is still sparse, the debates around “empirical ethics” have produced some disturbances in ethics. This hints at the fact that much more is at stake in this debate than simply methodologi‐cal questions.  While there have been increased calls for “dialogue” and cooperation between the social sciences and ethics from both sides, the relationship between these two dis‐ciplines is also characterized by a series of misunderstandings, especially regard‐ing  the renewed  interest  in empirical methods on  the side of ethics. As Zussman (2000) has argued, many (if not most) ethical propositions are based on empirical claims.  These  empirical  “facts”  mostly  stem  from  the  (natural)  sciences,  which hitherto have served as a basis for ethical reasoning without reflection. Thus, the recent interest in empirical research from the social sciences as a source for “em‐pirical  data”  needs  additional  explanation.  Here  the  question  is  whether  the  re‐newed interest of ethics is in accessing an additional reservoir of “empirical data” or is due to a genuine interest in social science.  The most striking feature of these misunderstandings is that, in the perceptions of ethics,  the  social  sciences  are  often  equated  with  “empirical  methods”.  There  is also  an  assumption  about  intrinsic  linkages  between  “social  science”,  “empirical research”  and  “facts”,  where  social  science  (discipline)  conducts  empirical  re‐search (method) and is thus able to provide facts (ontology of the knowledge pro‐duced)  to  provide  a  basis  for  ethical  reasoning  (hierarchy  between  disciplines). Here, the social sciences are often seen as identical to “empirical research”, as, for example, is suggested by this quote: “We will use the terms, ‘sociology’, ‘social sci‐ences’,  and  ‘empirical  approaches’  in  a  broadly  interchangeable  fashion”  (Borry, Schotsmans, and Dierickx 2005, 52). There is also the assumption that “empirical” research  results  in  “facts”:  “The  common  picture  of  the  relationship  between bioethics and the social sciences assigns responsibility for accurately gathering the pertinent facts to epidemiologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and their kin, and for assessing  those  facts  to bioethicists wielding explicitly normative  techniques” (Nelson 2000, 13). 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Seeing the social sciences with the “facts” glasses is rooted in the metaethical dis‐tinction between  “is”  and  “ought”,  that  is,  the  idea  that  the  factual  can never de‐termine  what  could  be  regarded  as  good.  However,  while  normative  reasoning clearly draws a boundary around “facts”, the assumption is that “Good ethics starts with good facts” (Loewy 2003, 174); however, “Yet facts alone … will not produce good judgments since these are two different modes of thought. … It is an age‐old fact/value argument about the division of labor between those who carry the em‐pirical burdens and those who toil the normative fields: moral choices require in‐formation, but  they also  involve values and mores  that escape descriptive analy‐sis.” (Dzur 2002, 199‐200).  The role of social science as a provider of “facts” can be challenged in many ways. In  particular,  “facts”  never  speak  on  their  own,  but  are  inherently  linked  to  the theoretical  and epistemological  frameworks  in which  these  “facts”  are produced. What is called “facts”  is the product of technologies that make the social sciences see the things they see, and these means are neither neutral nor objective. The call of ethics for social facts demonstrates the wish to define what “is” the case in order to be able to carry out an ethical analysis in a proper way. However, not all scien‐tists  using  empirical methods  are  social  scientists;  and  social  sciences  often  em‐ploy non‐empirical methods of knowledge production. Furthermore, it is often dif‐ficult to precisely define whether a study is “empirical” or not—for example, a dis‐course analysis where texts that have been produced by others are analyzed. The metaethical distinction between “is” and “ought” assigns a special role to the social sciences, that is, as “merely empirical auxiliaries” (Borry, Schotsmans, and Dierickx 2005, 61) or as a “handmaiden” of ethics (Haimes 2002). A stronger “integration”, beyond a supplementary role for the social sciences, is accompanied by fears that ethics  may  loose  its  normativity  and  thus  its  relevance  (van  der  Scheer  and Widdershoven 2004). While on one hand the social sciences produce facts through empirical research, they are also associated with relativism: “Most bioethicists de‐picted sociological studies as irrelevant to their discipline because they feared be‐ing too strongly influenced by historical and sociological contextualization, which could bog  them down  in cultural and ethical relativism“ (Borry, Schotsmans, and Dierickx 2004, 1). The fear expressed is that the context would dictate what is right or wrong thus making ethics depend on cultural relativism. Another fear is that the inclusion of empirical research in ethical reflection would lead to “mediocre stud‐ies of little interest or significance” (Hope 1999, 219). However, the question is to whom such studies are and should be significant: To other ethicists or to politics?  While there are misconceptions on the side of ethics about what social science  is and what  it does,  the misunderstanding often also rests on  the side of  social  sci‐ence.  Klaus  Hoeyer  (2006a)  identifies  three  dominant  ways  in  which  social  sci‐ences encounter bioethics: They either employ a “deficit model” (bioethics lacks a sense of context), a “replacement model” (social science is the better way to con‐duct bioethics) and a “dismissal model” (bioethics should be abandoned as a mis‐construed veil of power). He goes on to suggest a dialogue with bioethics. 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However,  misunderstandings  seem  unavoidable  in  light  of  the  heterogeneity  of both disciplines. Even for social scientists, it is impossible to provide a comprehen‐sive account of their own discipline, its procedures and tasks. The “ethics wars”, as Hoeyer (2006a) has termed them, are not only a Methodenstreit between two dis‐ciplines about  the best way  to produce knowledge. Rather, both disciplines have different  “epistemic  cultures”  (Knorr  Cetina  1999)  that  also  define  the  way  the knowledge produced relates to politics and society. Scientific ways of knowing are always associated with political cultures as “civic epistemologies” (Jasanoff 2005). Focusing on the context of value production, as social science does, is not merely a methodological  question,  but methods  always  contain  a  performative  dimension that enact  certain politics  (Mol 2002; Law 2004). This  is  true  for both social  sci‐ence and ethics, which both carry implicit and explicit assumption about the politi‐cal  nature  of  their  knowledge.  Thus,  these  misunderstandings  reveal  different knowledge politics.  In politics, involving “ethics” is often equated with addressing “public concerns” in decision‐making. Debates and controversies are expected to be ended by referring the treatment of the issue at stake to an institutionalized ethics body. The assump‐tion is that institutional ethics is able to “represent” a common morality and thus to balance the questions posed by new technological developments and innovation with  given  values  in  a  society.  The discussions  around  “empirical  ethics”  in  part reflect  this  increasing  struggle  for  “representativeness”  and  public  legitimacy. However,  as outlined above,  it  is  strongly  contested whether public  attitudes  to‐wards ethical issues should inform ethical opinion making: “If it [a survey] is suffi‐ciently probing, it can determine the reasons why people have the beliefs and pref‐erences  that  they do,  as well  as  the  causes  for  their beliefs  and preferences  that may not function as reasons. But judgments, unlike preferences, are correct or in‐correct;  and  determining  what  people  believe  does  not  determine  whether  their 
beliefs are correct” (Hausman 2004, 244). This constitutes a striking ambivalence between allowing for public values and completely ignoring them, which helps to maintain ethics as a field of expertise that has been hitherto largely unchallenged in public debate.  “Public concerns”, in this version, do not include the values of people who are and will be confronted with new technologies. Public is replaced by “common”, which abstracts  from concrete people and refers rather to an abstract reason or  idea of values in democratic regimes that count as “accepted”. The social sciences—on the other hand—do have quite different technologies of representation. The “public” is rather understood as consisting of people with different attitudes and preferences.  Of  course,  the misunderstanding  is  also  on my  side.  Throughout  the  text,  I  have used  the  term “ethics”  rather  than  “bioethics” or  “medical ethics”.  I have also  fo‐cused  on  “ethics”  in  its  normative  version,  rather  than  “descriptive  ethics”  or pragmatist approaches. This is because I have aimed to describe ethics as a larger 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“epistemic community” (Haas 1992) and its dominant27 practices in societal, and in particular  political,  contexts.  My  focus  has  been  the  institutional  practices  and their relation to public policy, as well as the governance of science; in short, I have aimed to analyze ethics as a technology of power (without the intention to disqual‐ify  “power”  in  principle)  to  construct  communities  that  are  held  together  by  the “free” commitment to a certain reasoned morality (Rose 1999b).  When  describing  these  dominant  institutional  practices  of  ethics,  I  have  had  no intention of speculating on the individual motives of ethicists regarding their work in this profession, be it academics or members of ethics bodies. I regard ethics as a means to order and regulate how humans deal with themselves as a collective  in relation to scientific knowledge and technologies. Ethics as a means to co‐produce moral orders of humans and technologies, however, is not particularly dependent on the direct involvement of trained ethicists, but is rather a wider discourse that shapes  the way we deal with  values  in  relation  to  emerging  technologies.  Ethics could be analyzed as a certain kind of power (Hoeyer 2006b; López 2004) that is manifested in institutional practices. Thus, there is of course a wide range of mis‐understandings on the part of the social sciences with regard to how ethicists pro‐duce knowledge, and about the disciplinary cultures of ethics. However, the strug‐gle between ethics  and  social  science  is not  so much about  “method”,  but  rather about  “political  authority”,  as  particular  epistemic  cultures  and  methodologies construct certain visions of the social.  While an increased dialogue between social science and ethics, rather than mutual ignorance, is surely to be welcomed, in particular as it leads to the questioning of implicit assumptions both disciplines hold—that is, with regard to ethics, assump‐tions about  the nature of  the  social  and  the nature of  science and  research;  and, with regard to the social sciences,  their own, often non‐reflected, normativity—it also  seem  crucial  to  further  pursue  the  social  study  of  ethics  as  a  societal  phe‐nomenon, and thus contribute to a critique of ethics as an authorative institution. The basic problem of ethics is not that its evaluations are too weak and thus need additional evidence or “facts” from the social sciences in order to gain more legiti‐macy and representativity. Rather, this is just an isolated dimension of issues that concern  the  institutional  context  in  which  ethics  is  carried  out  today,  and  that characterize  ethics  as  a  political  endeavor.  Empirical  ethics,  however—with  its current appeal to social science as a new supplier of “evidence” and “facts”—aims to render ethics apolitical again, thus re‐enforcing the distinction between fact and values  or  is  and  ought,  something  which  Bruno  Latour  described  as  “(political) epistemology”, which “claims to be limited to Science, whereas its aim is really just to humiliate politics” and  to  “short‐circuit any and all questioning …  through  the invocation of Science as the salvation from the prison of the social world” (Latour 2004, 13).  (Political) epistemology  is not  treating science and politics with equal interest, but seeks  to do politics without politics by referring  to  facts and reason 
                                                27   For a similar approach of describing dominant discourses of ethics in the public domain, see Wynne (2001). 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“without respecting the procedures for coordination either of the sciences or poli‐tics”  (Latour 2004,  15).  Certainly,  Latour had  in mind natural  sciences  and  their invocation of facts and “nature” when doing politics. However, many claims made in the debate over “empirical ethics”, as well as in institutionalized ethics, strongly suggest that in fact a certain kind of (political) epistemology is enacted.  Hence,  engaging  with  ethical  issues—from  whatever  disciplinary  background—means performing public meaning. Institutionalized ethics so far has not reflected on  the constructive role  it  is playing  in  the performance of public meaning—and thus the role the public has with regard to deliberations on ethical issues. The in‐clusion of empirical methods in order to enhance ethical analysis and to be able to provide  more  valid  evaluations  does  not  cover  the  full  scope  of  the  problem. Rather, it hides and displaces the problem of the societal legitimacy of ethics. Thus, rather  than  simply  including  social  science  analysis  in  ethical  reasoning,  a much more fundamental reflection seems required. What is the role of ethics in society? How do the norms produced in ethical reasoning relate to public meanings? How does ethics  implicitly and explicitly  frame public debates on ethical  issues? What are  the  fundamental  presumptions  of  ethical methodologies? How are  ethical  is‐sues generated in the first place (why those and not others)?  In my opinion, ethics and the social sciences do not share enough common ground at  this  time  to  opt  for  a more  integrated  collaboration.  Both methodologies  and epistemologies  seem  rather  distant;  for  example,  consider  the  fact/value  and is/ought  distinction.  While  for  ethics  this  distinction  is  quasi‐naturalized  and serves to  legitimate the whole enterprise of ethical expertise,  in STS what counts as facts and what counts as a value is the product of negotiation processes that are constantly  being  remade.  There  is  nothing  basic  in  this  distinction  (see  Latour 1993,  2004).  Social  science  has  expressed  some  quite  fundamental  critiques  to‐wards ethics,  for example that professional ethics  is “thinning out” the debate on ethical issues (Evans 2002), or that bioethics has established a “global moral econ‐omy”  that  aims  to  normalize  the  trading  of  values  across  cultural  boundaries (Salter and Salter 2007), or that ethics has become a political technology that has introduced  a  kind  of  side‐law  beyond  the  traditional mechanisms  of  democratic rule‐making (Tallacchini 2006). This critique targets the institutional and political dimensions of ethics in society, and it is hard to see how a closer collaboration (or integration) with  social  science methods,  as  is often  suggested  in  “empirical  eth‐ics”,  can  remedy  the  often  problematic  nature  of  institutionalized  ethics.  In  my opinion there is a fundamental misunderstanding of social sciences involved, that social science methods and empirical work is somehow neutral and serves to cre‐ate facts about the nature of the social. However, methods as deeply performative have  a  normative  dimension  that  cannot  be  separated  from  what  is  called  the “facts”. On the other hand, sociological inquiries into ethical issues are sometimes rejected  by  ethicists  because  of  their  (implicit)  normative  statements  (Herrera 2008).  Thus,  the way  ethicists  deal with  the  social  sciences  sometimes  suggests that in their view social science research can be separated into two branches: the relatively neutral  gathering of data  (which  is  seen as  the domain of  social  scien‐
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In  order  to  contextualize  the  following  empirical  chapter,  I  will  now  shed  some light on the wider context of public engagement and ethics in the political culture of Austria. This context was mirrored in the discussions at the Round Table; that is, the participants not only reacted to each other, but also reflected—implicitly and explicitly—the  wider  civic  and  citizens’  epistemologies  (Jasanoff  2005;  Felt  and Fochler 2007) common in the cultural context they live in. By referring to the con‐texts in which our experiment in public engagement took place, I aim to make an argument to take seriously the localities of citizens’ encounters with science, a di‐mension often neglected in public participation exercises (Felt et al. 2006).  In  general,  the  science policy  engagement with public  participation  set  in  rather late in the Austrian context compared to the European context. Public participation exercises  have  been  implemented  rather  poorly  and  in  a  hesitant  way  (Felt, Fochler,  and Müller 2003a),  and  science policy has not managed  so  far  to  install sustainable measures in this regard. In the meantime, the priorities of science pol‐icy have shifted again, away from the attempt to let the public participate in tech‐noscientific  decision‐making  and  towards  “awareness”  campaigns  with  a  clear economic  impetus. Thus,  science  communication  in Austria  is  characterized by  a “prosperity  by  consensus”  narrative  (Fochler  2007),  where  the  public  is  largely and  deliberately  bypassed  in  contributing  to  opinion‐making  in  innovation  poli‐cies. This also holds for ethics in the public sphere, where citizens are completely absent  as  relevant  actors.  On  an  institutional  level,  Austria  is  in  line with  other European countries. However, while Austria has been able to implement ethics on administrative  level,  it  has  failed  to  initiate  a wider  public  debate  on  this  issue, with the result that ethics is seen as a matter for specialized experts.  In  the  following,  I will  outline  four  features  of  public  participation  and  ethics  in Austria that possibly informed the discussions at the Round Table.  The first attribute of the Austrian discourse is its particular cultural understanding 
of consensus. Austria has a long tradition of corporatist consensus politics, the so‐called Sozialpartnerschaft  (social partnership), which has  led  to a  rather  informal system of  politics, where  collective  decisions  are made  outside  of  parliamentary structures, which would warrant a certain degree of formal procedures and trans‐parency. The policy domains of the Sozialpartnerschaft are not limited to the direct concerns of employers and employees, but comprise a wide range of economic and social  issues. The corporatist culture has had the result  that conflicts and dissent are  rarely  brought  into  a  public  debate,  but  decisions  are  made  behind  closed doors without  the  deliberative  participation  of  the wider  public.  This  culture  of corporatist consensus is also reflected in public understanding of science policies. 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The main  aim  is  to  raise  the  “public  awareness  of  research  and  innovation”,  be‐cause innovation “is the motor of economic prosperity and provides a solid basis for  the  social  and  cultural  advancement  of  this  society.  The  public  is  too  little aware of this fact, and it should be made clear to the population through a number of  means”  (Rat  für  Forschung  und  Technologieentwicklung  2001).iii  Hence,  a “broad  acceptance  in  the  public”,  by  aiming  at  a  “societal  consensus”,  is  needed. The societal consensus is not one that is struggled with by engaging and involving the public, but a predefined one that has to be manufactured. The Austrian innova‐tion policy regime is located in the triangle of economic prosperity, public aware‐ness and consensus,  thus, rather closing down than opening up opportunities  for civic participation in research and technology development. The local cultural un‐derstanding  of  consensus was  also  present  at  the  Round  Table  discussions,  and was  articulated  in manifold ways.  For  example,  dissent—e.g.,  in  the  form of  fun‐damental  opposition  to  particular  practices—was  not  articulated  in  the  plenum sessions of the Round Table, but in peer group discussions, in order not to disrupt the social setting of the Round Table perceived as fragile. Thus,  in a way, the cul‐tural importance of consensus and the avoidance of public conflict led to a taming of the discourse.  
Great confidence in the status of expert authority is a second feature of the Austrian context that comes into play in ethics and in science communication. Based on the central agenda of Austrian science policy  to  raise  “public awareness”  for  innova‐tion,  the  campaign  Innovatives  Österreich  (Innovative  Austria),  for  example,  ini‐tially relied on classic means of advertising and PR. Later on, the campaign was re‐launched,  aimed  at  a  more  “interactive”  involvement  of  citizens  via  a  website where they could pose questions to “experts” who then provided their expertise on the questions of  the  lay public. Hence, while claiming  to be more  interactive and open to user involvement, the initiative also reinforced the hierarchical divide be‐tween experts and citizens.  Experiments with more  open  notions  of  lay  involvement  and  participation  have been  scarce,  and were  also  characterized  by  a  hierarchical  relation  between  lay participants  and  experts.  In  2002,  a  so‐called Diskurstag  (Discourse  Day)  on  ge‐netic diagnosis was organized by the GEN‐AU program.28 Despite its aim to create a more open debate on genetic issues, the organization was rather unspecific with regard to the overall aims of the event, especially with regard to its notion of “dia‐logue”, where, again, experts responded  to questions of  lay people  (Felt, Fochler, and Strassnig 2003). As there is no long‐learned tradition of participation in Aus‐tria, it was rather hard for the people to integrate the Diskurstag into their experi‐ences with the existing political culture. 2003, a citizen conference on genetic data was organized within the framework of the Innovatives Österreich awareness cam‐paign. The Danish consensus conferences served as a role model for this event, in which a panel of  citizens was supposed  to ask questions of experts and  then de‐
                                                28   The GEN‐AU program  is  a dedicated  research program  funding  research  in  the  field of  ge‐nomics. See http://www.gen‐au.at. The research this dissertation is based on also took place within GEN‐AU’s ELSA branch. 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liver  a  consensus  report.  While  this  exercise  was  celebrated  as  a  participatory event by the organizers, the citizen conference did not find any resonance in poli‐tics—and not  even  in media  reporting.  Its basic  logic was  that of  a participatory event—however, it remained unclear to all involved actors in what it participated (Bogner, Puchrucker, and Zimmer 2004; Felt, Fochler, and Müller 2003b; Fochler and Müller 2006). Furthermore, this citizen conference followed the model of  lay asking questions  and experts  responding. The  lay participants had not been em‐powered  by  the  organizers  in  such  a  way  that  they  were  able  to  challenge  and critically question the expert advice provided to them. Hence, a main feature of the consensus paper of  the citizens was that  they often recommended further expert engagement with issues, and thus re‐affirmed expert dominance over technoscien‐tific issues (Rat für Forschung und Technologieentwicklung 2003).  Later public engagement events of the GEN‐AU program focused on attracting pu‐pils to careers in research. This is also the focus of recent initiatives of the Austrian Federal Ministry  of  Science  and Research  (bmwf).  Under  the  heading  “Sparkling Science”29,  projects  are  funded  that  are  explicitly  directed  to  pupils,  aiming  at  a “true partnership” between research and schools. The long‐term goals are to raise the proportion of  scientists  in  the population, especially with regard  to  technical and natural science.  The recent  initiatives that focus on younger people further emphasize the educa‐tional impetus of the Austrian science policy paradigm. The larger public is seen as in need of education regarding the benefits of innovation for economic prosperity, and younger people must get into science in order to raise the number of scientists in this country, which is seen as an important prerequisite for innovation. The tone of these initiatives also suggests that the obligation to engage with science is with the public. The reason for the public’s reservations towards science is seen as an informational  deficit.  The  assumption  is  that  if  the  people were  better  informed they would appreciate  science and  subscribe  to a  career  in  science. The hesitant beginning of public engagement initiatives directed to a broader public, such as the 
Diskurstag  or  the BürgerInnenkonferenz,  has not been  continued  in  a  sustainable and  more  institutionalized  way  that  would  facilitate  a  sustainable  institutional learning process. There are also hardly any institutions that have experience and special competences in organizing such events, different exercises often seem un‐coordinated, and their relations to the more general democratic culture in Austria often remain unarticulated. This hints at the inability of Austria to develop its own culture of public engagement in science and technology, because most of the exer‐cises are  imported models applied  in  the Austrian context without adaptation  to more  local  cultures of participation. This  is  also  true  for  the uptake of EU policy discussions. They remain mostly in the background, and policies are implemented in a very selective way. In particular, the economic narrative of “public awareness” had a huge impact, while other facets of the European discussion, such as the de‐
                                                29     http://www.sparklingscience.at/ (accessed July 8, 2008). 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mocratic  impetus  of  participation,  are  often  completely  missing  in  the  Austrian discussion.  The strong role of experts also holds for the bioethical discourse in Austria, which is largely limited to the Bioethikkommission and its members. The Bioethikkommis­
sion is an expert panel with representatives from medicine, genetics, law, philoso‐phy, social sciences and theology. A representative of the pharmaceutical industry (Novartis) was on the panel in previous years, but has now been replaced by a rep‐resentative from disability organizations as a concession to critics. The majority of the members are  from  the  field of biomedicine. All  current members except  two are affiliated with a university. The bioethical discourse  in Austria  is mostly  car‐ried out by these people via contributions to a small range of high‐quality media. While the Bioethikkommission is supposed to initiate and facilitate a public debate on bioethical issues, the limited financial means of the institution do not admit the organization  of  particular  events  in  this  regard.  Besides  the Bioethikkommission and the individual contributions of a small number of its members, an engagement with bioethical issues is completely absent. In politics, the government has had no explicit programs on biomedical issues for years, and the political programs of the parties represented  in the parliament do not contain bioethical  issues. Thus, bio‐politics and bioethics are not very high on the political agenda in Austria. For ex‐ample, Austria has not been able so far to pass a law that regulates the production and use of human embryonic stem cells. The Reproductive Medicine Act indirectly prohibits production, but the exact legal status of imported stem cell lines is con‐tested among experts. Opponents and advocates of stem cell research are reluctant to  regulate  this  domain:  The  advocates  fear  that  the  legal  rules would  constrict research too much, while opponents assume that they would lead to further liber‐alization. Thus, a grey area has been established where everyone seems happy that the matter  is  not  formalized  in  legal  norms  (Körtner  2008a).  This  situation  also holds for other biomedical issues. In general, politics seems reluctant to explicitly address biomedical issues, because these issues are seen to lack political relevance compared to others. Furthermore, it is feared that the debate produces “unneces‐sary” conflicts that impede the innovation paradigm proclaimed by science policy. This policy of non‐conflict supports the role of ethical experts, as the  issue  is not publicly discussed and expert opinions are not be in danger of being challenged in public debates. The confidence that is put in experts and their authority was reflected in the dis‐cussions at the Round Table. The first two to three Round Tables were often char‐acterized by one‐directional communication: Researchers provided factual knowl‐edge while the lay participants asked some questions for clarification and further explanation.  This  puts  the  researchers  in  the  role  of  experts  and  the  lay  partici‐pants in the role of consumers of knowledge. People were hesitant to bring in their own experiences, as this knowledge was initially not regarded as a legitimate form of discourse in such a setting, thus maintaining the hierarchy between experts and lay. That is, both researchers and lay participants regarded the “expert” model as the ideal‐typical way in which to debate about knowledge in the public domain. 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Third, the ethical discussion in Austria is largely monopolized by one institution and its  members,  namely  the  national  ethics  committee,  Bioethikkommission  beim Bundeskanzleramt (founded 2001). A large proportion of the public discussion of ethical issues of science and technology is carried out either by this institution or by  a  rather  small  number  of  its  members.  Furthermore,  the  public  debate  over ethical  issues  takes  place  via  certain media;  that  is,  in  a  few  “high‐quality”  print media and in a few branches (such as the religion department) of the public broad‐casting corporation, ORF. The domination of ethics by the national ethics commit‐tee is complicated by a high degree of opaqueness. In particular, the Bioethikkom­
mission  has been criticized  for  its opaqueness with  regard  to  its process and  the appointment  of  its members  (Gottweis  2001).  The  criteria  for  the members’  ap‐pointments,  as  well  as  their  legitimacy  in  representing  societal  values,  are  not transparent—an issue which has been often criticized in STS (Jasanoff 2003b). The members are not asked to publicly reveal conflicts of interest, which is particularly a problem for the members who come from biomedical disciplines.  In the past, a possible conflict of interest have been a source for some public debate which led to the resignation of the last chairman of the Bioethikkommission—however, not be‐cause he had such relations, however, but because he promoted a medically con‐troversial cancer therapy.   With the Bioethikkommission as the dominant actor in ethics in Austria, it is seen as the “natural” and legitimate place for ethical deliberations, allowing for a delegat‐ing—or  displacing—of  ethical  questions  to  the  committee.  The  concentration  of “ethics” in a single institution and a handful of actors also leads to the framing of ethical  issues  in a particular way.  In particular,  the Austrian bioethical discourse has  subscribed  to  a  deontological  ethics  and  has  focused  on  the  preservation  of human  dignity—rather  similar  as  in  the  German  “civic  epistemology”  of  ethics (Jasanoff  2005).  Furthermore,  representatives  of  ethics  often  have  a  Christian background, and thus promote a certain framing of ethical issues dictated by onto‐logical understandings of human nature, barely leaving room for other framings of  the value debate.  The monopolized character of ethics in Austria was to a certain degree reflected in the  discussions  at  the  Round  Table  in  the  assumption  of many  participants  that ethics  is best handled  in an  institutionalized committee consisting of experts and representatives  of  societal  interest  groups.30  The  monopolistic  character  of  the ethics committee further influenced the Round Table discussions in the lay partici‐pants’ desire for a central agent able to assemble and reconcile heterogeneous val‐ues by providing  collectively binding moral  advice. Because  ethics  has been mo‐nopolized by a few actors, the participants at the Round Table were also hesitant to label their engagement as “ethical”, calling it “moral” instead. What also became visible in the discussions at the Round Table was the desire to delegate the respon‐sibility  for  ethical  decision‐making  to  certain  authorities  that  were  regarded  as 
                                                30  On the other hand, the lay participants struggled to find a composition of the committee that was “representative” enough in order to legitimate its decisions. 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better equipped for engaging in the discussion. Of course, participants also called for public deliberations on ethical issues, which involves the public to a larger de‐gree; however, in the end, institutions were seen as the legitimate space for collec‐tive decision‐making.  The  fourth  aspect  of  the  Austrian  ethical  and  participatory  culture  concerns  the particular understanding of  the “public” and  its role  in society  in  the presence of the conception of a potentially malleable and technology­adversarial public. A com‐mon assumption about the Austrian public is that it is hostile towards technology in general (Torgersen and Seifert 1997). This assumption, widely shared in science policy circles, stems from a few instances where the public heatedly rejected tech‐nologies, in particular the nuclear power plant in Zwentendorf, which was rejected in  a  referendum  in 1978  (see,  for  example, Hirsch  and Nowotny 1977; Nowotny 1979), and the public resistance against a hydroelectric power plant  in the Hain‐burg floodplain forest in 1984. These instances, supported by the outcomes of the EU’s Eurobarometer  surveys,  led  to  the  idea  that  the Austrian population  suffers from a general aversion towards technology. Zwentendorf and Hainburg were both instances where, for the first time since the Second World War, the formation of a civil  society  resulted  in  a  large  mobilization  and  in  changes  in  the  authorative methods  of  official  politics.  However,  it  was  a  form  of  “uninvited  participation” which was not very well appreciated by politics. This results in a political paradox: the public should engage and participate in (technological) matters, but if the out‐come is not in favor of the political elites, the idea of a malleable and ignorant pub‐lic is invoked. A second paradox arises between the idea of the aversion of the pub‐lic  towards  technology  in  general,  and  the  political  encomium  of  the  innovative potential of Austria, where  it  is praised as a  leading  innovator, particular  in high technology. The assumed general “aversion” of the population towards new tech‐nologies must be related to the fact that,  in nearly all cases, research and techno‐logical  application  goes  on without  any  controversies. Wider  public  rejection  fo‐cuses  on  only  a  few  technologies,  namely  nuclear  technologies  and  agricultural GMOs. Hence, it is interesting to observe in what instances politics invokes the nar‐rative of a public that suffers technology aversion. Often, the “public” is drawn on when it is feared that a particular interest group may object to certain innovations. The  idea  of  a  malleable  public  finds  its  continuation  in  the  discussion  around (bio)ethics  in Austria. The public  is  seen  as  subject  to demagogic manipulations, and thus as holding unreasoned opinions. Here  is a quote  from an article by  two members  of  the Bioethikkommission  in  which  they  discuss  the  relation  between ethics and the public:  Instruments of participatory democracy are certainly not a convincing alter‐native [to expert panels]. They refer to “the population”, which is constantly re‐invented in plebiscitary campaigns to stage politics as a medial and emo‐tionalized  event. …  The  request  for  increased  involvement  of  the  public  in bioethical and biopolitical debates  is emphatically  to be supported with re‐gard to democratic politics, but encounters considerable difficulties in its re‐
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This dissertation is based on a research project, “Let’s talk about GOLD! Analyzing the interactions between genome‐research(ers) and the public as a learning proc‐ess”,31 of  which  the  main  element  was  the  organization  of  a  public  engagement event—the Round Tables—where a group of  lay people and genome researchers met over a  longer period of  time  to discuss ethical and social  aspects of genome research. The Round Table, as well as interviews with all participants, provided the empirical data for my dissertation.  The central idea of the project was to stage a “collective experiment” in public par‐ticipation in ethical and social aspects of genomics. “Experiment” refers to our aim to deliberately modify key parameters of public  engagement  settings  in order  to test  implicit  and  explicit  assumptions of  the  relations between  “the public”,  “sci‐ence”  and  public  engagement.  “Collective” means  that many  elements  of  our  en‐gagement  setting were  subject  to  changes  emerging  from  the discussion process itself, and therefore the project was open to input from the participants. We modi‐fied the public participation method of  the “Round Table”  that was developed by the Swiss foundation Science et Cité. Its basic principle is to let a group of lay peo‐ple accompany a bigger research project/topic over a longer period of time. Expe‐riences  for  setting  up  the  project  came  from  another  project  that  analyzed  and compared public engagement exercises and their role in a “socially robust politics of knowledge” in several European countries (Felt, Fochler, and Müller 2003b), as well as from evaluations of public understanding of science activities (Felt, Fochler, and Strassnig 2003). 
6.1.   The “Round Table” as a “collective experiment” of 
public engagement with science 
The idea of a “collective experiment” was central  to the design of  the setting. We aimed to set up a rather different  “trading zone”  for  the negotiation of values by taking up several aspects and problematizations of public engagement and ethics. What are the basic characteristics of the “Round Tables” that we aimed to modify for our public engagement setting? 
                                                31  The research project was carried out at the Department of Social Studies of Science (Univer‐sity of Vienna) and funded by the GEN‐AU ELSA program of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Education,  Science  and  Culture.  The  principle  investigator was  Ulrike  Felt.  Annina Müller, Astrid Mager, Maximilian  Fochler  and  I worked  at  the  project  at  the Department  of  Social Studies of Science, University of Vienna, and Sandra Karner and Bernhard Wieser at the IFZ Graz. The project ran from 2004 to 2007. 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Upstream engagement:  In order to allow the participants to address a wide range of ethical and social questions,  the question was  in what kind of research the  lay people should be involved. The selection of the genomics project was an attempt to choose a project that on the one hand understood itself as “basic research”, but on the other hand was related to contemporary issues in public health and thus might have  implications  for a wide range of actors  including members  from the public. Hence, the lay participants in particular would have the possibility to discuss more fundamental values underlying innovation processes as well as imagined outcomes and their consequences for society. While other models of science communication and public engagement step  in at a rather  late point  in  time, when many  institu‐tional  commitments  have  already  been  made  and  a  wide  range  of  issues  is  no longer  open  for  debate,  upstream  engagement  rather  poses  questions  about  the innovation regime as such, and thus seeks “to force some of these questions back on to the negotiating table” (Wilsdon and Willis 2004, 29). 
Symmetrical  participation:  In  order  to  recover  the  shortcomings  of  science  com‐munication within a deficit model of public understanding of science, recent public engagement  events had  taken  the  idea of  the public’s  “speaking back  to  science” too far, so that there was little room for those who spoke in the name of science to articulate their expectations, hopes and concerns apart from delivering the “facts”. Thus, we aimed at involving both lay participants and researchers in a symmetrical way. Symmetry concerned both the number of members invited to the Round Ta‐ble and the discussion procedure. For example, we abstained from using academic titles when addressing each other, in order not to further facilitate already existing hierarchies  between  lay  participants  and  researchers.  All members were  free  to provide input at any time during the discussions; the facilitator was instructed to take special care of those who had less trust in their rhetorical abilities, and thus were rather silent.  
Long­term  engagement: Our  aim was  to  allow  for  a  continued  debate  that  could refer  to prior discussions and  thus elaborate on  some  issues  in more detail. The long‐term engagement allowed for the participants to reflect on the discussion and re‐problematize  certain  issues  later  on. While  in  short‐term  interactions  partici‐pants tend rather to “sell” their “messages”, an ongoing engagement may open up the space for discursive ambivalences and complexities that we think are a feature of  current  technosciences which  needs more  reflection.  This  is  of  crucial  impor‐tance for the discussion of ethical and social aspects, because the Round Table had to be able to provide enough time to allow for the development of complex argu‐ments and continued discourses. Long‐term engagement also allowed for develop‐ing (negative and positive) social relations between the participants, and thus the articulation  of  dis/trust  relationships  between  researchers  and  lay  participants based on concrete experiences. 
Open dialogue: Our aim was to create an open space with as few rules as possible. Our facilitator was briefed to intervene as little as possible, but to take care that a fair discussion took place. Of course, our setting was far from being “neutral”, and, 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moreover, had a strong performative dimension that is  included in our participa‐tory setting as well as in social science method (Law 2004). Our interventions took place during the design of the setting, and we aimed for little input as possible dur‐ing  the  discussion  process.  The  open  space  idea  was  continued  over  coffee  and lunch breaks, where the researchers and lay participants had the chance to discuss outside  of  recorded  plenum  sessions,  and  thus mutually  engage  in  a  rather  per‐sonal way. The open dialogue aim was supported by the confidentiality of the dis‐cussions, because the Round Tables did not  take place  in public.  “Open dialogue” also meant  that we as organizers never explicitly or  implicitly expressed any ex‐pectations about what would be the desired outcomes of the process.  
Process as outcome: We explicitly did not demand a concrete output such as a con‐sensus  paper  from  our  participants,  but  regarded  the  process  itself  as  the main “product” of our project. We assumed that a pre‐defined output would narrow the discussion process too quickly and demand the entire attention of the participants. Furthermore, we decided that the discussion would not directly feed into policy, in order not to trigger the participants’ expectations with regard to a direct political input.  However,  our  focus  on  the  process  itself  left  some  of  the  lay  participants quite puzzled about what the aim of the Round Table had been.  These aspects were communicated—as well as our  intentions  for  the project—at the beginning of the Round Table.  In our version of the Round Tables, a group of 14 lay people met with a group of genome researchers working together on a specific research project on the genom‐ics of lipid‐associated disorders (“GOLD”). The number of Round Tables organized was six, and  they  took place over a period of 8 months  from September 2004  to May 2005 in Graz, Austria, where the bulk of the GOLD researchers were working. The lay participants were selected via a nationwide call through posters and leaf‐lets in public institutions with an educational mission (public high schools, muse‐ums, etc.). This strategy was chosen on one hand to reach a quite broad range of the  Austrian  population,  and  on  the  other  hand  to  specifically  target  audiences relevant to the project goals (affected people, people related to the issue of gender and health). Additionally, we advertised in a local newspaper and sent bulk mail to the  local  population  in Graz, where  the Round Tables  took place.  The  applicants were asked to write a short paragraph on their motivations for participating in the activity,  and  to  provide  some  basic  personal  data.  This  information was  used  to select the participants. We aimed at a balanced selection regarding sex, age, educa‐tion and personal motivations. However, our goal was not “representativity” of the Austrian population, but heterogeneity with regard to personal motivations while maintaining a balanced distribution of sex, age, and education. While we achieved this with  the  former  two,  the  actual  selection  of  education  had  a  strong  bias  to‐wards higher education. We can only speculate about the absence of applications from people with no formal education, but it was surely due to the issue of genom‐ics  in  the domain of  lipid disorders,  as well  as  to  the  large  time  investments we demanded from the participants. 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One of the basic aims of the “Let’s talk about GOLD!” project was to contribute to an  enlarged  vision  of  social  and  ethical  issues  linked  to  the  field  of  genome  re‐search, which  goes  beyond  the  classical,  purely  expert‐defined perceptions. Usu‐ally,  ethics  is  discussed  between  “experts”  in  specially  established  bodies.  Its members have to prove their expertise in order to be assigned to an ethics body. In light of critical public understanding of science and the “participatory turn” in sci‐ence governance, we aimed  to  set up an experiment where ethically non‐trained persons—lay participants and researchers—could discuss ethical  issues,  in order to  think about whether  their contributions could provide an alternative vision of how ethical issues can be addressed. The Round Table provided a platform where those who can be regarded as “producers” and “users” of  the knowledge meet and discuss their visions of the ethical and social aspects of genomics.  Official discourses on ethical issues in technosciences are characterized by a strong hierarchy  of  knowledge.  The  expertise  provided  by  ethics  bodies  is  considered more authorative than opinions held by the public with regard to ethical aspects of science and technology. Thus, the role of the public in this discourse is rather mar‐ginalized, particularly in the Austrian context. Though members of expert commit‐tees often claim that they want to facilitate “public discussion” on bioethical issues, it  remains unclear how precisely such a discussion  is  imagined, beyond  the pub‐lished  opinions  of  experts  for  consumption  by  the  public.  The Round Table  pro‐vided a setting were  it should be possible  to debate ethical  issues without a pre‐defined  hierarchy  of  knowledge  on  ethical  and  social  aspects  of  genomics.  The Round Table, however, had no intention of replacing ethics committees and other forms of  institutionalized ethics. It also did not aim to provide a definite decision or recommendation for ethical issues related to genomics; that is, it did not assum‐ing the framing of institutionalized ethics. The aim was to provide different perspec­
tives on ethics, which could possibly nourish professional ethics with experiences from other more  open  settings,  as well  as  to  generate  accounts  of  ethical  issues able  to  challenge  framings  of  issues  by  institutionalized  ethics  (Jasanoff  2003c, 2003a) In contrast to ethics committees that provide expertise for governmental decision‐making on bioethical issues, the Round Table was linked to a concrete research pro­
ject and to the work of the participating researchers. This does not mean that ethi‐cal  issues  only  had  a  narrow,  project‐related  focus.  In  fact,  the  participants  ad‐dressed ethical questions mostly in a more general way, oscillating between “eth‐
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ics  in general” and “ethics in particular”. However, the presence of a concrete ge‐nomics project and the people involved in it provided an “anchor” for the discus‐sion that allowed it both to abstract from the particular research and to return to it when  needed.  This  should  have  allowed  for  a  debate  over  ethical  questions  “in here” by people who personally have to bear the consequences of both the scien‐tific research and of rule making based on recommendations by professional eth‐ics. Thus, I think it makes a huge difference in the framing of ethical issues whether one  gives  general  recommendations  on  wide‐sweeping  bioethical  issues  or  ad‐dresses ethical concerns in the context of a concrete research project. The Round Table, thus, goes well beyond the notion of “empirical ethics”, which is a very narrow one with regard to the role of the social sciences and the abilities of non‐experts  in  ethics  (in  our  case,  both  lay  participants  and  researchers).  First, ethics  in  social  contexts was  not  just  observed  for  theoretical  reflection,  but  the participants were actively asked to engage with ethics in the field of biomedicine. Thus,  the ethical discourse at  the Round Table was not another source of data  in the way  that  scientific  facts  provide  data  for  ethicists’  analysis.  The  participants were well  aware  that  they were  engaging  in  and  contributing  to  a  discussion  of ethical  issues of biomedicine.  Second,  I  aim  to  analyze what  ethical  concepts  the participants used themselves, and in what kind of wider conceptions their ethical reasoning was embedded. Hence, my theoretization of the ethical issues discussed at the Round Table is strongly linked to the discourses of the participants, and does not take place independently from them, as it  is often the case in ethics based on the metaethical  distinction  of  facts/values  or  “is”  and  “ought”.  Third,  “empirical ethics”  is  framed  as  a  problem  of  interdisciplinary  co‐operation  between  social sciences and ethics. Thus, the discussion and negotiation remains among experts. We, however, regarded the participants as “experts” on debating ethical issues. 
6.3.   Data Analysis 
The analysis of  ethics  at  the Round Table was made using  the Grounded Theory method  (Strauss  and Corbin  2000).  The Grounded Theory  approach was  chosen because of its synoptic consideration of theorizing and data analysis, which allows oscillating  between  both  levels,  and  because  it  does  not  predetermine  empirical analysis  by  ex  ante  imposed  theoretical  frameworks.  While  I  did  not  follow Grounded  Theory  in  a  formulaic  way,  it  provided  the  guiding  perspective  for reaching an inclusive consideration of theoretical, contextual and concrete empiri‐cal elements.  All  data  were  encoded  with  Atlas.ti  software  using  iterative  processes  of  global coding in order to develop a code set appropriate for the data. Global coding also served  to  identify  the  main  themes  and  discursive  lines  of  the  ethical  debates. Then, relevant ethical  issues at the Round Table were selected for analysis  in de‐tail.  The  relevance  of  issues  was,  on  one  hand,  determined  by  the  participants 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The general purpose of this thesis is to illuminate basic aspects of a discussion on ethics  in  a  “bottom‐up”  public  engagement  setting,  beyond  the  usual  expert‐oriented  settings,  and  thus  to  inquire  into  the possibilities  and  limits  of  citizens’ (researchers’  and  lay  people’s)  engagement  with  ethics.  Such  an  analysis  has barely been done in detail before. However, such work is crucial for understanding the relations between science, the public and the role of expert ethics in our con‐temporary  society,  because  the  current division of  labor between  these actors  is built on a wide range of assumptions that have not been scrutinized in detail be‐fore. Ethics today is a substantial feature of innovation regimes that include visions and expectations of technosocial futures. Thus, it seems crucial to juxtapose domi‐nant policy regimes with the responses of those “affected” by their policies, in or‐der to analyze how these link up (or not).  I posed three broad research questions to the material: 1. What issues counting as ethical have the participants discussed? 2. How did the participants discursively deal with ethics? 3. How did  the  participants  evaluate  their  participation  in  a  discussion about ethics, and what did they “learn” from it? The  first  research  question  seeks  to  analyze  the  main  ethical  issues  that  were raised by the participants. This question is related to the fact that institutionalized ethics frames ethics in a particular way and thus gives priority to very specific is‐sues.  Thus,  my  research  questions  seek  to  shed  light  on  researchers’  and  lay­
people’s framings of ethics. In more detail, this question asks 
• What ethical issues do the participants define as crucial with regard to genomics,  and  also  with  regard  to  science  and  research  on  a  more general level? 
• Who should be concerned with these questions and who should be in‐volved in a debate about them? 
• Where are the legitimate and appropriate sites where these questions can and should be asked? 





• How  should  researchers  deal with  ethical  issues,  both  in  the  eyes  of the lay participants and according to the researchers themselves? The second general research question considers the Round Table as a trading zone for values.  Institutionalized ethics widely neglects the fact that their ethical opin‐ion‐making takes place within a certain social context. Thus,  I aim to analyze the 
discursive mechanisms and strategies at work in the discussions that are an integral part of every ethical talk.  
• What discursive processes take place at the Round Table that shape the dis‐course on ethics? Are there hierarchies and power structures that shape the ethics  debate? What different  “micropolitics”  are performed  at  the Round Table? 
• How does  the participants’  engagement with ethics  contribute  to  the con‐struction of individual and collective identities at the Round Table (and be‐yond)? 
• How  do  the  participants  relate  knowledge  to  the  ability  to  make  ethical judgments?  The third main research question analyses the researchers’ and  lay people’s self‐evaluations  of  their  involvement  in  a  discussion  on  ethics.  This  set  of  question takes seriously the Round Table as a kind of learning process, and asks what differ‐ence it makes that both researchers and lay people took part in the Round Table.  
• What changes  take place  in  the perception of ethics during  the discussion process?  
• What do the participants “learn” from their participation in the Round Ta‐bles,  with  regard  to  ethics  as  well  as  with  regard  to  their  perceptions  of each other? 
• After participants have engaged with ethics  for a rather  long period, what role do they attribute to ethics in the governance of science more generally?  
• How do the lay people perceive the researchers’ dealing with ethics in rela‐tion to their societal status and role? 






edge as a bottom‐up perspective on “ethics”. I will do so by analyzing how the main “ethical”  issues were  discussed  at  the  Round  Table. My  analysis  focuses  on  two different strands of the discussion. First, value questions concerning the relations 
between research and societal values. In this domain, I identified two relevant ethi‐cal issues around which values were negotiated:  
• I will  start  (chapter  8.1)  by  analyzing  the  discussion  of what  counts  as  a problem and its solution, focusing on the issue of “obesity”: What is the na‐ture of the “obesity problem” and what kind of “solutions” should be drawn upon  in order  to  solve  the problem? What are  the values  the participants draw upon when making their arguments?  
• In chapter 8.2, I analyze the discussions around the issue of “responsibility” of research: What different positions were debated at  the Round Table on the  question  of  who  should  and  can  take  responsibility  for  the  conse‐quences of the knowledge produced by research? For what can responsibil‐ity be taken and for what can it not? What are the different understandings of how responsibility should be enacted? The  second  strand  of  the  ethical  discussion  at  the  Round  Table  focused  on  the 
means of knowledge production. This discussion primarily revolved around the is‐sue of animal experimentation, but quickly  left  the  terrain of a pure moral ques‐tion—“is animal experimentation right or wrong?”—and revealed aspects that are not typically associated with animal ethics in academic ethical debates on this  is‐sue:  
• First, I investigate how the drawing of ethical boundaries in animal experi‐mentation  served  to  (co‐)construct  the  individual  and  collective  identities of the researchers (chapter 8.3).  
• Second, I analyze the relations between the way the researchers articulated their  position  towards  animal  experimentation  and  the  lay  participants’ trust in the researchers (chapter 8.4).  The term “lay” in “lay ethical knowledge”, refers to “expertise” on ethical issues—thus,  both  researchers’  and  lay  participants’  discourses  of  ethics  fall  under  the category  of  lay  ‘ethical’  knowledge.  I  will  use  the  term  “knowledge”  rather  that “epistemologies” because the latter term by Jasanoff (2005) would need the clarifi‐cation of dimensions such as objectivity strategies, styles of public accountability, demonstration practices and so forth. I assume that in the public there are ethical 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epistemologies present; however, to analyze these would require me to go beyond the available data and conduct further empirical research. Thus, I will use the more modest term “knowledge”, which also allows for incoherent and fragmented pieces of the participants’ engagement with ethics to be included in the analysis. The no‐tion  of  lay  “ethical”  knowledge  is  useful  to  express  that  the  participants’  under‐standing of “ethics” was not necessarily be based on a coherent set of principles in the sense of academic ethics. Furthermore, I put the term “ethical” in quotes, as it was  not  always  certain whether  the  participants  saw  themselves  in  an  “ethical” discussion or in one on “values” or in a “political” discussion.32 However, this is not (only) a definitional or analytical problem, but a substantial part of the discussion itself, reflecting wider societal issues with regard to ethics.    




In  this  chapter,  I will  analyze  the  “ethical”  issue  at  the  Round  Table  around  the question  of  defining  “problems”  and  solutions.  Concretely,  the  debates  revolved around  “obesity”  as  a  central  subject  in  the work of  the  researchers, which  they focused  on  in  their  descriptions  of  their  work  from  the  beginning.  The  issue  of “obesity” was an interface which linked their basic research on the genetics of fat metabolism  to  general  societal  issues  such as public health. Around  this  issue of obesity, a debate emerged over what kind of problem “obesity” actually is. What is the nature of  this “problem”, and what are  its “causes”? On what different values did the participants draw to enforce their arguments? In the second section of this chapter, I will engage with the question of what kinds of solutions are proposed to “solve” this problem. How should the problem of “obesity” best be addressed, and what values are drawn upon in order to justify the proposed solutions? The attribution of the word “ethics” to this part of the Round Table discussions is in need of some explanation. Indeed, it is a problem as such (see chapter 9), as the participants often did not  explicitly  label  their discussions as  “ethical”. However, assuming that “ethics” is more than an issue of labeling, the discussion of problems and  solutions was  a  debate  about  different  and often  opposing  values  that were called into play by different definitions of problems and solutions. Because the par‐ticipants provided underlying reasons why they opted for certain problem defini‐tions  as  well  as  solutions,  the  discussion  can  be  seen  as  an  “ethical”  one  in  the sense of the definition of ethics I provided in chapter 1.3. I will take up this ques‐tion again in the concluding remarks to this chapter, and relate it to the wider con‐text of innovation policy.  
Defining obesity as a problem: Between fact and contingency How did  the  researchers define  the  “problem”  they were working on? And what were the lay participants’ readings of this definition, as well as their own views on what  the “problem” was?  In analyzing  this, my hypothesis  is  that, behind  the de‐bates around “problems”, different values are negotiated, which are linked to dif‐ferent presumptions about the social and political, thus linking “ethics” to political and  social  contexts.  In  the  following,  I will  analyze value  tensions  in  the debates that characterized the discussion of the question of what is a “problem”. In these debates about what counts as a problem, a particular tension was included which could be—on a general level—described as follows: The researchers’ claim was that obesity is a “disease” that exists independently from what the researchers do—and as such  in  two different ways: On one hand, obesity  is a disease associ‐ated with genes, thus it is determined by nature. On the other hand, the problem is also  determined  by  society.  Thus,  they  argue,  they  only  “pick  up”  the  “problem” 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that  has  already  been  defined  by  others  in  society. Many  of  the  lay  participants indeed agreed that the problem was a given one. However, in their view, this is the “problem”. While  the  researchers used  “society” as a  justification and as a moral resource  to  legitimate research,  “society” was  the subject  to be explained  for  the lay participants; that is, it could not be taken as a justification for research. On the contrary, they argued, what is socially given must be questioned in terms of possi‐ble alternatives. That is, one basic tension at the discussion at the Round Table was between “problems” as given fact vs. as contingent. I will start with the way the re‐searchers defined the “problem” they were working on:   The problem we are working on is the new plague, namely obesity. And the reason why we know so little about it  is that it  is hard to grasp:  it  is a very complex disease. (S6/RT1/2/13)vii In this quote, the researcher makes a direct link between obesity and “disease” in a biomedical sense, that is, as rooted in the genetic makeup of persons. She also re‐lates obesity to public health issues by describing it as “the new plague” and thus defining it as a problem for the whole society. Hence, the “problem” is defined two‐fold: On one hand, the “problem” is regarded as a matter of “nature”, of the genetic makeup of the body. As such, it is of interest for “basic research” regardless of its relevance  to society.  In  the discussions,  the researchers often  invoked  the narra‐tive of explaining nature as driving their interests, as this researcher stated: “As a basic  researcher …  I’m primarily  interested  in gaining new knowledge.  I want  to know how the fat metabolism functions” (S8/RT1/2/69).viii Defining themselves as “basic  researchers”,  they  argued  that  nature  poses  challenges  and  riddles which they aim to solve. On the other hand, they strongly related their research to prob‐lems that have been defined as such by society:  we  have,  so  to  speak,  received  the  offer  by  the  public  through  these  pro‐grams: ‘we as the public offer you a lot of money for something that is of in‐terest for us’. And we have engaged with it. (S7/RT5/2/476)ix Here, the researchers argue that it has not been they who have defined obesity as a problem that should be tackled, but that “society” has defined it as such and then turned to science to help solve the problem. This “offer” is, so they argued, the con‐sequence and outcome of more general  cultural need  in society, namely of being slim:  So  …  if  you  look  at  how  many  people  buy  the  Brigitte  [German  women’s magazine] diet or such things, or at ‘Slim Fast’, to some it is obviously a need. If you … walk by the shelf with the women’s magazines,  there  is some new diet on each cover page. On the non‐fiction shortlist, the South Beach diet is on  top  and  the  Atkins  diet  on  second  place,  and  that  for  months. (S6/RT5/2/389)x Acting as a “lay sociologist”,  this researcher explains that  there “is” a societal de‐mand for means to counter obesity based on a particular cultural attitude. By pro‐
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viding “evidence”, the researchers sought to “prove” this demand as a “sociological fact” that could not be denied by the lay participants.  Hence, in the researchers’ view, it is both “nature” and “society” that tell research what “is” a problem. By  taking  into consideration both contexts as  the “cause” of the “problem”, the researchers were able to establish a double narrative by which different values could be promoted simultaneously—on one hand focusing on re‐search based on the riddles posed by nature and the value of knowledge produc‐tion uninfluenced by subjective or social interests, while on the other hand taking up interests that are shared by society and hence showing “solidarity” with society and its problems. Hence, in justifying their research by means of the problem defi‐nition, the researchers aimed to reconcile internal and external interests and val‐ues;  that  is,  to  adjust  the  internal  values  of  science—the  quest  for  new  knowl‐edge—to  the  external  values  of  society—improving  public  as  well  as  individual health. With  this  scheme,  the  researchers aimed  to uphold  the  relevance of  their research to the scientific community as well as to society; however, they also con‐firmed  boundaries  between  science  and  society.  However,  the  researchers  put themselves in a rather passive position with respect to their research objects, as it is not they themselves who actively define the problem they are engaged with—it is either “nature” or “society”. This can be explained by the fact that the research‐ers saw themselves in an “ethical” discussion during the Round Table, which was generally  perceived  as  potentially  challenging  their  own  “cultural”  practices,  in particular when  the discussion  engaged with  research  itself  and not  just  its  out‐comes. Hence, they aimed to defend research by attributing the forces that define “problems”  to  the outside—be  it  “nature” or  “society”.  In doing  so,  they believed that  they  were  in  a  position  that  could  not  easily  be  ethically  contested  by  the moral concerns of the lay people. However,  in their critique, the lay participants touched upon many aspects of the researchers’ “problem” narrative by attempting to open up value questions as con‐tingent.  In  particular,  the  lay  participants  targeted  the  researchers’  definition  of obesity as a form of medicalization: the definition of disease is questionable for me, and then next came ‘Oh, well! We know that adiposity is a genetic disease’. If I now say a large proportion of the population is adipose, and the whole thing is a genetic disease, then I define  the  majority  of  the  population  suddenly  as  ill  by  definition. (L6/RT1/2/164)xi  In this quote, the lay argue that the researchers are medicalizing the population by defining  a  condition  and  behavior  as  a  “disease”  and  thus  making  it  subject  to medical and genetic interventions. This was seen to contradict their basic research narrative, in which they highlighted that they were only interested in gaining new knowledge.  Thus,  the  lay  discovered  a  contradiction  between  the  researchers  as non‐intervening according to the narrative of basic research, and as intervention‐alist  in  defining  obesity  as  a  “disease”  in  need  of medical  treatment.  Behind  the critique  of  the  lay  participants  was  the  presumption,  which  was  widely  shared 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among the lay participants even after the Round Table, that the researchers were not “authentic” regarding their “real” goals of research. As such, many lay partici‐pants  assumed  economic motives  behind  the  research  on  obesity,  as  one  lay  ar‐gued that only an extremely small proportion of the population could be regarded as adipose and thus as ill. For him, such a small target group could not justify the deployment of high amounts of money; thus, there must be other aims behind the research, namely to address people “with a small beer belly” (L1/RT1/2/39), that is,  a  great  number  of  people.  He  argued  that  people  are medicalized  because  of economic interests. Second,  some  of  the  lay  participants  identified  the  “problem”  as  one  that  is  not caused by genes and thus by “nature”, but rather solely by society and cultural hab‐its:  Actually,  in  an  affluent  society where  there  is  a  huge  offer  of many  things, [where]  ‘I,  being  overweight,  have  to  abstain  from  something  that  tastes good  to me’,  I  think  that  this  psychological  domain  plays  a  role  too. What tastes good, I have to abstain from to reduce my weight. Thus, on one hand I’m confronted with the difficulty of abstaining  from something, and on the other  hand we  have  this  huge  offer—the  seductive  force  of  the  offer.  And where can I find the middle ground? And this surely has to do with the psy‐che. (L14/RT1/2/67)xii This lay argues that obesity is not due to genetic causes but to the particular cul‐ture  people  live  in, which  overburdens  people with  consumption  and where  re‐nunciation is not a quality that is favored. Thus, her explanation of obesity is a psy‐chological and social one, that is, that individuals cannot resist the temptations of the affluent society. To a certain degree, the researchers were also sympathetic to this analysis; however, they regarded changes in lifestyle as only a “trigger” of the “obesity epidemic”, as its true cause was located in the genetic disposition of indi‐viduals. In doing so, they frequently referred to cases in which mice with a special makeup could eat as much as they wanted but did not become fat. For the lay par‐ticipants,  it was  clear  that  the  cause  for  the obesity  epidemic must be  located  in changes of lifestyle, as other societies and other times did not suffer from it. Thus, as the “cause” for this problem was a social one, it had to be solved in this domain. As such, discussing obesity served as a way to express a wider cultural critique of 
modern society, in particular in its economic dimension, where the “real” needs and nature  of  humans  are  imposed  by modern  culture  and  its  globalized  structures, which seem out of the scope of governability. The argument of the lay people was that the ability of individuals to contribute to wider societal and cultural changes is rather limited. Third,  the  discussion  of  the  cause  of  “obesity”  provoked  debates  over  whether “obesity” was a “problem” at all, which revealed another tension: If something is a problem,  for whom  is  it? As  the  researchers  aimed  to  the  define  the  problem of obesity as one not only for “basic research” but also for society, the discussions at the Round Table  shifted  to a debate over  the question of what  counts as a  “good 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life”. The particular tension that became visible here was between a collective con­
sensus and individual autonomy in decision­making.  The researchers argued that they only “picked up” a societal problem in their re‐search.  In doing so,  they argued  that  the problem was based on a collective con‐sensus rather than on the particular interests of a small group of actors. They ar‐gued,  “Namely  I  believe  that  not  all,  no  question,  but  a  large  proportion  of  the population has a rather similar—not the same but a rather similar—attitude con‐cerning a good life.” (S6/RT5/3/350).xiii As they justified their research by “social problems”  that are widespread,  they had to define what counted as a “good  life”. The assumption was that obesity meant a “reduced quality of life” for most people, and many were  unsatisfied with  their  situation.  They  assumed  that  there was  a “collective  consensus” of what  counts as a  “good  life”. The  “good  life” defined by the researchers was a life that did not suffer the burdens of obesity; thus, they as‐sumed that there was a collective consensus that being slim was considered good. In their account, the greatest number defined the greatest good.  For some of the lay participants, however, what counts as a “good life” could not be defined  for  the  whole  society.  They  rather  held  personal  autonomy  in  choosing lifestyle  as  a  value  preference.  In  his  critique,  one  lay  argued  that  the  societal dominance of the slimness narrative is also a problem as such:  On  the other hand  there  is  [the]  argument—people  or  so who  say  there  is nothing  worse  than  this  youth,  slimness,  reducing  weight  delusion  …  And there is the saying “The fat are jovial.” Hence, are these, so to speak, not ar‐guments  that  can  be  taken  in  contrast,  that  say  ‘I  do  not  want  to  reduce weight or I do not want to get slim.’ They do not want to lose weight at all. (L4/RT5/2/379)xiv The lay participant argues that a collective consensus of a “good life” has to be as‐sessed regarding its downsides because the enforcement of dominant values may endanger  the  capability  of  individuals  to  enact  their  own  vision  of  a  “good  life”. Thus,  the  lay participant  juxtaposes  the collective consensus  that  is based on the greatest  number  of  people  with  the  value  of  individual  autonomy  in  decision‐making. Individual autonomy in choosing lifestyles was the value some lay partici‐pants advocated, a value which they saw as endangered by the normative visions of the researchers.  While for the lay participants the “problem” of obesity was characterized by social contingency  in  terms of  its  status  as  a  “disease”,  its  “causes”  and  its  relations  to dominant  cultural  norms  and  individual  autonomy,  the  researchers were  rather convinced of the “fact” nature of the problem they were addressing with their re‐search.  It was both a  “problem”  that was  rooted  in  the genes and  thus  in nature and a problem that was rooted in societal “facts”, that is, its costs for public health, individual burdens and a culture in which obesity is seen as a problem. The tension revealed in this debate was,  in a more general sense, that the lay participants re‐garded  obesity  as  a  problem  that  is  socially  negotiable.  For  the  researchers,  the 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problem as such was barely negotiable, since many dimensions of it were consid‐ered “facts.” This is not to say that the majority of the lay participants did not con‐sider obesity a problem; however, they considered it one the terms and conditions of which were subject  to debate. However,  there was dissent about the nature of the problem: the researchers predominantly characterized obesity as a disease in a biomedical sense, while the lay people saw it as a certain lifestyle. While some lay argued that the choice of  lifestyle should be an individual decision, others clearly regarded  this  lifestyle  as  having  large  consequences  for  individual  and  public health,  and  thus  agreed  to  a  certain  degree  with  the  researchers’  assumptions. However, there were huge differences in the way researchers and lay thought the obesity problem should be addressed.  In  the  following,  I will  analyze how  “solu‐tions” and their values were negotiated at the Round Table.  
Defining solutions: Between “social” and “technical” In the debates around the question of what kind of solutions might be appropriate to address the obesity problem, different tensions came to the fore: First, the ten­
sion between “human and social” and “technical” solutions, which was debated with reference to the “fat pill”. A second tension concerned the question of what values should govern the allocation of research money, and was a confrontation between 
solidarity  in  terms of distributive  justice and the  internal values of  science, such as scientific “excellence” and “quality”. The third tension was around the role of citi‐zens and society in the enforcement of “solutions” in which collective responsibility 
and individual freedom were juxtaposed. I will discuss them in turn.  Based on their definition of obesity as a disease rooted in genetics, the researchers made a strong argument for biomedical solutions to the problem. However, given their strong motivation as “basic researchers” and their prime interest  in gaining knowledge, they did not aim to be too concrete in their suggested solutions, as this would  have weakened  their  position  as  basic  researchers  and hence  the  “excep‐tional”  moral  position  which  the  assumed  for  themselves  as  basic  researchers. Thus, in a balancing act, they managed to rule out solutions that were not based on a genetic understanding of the problem one by one, more or less implicitly suggest‐ing their particular kind of solution without being too definite about it.  Now, there are several possibilities for how I can resolve this. The easiest is … yes, I go to the gym, do a little bit of sports and eat a bit less, one apple a day would arguably be enough, wouldn’t  it. …  that obviously doesn’t work, otherwise we wouldn’t  have  the  problem,  if  it  were  so  easy.  A  short‐term change is reachable in most cases, but in the long run it simply doesn’t work, That means, it would be the healthiest, it is the best, it is above all the cheap‐est, and nevertheless it doesn’t work. This means, there must be other possi‐bilities. (S6/RT1/2/14)xv These  other possibilities were medical  interventions,  such  as  drugs  that  prevent the absorption of fats from the diet or surgical interventions such as bariatric sur‐
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gery to reduce the volume of the stomach. Both had been identified as problematic by the researchers in terms of the kind of  intervention into the body. However, a medication  based  on  the  genetic  understanding  of  obesity  was  never  explicitly mentioned by  the  researchers. While discussing  solutions  for obesity  that would not work,  they were rather vague about  their own contribution  to possible  solu‐tions,  emphasizing  their  role  as  “basic  researchers”—“We  aim  to  find  the  adi‐polytic genes that we do not know” (S6/RT1/2/14)xvi — and then mentioning the patenting of outcomes as a goal of the project. While the researchers did not explic‐itly mention a drug, therapy or the like in their introduction to their research, the lay  participants  assumed  such  a  goal  right  after  the  researchers  had made  their statement. The  assumption  that  the  researchers were  “secretly” working on  that application was held by the participants throughout the Round Table. The symbol for the “technical” solutions of the obesity problem was the so‐called “fat pill”, that is, a drug or other simple‐to‐apply medication that would remedy obesity. The de‐velopment of the “fat pill”, however, was not welcomed by the lay participants, but subject  to great critique  throughout  the Round Table.  In  the  lay participants’ cri‐tique of the “fat pill” three dimensions are of importance: First,  the  “fat  pill” was  subject  to  criticism by  the  lay  participants  because  it  ac‐counted  for  their assumption  that  the  researchers had not been honest about  the 
“real” goals  “behind” their research. The assumption that they hid their real aims raised  concerns  that  the  researchers’ work might  entail  consequences  that were ethically questionable, and that the researchers did not openly want to talk about. Hence,  the double narrative of  the researchers,  in which they aimed to subscribe both to basic research and to the social relevance of their research—which is un‐derstandable considering  the  transformations of science‐society and the high de‐mands on research(ers)—did obviously result in a great degree of mistrust by the lay participants, which could not be resolved until the end of the Round Tables.  Second,  the  “fat  pill”  was  a  symbol  for  a  particular  technology­driven  innovation 
politics  that  puts  great  emphasis  on  “technological”  solutions  the  dominance  of which leads to the “ignorance” of other means that might address the problem in a “better” way. The assumption was that “technology” increasingly shapes and inter‐venes in society and in individual behavior, introduced and enforced by actors who benefit from these technologies. The “fat pill” was understood as a “technical fix” of problems that are rooted in cultural changes in lifestyle. As such, the “fat pill” was seen as a promoter of  a  technological  culture  in which all  kinds of problems are increasingly  addressed  solely  by  technical  means  and  through  which  “societal” values that are not seen as represented in the technology are reshaped. And then one could not quickly quit it. And I think with the fat pill it would be the same, because not everybody wants to be slim of course, yes. I mean, [in] some cultures women aren’t supposed to be slim at all. And if the fat pill were to be thrown on the market there together with Western beauty ideals, it would probably have fatal consequences. (L1/eP/275)xvii 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In  this quote,  the  “fat pill”,  as  a  symbol  for  technology‐driven  social  change, was seen as endangering cultures and their particular values.  Third, “technical” solutions were perceived as endangering individual freedom with regard to public health issues. Genomics was seen as being part of a development that is  increasingly diminishing individual autonomy, as in the future the popula‐tion might be  “forced”  to  take  the  “fat pill”  in  the name of public health. One  lay participant argued: Now, one does gene research on fat metabolism disorders, one finds a medi‐cation that remedies [obesity], or another procedure—it does not necessar‐ily have to be a medication, but a procedure where one can correct or control it, and the people get slim—and this has the outcome that public health  in‐surance  is  saving a  lot of money. And  then  they could—and now we get  to the  ethics—then  they  could  come  across  the  idea  that  one  must  use  it. (L9/RT5/3/45)xviii In this quote, technology, in the form of the “fat pill”, and the autonomy of the indi‐vidual to choose a lifestyle are juxtaposed. As the “fat pill” was seen as a goal of the genomics researchers at the Round Table, their research was not regarded as “neu‐tral” in terms of gaining new knowledge, but as contributing to a particular politics that eventually could endanger values of  importance to the participating lay peo‐ple. The “fat pill” was regarded as politics by other means, and as something that might be imposed on the public without its permission and justified by the savings to the public health system.  While the lay participants, in their critique of the fat pill, aimed to discuss different values that may be in conflict with a society that is governed by technological  in‐novation  and  “technical  fix”  approaches,  the  researchers  responded  by  arguing that they personally did not work on the “fat pill”, and that such a drug would be technically barely be possible even in the future.  Most likely, it will never be that way … that everyone gulps down his fat pill in  the  morning  and  we  all  run  around  with  ideal  proportions.  THAT  will most  likely  [never be  the  case],  that  it works  totally without  side effects … and I take this prophylactic life‐long. Such drugs almost do not exist. If I  in‐tervene  in  a  metabolic  pathway  then  I  disturb  a  lot,  always.  I  can  try  to minimize it and to reduce my side effects, but to have a prophylactic remedy that is really so efficient—that is more than unlikely. (S6/RT1/2/125)xix The  researcher  responds  to  the  concerns  of  the  lay  participants  by  negating  the possibility of  a  “fat pill”  and by alluding  to  the  technical problems  in  realizing  it. Thus, the discussion of the “fat pill” is an example of a case in which both groups used rather different, incommensurable frames in the discussion. The researchers did  not  engage with  the  value  arguments made by  the  lay  participants,  but  only with the technical aspects of a possible “fat pill”, and thus were not able to respond in such a way that the lay participants could see that they were engaging with their concerns.  Such  arguments  are  very  common  in many debates on  emerging  tech‐
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nologies, where  science  policy  or  institutionalized  ethics  is  responding  to  public concerns by referring to technical risk assessment, but  ignoring underlying value questions (Levidow and Carr 1997; Wynne 2001).  Such public concerns, however, often go beyond  the  issue and seek  to widen  the context in which a particular problem is discussed. An example of this can be found at the Round Table, where the lay participants aimed to  link research agendas to societal expectations of science. In doing so, the lay participants situated the “obe‐sity  problem”  in  the wider  context  of  research policy  and  raised  the  question  of what values  the allocation of research money should be governed by.  In  this,  the tension  between  distributive  justice  and  the  self­governance  of  science  under  the 
norm of “excellence” became visible.  Based on the researchers’ narrations, a question that puzzled the lay participants throughout the Round Table was the researchers’ relation to basic knowledge pro‐duction on one hand, and acting  in pursuance with economic goals on  the other: “Does one rather consider insights and knowledge, or is it economic interests that are  in  the  foreground?”  (L2/RT5/3/131)xx  was  the  question  one  lay  participant posed to the researchers. The lay participants’ presumption was that it was not the quest  for new knowledge  that was driving  the researchers’  interests, but  the po‐tential marketability of products. To illustrate their argument they coined two ex‐amples:  First,  research  on malaria, which  they  saw  as  poorly  represented  in  the research landscape. The malaria example was brought up because “so many people die because of malaria” because  they  “cannot  afford  to buy medication”,  and  the “society  that  provides  the  money  does  not  suffer  from  malaria” (L12/RT5/sgP/519).xxi Second, the lay introduced the example of rare diseases—“where  there  are,  I  don’t  know,  only  500  diseased  in  Europe.  In  this  case,  the pharmaceutical  industry doesn’t spend anything for research because one cannot make a profit there” (L9/RT5/3/147).xxii With these two examples of orphan dis‐eases  and  those  predominantly  afflicting  poor  and  developing  countries,  the  lay participants  raised  the  issue  of  distributive  justice  in  the  allocation  of  research 
money. While they accused science of following the norm of maximizing profits on large market, they also coined the value of solidarity with those who are excluded by market‐guided norms  in research policy.  In  the eyes of  the  lay participants,  it was  dominantly  economic  values  which  governed  the  allocation  of  research money.  As  an  alternative,  they  suggested  that  the  value  of  solidarity  in  terms  of distributive  justice  should be  considered  to  a  greater degree. Distributive  justice was addressed both as an  issue  in Western societies,  to balance  funding of mass and orphan disease research; and between Western societies and poor or develop‐ing countries, to balance the needs of domestic and foreign populations. Thus, they argued  that  it  is  not  science  alone  and  its  alleged  economic  impetus  that  should define research agendas.  The researchers, on the other hand, did not straightforwardly argue that economic norms  should guide  the allocation of  research money. On  the  contrary,  the were quite  critical,  for  example  regarding  “scientific  fashions”  or  dedicated  research 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programs, because these, especially the latter, were seen as endangering bottom‐up  basic  research,  for which  they made  a  clear  plea  in  the way  research money should be allocated. They argued that potential applications should not be a crite‐rion  for or against  the  funding of basic research:  “To make differences here …  in basic research, this is not the case and should not be the case either, for god’s sake” (S8/RT6/2/151).xxiii Thus,  the researchers argued that what should be  funded or not must not be subject to social and moral values. In their view, “scientific quality” 
and “excellence” should govern the allocation of research money. As such, it  is only science  itself  that  defines  the  criteria  for  what  research  should  be  funded,  by means of peer review. In this regime, social values such as solidarity and “just” dis‐tribution of  the research money played no role  for  the researchers. Basically,  the researchers’ rejection of moral issues as playing a role in their work was based on their particular self‐understanding as  “basic researchers” and  the resulting  “non‐responsibility” for social concerns. I will address this matter in more detail in chap‐ter  8.2. While  the  lay participants  rejected  the  idea  of  a  profit‐oriented  research policy,  they  were  equally  critically  of  science’s  orientation  along  pure  internal norms.  They  assumed  a  kind  of  “social  contract”  between  science  and  society, where society provides the money and science should deliver solutions in return: “I somehow have the feeling as a taxpayer, I finance a huge apparatus [science] and I expect something from it. There must be outcomes that make my life better, be‐cause it’s my money, yes” (L13/RT2/3/116).xxiv Since  “technical”  solutions were  generally  rejected  by  the  lay  participants, what 
kind of  “solutions”  for  the obesity problem did  they  suggest  instead?  In  the discus‐sions,  the  lay  participants  suggested  a  rather  wide  range  of  solutions  through which they aimed to provide an alternative to the alleged “technical fix” approach of  the  researchers.  In  a  general  sense,  they  self‐labeled  their  solutions  as  “more social”  and  “more  humane”  compared  to  those  of  the  researchers.  However,  the question is, what do “social” and “humane” in this context mean concretely? Overall,  two  different  narratives  that  describe  a  particular  tension  were  argued during the Round Table discussions. One narrative seeks to “responsibilize”33 citi‐zens with regard to the collective. This narrative emphasizes the “duty” of citizens to take on responsibility within a community where shared achievements need to be protected. The other narrative highlights the “right” of individual autonomy and freedom to choose a particular lifestyle. In each narrative, a different set of values is promoted, and different ideas about the relation between the individual and the collective are put forward.  The first narrative on the question of what kind of solutions are to be favored with regard  to  the obesity problem emphasized and defended  the  individual’s  right  to 
choose a lifestyle—that is, with regard to the problems discussed at the Round Ta‐ble, to be obese:  
                                                33  I briefly discussed the idiom of “responsibilization” in chapter 2.2 as a crucial feature of ad‐vanced  liberal democracies with  regard  to  the governance of  science. Here,  responsibiliza‐tion takes on another facet when citizens discuss how to “responsibilize” citizens. 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Public health wants to have a pill so that metabolism disorder goes down, so that  the costs go down. That  is good so  far. Then  they go down, only … we would compelled to take this pill everyday. That is coerced obligation … you have to swallow two Sortis34 every day because and so  forth. And this  is  in my opinion an ethical problem. Do I have to force him not to become fat, or is it his free decision to be fat? If he perhaps has to pay certain deductibles to the health system or  to  the social  insurance  is perhaps worth a discussion, but where is freedom? (L9/RT5/sgP/181)xxv In  this  quote,  the  lay  participant  is  expecting  that  the  individual’s  freedom  to choose a lifestyle will be endangered in the future by the increased cost pressure in public health systems together with “technical” solutions provided by biomedi‐cal research. The value on which he bases his argument is individual freedom. His suggestion for a solution to the obesity “problem” is to leave it to individual pref‐erence if someone wants to be fat or not. The obesity problem, he argues, should not be subject to decision by the whole society. In balancing the financial costs for the  welfare  state  with  the  basic  right  of  free  decision‐making,  the  latter  clearly prevails  in his view, because “if he eats much, he pays a  lot of value‐added taxes too” (L9/eP/366),xxvi and thus public costs and expenses are balanced. In that case, the individual’s rights are of higher ethical import that the interests of the collec‐tive.  At a  first glance,  the researchers seemed to agree with this narrative, as they too mentioned  the  opportunity  of  people  to  choose  freely whether  they  take  this  or that drug against obesity or whether they eat fatty food: “Yes, you can decide that you don’t eat  fast  food or no  fatty  food  in  the same way as you can decide  later, whatever,  not  to  eat  the  fat  pill”  (S2/RT5/sgS/185).xxvii  However,  there  are  sub‐stantial differences in the conceptualization of individual freedom and the discur‐sive contexts in which these narratives are brought up. First, the emphasis on indi‐vidual  freedom  to  choose  must  be  contextualized  by  the  researchers’  argument that obesity is not “caused” by individual behavior (this is only the “trigger”) but by physiological properties defined by genes. That is, they argued that the individual cannot really choose if he or she wants to be slim or fat: “that is, changes in behav‐ior are a very problematic matter, and therefore it will be absolutely necessary to intervene  here  in  a  different  manner”  (S8/RT1/2/69),xxviii  that  is  by  biomedical means such as  surgery. Thus,  there  is a  certain ambivalence  in  the arguments of the researchers, who depict the individual as free and not free simultaneously de‐pending on the context. Second, the researchers did not refer to individual freedom in an emancipatory‐democratic sense, as the lay participants did, but rather in the sense  of  a  market‐democracy,  where  individual  preferences  in  markets  decide what has to be considered as right. Third, for the researchers the principle possibil­
ity of individual freedom was the crucial dimension in their argument: In the above quote they argue that “in principle” no one can “really” be  forced to adopt a par‐
                                                34  A drug lowering cholesterol. Sortis is the market name in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. In other countries it is known as Lipitor. 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ticular behavior. The “fat pill”, for example, cannot exert “existential” force on per‐sons,  and  thus  the  principle  of  individual  autonomy  remains  untouched.  The  lay participant, on the contrary, focuses on the societal conditions that increase or de‐crease the chances that citizens can act freely and choose their lifestyles. In his ar‐gument, the “fat pill” entails “social coercion”; that is, the “social costs” of not fol‐lowing a normative behavior would be very high. In this view, individual freedom is  conceived  in practical  contexts—and not as an ethical principle—and  thus ap‐pears as a “right” to be defended.   However, arguments  in favor of the “right” of  individual  freedom were only mar‐ginally represented among the lay participants. The majority of those who explic‐itly  positioned  themselves  emphasized  rather  the  “duty”  of  the  individual  in  a 
larger collective for which the citizen should take on responsibility. As such, the lay participants  proposed  two  different  yet  interwoven  ways  to  solve  the  obesity problem. First, they argued that citizens should be “responsibilized” in terms of their dealing with health: Yes, this is the beginning actually, not to look for responsibility at the doctor, and not at the researcher, but to take responsibility for oneself. Why did I go there  to  call  on  a  doctor? That  is  the problem. Why did  I  gain weight? Be‐cause there is such a huge offer of this and that? No, because, perhaps, some‐thing  does  not  work  with  my  own  discipline.  The  other  is  not  to  blame. (L14/RT5/3/302)xxix This lay argues that the responsibility for one’s own health must not be displaced “elsewhere”, but the  individual must admit and confess that he or she is the only one who is responsible. The lay aims to bring back “responsibility” to the citizens themselves, and not have them rely on the collective to take care of them. This nar‐rative  strongly  emphasizes  the  “duty”  of  citizens  to  take  care  of  themselves,  but does not mention  the  “rights” of  the  individual as  the  lay participants above did. This  self‐responsibility,  however, was not  only  concerned with  individuals  living side by side but remaining unconnected:  The responsibility for oneself. … To learn that to bear self‐responsibility, first of all in its smallest form for myself—then for the family and society comes later, it’s significantly further, isn’t it? Thus, for myself, for the siblings, fam‐ily, friends, and then somewhere comes society. But the whole, the source is self‐responsibility. (L8/RT5/sgP/514)xxx In  this  quote,  the  lay  participant  argues  that  self‐responsibility  is  the  birthplace and necessary  condition  for  taking on  responsibility  for  the whole  society.  (Self‐)responsibility calls upon the duties of the citizens to a greater collective. The wel‐fare of the whole is put in an inextricable relation with the individual’s well‐being. Here,  a  particular  concept  of  “solidarity”  is  used: While  the  lay  participant  who emphasized individual freedom called upon the welfare system to be in solidarity with the individual citizen regarding his or her right to choose his or her lifestyle, solidarity  is here depicted  from  its  flip‐side.  It  is  the  individual who has  to be  in 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solidarity with  the whole,  and  the  citizen who has  obligations  towards  the  com‐munity, rather than the other way around: Taking care of oneself is taking care of the community.  The lay participants’ ideas for how to “govern” obesity can be related to the wider political context: In fact, the lay participants’ ideas for solving the obesity problem are close to Nikolas Rose’s idea of “responsibilization”, which “works through the values, beliefs, and sentiments thought to underpin the techniques of responsible self‐government and the management of one’s obligations to others” (Rose 2000). As such, he argues elsewhere, “Politics is to be returned to citizens themselves, in the  form of  individual morality and community  responsibility”  (Rose 1999a, 11). This fits nicely with some of the lay participants’ attitudes toward solutions for the obesity problem.  Second,  the  argument  of  “responsibilization”  for  solving  the  problem  of  obesity was supplemented by solutions  in a rather Foucauldian manner,  that  is, by disci­
plining citizens. Two particular mechanisms of disciplining were suggested by the lay participants. On one hand, some lay participants put great emphasis on educa‐tion, in order that people learn to deal with nutrition in a more reasoned way. For example, it was proposed that basic schools should educate pupils regarding nutri‐tion. On  the other hand,  the  lay people  suggested  that people  could be governed regarding their nutrition behavior by disciplining them through money:  We thought it that way. For example, McDonalds, on every burger—or other firms  that  just  produce  unhealthy  products  so  to  speak—so  the  costumer just pays more, whatever, 50 cents more for one burger, and all the rest of it. And the 50 cents of this fat tax go of course to useful things, for example to the  promotion  of  [health],  prevention  in  society,  funding  of  research  or change of behavior. (L2/RT5/3/175)xxxi The lay participants developed the idea of a “fat tax”, through which individual be‐havior could be governed, and the financial gain of which would be used to spon‐sor  further  activities  of  health  precaution.  Beyond  this  argument,  there was  the widespread opinion among the  lay participants that people are best governed by systems of rewards and penalties.  Interestingly,  those who argued for the  individual’s right to choose a  lifestyle did not perceive the responsibilization and disciplining of citizens as a kind of coercion as  they  did with  “technical”  solutions.  It  is  difficult  to  answer why  this was  the case. One reason may lie in the fact that “technology” was perceived as something alien to “society”, and thus often conflicting with cultural values, while social tech‐nologies  of  responsibilization  were  perceived  as  “internal”.  Responsibilization brings back politics—as Rose argues—to the citizens themselves, and leaves  it  in their hands to enforce certain values by their own means, so that people feel more involved in political processes. Another reason could be in the social dynamics of the lay group, which was characterized by boundary work with respect to the re‐searchers  in order  to  constitute  themselves as a more  coherent  community with 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shared  moral  and  epistemic  assumptions.  Internal  arguments  would  have  dis‐rupted these efforts; thus, they put emphasis on the boundary work with respect to the researchers and their concepts of “technical” solutions rather than criticiz‐ing each other.  
Lay ‘ethical’ knowledge and the challenge to push ethics upstream In summing up, I again take up the question of why I introduced these issues as an “ethical” discussion. In discourses of institutionalized ethics, defining a “problem” and  its  associated  “solutions”  is  usually  not  regarded  as  an  issue  that  deserves ethical  consideration. Problem definitions  created by  science are generally  taken for granted in the context of institutionalized ethics. However, as the discussions at the Round Table showed, what is a “problem” cannot be assumed to be a matter of consensus; different accounts of “problems” engage different values. However, if a problem  is  defined  in  a  certain way,  decisions  are made  about  institutional  and financial commitments to future technoscientific trajectories, making it rather dif‐ficult to open up these questions again if contested later. I have demonstrated that, in the discussions of problems and solutions, a wide range of concerns regarding “science” and innovation were communicated, especially by the lay participants.  The debate around problems and solutions particularly poses a question about the “when”  of  an  ethical  debate.  The  lay  participants’  discussion  of  these  questions indicates the wish that a debate over what values are involved when “society” de‐cides that something is a problem and that this problem should addressed by cer‐tain means  should  take  place  before  too many  future  commitments  are  already made,  impeding a more open debate.  In short,  it  suggests  that ethics should  take place more “upstream”, which  is also suggested by the  literature on this  issue,  in order  to  be  able  to  pose  questions  like  “Do  we  need  this  technology  at  all?” (Wilsdon and Willis 2004). This literature argues that such a discussion cannot be resolved in terms of classical PUS—that is, “the public does not know the facts of ‘obesity’ but once informed persisting and critical questions will quickly disappear by the common epistemic ground of ‘science’”. The discussions at the Round Table revealed  that  the gap  is not between knowledge and  ignorance, but between dif‐ferent cultural values. Upstream engagement is necessarily connected to a discus‐sion on values, because  it seeks to  forego discussion about risks  in  favor of a de‐bate of underlying values and interests.  However,  the call  for  “upstream engagement” also deserves closer consideration. Three questions can be posed: First, “ethical” debates do not emerge in a “purified” manner,  but  involve  a  range  of  aspects,  some  of  which  are  problematized  “up‐stream”—that  is,  as  open  to  change—while  others  are  employed  as  “down‐stream”—that  is,  as  given  facts. As  a matter of  fact,  discussion of which are  “up‐stream”  in  its  full  content  is  hard  to  conduct,  as  the  participants  in  the  discus‐sions—regardless  of  whether  “experts”  or  “lay”—need  resources  that  they  can take  for  granted  and  that  serve  as  an  anchor  in  the  discussions.  The  question  is 
how  to balance between upstream and downstream discussion? How  far  can a de‐
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bate  move  upstream  and  not  end  up  as  idle  talk?  Second,  the  question  is  “up­
stream” for whom? For the researchers, the issues involved in the obesity problem have already been clarified. For them, many elements were “facts” not  in need of any further debate. For the lay participants, however, problems and solutions were far from being considered consensus facts. In the mutual engagement at the Round Table,  different  “frames”  collided,  and  it  often  seemed  that  a  kind  of  “meta‐language” was necessary so  that  the participants would be able  to  talk about  the same issue in the same framework. However, such a meta‐language will be hard to find, and probably will result in further conflicts. Third, the question remains, what 
is “upstream” enough, and who defines this? This question was also raised by the way the participants discussed the question of problems and solutions. In debating what was to be considered a problem and what might be possible solutions for it, the participants drew upon different ideas of the social and the political, in particu‐lar with regard to the relation of the individual to the collective. These narratives were  not  as  explicitly  debated  as  the  question  of  problems  and  solutions. While one could argue that the Round Table discussions were rather upstream with re‐gard to the question of what a problem is and what might be solutions  for  it—in particular when considering the way institutionalized ethics deals with the issue—the discussion stopped at the point of the problem definition, while simultaneously calling into play visions of the social and the political that were not explicitly made a  subject  of  the  debate.  These  ideas  were  not  only  mere  “context”,  but  were strongly linked with what was suggested as a particular problem definition as well as a solution.  It is in particular the social ideas of lay ‘ethical’ knowledge that deserve closer at‐tention, as different visions of  the social have different “ethical”  implications  in a narrow sense. The dominant narrative in the lay group, especially, was able to pose challenging questions as they redrew the relations between the individual and the collective in terms of rights and duties. These can be labeled “neo­social” political 
epistemologies, in which the welfare state is coupled with citizens’ responsibilities in  such  a way  that  only  those who are  ready  to  take on  responsibility  for  them‐selves  are  to  be  supported  by  the  welfare  state.  The  “active”  citizen  is  recon‐structed  in a moral way. The discussion of problems and solutions,  thus,  reflects the wider political context and the transformation of the state over recent years. As such,  this discussion  is  not  limited  to  the Austrian  context,  but mirrors develop‐ments  in all Western  liberal democracies  in which the relation between the  indi‐vidual, the collective and the state is conceived in new ways and political questions are increasingly declared to be “debates on common values”. 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8.2.   Responsibility of research as an ethical question 
The issue of “responsibility” was one of the main ethical questions and challenges for both the researchers and the lay participants at the Round Table, as it was de‐bated  throughout  the whole Round Table—initially  in  a  rather  implicit way,  but towards the end of the discussion it was brought forward in particular by the lay people in a rather explicit manner. Generally, two different ways for addressing the responsibility of  research came  to  the  fore  in  the discussions. Both have  in com‐mon  that  they  “struggled” with  responsibility,  but  they did  so  in  rather different ways. The researchers subscribed predominantly to a model of a limited responsi­
bility  of  research,  which  narrowed  down  their  responsibility  to  the  means  of knowledge production only, while the responsibility for the consequences and im‐pacts of the knowledge produced was largely rejected. Hence, their idea of respon‐sibility was  largely one of non‐responsibility. By and  large,  the  researchers went into the discussions with this narrative and also left the Round Table with it. For the lay participants, the issue was far more complex, as they did not go in with a ready‐made concept of  the responsibility of research and researchers, but had to develop  their  visions  in  the  engagement with  the  researchers’  narratives, which they predominantly rejected. However, it was extremely difficult for them to find a positive  counter‐narration,  and  they  did  not  leave  the  Round  Table with  a  clear idea of how the responsibility of research could be governed in a better way.  Before I analyze the different narratives on responsibility, the term itself is in need of a few words of clarification. It is overloaded with a multitude of meanings, as it is  used  in  many  different  contexts  (philosophy,  ethics,  law,  everyday  conversa‐tions,  etc.).  The  common  ground  around  which  all  participants  positioned  their narratives  at  the  Round  Tables was  that  responsibility  implies  an  attribution  of consequences to one’s actions, and thus suggests a more or less direct causal rela‐tion  between  an  action  and  its  subsequent  impacts  and  consequences.  At  the Round Table, however, the issue of responsibility was not discussed as a theoreti‐cal concept of ethics as such, but as a means to articulate science‐society relations and to express mutual expectations between “science”—as represented by the re‐searchers—and “society”—represented by the lay participants.  I will start with the predominant narrative of responsibility held by the research‐ers,  as  they went  into  the Round Table with  it  and  thus  started  to promulgate  it from the very beginning. Then I will  turn to  the narrative of  the  lay participants; afterwards,  I will  briefly discuss narratives  of  responsibility present  rather mar‐ginally, and make some conclusions  
Limiting the responsibility of research(ers) Is  science  responsible  for  its  societal  consequences?  The  researchers’  answer  to this question was clearly “no”—if “science” is understood in a particular way. How 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must “science” be understood in order not to be responsible for the outcomes? The researchers’  image of  science  rested on  a  clear‐cut  separation between basic  re‐search  and  knowledge  production  in  the  context  of  application,  together  with  a linear model of innovation. “Basic research” was understood as the practice of ba‐sic  knowledge  production  in  the  laboratory,  which  remains—and  ought  to  re‐main—untouched by the expectations of society, as this researcher explained: As a researcher, I strongly distinguish between the things I do in the labora‐tory, where  I’m  forced  by  law  to  let  nothing  escape—to  take  care  that my mutants really stay in the lab. And as they are not able to do harm, I’m in a very  different  position  than  a  plant  physiologist  who  plants  [genetically modified]  corn;  or  any  company, whatever,  that  releases  genetically modi‐fied potatoes, tomatoes or whatever to the open field. ... But as a natural, as a laboratory  scientist  ...  I’m  in  an  entirely  different  position. (S7/RT5/2/263).xxxii  I  this quote,  the  researcher  argues  that  a  clear distinction  can be made between research  that  aims  for  practical  ends  and  societal  application,  and  research  that remains in the lab, aiming only for new knowledge. As basic and applied research are different matters,  the ethical  framework  for each must also be different. The researchers’  ideal  vision  of  science  contained  the  idea  of  an  “epistemic  core”  of knowledge production, which  is committed not to an “outside” but to an  internal ethos of science that warrants that the knowledge produced is primarily genuine and of relevance to the community of scientific peers in a Mertonian (1973) fash‐ion according to the scientific ethos. Other forms of knowledge production, in par‐ticular those which are concerned with applications and technology development, must,  following  the researchers, be carefully distinguished  from “basic research”. The researchers at  the Round Table situated  themselves  in  the area of  “basic  re‐search”, with gaining knowledge as their prime motivation, as this researcher ar‐gues: “I want to know how the fat metabolism functions, and I am frantically inter‐ested in how this fat metabolism is connected with diabetes” (S6/RT1/2/69).xxxiii  The researchers’ interest in gaining new knowledge as their basic motivation came up  in many  contexts  at  the Round Table,  in  particular when  the  discussion  con‐cerned issues of the societal consequences of research as well as the expectations of society towards research. What, then, was the researchers’ vision of the relation between what they called “basic research” and knowledge production that strives for  technologies and application and  finally  towards marketable goods and serv‐ices? To describe this relation, they introduced a linear model of innovation:  Within our research aims, we have classified it like this: we have direct aims, which are ours  in  the  laboratory. Our direct aim  is  to  identify genes and to clarify metabolic  pathways … Then,  there  are  indirect  and  long‐term  aims. Indirect  aims,  one  could  say,  somebody  takes  this  up  to  research whether one can develop certain substances with which this gene or its product can be manipulated so  that somebody becomes  fat or slim, or  to remedy a cer‐tain disease. ... And the long‐term aims would be to reduce obesity, to reduce 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arteriosclerosis,  heart  attacks,  cancers  and  so  forth.  But  these  indirect  and long‐term aims are not the aims of GOLD. These are only societal aims, which are  realized  by  others. We  do  not  do  them  ourselves. We  cannot  even  do them. (S6/RT5/2/314)xxxiv This innovation model is particularly interesting because it suggests a linear flow from basic research to technological applications  in society. The basics of  fat me‐tabolism are clarified, then substances are developed by others to target particular diseases, and finally drugs are introduced into society in order to remedy diseases. However, they also introduce different stages in the knowledge production process that  are  separated  by  clear  boundaries.  Each  of  these  stages  describes  idiosyn‐cratic social and moral worlds in which different norms apply. In “basic research”, working  towards practical ends and solutions plays no role. Here,  the considera‐tion  of  societal  values would  be  quite  harmful.  In  “applied  research”,  as well  as technology  development  and  implementation,  the  orientation  towards  societal needs  and  expectations  is  central.  The  need  for  “basic  research”  is  explained  by arguing that  it provides a reservoir of knowledge that must not be compromised by a short‐term orientation towards applications, so that one cannot bypass these different stages of innovation and move directly to technology development. They explained this, for instance, with the example of the laser: the laser was not invented so that I could have a laser beamer … and to scan my  eyes.  ...  These  are  applications  which  were  totally  unforeseeable.  That [the laser] was not invented because of an application ... Per se, I can assess then what all  I  could have done with  it: That,  I believe,  is asking  too much. (S6/RT5/2/25)xxxv The  researcher  here  introduces  the  notion  of  “serendipity”  (Merton  and  Barber 2004) as a crucial property of  the  innovation process, which assigns high  impor‐tance  to  basic  knowledge  production.  She  argues  that  it  is  impossible  to  foresee what kind of technology comes out  in the end when starting with basic research. As mentioned above, responsibility  implies some kind of causal relation between what one does in the laboratory and the consequences that appear later in society. The researchers’ narrative of what science is aims to remove these causal relations between basic knowledge production and later technological applications, describ‐ing strict and quasi‐natural boundaries between basic research and applied forms of knowledge production by introducing different stages of innovation and by the narrative of  serendipity. The  researchers’  argument  is  that  if  there  are no direct causal  relations between gaining basic knowledge and  later applications,  “we” as researchers cannot be held responsible for what “others” “elsewhere” do with this knowledge.  That basic researchers cannot be held “responsible” for applications was also im‐plied by another characteristics of “basic knowledge”, as this quote demonstrates: “there always will be possibilities to apply things negatively. The question is, then, does it have to be research that is restricted, or shouldn’t it be negative application which  I  try  to restrict”  (S6/RT5/2/65‐67).xxxvi For  the researchers, knowledge as 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Erkenntnis has no moral properties, but has to be regarded as neutral and given by nature.  Hence,  they  argue  that  it  is  its  societal  use  that  decides  if  something  is “good” or “bad”, and not the fact that this knowledge exists through basic research.  Yet,  this  quote  offers  another  feature  of  the  responsibility  narrative  of  the  re‐searchers. Responsibility is associated particularly with negative outcomes. For the researchers, making a  link between “basic  research” and “negative consequences in society” would have negative impacts on research itself, namely the restriction of the autonomy of research to define its research agenda. Their assumption is,  if “basic research” could be held responsible for later applications because there is a direct causal relation, society would quickly start to interfere in and restrict basic research.  Hence,  “responsibility”  was  perceived  as  the  attribution  of  “blame”  or “guilt” in case of negative impacts on society, which would have the consequence—in  the  eyes  of  the  researchers—that  science  would  no  longer  be  entitled  to autonomously define  its  research  fields by  its  internal  criteria. As basic  research and application are entirely different, regulation must be concerned with applica‐tions and not interfere in research agendas.  The researchers’ perception of responsibility as potentially being blamed for nega‐tive  impacts  on  society  had  another  interesting  facet. While  basic  research  was predominantly  conceptualized  as  a  collective  enterprise  of  a  community  sharing particular  norms  that  attribute  meaning  to  the  knowledge  produced  through shared models  of  success  and  failure,  they  often  individualized  responsibility  in order to oppose the arguments of the lay people. They attached “responsibility” to the capacity of individual researchers to assess the full range of the developments certain scientific knowledge might trigger in the future by saying, for example, “Is Darwin  to  blame  for  euthanasia?”  (S6/RT5/2/200).xxxvii  The  researcher  rhetori‐cally overstates the responsibility of the individual researcher in order to “prove” that the collective of science cannot held be responsible for the misuse of knowl‐edge ascribed to society. For the researchers, applications that later turn out to be good or bad are not foreseeable, because of the nature of scientific knowledge, the innovation process and the eventuality of individual misconduct. As such, they did not  exclude  the  last  as  a  possibility  for  how  individuals,  even when  they  are  re‐searchers, might make use of scientific knowledge:  Somebody who wants  to have war gas will not wait until others develop  it and  then  take  it  as  a  byproduct.  He  will  do  it  himself  in  the  worst  case. Somebody who  assumes  negative motives,  I  cannot  prevent  him  from  this because it is forbidden. (S6/RT5/2/41)xxxviii Constructing the figure of the “black sheep” scientist, the researchers personalized scientific misconduct and misuse of knowledge. They argued that potential misuse is  a pitfall of  all  knowledge. This, however, must not be attributed  to  the knowl‐edge production process itself, as the consequence would be to stop basic research altogether and technological progress would come to an end. They argued that  if society wants to reap the rewards of technoscientific progress, it has to accept the 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fact that misuse is possible. However, only individual misconduct is responsible for this misuse.  In order to underline that black sheep are deviations from the mainstream norms of basic research, these researchers were always located “elsewhere”. “Elsewhere” was meant both in a geographical as well as in a cognitive sense. They are distant in place, for example in “China”, as well as distant to the internal norms of science. Individual misconduct does not harm the integrity of basic research, insofar as it is not the product of a missing general responsibility of science but one of individual criminal motivations. The “black sheep” remained a singular exception in the eyes of the researchers.  One can see that the researcher cast a rather black and white picture of responsi‐bility, with no shades of grey. Responsibility was regarded as a matter a researcher could  only  fully  assume when  breaching  the  internal  norms  of  science  based  on criminal  intentions,  or  which  could  not  be  assumed  at  all  due  to  the  nature  of knowledge and the serendipity of the innovation process.  So far, I have analyzed why the researchers did not see themselves as able to take responsibility  for  the  consequences  scientific  knowledge  might  have  in  society. However,  for what did  the  researchers  regard  themselves  responsible? Their  as‐sumption was that they could only be responsible for the means of knowledge pro­
duction.  However,  responsibility  in  this  regard was meant  less  in moral  than  in legal  terms. Based on  the  assumption  that  the  regulatory  system  in place  covers the full range of the activities of the researchers’ research practice, responsibility is satisfied  if  the researchers stick  to  the  law and other  formal rules. Following  the rules  was  often  perceived  as  the  fulfillment  of  responsibility,  as  this  researcher indicates in the interview made after the Round Tables in which she was directly asked  to what  extent  she would  apply  responsibility  in  a  project  proposal:  “It  is actually required everywhere, when one applies  for a project,  that one  fills out a form which precisely  contains what  ethically  relevant  things  one  intends  and  so forth. After all, it is actually very strictly controlled” (S2/eP/219).xxxix In this quote, and in particular with regard to the issue of animal experimentation, the research‐ers frequently referred to the law when the lay participants brought up the issue of responsibility.  This was  a  rhetorical  strategy  of  the  researchers,  by which moral questions were displaced  into the  legal domain,  thus again shifting responsibility outside science.35 Researchers are only responsible for following the rules, not for making  them. The delegation of responsibility  from one area  to another—in par‐ticular from science to politics as lawgiver—was subject to serious critique by the lay participants, as I will analyze in the next section. So  far,  I  have  provided  a  rather  clear‐cut  image  of  the  researchers’  attitude  to‐wards responsibility by showing that, because of their role as “basic researchers” and the clear demarcation between “inside” and “outside”, they could not be held responsible for the consequences of the knowledge they produced. However, this 
                                                35   I will discuss this in more detail in chapter 9. 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picture assumed more shades of grey in the discussions, as there were several in‐stances  at  the Round Table where  “society”  interfered with  the  “inside”,  and  thus created a slightly modified concept of responsibility.  In  the  course  of  the  discussions,  the  lay  participants  increasingly  challenged  the researchers  regarding  their  idea  of  responsibility.  Being  heavily  criticized  with regard  to  the societal  “use” of basic research,  the researchers reacted by arguing that not only does research produce knowledge that is science‐internally relevant, but  scientific  knowledge  and  its  production  must  be  understood  as  a  “cultural good”  (“Kulturgut”)  similar  to art and other cultural  traditions.  In particular, one senior researcher felt “assigned by the public” to produce knowledge as a cultural good.  Here,  social  meaning  is  imported  to  the  knowledge  production  process, which originally was described as having no practical ends. The arguments of the researchers were  that  in  society  the  cultural  value  of  art  is  usually  uncontested, that it is appreciated on its own terms and that society is investing a lot of money in it without demanding a clear orientation towards practical application and util‐ity. With the idea of the cultural good of science, the researchers sought to main‐tain  the  autonomy of  research  and  thus  to deflect  the  lay people’s demand  for  a more responsible science. However,  the researchers also  introduced different so‐cial criteria for appraising science; that is, as one of the lay asked in the interview after  the  Round  Tables,  is  society willing  to  pay  for  genome  research  as  for  the state opera? The narrative of being  solely basic  researchers and  thus being unable  to assume responsibility  for  the  social  consequences  of  research was  also  disrupted  by  the researchers  themselves. When ethical  issues were discussed at  the Round Table, the researchers relied on the model of basic research to describe their work, and they were thus  largely able to deflect the ethical concerns of the  lay participants. However, in other contexts of the discussion, they emphasized the close relations of their research with society.  In particular, when the issue was the legitimacy of public  funding  for  research,  they were able  to  leave  the  terrain of pure basic  re‐search and highlight the potential usefulness of their research by linking it to “so‐cietal”  problems  such  as  obesity.  Here,  they  argued  that  they  have  been  “ap‐proached” by society  to help to solve  its problems. One researcher states “that  is virtually morally demanded … to research fat metabolism. It is simply a problem. A majority of people die [from diseases related to disorders of fat metabolism]. The most  frequent  cause  of  death  worldwide  …  is  simply  the  impact  of  obesity” (S6/RT5/2/324).xl Here the researcher argues that if research aims to take on re‐sponsibility, it must do research. 
Desiring a different kind of responsibility of science These ambivalences and tensions in the narratives of the researchers made the lay participants increasingly alert regarding their notion of limited responsibility. How did the lay participants respond to the way the researchers dealt with responsibil‐ity? What kind of ideas of the responsibility of science did they develop? From the 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very  beginning,  the  majority  of  the  lay  participants  did  not  agree  with  the  re‐searchers’ narrative of the limited responsibility of research. Basically, the lay did not perceive their narratives as coherent and authentic; in particular, the attribu‐tion of “basic research” to the kind of research the participating researchers con‐ducted was not plausible to the lay participants: And now for me somehow the dialectics is a bit difficult: on one hand want‐ing to gain knowledge in the sense of basic research, and on the other hand a certain sense of enthusiasm: there [is] the application in the form of drugs, … to talk about diverse firms, to have the idea that there will be a pill. Thus, … somehow  I have difficulty  accepting  that  it  is  really only  about knowledge, only about academic research. (L6/RT1/2/164).xli  In  this quote,  the  lay participant addresses  the ambivalences and  tensions  in  the narratives of  the researchers, where  they argue both  in  terms of potential  future remedies for obesity and in terms of “basic research” that is not oriented towards applications. This does not mean that the lay participants believed that “basic re‐search” does not exist at all, but they expressed concerns that the “basic research” narrative was used  to  cover up  the  researchers’  “real” motivation, namely  to de‐velop drugs to remedy obesity, as a kind of technical fix to a problem that the lay participants  did  not  necessarily  consider  as  such  and  where  alternative  means would  be  ruled  out  without  public  debate  in  the  name  of  “basic  research”  (see chapter 8.1). Hence,  for  the  lay,  the researchers were not  “authentic” about  their motives. The question of the authenticity of researchers in direct interaction with the public—their “body language”—was central to the lay participants in establish‐ing trust relations, as I will show in more detail in a following chapter (8.4) on the issue of animal experimentation.  The lay also questioned the researchers’ model of innovation, which on one hand suggested  a  seamless  flow  from  knowledge  produced  in  basic  research  towards applied  technologies,  but  also  posits  clearly  separable  stages  of  innovation  that “shield”  basic  research  from  the  need  to  take  on  responsibility  for  its  outcomes. The lay challenged the researchers’ innovation model, as they did not believe that “basic research” was done without thinking and being able to think about later ap‐plications.  For  example,  they  did  not  buy  into  this  because  they  questioned whether huge amounts of money would be spent if there were not an expectation of  application  from  the  research.  For  many  lay  participants,  the  orientation  to‐wards  application  is present  from  the very beginning—in particular because  the researchers  themselves  communicated  it  right  from  the  beginning  of  the  Round Table. This and a series of other tensions in the discourse of the researchers pro‐vided a quite incoherent picture of what “research” is about and of what research‐ers do to the lay participants. This incoherency was attributed to the researchers’ not being authentic about their motives.  The  lay  also  expressed  quite  some  unease  about  the  researchers’  shifting  of  re‐sponsibility  “downstream”  in  the  innovation process,  towards  the moment when ready‐made  technology  becomes  available  to  be  implemented  in  society,  thus, 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away  from science  towards  “society”. Research  imposes responsibility on society regarding the use of knowledge, while research only takes care of  its production. Being quite unhappy with this solution of the responsibility problem, the lay par‐ticipants aimed to challenge the boundary work of the researchers. However, they struggled throughout the discussions to find responses to the researchers’ idea of responsibility. In defense of the model of responsibility, the researchers could pri‐marily  rely  on  two aspects:  First,  they brought  their model  along when entering the Round Table, and they could rely on the fact that the other researchers would share  this  notion  and  thus  speak with  one  voice.  The  lay  participants,  however, first had to form an “epistemic community” (Haas 1992) that shared the same con‐cepts and values, and thus had to negotiate among themselves what kind of posi‐tion they would develop towards the researchers. Second, the  linear model of  in‐novation, as well as the separation between basic and applied research, are domi‐nant societal models that have structured science policy as well as research itself (Godin  2006)  for  a  rather  long  time.  It  is  the  dominant  idea  of  how  innovation works,  and  that  which  alternative  models  need  to  challenge  in  order  to  be  ac‐cepted. The  researchers’ model was  the norm,  and  thus need not be  legitimized. Hence,  it was easy for the researchers to refer to funding institutions such as the Austrian Science Fund FWF, which funds predominantly bottom‐up basic research and thus supported the researchers’ model. They could also provide anecdotal evi‐dence  from  the  history  of  technology,  such  as  the  above‐mentioned  laser,  to “prove” that their concept of basic research, and thus their model of responsibility, was “true”.  The dominant model of innovation, with its particular implications for the respon‐sibility of research, made it quite difficult for the lay people to develop their own ideas  of  responsibility.  In  fact,  their  engagement  with  this  issue  was  foremost characterized by a desire or an expectation that a “different” way of dealing with responsibility in research was required, but an inability to find a coherent counter‐narrative to the researchers’ approach to the issue.  The  discussion  in  a  small  group  the  lay  participants  had  among  themselves  is  a pivotal example of their struggle to find a “viable” response to the narratives of the researchers. In particular, they did not aim to find a merely normative position of what ought  to be the case, regardless of  its practical problems, but also reflected upon the possibilities of how alternative visions of responsibility would work out in a social reality they considered given.  In this small group discussion, they first discussed  the  shortcomings  of  the  researchers’  approach  to  responsibility.  The main focus of the critique was that the researchers always “delegated” responsibil‐ity to someone else, which was identified as a “very simple means to make oneself invulnerable”; however if I teach at the university or something, then I am somehow in an outstand‐ing position,  and  then  I have  to  somehow  take on  responsibility or make a commitment or, yes, simply stand above things. In that I cannot reflect upon 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things  somewhere, maybe  quietly  at  home,  but  I  have  to  take  up  a  stance, even towards basic questions. (L5/RT5/sgR/164)xlii The  lay  participant  identifies  researchers  as  public  actors  who  are,  therefore, obliged  to  assume  responsibility  in  a quite wide  sense. That  science  should be  a public good was a narrative to which both  lay and researchers agreed in the dis‐cussions. While for the researchers the public good character of research was sat‐isfied by the production of knowledge, the lay people explicitly demanded that the researchers themselves must be present as public actors and articulate moral posi‐tions. Because of the researchers’ deflection of ethical concerns by referring to “ba‐sic research”, the lay people regarded them not as willing and able to take on such responsibility.  The delegation  of  responsibility was  identified not  only  as  a way  the  researchers dealt with responsibility, but also as a more common, society‐wide characteristic. In further discussion in the small group, the lay aimed to identify promising candi‐dates to take care of responsible development in science. In a first round, they dis‐cussed whether  responsibility  for  research  could  be  assigned  to  specific  societal domains,  such as  science  itself,  ethics, politics,  the economy or  religion, but  they failed  to  do  so,  as  “in  reality”  those  actors  always  delegate  responsibility  some‐where else. The lay’s primary example of this particular approach to responsibility was  “politics”:  “What  does  politics  do?  It  puts  together  a  commission  and  is  ad‐vised  [by  it],  isn’t  it?  What  do  politicians  really  decide  themselves?” (L5/RT5/sgR/258).xliii Politics is described here as unwilling to make binding col‐lective decisions, but also as malleable  to economic  interests, because “Politics  is finally  an  instrument  too,  or  is  also  influenced  by  the  economy,  I  believe” (L5/RT5/sgR/758).xliv The  lay participants assumed that responsibility circulates in  society  but  cannot  be  pinned  down  to  a  particular  actor:  “we  are  again  ap‐proaching this circle, which consists of politics, the media, the society as such, the researchers,  the  economy, which,  yes, which  always  shift  responsibility  towards each other” (L13/RT5/sgR/284).xlv The  lay participants criticized the “specializa‐tion” of society,  its splitting into sub‐domains, as the main cause for this “delega‐tion  of  responsibility”,  because  every  societal  domain  now  aims  “to  optimize  its own parameters” (L13/RT5/2/11),xlvi for example, in the interaction between sci‐ence and politics: Because the politician, ... because what does he do? He is just like us, he is no expert, and in order to be able to make a decision he invites scientists who ad‐vise him. And here we are again in this circle, aren’t we? The politician is cre‐ating  the  legal  framework  for  the scientist who  is  in  turn advising  the politi‐cian in order that he is able to create the framework. And there it goes in cir‐cles and finally no one is responsible anymore. (L13/RT2/3/183)xlvii Hence, his argument is, politics is turning to science while the “responsibility” for decision‐making  formally  remains with  politics.  Politics  is  not  assuming  its  role, while  experts  are  seen  as  transgressing  their  competences  by  too  strong  an  in‐volvement  in  political  decision‐making  processes.  Politics  is  regarded  as  not  as‐
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suming  its control  function, because  it  transfers governance to  those who should be  controlled.  As  such,  the  politics  perceived  as  state‐centered  politics was  per‐ceived as too weak to exert control over technoscientific developments. The  second  point  of  critique  by  the  lay  participants was  the  question  of what  it means to take on responsibility: “the question of responsibility is only posed in the moment of catastrophe” (L13/RT5/sgV/310),xlviii thus permitting only the notions of  “blame” and “guilt”, which are attributed ex post. However,  they asked  if  there were shared norms to determine what is a negative event for which someone can be blamed. This critique, too, was a response to the researchers’ conceptualization of responsibility, because the researchers imagined responsibility solely as “guilt” for negative consequences. However, the lay suggested that technoscientific devel‐opments such as stem cell research are much more ambivalent, so that black and white attributions of responsibility are not possible. While stem cells can be ethi‐cally challenged in different ways, the lay asked who was responsible for missing economic opportunities. Hence, they argued that there was a great need to discuss the question of what “our” shared norms are that allow us to assess whether some‐thing is right or wrong, which could then serve as a starting point for the attribu‐tion of responsibility. 
“Sharing” responsibility: Who and how? What was  the  lay participants’  alternative vision of  responsibility,  after  they had discussed the shortcomings of  the researchers’ narratives and the problems they would face in society when trying to find a different way to deal with responsibil‐ity? Based on this critique,  the  lay participants aimed to  find a viable alternative; however, their idea was less clear than the researchers’ model, in terms of who is and who is not responsible for what, because they abstained from using such strict boundaries as the researchers did.  Reflecting on their difficulties in finding a response, the speaker of the small group stated, in his presentation of the outcomes in front of the plenary with all partici‐pants present, that “we have discussed this question of responsibility and we too did not reach an unambiguous outcome” (L13/RT5/2/7).xlix In the following pres‐entation, they aimed to sketch out their method of discussion, seemingly struggling to come to terms with what an alternative model of responsibility might look like. Based  on  their  critique  of  the  delegation  of  responsibility  caused  by  “specializa‐tion” of scientific knowledge production and ethical reflection, they first concluded that “in principle we all are responsible” (L13/RT5/2/11).l However, they increas‐ingly distanced themselves from this argument, because “we all” also included the researchers. Here,  they raised concerns about  the researchers’ capability  to criti‐cally challenge their own practice, because the researchers followed particular in‐terests and were not regarded as being able to transcend their involvement in re‐search and  “objectively”  reflect upon  the consequences of  their  research. Finally, they presented their alternative view on the responsibility of research, which con‐sisted of two main arguments: 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Based on the critique that responsibility only becomes subject to debate  if some‐thing goes wrong, they argued that  this question about responsibility,  that  is,  the question of preventing some‐thing  really  bad  from happening,  perhaps  it  can best  be  prevented by  that along  the  path  one walks  consequently  asking  if what  one  does  is  right  or wrong. That means that  the society  takes care  in a sense that  the path that the society takes is be permanently critically challenged. (L13/RT5/2/11)li This quote shows that the lay participants wished to discuss responsibility during the whole  innovation process,  from  the definition of public  research agendas  for basic  research  to  applications  and  their  implementation  in  society.  For  the  re‐searchers,  responsibility was  instead  a  question of  a  once‐and‐for‐all  decision  at the moment when technologies are ready and waiting to be introduced to the mar‐ket. Only at this point does society have the possibility to decide. For the lay par‐ticipants, decision‐making on technosciences could not be reduced to a single mo‐ment,  as many  institutional  commitments would have been made already before that moment.  In particular,  large amounts of money would already have been in‐vested  in  the  research.  Instead,  course  corrections  have  to  be  made  along  the whole process of knowledge production.  In the view of the  lay participants, who should take care of responsibility as per‐manent reflection during the innovation process? On one hand, the lay people de‐manded “continuous thought‐provoking impulses from the outside—namely, that there be certain persons or organizations which simply critically question if what happens would  be  right  (L13/RT5/2/11).lii  Pushes  from  the  “outside”  should  be supplemented  by  “self‐responsibility”  by  facilitating  critical  reflection  by  the  re‐searchers on their own practices.  What  are  the  particular  features  of  the  lay  participants’  vision  of  responsibility? First,  the  definition  of  “who”  should  take  on  responsibility  remains  extremely vague, as idioms such as “one should”, “the society”, “certain persons and organiza‐tions” or  “the outside” demonstrate. Even  in  the  later accounts of  the  lay people, the  question  of  “who”  was  not  answered  in  a  more  detailed  way.  Hence,  they struggled to identify particular actors who would be responsible for technoscien‐tific governance. In a certain sense, the lay participants’ answer to the question of who  is  responsible  is  similar  to  that of  the  researchers. Both had a  rather vague concept that “society” should be responsible. However, the researchers shifted re‐sponsibility to the technology end of the innovation process, and imposed the full responsibility on  “society”  so  that basic  research would not be  touched by  these concerns. The lay participants, on the other hand, did not make a general distinc‐tion between science and society with regard to the attribution of responsibility. Second,  in  the  lay people’s  visions,  a  tension becomes  evident. On one hand,  the call  for  “self‐responsibility”,  primarily  directed  towards  the  researchers,  hints  at notions  of  liberal  governance  (Rose  1999b),  putting  great  emphasis  both  on  im‐posing  responsibility  on  citizens  and  on  thoughts  about  reflexive modernization 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(Beck 1992; Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994), which considers possible side‐effects of R&D early in the innovation process using ideas of, for example, “sustainability” and the “precautionary principle”. On the other hand, by referring to persons and organizations from the “outside”, the lay people express a certain desire for a cen‐tral moral authority that is listened to in order to trigger moral reflection “inside” science. This does not mean that they were not in favor of wider public delibera‐tion  over  ethical  issues,  but  that  they  thought  “the  public”  should  be  consulted rather than pushed  into the role of decision‐making. This also has to do not only with an assumed lack of knowledge in the general public, but also with the author‐ity  that  is  ascribed  to professional  critics of  science.  It was  assumed  that  the  re‐searchers would rather listen to them than to “ordinary citizens”. This assumption was partly based on the experiences at the Round Table, where the lay participants failed  to  influence  the assumptions of  the  researcher  for quite  some  time. At  the fifth Round Table, the invited ethicist was able to question several basic assump‐tions  of  the  researchers,  something  that  the  lay  ascribed  to  the  ethicist’s  back‐ground as a trained academic scientist who was able to meet the researchers at eye level, and thus whose authority to speak  in the name of ethics could not be chal‐lenged so easily. As an outcome of the mixed experiences at the Round Table, the lay  participants  called  for  both  wider  public  deliberation  and  central  actors  to guide this deliberation process. Third, analyzing the sum of the discussions in the small group, the presentation in front of the plenary and other accounts during the Round Table reveals that the lay implicitly had a certain normative hierarchy regarding the question of who should take on  responsibility. On  top,  as  the  ideal  form of  how  responsibility  should be enacted, was the “responsible citizen” who takes care of himself or herself as well as  showing  solidarity  with  values  considered  shared  and  common.  Researchers were also regarded here as “citizens” who equally share responsibility. However, this form of governance was seen as not workable, as everyone “optimizes his own parameters”;  that  is,  different  societal  actors  pursue  their  respective  particular interests.  In particular,  the researchers were not seen as able  to reflect upon the consequences  of  their  actions  in  an  “objective” way.  Thus,  in  the  view of  the  lay participants, a central moral authority was needed that would be able to reconcile these  conflicting  social  interests and provide a moral basis  for  society. However, the  lay  were  unable  to  find  such  a  central  actor:  The  state  was  considered  too weak;  the economy  is only  interested  in profit;  and  religion  itself  consists of  too many different moral concepts. Hence, what remained was the demand of the lay people that “the society” should take responsibility. This, however, is much more a question than an answer—a blank position waiting to be filled.  The researchers’ model of  the  limited responsibility of research, and the  lay peo‐ple’s search for and struggle with a different kind of responsibility, dominated the discussion on responsibility. However,  it  is  interesting to note that other  ideas of responsibility were  also put  forward,  but played only  a minor  role  at  the Round Table. This is in particular true of the idea that the state should rebuild its past role as the central body of collective decision‐making—an idea that was promoted by 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only  one  lay  person.  Similar  to  the  other  lay  people,  he  regarded  the  self‐governance  of  science  as  not  able  to  impose  boundaries  on  research. While  the majority of the lay people in search of a different kind of responsibility politics put emphasis on public deliberation and involving “the society”, the lay advocating the state as a central actor regarded deliberative political processes as also too weak to  be  able  to  control  science  because  the  public  was  not  seen  as  well‐informed enough  to  be  able  to  decide  on  these  issues—an  assumptions which  he  thought also held for politicians themselves. Thus, he suggested the increased institution‐alization of expert bodies  that  take on a  leading role  in political decision‐making processes. In his view, pubic deliberation is not able to exert enough control over science. By and large, state‐oriented control of and responsibility for research was rejected by both the researchers and the other lay people. The researchers did not want to give up their authority in the self‐governance of science. The rest of the lay people argued in favor of a stronger role for civil society in the governance of sci‐ence, rather than state control and expert ruling, because the state was seen as too weak an actor and incapable of controlling science in general and genomics in par‐ticular, based on the assumption that even strict national regulation is futile as sci‐ence policy is made on a global level. More liberal regulations elsewhere—frequent examples were  the United  States  or China—will  produce knowledge  that will  be available also  in Austria. The global knowledge economy  implies  that knowledge and  innovations  produced  elsewhere  will  sooner  or  later  be  introduced  also  in Austria.   By  the same  token,  the  idea of a radical  liberal market democracy  that gravitates around the  individual citizen as the sole unit of responsibility was abandoned by the majority of  the  lay participants. At  the Round Table, a series of different ver‐sions  of  individualized  responsibility  existed,  in which  individual  preferences  in “consumption” would govern technoscientific pathways. The version suggested by one  lay participant was  characterized by  the  assumption  that  governance has  to focus on the individual citizen to increase his or her capacity to take responsibility for his or her own life. This would alter consumption behavior in the market, and people would  acquire  a  “healthier”  lifestyle.  This  change  in  lifestyle would make drugs  generated  in  genomics  dispensable,  and  thus would  exert  indirect  control over scientific developments through consumer markets. This idea found its coun‐terpart  in  some  ideas promoted by  the  researchers, which were meant as a  sup‐plement  to  the  limited  responsibility  of  research. Here,  as  basic  research  cannot take  on  responsibility,  it  is  the  individual  citizen who  has  to  take  responsibility. The argument of the researchers was that whatever outcomes are produced in ba‐sic  research,  it  is  still  the  individual who decides what he or  she does. Based on their assumptions that genetics‐based “solutions” for the obesity problem are the only workable ones, the displacement of responsibility to the individual citizen in a market should work in favor of their research. At the same time,  it also shifts re‐sponsibility  away  from  basic  research  towards  the  use  of  technologies  “down‐stream”. 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Debating responsibility—ethicizing innovation  Drawing  together  these different  ideas of  responsibility—in particular  the domi‐nant debate between  researchers and  the majority of  the  lay participants—what does this mean with regard to the wider context of “ethics” and “public participa‐tion” and the transformation in science‐society relations?  All  ideas had  in common that  they reflected the wider societal context as well as perceived transformations in science and society. Regarding the researchers, their way of engaging with the issue of responsibility can be seen as a way to defend the autonomy of research in an environment that increasingly interferes with knowl‐edge‐production processes in the laboratory. As such, to define oneself as a “basic researcher”  is  a way  to  limit  expectations  from  “outside”  and  create  a  space  for autonomous action. It is also a way to reduce the complexity of the heterogeneous expectations that are seen as increasingly imposed on science, from industry rela‐tions over ethics to communication with the public. To draw these clear bounda‐ries,  as  the  researchers did,  can be seen as a  response  to an environment where such clear demarcations are increasingly removed and new kinds of relations are demanded. That the researchers were well aware of this dissolution of boundaries was demonstrated by a different discursive repertoire on other issues, for example on the justification of funding. In terms of what Nowotny and co‐authors have de‐scribed as a transition from mode 1 to mode 2 knowledge production, the choice of the researchers was naturally to employ both modes in their narratives as it suited their interests. For the lay participants, experiences beyond the Round Table, as well as their di‐rect  interaction with the researchers, made clear to them that such strict distinc‐tions between basic  research and application can no  longer be made. Science  in‐creasingly turns out to be an opaque assemblage of a multitude of interests where responsibilities are difficult to attribute. For them, the references to possible obe‐sity drug development made by the researchers demonstrated that science today follows  different  rules  than  they  had  imagined  before  the  Round  Table  started. They  interpreted  the  incoherence  in  the  narratives  of  some  researchers  as  non‐authenticity  of  their  motives;  that  is,  they  assumed  that  these  researchers  pre‐tended to be basic researchers while in fact looking ahead to commercial exploita‐tion  of  their  findings.  It  was  not  imaginable  to  the  lay  participants  that  the  re‐searchers could hold a multitude of narratives which were all “authentic”. The lay participants’  own  ideas  on  responsibility  reflected  both  the  experiences  at  the Round Table and the particular political context in Austria. In this context, there is no discussion about the governance of innovation as such. The dominant narrative is that the population must be made “more aware” of the economic benefits inno‐vation brings  (see  chapter  5)—criticism of  certain  applications  is  interpreted by science  policy  as  a  more  general  aversion  of  Austrians  towards  technology  and innovation. Thus, “consensus” must be reached that  innovation  is “good for all of us”. 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The quest for a consensual way of governing innovation can also be traced in the narratives of the lay participants, in which they looked for ways to reconcile con‐flicting  interests  and  provide  a  consensual  moral  basis  for  decision‐making  on technoscience. The Austrian context is also reflected by the lay participants’ way of seeing the role of non‐experts and citizens in this process. With regard to respon‐sibility, they argued that “the society” should have a greater role. However, “soci‐ety”,  although  remaining  mostly  unspecified,  did  mean  professional  representa‐tives  of  society  rather  than members  of  the wider  public.  This  reflects  the weak role of public participation in the Austrian context, where civic participation has no tradition,  but  interests  are  taken  care  of  by  professional  representatives.  Tradi‐tionally, social interests are balanced between the social partnership behind closed doors, represented within the political parties without being explicitly negotiated or seen as already decided “outside”,  in particular  in the EU. Thus, state‐oriented politics is perceived as weak, which was manifested in the way the lay participants perceived  the potential  of  the  state  to  govern developments  in  genomics. Hence, with one exception, the state was not considered a potential central actor for en‐forcing responsibility by the lay participants. The state was not trusted anymore to have the capacity to control research. What conclusion can be drawn from the discussion on responsibility for the wider debate over ethical issues of science and technology? The central argument would be that the way the lay people approached this issue indicated a desire to make the 
dominant innovation processes and regimes as such subject to a wider ethical debate. In  the  analysis  above,  I  showed  that  the  researchers  embedded a  series of  value assumptions in their idea of the innovation process. To a large extent, it is not only our researchers at the Round Table who subscribe to these assumptions, but they are  also  a  feature  of  how  society  as  a whole  deals with  innovation.  This  can  be traced  in  national  innovation  policies  as well  as  on  the  European  level.  In  these innovation  regimes,  a  particular  role  is  attributed  to  institutionalized  ethics, namely  to  oversee  a  smooth  implementation  of  emerging  technologies  with  re‐spect  to  cultural  values.  However,  in  these  ethical  evaluations,  innovation  proc‐esses as such are never opened to debate. Lay  ‘ethical’ knowledge would provide an  additional  resource  for  decision‐making  processes  on  innovation,  as  it  poses questions  like  the  following:  What  kinds  of  values  are  embedded  in  dominant knowledge‐production  processes?  Should  science  alone  define  these  values  or should society have a say in the process? What does it mean to leave the fabrica‐tion of “facts” to science while society is concerned with decision‐making on “val‐ues”? What  commitments have already been made  in  the  innovation process be‐fore  something  becomes  subject  to  societal  debates  in  the  form of  technologies? Can these commitments be reconsidered? Are there other options for how to gov‐ern innovation processes? The lay participants and their idea of a shared responsi‐bility  re‐define  innovation processes  as  such as  ethical  questions. Responsibility, they argue, should not concern only technologies applied and implemented in so‐ciety; rather, responsibility as the continued awareness of the possible impacts of even  pure  knowledge  should  be  present  during  the  whole  innovation  process. 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In this and the following chapter, I will turn to a second aspect of ethics that was important  at  the Round Table,  that  is,  ethical  questions  concerning  the means  of 
knowledge  production.  The  discussion’s  focus  on  the  moral  dimensions  of  the means  by  which  knowledge  is  produced,  however,  does  not  mean  that  science‐society relations were not at stake. This question was predominantly discussed in terms  of  the  issue  of  animal  experimentation, which,  for  both  groups  of  partici‐pants, was very central.  In many ways,  the discussion of animal experimentation was constitutive for the Round Table as an interactive setting, for the mutual per‐ception of the participants and their identities and for the way trust relationships were enacted between the participants.  In  the  first  part  of  this  chapter,  I will  ask,  “What  are mice  in  the  laboratory?”  to show that animals are not simply technical constructs or natural beings, but moral agents in the laboratory shaping the identity of the involved researchers. I will de‐scribe five aspects of animals that are strongly related to the different roles, inter‐ests, and identities of the involved participants. In the second part of this chapter, I will describe with what further means the researchers constructed their individual and collective identities by referring to animal experimentation, but also how dif‐ferences between the researchers with regard to the ethics of animal experiments became evident. 
What are mice in the laboratory? Animals as epistemic and moral agents Today, the use of animals in science is seen as an essential factor for the advance‐ment of knowledge and progress in medicine. The development of biomedical sci‐ence  and  the  use  of  animals  are  inextricably  tied  together  (Rader  2004;  Birke, Arluke, and Michael 2007; White 2005). However, the meaning of animals in bio‐medicine  goes well  beyond  their  instrumental  relevance.  They  have  been  active agents rather than passive objects in shaping material laboratory practice. On the other hand, the use of animals in science often demands the harming or killing of the animals; thus, the use of animals in the scientific laboratory is characterized by the ambivalence of  the  involved  researchers,  as well  as public  controversy,  as  in both  contexts  the  way  the  animal  are  conceptualized  in  the  laboratory  collides with other cultural notions of animals. This does not mean that in society, animals have  a  unanimously meaning. Here,  they  are  encountered with  ambivalence  too, for example, as pets, as pest or as suppliers of food. As I will describe the research‐ers narratives of animals as ambivalent at the Round Table, their ambivalences are nothing special but reflect wider cultural ambivalences. 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Many  of  the  ambivalences  the  researchers  at  the  Round  Table  were  confronted with when conducting animal experiments were suggested by the phrase “working with mice”, which they frequently used. On one hand, mice were seen as collabora‐tors, as subjects or as “workers  in  labs” (Haraway 2008, 71), because the  labora‐tory research was highly dependent on the mice’s cooperation, their willingness to contribute substantially to research. On the other hand, “working with” also indi‐cates their character as objects and their instrumental use. Here, mice are used as tools in order to reach another goal, that is, the production of knowledge. Thus, as Birke, Arluke and Michael (2007, 53‐54) note, the “animal model” is both a techni‐cal construct for conducting biological research and a moral category in which dif‐ferent values are brought together and negotiated.  These cultural tensions around experimentation with animals were present in the discussions at the Round Table. The researchers anticipated the issue as a possible highly  controversial  issue at  the Round Table, while most of  the  lay participants did not identify animal experimentation as an ethical topic that would come up at the Round Table. This picture at the beginning of the Round Table was somehow inverted at the end: Many of the lay participants now claimed that animal experi‐mentation was the most important ethical issue for them at the Round Table. The researchers, on the other hand, barely mentioned the lay participants’ ideas on the issue, but rather expressed surprise at their colleagues’ attitudes.  Both  groups  of  participants,  however,  did  share  some  common  assumptions  re‐garding  the  use  of  animals  in  research.  It  was  in  principle  uncontested  that  the knowledge  gained  from  animal  experiments  allows  for  better  understanding  of human conditions by science in general. However, there were voices among the lay people that raised the question whether the researchers at the Round Table were legitimized  in  their  use  of  animals,  as  they  often  claimed  to  be  interested  in  the production of  “pure” and  “application‐free” knowledge. That  is,  the  lay asked  for the careful balancing of possible benefits against the means of reaching them, and also questioned whether  the possible benefits,  if  agreed on,  could be  reached by other means. The lay further questioned whether the way the researchers treated animals  was  the  best  one,  and whether  the  use  of  animals  for  scientific  experi‐ments could not be more efficient in terms of reducing the number of lab animals. But it was acknowledged that animal models yield outcomes providing valid knowl­
edge  of  human  physiology—something  that  is  strongly  contested  by  the  anti‐vivisectionist movement  (Festing 2005).  For most  of  the  lay participants,  animal experimentation was a question of balancing right and wrong, risks and benefits. The  researchers  shared  this  rationale;  however,  they had different  arguments  to add to the balance, and therefore different opinions of where to define limits in the dealing with animals in research. For the researchers, the use of mice in research is a trade‐off between the greatest possible proximity to human physiology, in order to yield knowledge that is valid for human application, and the moral and technical “usability” of these model systems, which decreases the nearer they are to human physiology: 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We  have mice  as model  animals,  which  can  be  handled  very well  because they are easy, relatively easy,  to keep, and because they are rather close  to humans; and yeast. The problem that I always have is: The more simple my system is,  the easier  I can work with  it, but  the more distant  it  is of course from the human. (S6/RT1/2‐14)liii Animals  in  the  laboratory,  however,  are  not  simply  “natural”  beings  in  another context. Biology’s obsession with animals has also reshaped animals in many ways, not  only  in  a  material  sense  by  changing  their  genetic  make‐up.  Besides  their meaning as “natural” animals, mice, for example, are also considered “data” in the laboratory as well as  in scientific articles (Turner 1998; Lynch 1988). As modern biology has seemingly multiplied the meanings of animals, it is interesting to inves‐tigate  how  the mice  were  discussed  at  the  Round  Table,  especially  because  the Round Table was a forum for negotiations with members of the public. Going be‐yond  the  dichotomy  between  animals  as  “natural”  and  as  “data”  put  forward  by Mike Lynch (1988), I will discuss five such articulations of mice at the Round Table that defined the involved researchers even as they defined the animals themselves. The  identities of  the animals and of  the researchers, both as  individuals and as a collective, were co‐constructed. As the Round Table brought together researchers with different roles and functions from different hierarchical levels in the research consortium with members of the public, it is interesting to observe who subscribed to what  kind  of  articulation.  Such  specific  articulations,  then,  contributed  to  the identity work  of  different  “communities”  at  the  Round  Table,  be  they  the  young researchers, the project management, the project leaders or the lay participants. I  start  with  the  epistemic  animal.  In  this  articulation,  the  mice—and  animals  in general—were  constructed  as  a  source  of  information/knowledge  and  as  “data” (Lynch 1988) only. The animal was relevant only as a carrier of relevant informa‐tion  that  helped  to  shed  light  on  the  puzzles  posed  by  nature  the  researchers aimed to solve:  The  genes  that  code  these  protein  substances  can  knock  out  an  animal. What’s more, we can induce the cells of the animal to over‐express the pro‐tein;  that  means  the  cell  now  produces  much more  protein  than  it  would produce otherwise. That is, one gets basic biological information, and on the other hand one gets  information on what  roles enzymes play  if  the  fat me‐tabolism does not work right. (S3/eA/50)liv In  this  context,  the mouse was  not  considered  as  a  living  being with  a material body. While the animal is addressed in the singular (“the animal”), no specific ani‐mal  is meant. Using the rhetorical trope of synecdoche, “the animal” refers to the whole species, and, even wider, to the organic functioning of all living beings. This abstract idea of biological functions misses the possibility of suffering.  This way of seeing animals was mainly enacted by senior researchers at the Round Table who barely did bench work themselves. Their distance from laboratory work was mirrored by the distance in their narratives of the role of mice. The mouse is a 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carrier of information that contributes to knowledge production. This view, which describes mice as “produced”, was therefore subject to criticism from the lay par‐ticipants. While  the  senior  researchers  saw  the mice  as  a  pure  epistemic  entity most of  the  time,  the  junior researchers also partly  talked about  the mice  in  this way;  but  they  also had different  articulations  of mice, which  rather pointed  to  a “naturalistic”  understanding.  This  switching  between  different meanings  of mice suggested  their moral  struggle,  ambivalences  in  their  relationships with  animals (see  also  Birke,  Arluke,  and  Michael  2007,  59)  and  a  habituation  and  learning process  they  have  to  undergo  in  their  scientific  careers.  The  articulation  of  the epistemic  animal,  however, made  ethical  reasoning  largely  absent,  as  ethics was seen to require the involvement of living beings. Constructing animals as carriers of  information necessary  for  research was a way  to bypass and  temporarily  sus‐pend moral questions about animal experimentation.  The  second  articulation was  the  instrumental  animal,  which means  that  the  use and killing—or “sacrifice” in the language of the science—of animals is necessary in order to reach a particular goal; that is, in the context of the researchers at the Round Table, to gain knowledge of human conditions that may lead to remedies in the  future. Mice were not killed  for  the sake of producing new knowledge alone. Here,  the death and the suffering of animals were mentioned, but were balanced with  the greater good of  improving human health. The animal’s body was pulled between  current  suffering  and  potential  future  benefits  for  human  health.  This balancing of benefits was particularly evident  in  the  statements of  the young  re‐searchers,  who  often  linked  animal  experimentation  to  societal  problems  and goals:  Yes, of course on the one hand to show what we are actually doing, why we are doing it, what the goals are. That is, that we do not do it because we have fun killing animals, which  is  absolutely not  the  case, but  that we are  really pursuing a goal that we regard as useful of course, and which of course also transfers to others … finding drugs against arteriosclerosis eventually in the future, I think,  is a goal that everybody probably finds very interesting, and they want to have it, and we should hurry up. Which finally will come, then. And then simply to demonstrate that genome research too can go in this di‐rection, that it is also bringing positive things for people. (S1/eA/183)lv This  articulation  manifests  the  young  researchers’  struggle  between  seeing  the animal  as  “natural”  and  as  a  provider  of  information  that  may  lead—in  the  fu‐ture—to remedies for human illnesses. This rationale is based on the idea of a lin‐ear progress of scientific innovation (Godin 2006), where basic research on mouse models finally yields applications useful in societal contexts. Belief and trust in this model  justifies  the  use  of mice  for  a  greater  good.  The  instrumental  animal  also was used to justify research in public contexts, however, further highlighting that the  end  (fighting  a  wide  range  of  diseases)  justifies  the  means  (animal  experi‐ments). 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The third articulation of animals at the Round Table was the mouse as an economic 
good. They were seen as part of the scientific capital of the research group. It was not the individual animal that was valued, but the mouse as carrier of genetic at‐tributes:  The mice are our primary capital, aren’t they? You can imagine if a Post‐doc has  to work three years so that such a mouse  is produced—it has an enor‐mous value in the laboratory. It is not something with which we [deal] care‐lessly …  It  cost  a  gigantic  amount  of money.  The  [mice]  are,  thus,  the  real gold that we finally own. That means they are normally better taken care of than  our  doctoral  students  or  other  members  of  the  laboratory. (S8/RT1/3/93‐97)lvi The assumption is that the mouse’s economic value for the research group guaran‐tees that the animal is treated ethically appropriately. Therefore, in responding to a layperson’s question, the researchers rejected the allegation that the mice were “tormented”.  To  emphasize  that  mice  are  valued—both  economically  and  thus ethically—the researcher above compares the treatment of mice with the way doc‐toral candidates are taken care of. Seeing the mice as an economic good was a posi‐tion that was held in particular by those researchers who had to fulfill managerial tasks in the group and who had to take care of the overall financial resources of the consortium.  At  the  Round  Table  there was  also  a  range  of  articulations  that  constructed  the animal as a suffering, natural and  living being. The notion of  the “natural” animal comprised a wide spectrum of understandings—from the animal in its natural en‐vironment to pets. The articulation of mice as “suffering and natural” animals was shared by most of the lay participants, but also sometimes by the young research‐ers who struggled with that notion when killing them for research purposes—that is, in a context where they had to see the mice other in epistemic or instrumental terms. However, more experienced researchers also sometimes talked about mice as “natural” animals, by linking them to their own emotions. What is interesting in this  understanding  of  the  animal  is  that  an  emotional  relation with  the mice  as natural beings was supposed to ensure an ethically correct dealing with the mice.  In principle  they are a bit  like  family. Yes,  the mice bear around  five  to  ten offspring. And I am of course very curious, and I have already looked into the mice stable, and I go in nearly every day, because in the beginning the mice are without hair,  totally meaty,  little, blind bulbs. And as soon as they have hair it gets exciting for me, because if the mice are black, then it is bad for me and bad for the black mice. (S9/RT2/2/84)lvii  In this quote, the researcher emphasizes his great care for the mice, his empathetic curiosity. However, empathetic caretaking is not enough in the context of research, and thus in the quote he quickly turns his attention to the selection process that is necessary for his research. As the mice carry a genetic marker through which they develop black fur if they do not have the desired genetic properties, the researcher 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is then forced to kill these mice instantly. Interestingly, such a way of dealing with the mice was not perceived as unjustified cruelty by the lay people, but, on the con‐trary,  the  inclusion  of  his  own  emotions  led  to  the  fact  that  this  researcher was perceived as “authentic” and resulted in greater trust from the lay people.  Including emotions when talking about animals was also present in the narratives of the junior researchers, but in quite a different way. They particularly expressed their unease when killing individual mice, and they addressed the relation of kill‐ing practices  and  the personal  attitude  towards killing. Thus,  different  visions of “care”  were  articulated.  The  above‐cited  senior  researcher  expresses  the  care  a breeder has for his or her animals when selection is a necessary strategy in order to maintain the value of the whole animal population. The lay people perceived the junior  researchers’  uneasiness  regarding  the  killing  of  the mice  not  so much  as “care” for the animals but rather as care for themselves. My hypothesis is that the lay participants could accept  the breeder account because  this was  familiar  from agricultural contexts where farmers are able to express care for their animals but later  have  to  slaughter  them. However,  killing  and  the  practices  associated with it—as reported by the young researchers—are cultural experiences almost no one has had. As a result,  they acknowledged the narrative of the senior researcher as more  authentic  then  the  accounts  of  the  junior  researchers.  This may  be  linked also  to  the  anthropomorphization  of  the  mice  in  the  account  of  the  senior  re‐searchers, a rhetorical practice also frequently performed by the lay participants at the Round Table, for example when one lay participant suggested that mice should be “healed” after experiments are conducted “because with regard to humans I act in the same way” (L4/RT5/4/187)lviii.  Finally,  the  social  animal was  conceived  as  an  entity  shaping  the  social  relations between the researchers in the research group; therefore, the treatment of animals had to be regulated, in order to govern the research group: In  principle,  then,  not  everyone  is  really  working  with  the  mice.  But  one should be in principle prepared to do so. … Oh well, it [having no such prin‐ciple]  would  always  lead  to  there  being  do‐gooders  in  the  laboratory  and mice murderers. And that is, with regard to group dynamics, surely very un‐favorable. … in principle it should not be like that, that there are some who consider themselves morally purer than others. Such tensions surely have no place in a laboratory. (S8/eP/172‐180)lix This statement, which was repeated several times at the Round Table, emphasizes the great importance the animals have in the context of experimental biology. They are  not  only  a  passive means  for  producing  valid  knowledge,  but  also  an  active agent  for  shaping  the  relations  among  the  researchers. While  the norm  suggests that everyone was “equal” within the group, different researchers interpreted this code of conduct according to their context. The young researcher saw it rather as a kind of personal choice whether or not to kill mice with their own hands. On the other hand, senior researchers and project management were only marginally in‐volved in animal experimentation as a concrete activity. 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Starting from the multiple articulations of mice, one can see that the mice and the researchers’  identities are co‐constructed. Thus, the mice are active moral agents in shaping the collective of the research group as well as individual roles and posi‐tions in the group. However, the different articulations of mice must not be under‐stood as standing side by side on the same level, as the researchers also provided a story in which these different articulations were arranged in a chronological order, using  the  narrative  of  an  individual  development:  overcoming  personal  disgust when dissecting animals was a habituation process, where in the end the notion of the  animal  as  an  epistemic  and  instrumental  entity  should  prevail.  This,  in  turn, does not mean that ethical boundaries as shifted further and further, but that they are constantly re‐negotiated.  
Constructing individual and collective identities of researchers: Ethical 
boundary work and animal experimentation I will now analyze how the collective and individual identities of researchers were constructed  at  the  Round  Table  by  the  ethical  issue  of  animal  experimentation. This was  done  in  two ways.  On  one  hand,  boundaries were  drawn  between  the collective  of  researchers  and  society.  On  the  other  hand,  the  issue  of  animal  ex‐perimentation also constituted differences inside science. To analyze this, I will use the  concept  of  “ethical  boundary work”  that  has  been  developed  by Wainwright and co‐authors (2006) using Thomas Gieryn’s (1999; 1995) concept of boundary work. Gieryn’s concept seeks to explain the discursive work done by scientists and their  respective  institutions  to  demarcate  science  from  non‐science  in  order  to maintain  authority  over  a  certain  domain. Wainwright  and  co‐authors,  however, see  their  concept  of  “ethical  boundary work”  in  a  certain  opposition  to  Gieryn’s notion, because they try to show “that non‐science, in the form of ‘ethics’, is becom‐ing an integral part of maintaining the image of science” (Wainwright et al. 2006, 735). Ethical boundary work means the practices and discourses that demarcate a certain social domain by assigning it its own morals and ethical norms that distin‐guish  this  area  and  its  actors  from  other  cultural  endeavors.  These  norms,  inter 
alia, can even mean that ethics in a wider sense (for example, reflection on the so‐cial  consequences  of  science)  does  not  apply  to  science.  Socio‐ethical  domains must be understood as  flexible ones  that may change  their boundaries  from one context to another. For example, ethical boundary work in science does include the possibility of excluding other scientists  if  the way  they produce knowledge  is re‐garded as “unethical” (discussed  in this chapter as “creation of negative others”). Therefore,  “science” as a whole can be a specific socio‐ethical domain defined by boundary work in one context; however, other collectives are also possible as so‐cio‐ethical domains, for example a specific research group or a cohort group within this  research  group.  Ethical  boundary  work,  then,  serves  to  construct  a  socio‐ethical  domain within which  certain  actions  are  considered morally  unproblem‐atic. 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Ethical  boundary work  has  a  crucial  impact  on  the  construction  of  identities  for scientists as individuals, but also for scientific collectives, be it a research group or “the” scientific community” as an imaged community that all scientists are part of. The negotiation of norms and values associated with animal experimentation con‐tribute to the way science and scientists are understood by others and to the way they perceive  themselves. Negotiations over moral questions, however, must not be  understood  as  impeding  the  process  of  becoming  a  full‐fledged  scientist,  but rather as being an  integral part of  this socialization process. Ethics and scientific practice mutually shape each other. Scientists always enact both ethical and epis‐temic arguments simultaneously. In doing so, they perform an integral part of their identity work aiming at the establishment of moral‐epistemic communities. Their identity  is made  in  the  course  of  this  ethical  boundary work.  It  not  only  defines them  as  scientists  in  general,  representing  science  at  large,  but  also  defines  the researchers’ specific positions within a smaller research collective.  
Collective identities of researchers and the ethical demarcation of the “outside”  Concretely at the Round Table discussion, ethical boundary work towards an “out‐side”  with  regard  to  animal  experimentation  employed  two  prominent  mecha‐nisms. First, the work with mice was described as a habituation process, necessary for  enculturation  as  a  researcher  in  modern  biology,  as  a  learning  process  that every  researcher  had  to  go  through.  This  allowed  for  an  individualization  of  re‐searchers  in  the  group,  and  accounted  for  hierarchies  within  the  group  of  re‐searchers. The  idea behind the narrative of  the habituation process was that one cannot assume that all researchers naturally share the same values with regard to animal  experimentation;  however,  through  a  learning  process,  all  researchers would become part of the same moral‐epistemic community in the end. Second, in light of an increased public attention to ethically sensitive research, the research‐ers were  eager  also  to  emphasize  differences  between  their  ethical  conduct  and that of other scientists who were considered immoral in their dealing with animal experimentation.  These  negative  “others”  were  created  together  with  a  positive image of themselves.  The first narrative of a habituation and familiarization process focused on the indi‐vidual  researcher  and  his  or  her  engagement with  animal  experimentation  as  a learning process. While expressing too much empathy for the animals was not seen as a good way of handling the work with mice, it was also unwelcome if one liked to kill animals: I  say,  if  somebody  reacts  like  “when  can  I  finally  [kill] my  first mouse”,  he needs  a  doctor.  He  is misplaced  in  a  laboratory.  I  know  no  one who with great lust and love is thrilled when she walks into the mice stables the first time to kill a mouse. That is by all means a step that takes getting used to, but is  also necessary.  Similarly—I always  say  that  too  to people who eat many chickens  in course of  their  life but have  trouble killing a chicken: Theoreti‐
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cally,  one  must  say  if  I  eat  it  then  I  should  be  also  prepared  to  kill  it. (S8/RT1/2/103)lx While  the work with mice  in  the  laboratory entails  the killing of mice and this  is sometimes  perceived  as  “cruelty”  by  animal  rights  activists,  this  researcher  puts great  emphasizes  to not  include ongoing  researchers with  a  cruel  attitude  in  re‐search. However,  to practice  the killing of mice  is  seen  as  an  important  learning process that should not be bypassed, as the work with mice is a necessary and cen‐tral  element  in modern  life  sciences. Working  in  the  life  sciences means  that  re‐searchers benefit from the knowledge gained from animal experimentation; there‐fore, one should—in principle—be able to kill the animals her‐ or himself, and ac‐cept  that  being  a  researcher  in  the  life  sciences  entails  “sacrificing”  animals  for “higher purposes” as a process of enculturation. Thus, a careful balancing process between habituation and sensitization is pivotal to the researchers.  The process of enculturation was seen as a gradual process of habituation to ani‐mal  experiments  in  which  personal  ethical  boundaries  have  to  be  transgressed little by little so that originally undoable work becomes more and more accepted: I  can only  talk  from my experience: …  I have always worked with animals, and my field was for a time transgenic animals. … And in the beginning I also had not overcome this hurdle.  [I]  thus  told myself:  “… you cannot do  it. Do you really have to genetically modify mice?” And then I only started with it in the  years  ’91  or  ’92. Hence,  you  can  see,  one  of  course  is making  up  one’s mind, and not everything that later becomes a matter of course is a matter of course on the first day. (S8/eA/402‐28)lxi This  senior  researcher describes a gradual enculturation process  in which moral thresholds move towards performing the work with animals as a matter of course. The young  researchers also held  the narrative of boundaries  transgressed  in  the course of a scientific career, “because one simply has to, because it belongs to the work, which one must deal with” (S1/eP/223).lxii This process was seen as one that would never be complete, as scientific practice and progress continues to demand that ethical barriers are re‐negotiated: “And that is simply that which … from the beginning  of my  study  until  now  and  probably  also  in  the  future  always will  be there, I think” (S1/eP/223).lxiii According to the habituation narrative, researchers conform  to  the work  environment  they  live  in  rather  than  drawing  clear  ethical boundaries  that  are  never  transgressed.  Being  a  researcher  in  the  life  sciences means, therefore, a constant re‐negotiation process of personal values in order to prevail over the course of a career.  Having said that, re‐negotiating personal ethical boundaries do not mean that the animal experimentation should be done without any unease. The demand was to balance  carefully  between  gradual  habituation  and  maintaining  sensitivity  to moral questions in animal experimentation. Furthermore, the process of habitua‐tion must no be seen as a general one in science or biology. What counts as accept‐able  habituation  to  animal  experimentation,  and  thus  the moral  limit,  is  defined 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rather by the smaller collective of the research group than by legal regulations or by general scientific standards.   To a certain degree, the lay participants shared this assumption that a habituation process is necessary and unavoidable in science by comparing it with experiences from  their  professional  or personal  lives:  “I  have  for  example many  friends who work in prison. There is a different way of speaking…. That is, in my opinion, nor‐mal;  that  goes  through  all  domains  [of  professional  life]:  One  is  numbed  to  that with which one is working” (L10 RT1/4/77).lxiv While habituation was mostly ac‐cepted as a normal way of dealing with ethically difficult situations,  this position was also subject to criticism. Gradual habituation was also perceived as a danger by  the  lay  participants,  as  it  gets  harder  and  harder  to  see  and  define  ethical boundaries.  What has also been present in the researchers’ discussions on animal experimen‐tation was the myth that scientists share a special position to science. Concretely, this meant  that  the  researchers quasi naturalized  their way  into  research as one that  was  already  laid  out  in  childhood  and  the way  they  developed  interests  in knowing  things  beyond  the  usual.  This  allowed  performing  a  collective  identity work through the narration of a commonly shared history of how one becomes a researcher  by  telling  stories  about  the  origin  of  scientific  curiosity.  Such  stories were told each other in a small group discussion where the members of the public were not present. They did not share these narrations with the lay participants, as they possibly considered them “outsiders” who would not share the same under‐standing. By telling such stories, the researchers did identity work by placing the origin of  scientific  curiosity  in childhood. As such,  they mirror  the wider societal ambivalences with animals—on one hand great emphasis is put on the protection of animals; on the other hand, animals are killed for human purposes.  The creation of negative “others” (Michael and Birke 1994), and simultaneous sani‐tization of their own practice of and reasons for animal experimentation, was the second  important  rhetorical  strategy  of  the  researchers  to  manage  their  ethical unease and also to  foster the collective  identity of  the research group.  In the dis‐cussions  with  the  lay  people,  the  researchers  tried  to  display  their  own way  of dealing with animals in a good light by hinting at practices elsewhere that they did not regard as ethically sound. Distance was a crucial resource, as spatial distance also meant a cultural and cognitive distance for them. Thus, very often, these nega‐tive  “others” were  located  abroad,  for  example  in  countries  that  did  not  comply with “our” standards.  One example was the use of hedgehogs in basic research, because this species has a protein that only exists in humans and hedgehogs and is thus an interesting model organism. The project manager explained that the hedgehog was a protected spe‐cies in Austria, but “In China there exists no such regulation. And in China this ex‐periment was conducted” (S8/RT6/3/156).lxv However, as publication in Western journals requires the approval of ethics committees, “the Chinese researcher who according  to  our  standards  is  doing  a  prohibited  animal  experiment  really  has 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theoretically  only  one  way  out:  he’s  publishing  it  in  a  Chinese  journal.  Only,  in practice,  it  has  no  meaning  today,  because  …  no  one  reads  these  journals” (S3/RT6/3/188).lxvi “Chinese research” was one example of a negative “other”; and, simultaneously, the Western internal control systems of peer review and ethics committees were dis‐played  as  institutions  that  guaranteed  that  published  knowledge  was  ethically sound. Michael and Birke (1994, 201) concluded that the depiction of foreigners as morally questionable  “appeals  to nationalistic propensities  in  the would‐be audi‐ence.” Besides the slightly nationalistic implications of the creation of the negative “other”  abroad,  the  negative  account  of  foreigners worked  to  create  trust  in  na‐tional regulatory regimes, and thereby in research itself.  Other  examples  of  cases where  the  researchers  at  the Round Table would  draw ethical boundaries were experiments on  living animals, which were described by the researchers as “disgusting”, or on primates. These negative “others” comprised a wide  spectrum,  including  research  on  animals  done  in  non‐Western  countries, research conducted on animals classified as evolutionarily “higher” than mice, re‐search for purposes which were not regarded as ethical (e.g., for the cosmetics in‐dustry) and experimenting on living animals and thereby causing pain.  The  above  arguments  were  directed  against  other  research  methods,  and  were made  in  the presence of  the  lay participants. The  researchers,  however,  also  en‐rolled a different type of negative “other” when discussing among themselves in a small group. Here, “society” appeared as the negative “other”. In a quite emotional discussion, the researchers listed a number of societal practices that could count as “unethical”  by  the  standards  of  animal  experiments.  They  looked  for  resources through which  they would be able  to counter  the arguments of  the  lay people  in the following discussion. The consumption of meat and the killing of mice as pests in agriculture were such examples for the researchers, through which they aimed to  display  the  double  standard  society  employs  with  regard  to  research:  “So,  I think somebody who eats meat is not allowed to be upset about animal experimen‐tation, which is on the best possible level” (S6/ RT5/sgS/427).lxvii For them, medi‐cal research was a higher purpose than eating meat. Referring  to “meat” allowed for  a  balancing  between  animal  experimentation  and  other  commonly  accepted cultural  practices  in  which  the  killing  of  animals  for  reasonable  purposes  is  ac‐cepted. While on one side creating negative “others”, the researchers also aimed to create a 
positive  self­image with  regard  to  animal  experimentation. The  researchers often emphasized, even when among themselves, that they handled animals in research according  to  high  ethical  standards,  for  example,  “that  they  are  always  anesthe‐tized and that they are always killed immediately so that they do not even squeak, it  goes  so  fast  that  they do not notice  it  at  all”  (S6/RT5/sgS/419)lxviii  in order  to “make it as convenient as possible for the animals” (S6/eA/438).lxix The creation of a  positive  self‐image  also  included  hinting  at  ethical  boundaries  in  the  research practice. In a particular story, they emphasized that at one point in time they had 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voluntary abstained from mice experiments that they could in principle have con‐ducted  according  to  legislation,  but where  the  suffering  of  the  animals was  per‐ceived as too high:  one can justify a certain degree of suffering that is short‐term of course per‐haps  to  oneself—only  if  the  animal  dies  instantly. With  regard  to  this  ex‐periment,  however,  it  was  a  longitudinal  experiment  that  went  over  24 hours.  …  The  experiments  are  absolutely  internationally  accepted.  It  isn’t something  that would be  forbidden, but we have  internally agreed  that we will not do it. (S8/RT6/3/148)lxx The  researcher  emphasizes  that,  although  the  experiments  are  common  interna‐tionally, the law would allow them and there would be new knowledge produced, the  researchers’  personal  impressions  of  and  experiences  with  the  mice  made them abstain  from  these  experiments.  Thus, while mostly  arguing  that  following legal regulations as well as Western standards of scientific conduct was sufficient to be on the ethically safe side, there were instances where the ethical conscience of  the  research  group was more  pivotal.  The  central  role  of  this  story,  however, was  to  shed  a positive  light  on  their  own practice with mice  in  front  of  a  public perceived  as  critical.  More  important  than  the  individual  conscience  of  the  re‐search group, however, were institutional structures and mechanisms that ensure ethical  treatment  of  animals  in  the  lab.  Particular  emphasis was  put  on  peer  re‐view, which was seen as able to limit unethical conduct:  [It]  is  becoming  increasingly  common  that  the  publisher  requires  the  ap‐proval number of  the animal experiment showing that  the experiments are permitted to be conducted. So, in the meantime, it is also common in publica‐tions, similarly  it has been the case with studies on humans for a  long time already,  so  that  the ethics  committee was demonstrably  concerned with  it. (S8/RT6/3/122)lxxi  The  positive  display  of  the  researchers’  own  practice with mice  in  scientific  ex‐periments complements the depiction of negative “others”. The aim is to foster the moral‐epistemic position of the research group and contribute to the identity work of  the  researchers.  Institutional as well  as  individual ethical  limits  take care  that animals in the laboratory are treated in a good way. Such narratives served to ab‐sorb  ethical  protests  from  the  public  and  to  legitimize  the  researchers’  own  re‐search  in  a  societal  environment  perceived  as  potentially  adversarial  to  animal experimentation.  
Ethical boundary work between researchers The discourse of the researchers analyzed in the section above aimed at the con‐struction  of  the  identity  of  the  participating  group  of  researchers  by  drawing boundaries between them and society as well as “negative others”. This helped to create  the  image  of  a  collective  that  shares  common  values,  distinguishing  them from non‐scientists  as well  as  from  immoral  scientists.  However,  the  image  of  a 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coherent moral‐epistemic group was opposed by narratives that emphasized ethi‐cal  differences  with  regard  to  animal  experimentation  within  the  participating group of researchers.  The  Round  Tables  assembled  researchers  with  quite  different  research  back‐grounds—some worked directly with mice, some only used mouse tissue prepared by  others,  some  did  work  on  yeast  but  created  their  experiments  based  on  the knowledge  gained  by  research  on  mice.  Furthermore,  the  involved  researchers were at different stages in their careers, ranging from doctoral candidates to prin‐cipal  investigators.  Also,  different  functions  of  the  research  group  were  repre‐sented at the Round Table, from people working only in the laboratory to the pro‐ject manager, who was not directly involved in animal experimentation. This het‐erogeneity  of  the  group  led  to  the  fact  that  the  “negative  others” were  not  only situated outside the research group, but also within. Thus, who counted as a “nega‐tive  other”  was  highly  dependent  on  the  context:  When  speaking  of  animal  ex‐perimentation  from  the  perspective  of  the whole  collective,  the  negative  “other” might be in located abroad; when speaking of the work of individual researchers in the group,  the negative  “other” might be sitting  just next door. Hence,  some par‐ticipating researchers themselves became negative “others” if they did not appear to meet the standards of the speaker. I will draw here on two examples: First, re‐searchers who were not part  of  the  subproject working with mice directly  often emphasized how relieved  they were  that  they did not need  to kill animals  them‐selves. This  is a  form of ethical boundary work, however, without blaming some‐one directly.  Second,  there was been a debate between  the project manager  and the young researchers during the fifth Round Table over whether the principle that everyone  should  be  ready  to  kill  mice  should  apply  to  them  and  whether  the method of handling the animal experimentation issue should be subject to a collec‐tive norm or to personal attitudes.  Seeing  oneself  in  the  ethically  “fortunate  position”  of  not  being  concerned  with ethical issues of animal experimentation was an argument that was frequently em‐ployed by  the  researchers  at  the Round Table.  In  doing  so,  they did not  actively create a negative “other” within the research consortium, but often mentioned that their work did not include the killing of animals in a direct way, and therefore that they did not have to bear such moral burdens as those conducting animal experi‐ments. This was an important part of the ethical boundary work, especially in front of a public that may have had reservations about animal experimentation:  It  was  actually  this  way  then,  in  the  discussion  in  the  breaks  over  coffee where they [the lay people] asked if one actually works with mice. … Thank God I always said, no, I receive them ready‐minced [laughs]. (S2/eP/155)lxxii Because this post‐doc received mouse tissue from another research group and did not have to kill  them, she saw herself  in a “fortunate position”, a narrative which was also employed by other researchers. While  they saw the necessity of animal experimentation,  they would prefer not being directly  involved  in  it. This  “fortu‐nate” position was sometimes ascribed to a personal decision during education. I 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described above how getting used to the killing of animals was seen as a process of moral and epistemic enculturation in science and a necessary process in becoming a scientist. However, the narrative of habituation was sometimes contrasted with a narrative of “sensitization” during the study, as one researcher describes it: I  actually once,  in animal physiology  training, killed a  frog, and  then said,  I will  never  do  this  again.  That’s  enough.  I  only  thought  I  have  to  try  it  one time to see how I do with it, and then I decided, for me, okay, I do not want [to work] with higher animals. (S7/eP/27)lxxiii This  narrative  is  opposed  by  the  project management’s  norm  that working with animals is mandatory, and by the narrative of a habituation process necessary for becoming a full‐fledged life scientist. Of course, there is a strong power dimension in those concepts. Often, researchers who did not have to kill animals themselves were in a hierarchical position where they were able to opt out. Thus, the specific role and position in the research consortium is linked to the ethical standpoint one holds and the way animal experimentation is addressed.  Besides  statements  of  an  ethically  fortunate  position,  two  different  ethical  cul‐tures—that of a collective norm and of a personal choice—within the group of re‐searchers explicitly collided  in  the debates at  the Round Table. The project man‐agement set up a rule that everyone in the subproject must in principle be ready to kill mice and prepare mouse  tissue  for  further analysis. The aim was  to  create a “moral‐epistemic community”, with the intention of avoiding social conflicts in the group, because without such a principle of governance those who killed the mice would be considered morally “bad” by others in the group. This principle was sup‐posed to strengthen the social coherence of the research group, but also to prevent conflicts in wider society over animal experimentation from being carried into the laboratory. In that sense, such a governance principle is a kind of ethical boundary work, as  it draws a clear  line between those who are  involved  in  the “work with mice”—the  researchers  in  the  laboratory—and  those  who  are  not—the  society outside.  The project management stated this norm at Round Table one, directed to the pub‐lic  to  stress  that  the  participating  researchers  should  be  regarded  as  a  coherent group with regard to animal experimentation in order to protect those who actu‐ally kill mice in the laboratory practice. Other researchers did not comment on the statement,  so  the  lay  participants    could  assume  that  all  the  researchers  would share this norm. During the fifth Round Table, finally, after the young researchers had been asked directly why they went into research and what ethical aspects they saw in their daily practice, a young researcher responded: after I learned that in this department mouse research, animal experiments, are conducted, it was clear to me [that] I certainly will kill no mice. So, I do research with them … and I vaccinate them also, but I certainly kill no mice. So, that [is] actually a personal attitude of mine … there is a separate mouse stable. Anyway you have seen how it works. There are people there who do 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this, and if I do not have to do it—I do not want to do it. So, that is actually a personal attitude of mine. (S5/RT5/4/88)lxxiv Despite  her  awareness  that  a  common norm  in  the  other  subprojects  exists,  she clearly states that killing mice is not an option for her. As there are people whose primary  task  is  to  kill mice,  the  young  researcher does not  see  the necessity  for doing the killing herself. In the following discussion, a rather emotional debate be‐tween the project management and the young researchers developed. The project manager  asked  what  the  difference  was  between  standing  aside  and  observing how a colleague superextends the mouse’s neck and doing it herself, because she was “actually the executioner, who is responsible anyway” (S6/RT5/4/88‐173).lxxv The young researcher, supported by a more experienced post‐doc, answered that this would be a question of “personal attitude if you have to consciously kill a living being”.  Here, two ethical cultures collided: The project management aimed at the compre‐hensive  principle  for  the  whole  group  in  order  to  avoid  moral  discrimination within the research group. The personal emotional level of the involved research‐ers played no role  in  the project management’s rationale. Ethics, here, were con‐ceptualized  as  concrete  guidelines  providing  orientation  for  individual  actions from the top down. The young researchers, however, located ethics on a very per‐sonal  level  as  a  question  of  individual  choice.  Ethics meant  that  one was  free  to decide individually in morally problematic situations and not along law‐like rules that ignore personal attitudes.  The  importance  of  the  animal  killing  issue  and  the  debate  between  the  project management  and  the  young  researchers was  highlighted  by  the  prominence  the involved researchers gave  this debate  in  the  interviews we conducted with  them after the Round Table:  What was  surprising was  also  the  reaction  of  a  certain  colleague who was surprised when I said that we as young scientists do ethically reflect on this. … Because it is true that we have to deal with it. And because of what it is, it is hard for us to deal with it. … One month ago or so we had a test series that was  relatively  challenging with  the  animals, where  three  of  us worked  to‐gether, where we  really  some days  simply  sat  together  and  talked about  it again  and  again.  Others  could  not  even  join  us,  simply  because we  had  to deal with it on our own. And I was surprised then that the colleague was so astonished there [at the Round Table]. Because I think,  for me it  is also im‐portant that we reflect on it ethically, also regarding the handling that we do there, and not simply go to work unreflectively. (S1/eP/11)lxxvi The  young  researcher  argues  that  such  a  space  for  ethical  reflection  is  strongly needed  to  cope with  the difficult work with  animals.  Yet,  they preferred  to keep their  discussions  among  themselves,  as  the  issue  discussed was  regarded  as  too personal  to be able  to  share  it with colleagues who had different  interests and a different position in the research group. For the young researchers, ethical debate 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In the following pages, I analyze the roles trust plays in ethical debates—an issue to which little attention has been paid by bioethics so far (De Vries and Kim 2008). In  this  relation,  the performance of  “authenticity” at  the Round Table  is  relevant regarding two dimensions. The first one involves science in its non‐personal, insti‐tutional  aspect.  For  the  lay participants,  the question was whether  they were al‐lowed to see “authentic” science taking place, that is, to look behind the assumed closed doors of everyday scientific practice. The concrete touchstone, here, was the lay people’s  request  to  see  the mice  stables. The  second dimension concerns  the way the researchers expressed how they coped with the necessity to kill animals for  the  production  of  knowledge.  My  assumption  is  that  those  researchers  who were  able  to make  visible  their  “conscience”  and  “unease”  about  animal  experi‐mentation were the most authentic and the most trustworthy. “Authentic”  in this context  means  that  the  lay  participants  considered  the  articulations  of  the  re‐searchers “true”; that is, they did not think that there were other, hidden motives and interests behind the statements.  For both researchers and lay participants, attitudes towards animal experimenta‐tion were  a  touchstone  for mutual  trustworthiness.  For  the  lay  participants,  the question was whether the researchers treated the animals according to moral con‐victions that they thought should be a standard in a society—that is, that they did not regard animals  in purely  instrumental  terms as a mere means to create pure knowledge. On the other hand, the researchers also expected to be appreciated and trusted by the lay people. The researchers implicitly assumed that the lay partici‐pants’ trust in the researchers’ work, and, much more importantly, in the research­
ers as persons, were a necessary and important condition of robust science‐society relations. This indicates changes in the relation between science and society: non‐scientific criteria, such as public trust, increased their importance for science, but where particular dimensions of scientific practice,  for example the way scientists act  as  “persons” when  engaging with  the  public,  also  received  increased  promi‐nence in the public’s understanding of science.  For more than twenty years, science has perceived a lack of public trust in science in many different dimensions, be it the legitimization of its outcomes or its means of producing knowledge. As a “countermeasure”, science and science policy intro‐duced a range of changes aiming at a democratization of science, for example “ges‐tures of transparency” (Brown and Michael 2002, 270) and participation exercises. Indeed, opening science to societal concerns also implies that the authority of sci‐entists  as  experts  has  been widely  challenged.  In  that  light,  Brown  and Michael (2002,  259) observe  a  “transition  from  the demonstration of  expert  authority  to that of public authenticity”. 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Such changes in the image of science and scientists could also be observed at the Round Table discussions. Of course, rather classical notions of scientists often pre‐vailed in the discussions between researchers and lay participants. The research‐ers’  epistemic  expertise  was  seldom  challenged  when  they  were  explaining  the scientific  background  of  their  research. However, when  the  lay  participants  per‐ceived a clear “societal” dimension in the researchers’ statements, their authority as experts was called into question. Most obviously, this was the case in the discus‐sions  on  animal  experimentation, where  the  lay  participants  did  perceive  them‐selves as legitimate advocates for animals where no expert knowledge was needed in order  to participate  in  an  informed discussion. The  researchers  responded by lending  their  narrations  an  authentic  tone,  that  is,  resigning  from  authoritarian gestures  as  experts  and  emphasizing  the  “emotional”  dimensions  when  dealing with  experimental  animals.  This micro‐politics  of  emotions was  supposed  to  re‐establish what science qua authoritarian experts failed to do, that is, to regain trust in the eyes of the public.  
Looking inside the mice stables: See­through science and public trust The lay participants at the Round Table perceived genomics as a complex network that  was  entangled  with  society  in  a  range  of  dimensions,  creating  tremendous repercussions  on  cultures  values.  Because  of  its  perceived  complexity,  it  was rather difficult  for the lay participants to come up with concrete future scenarios with a high potential  to be  realized. On one hand,  there were vague  ideas  that  a genomics‐informed health system would increase the pressure on the individual to subscribe to this health paradigm. Genomics  invoked many uncertainties and un‐knowns  that  were  considered  difficult  to  deal  with.  On  the  other  hand,  the  re‐searchers were often able to draw boundaries between their present research and its potential realization in the form of applications in society. Hence, the question for the lay participants was what criteria—in the absence of clear technoscientific trajectories—they should draw upon in their judgments of the work of the present researchers  and  genomics  in  general.  In  answering  this,  researchers’  “body  lan‐guage” regarding animal experimentation can be seen as a cognitive resource and anchor for the lay people in dealing with complex genomics‐related matters. Look‐ing at how the knowledge was produced in the laboratory was regarded as a token for trustworthiness and the controllability of science.  One  dimension  in  the  assessment  of  genomics was  to  look  at  the  technology  as such. For the lay people, genomics was characterized by a lack of the clear material artifacts  that  they  were  used  to  from  other  technologies,  and  that  would  have served as anchors to position themselves in relationship to this technology. One lay participant expressed his ambivalence as follows: “What would worry me just now, like a huge  laser  canon,  I did not  see. They  [the  researchers]  really did not have them.” (L12/eP/191).lxxvii He talked about a material artifact that would have sig‐naled  clearly  to  him  that  this  technology was  dangerous.  This  he  could  not  find. However, what does this absence mean? Is the technology therefore harmless, or is 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it just playing tricks and deluding the public? The lay participants made clear that the perception of  genomics as  an opaque network  constituted a danger, because the  technology’s  repercussions on society only become visible when  it  is already too late. In this situation of high uncertainty and ambivalence, the researchers’ dis‐cursive  behavior with  regard  to  animal  experimentation  served  as  a  touchstone and reference point to address these wider concerns. Their rationale was, if I can trust  the  researchers  to  really  conduct  research  in  an  ethical way,  it would be  a criterion  to  evaluate what  genomics  does  and  could  do  in  society.  On  the  other hand,  the formation of  trust  is not a unidirectional movement.  It was also crucial for the researchers to trust that what they told and showed the lay people would not result in premature conviction or rejection of the research or the researchers as persons. Thus, the researchers did not quickly open up their minds and labora‐tories, as they feared to be misunderstood.  A crucial episode at  the Round Table with regard to the question of mutual  trust began with the question whether or not the lay participants should be allowed to visit  the  mice  stables.  After  a  visit  to  some  laboratories  of  a  subproject  during Round Table 2, some of the  lay participants expressed their wish to see the mice stables,  because  some of  them had  the  impression  that, while  certain  things had been  shown  to  them,  others  had  been  deliberately  hidden.  The  researchers  re‐sponded that so many people would endanger the mouse populations by bringing in infectious microorganisms. However, the lay participants insisted on seeing the mice stables, and asked if it would be possible to film the mice in the stables. Even then,  the researchers were very hesitant  to show the mice stables;  therefore,  the lay participants suspected that something wrong was going on in there. As the re‐searchers themselves did not regard the mice stables as a “nice” place to show to outsiders,  and  because  they  feared  that  the  lay  people’s  impression  of  the mice stables would have a negative effect on their relationship to the researchers, they employed a range of arguments for why it was “better” for the lay people not to see the mice stables. When one lay said that she had never been in “such a laboratory”, the project manager  responded by  saying  that  the mice  stable  is  a  room  “where racks and cages are disposed” (S6/RT2/2/121).lxxviii The researcher described the mice stables as mundane objects familiar to everyone, and thus not worth seeing. On the other hand, the researchers also emphasized that they wanted to spare the lay  participants  the  sight,  because  of  the  unpleasant  smell  of  the  mice’s  excre‐ments.  Later at this Round Table, when reflecting, one lay said that she felt “that they want to hide something” (L5/RT2/3/418).lxxix This reluctance of the researchers to open up the stables made it even more interesting for the lay participants to get access to  the mice stables, because  “something becomes more  interesting  if you are not allowed  to  do  it”  (L2/RT2/3/402).lxxx  Because  of  some  interventions  from  us  as organizers of the Round Table, the lay participants finally were able to see the mice stables. What was interesting with regard to this episode was that after the lay par‐ticipants had visited  the mice stables and had seen with  their own eyes how the mice were held, the mice stables as an object of discussion largely disappeared. 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This  episode  at  the Round Table  can  be  regarded  as  an  instructive  lesson  about how mutual  trust  relations between science and society are negotiated: The way the  researchers  dealt with  animals was  a  touchstone  for  the  lay  participants  for dealing with the complexities of genomics in general. While it was impossible for the lay to control or to oversee genomics in general, they could themselves visit the mice  stables  and personally  assess how  the mice were kept  as  living beings. Be‐cause of the idea that “transparency” is a crucial criterion for the trustworthiness of science, getting access to the mice stables was a test site for the lay participants’ trust. Their question was whether  the  researchers  trusted  them enough  to  show those  elements  of  their  research  practice  that  were  not  considered  “clean”  and “nice”, and which were usually hidden from the public, as to a certain degree the lay participants had the impression that only the positive aspects of research were shown to them:   We have surely, then, seen the thousand really good mice… [the] awful look‐ing mice  we  have  of  course  not  seen.  Yes,  well,  for me  this  also  fits  so  to speak into the image that it was displayed very, very positively. But as I said, I certainly understand it. So, I would probably do it exactly the same way if somebody came to me and wanted to see everything. Then I would also show and tell him only the nice things. (L4/eP/31)lxxxi While still thinking that the researchers had not shown the true face of their prac‐tice to the lay participants, and even that the laboratory visits had been “staged”, even this  lay admitted “that animal experimentation also comes with  it” and that “it was totally normal. Thus, I rather thought: Well, why do you actually put up a fuss about the animal stables?” (L4/eP/183).lxxxii Other lay participants shared this response: “I do not believe that they desperately have something to hide, but she [one  researcher]  maybe  also  communicated  this  somehow  with  her  behavior“ (L5/eP/175).lxxxiii In an ironic turn, some lay participants were rather disappointed that  they  had  not  seen  things  that  shocked  them,  describing  the mice  stables  as “nothing  special”  or  stating  “I  have  seen  more  awful  things,  I  have  to  admit” (L5/eP/55).lxxxiv This argument was supported by the plain and down‐to‐earth de‐scription one lay provided of the mice stables: “I mean, yes,  there are many mice caged  and  everything  is  in  artificial  light  and  through  the  experiments  of  course some mice will  die,  and  in  these mice  there will  be  certain  genes … deactivated. That then was not so tragic for me” (L2/eP/7).lxxxv  The crucial point in this debate was not the mice stable as such, but the lay partici‐pants’ expectation of the gesture of being invited into the stable as an expression of the researchers’ trust that the lay people could cope with it. The very act of inviting the  lay participants  into the stable enacted a mutual  trust relationship. For those among  the  lay people whose  trust  in  science was already established,  seeing  the mice stables became an interesting event only. However, for the majority of the lay people the negotiations over whether and why (not) they should be allowed to see the mice  stables were much more  important  than  the  stables  themselves.  Thus, once  they  had  seen  them,  they were  not  interested  anymore,  as  the  researchers 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had “proven”—in this context and for a limited time—to be trustworthy, and that they also trusted the  lay people. The “institutional body  language” (Wynne 1991, 1992) of the involved researchers, rather than the facts and information provided, was crucial for the possibility to create a trust relationship.  While  the  episode of  getting  access  to  the mice  stables  shaped  the  trust  relation between researchers and lay participants to a great degree,  it also had important implications  for  the  lay  participants,  because  it  triggered  a  process  of  regarding themselves as a more coherent group sharing particular interests. This was clearly expressed by  one  of  the  lay  participants  after  the Round Table, who  said  that  “I rather  liked the group dynamics  that developed when the researchers absolutely did not want to show us the mice stable. That was somehow funny. There we [the group of all lay people] suddenly were very much as one” (L10/eP/295).lxxxvi The  researchers also  interpreted  the mice  stable episode  in a positive  light  after the Round Tables, as  they also wanted  the  lay participants  to have good  insights into the GOLD project:  I was  astonished  that  the members  of  the  public  evaluated  the  visit  to  the mice stable positively. I think the animal stable is not particularly beautiful, and  there  are  animal  stables  which  are  more  convenient  for  mice.  … Whereas I had the feeling at the end of the discussion [that] most of them ac‐tually were  convinced  that  it was  necessary,  and  that we  really  try  to  use other methods than animal experiments. (S6/eP/165)lxxxvii The  researcher  assumes  that  providing  deeper  insights  into  their  research  con‐vinced the lay participants of the need for animal experimentation. For the lay par‐ticipants, the question of seeing the mice stables was not associated with the fun‐damental question of the necessity of animal experimentation, but rather with the question of how far the researchers were able to trust the lay participants. To bor‐row the concept of “see‐through science” from Wilsdon and Willis (2004), the lay participants wanted  to  see  a more  comprehensive  scope  of  scientific  practice  in order to be able to make sense out of it with regard to its social and ethical aspects. Looking behind closed doors—in our case those of the mice stable—was a crucial factor  for establishing trust relationships between science and society. Of course, genomics as such remained an opaque network for the lay participants, impossible to  see  through. More  important was  to be  invited  in and  to  see particular places where  the  lay participants were  able  to  see  research  in  action  as  a  possible  test field for trust.  
“Authenticity” as a touchstone for the public’s trust  Apart  from  the  question  of  a  rather  institutional  trustworthiness  of  science  en‐acted  through  the question of  getting access  to  the mice  stables,  the  researchers themselves were crucial  factor  for  the possibility of a  trust  relationship between science  and  society.  For  the  lay  participants,  the way  the  researchers  dealt with animals was not only a question of ethics, that is, do the researchers treat animals 
 ‐ 147 ‐ 
according to ethical norms? While this was an important issue (see previous chap‐ter),  the debate also  focused on another aspect. Based on  the shared assumption that “authenticity” was a value that might help to develop a more stable relation‐ship between science and society, the possibility of animal experimentation as an ethical question was translated into a question of mutual trust. Brown and Michael (2002)  have  observed  that  “authenticity”  in  scientists’  engagement  with  society has gained some importance in recent years, accompanied by a loss of relevance of enactments of  expert  authority. The  importance of  authenticity  is,  too,  accompa‐nied by calls for “transparency” in science policy, which emphasize “democratiza‐tion” and “transparency” as new strategies for regaining the public’s trust. Trans‐parency today is a nearly unquestioned democratic value; however, transparency alone is not a convincing vehicle to overcome the crisis of public trust (Brown and Michael 2002). While  “transparency” addresses a  rather anonymous  institutional dimension  of  science,  “authenticity”  steps  in  at  the  personal  level  as  a  powerful rhetorical device to persuade others from their own goals and interests. It is a rhe‐torical means to convince others that attitudes made explicit in words are consis‐tent  with  the  “real”  attitudes  and  emotions  of  the  person  expressing  them.  The perceived coherence of these implicit and explicit attitudes can serve as a measure for the trustworthiness of the person.  The researchers’ disclosure of  their authentic emotions when killing mice  for re‐search purposes was pivotal  for the lay participants in assessing the trustworthi‐ness of  the  researchers. The particular episode  I want  to describe here  to exem‐plify my argument took place during the second Round Table discussion, when a researcher concerned with the making of knockout mice36 was invited to the dis‐cussions. He described his relation to the mice as a rather emotional one, as he re‐garded  them  as  “my  family”.  He  emphasized  his  care  for  the  animals  and  their housing. However, he also explained that he had to eliminate them if they did not carry the right color of fur, which was an indicator for carrying a specific gene de‐fect he wished to generate. A  lay participant  then asked the researcher,  “How do you  feel  when  you  have  to  simply  eliminate  these  black  mice? (L6/RT2/2/316).lxxxviii The lay participant was not interested in the general ques‐tion of the rights and wrongs of animal experimentation, but was interested in the very personal feeling of the researcher. The researcher’s response provides a per‐sonal account of the suffering he underwent when he started to kill mice during his PhD work. He said that, when killing the first mice, he had “sleepless nights” and “there the pulse is at 180”.lxxxix He then described the killing as a habituation proc‐ess, because “it belongs to my work, I decided in favor of it“.xc He emphasized that he tried to kill the animals as quickly as possible, but the killing of mice remained a balancing between different rationalities for him:  
                                                36   Knockout mice are genetically engineered mice for studying functions of genes. The role of certain  genes  are  studied  by  „knocking  out“,  that  is,  turning  off  these  genes.  The  inactive genes cause differences in the physiology of the mice. The first knockout mouse was created in 1987‐1989 (see Nature 2002). 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Indeed, one can say that by and by one becomes dulled, but I believe one can only really do this if one identifies a purpose in it. If I were doing work where I was not convinced that it is important, then it would not be thinkable to kill the animals. (S9/RT2/2/330)xci What is particularly of interest here is how the lay participants responded to such enactments  of  “authenticity”—openings  of  the  “conscience”  of  the  researcher  in form of a “confession”. Many  lay participants valued the researcher’s account be‐cause he was ready “to provide a very personal commentary on my question, be‐cause  I have had  the experience  that  scientists never  speak  truly about personal things” (L3/RT2/3/277).xcii This researcher’s way of talking was compared to im‐ages  of  how  scientists  are,  namely  to  images  of  emotionally  detached  thinkers, which  are  particularly  present  in  public  images  and  stereotypes  of  scientists (LaFollette 1990). He was seen as an exception to an assumed rule of killing mice without emotions  following only  the rationale of generating new knowledge. An‐other lay participant also expressed her sympathy for this researcher, as he “was attracted  to his mice”  (L7/eP/51).xciii  Yet  another  lay  regarded  the  statements of the researcher as reflecting wider cultural dealings with animals and thus holding a mirror up to the lay participants’ own everyday practices that involve the killing of animals:  that he is reproached of course always with killing the mice. If you look at it from  the  flip  side,  one  has  to  say  that we  all  have  to  be  vegetarians  if  we really refuse [to kill mice]. I only put this up for discussion [because] in prin‐ciple no one is reflecting on that when he enjoys dinner. (L5/RT2/3/193)xciv The disclosure of  the researcher’s struggle when balancing the needs of research with his own emotions was perceived as an “authentic” account by the lay people. Consequently,  he  initiated  reflections  about wider  cultural  unease  regarding  the killing  of  animals  for  human  purposes.  The  researcher was  perceived  positively because he did not provide a ready‐made and clean “solution” for the problem of animal  experimentation  in  research. What  at  least  a  good  proportion  of  the  lay people at the Round Table seemed to demand was that scientists should not per‐form  the  “image of difference”  (LaFollette 1990), but act and  think  like  “normal” citizens. While this particular researcher and his accounts of animal experimentation were perceived in a positive light, this does not hold for other researchers at the Round Table. Other researchers concerned with management  tasks, who do not kill ani‐mals themselves anymore, who are concerned with managing the public commu‐nication of  the consortium and thus who have more advanced rhetorical abilities were perceived rather ambivalently by the lay people. The ability to “sell” science in a rather smooth way to the public was not seen as a property an “authentic” sci‐entist should have. This way of communicating was seen as “more smoothed”, in‐cluding the tendency to leave out aspects that do not fit into a clean message. 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While  rhetorical  competence  and  a  smooth  way  of  talking  were  evaluated  in  a negative  light  with  regard  to  trustworthiness,  the  same  holds  for  silence.  This point of critique by the lay participants particularly concerns the young research‐ers  involved in the Round Table discussion who—for a different set of reasons—did not contribute as much to the discussions as expected by the lay participants. The  lay people  interpreted the young researchers’ silence with regard to the ani‐mal killing  issue as  indifference  towards  the suffering of  the animals. While both the researcher creating the knockout mice and the young researchers have to kill animals as a practical aspect of their work, only the latter were criticized for it: Either they did not care, or  they maybe did not dare to say that  they really have crises. But I do not believe that, because by and by all becomes routine. And  they  know  in  advance  what  they  have  to  expect  if  they  are  working there, probably. They did not have to do it. Because I do not believe that one goes in there and one does not know what one has to do there. These people do this voluntarily. (L2/eP/27)xcv While  perceiving  the  young  researchers  in  their way  of  dealing with  the  animal experimentation  issue  rather  negatively,  this  lay  also  found  the  project  heads “quite nice”. Other lay people came to the opposite conclusion. They saw the young researchers as dependent on  the benevolence of  their supervisors, and  therefore as having no choice whether or not to conduct animal experimentation. The young researchers were  also  seen  as  discussing  animal  ethics  issues more  than  senior researchers did. However, those researchers who appeared the most “authentic” in the eyes of the lay participants were perceived in the most positive light. The ques‐tion was why the young researchers who in part very openly discussed their emo‐tional struggles and suffering with animal experimentation were not considered as trustworthy as the researcher who created the knockout mice. One explanation is that  the  long‐lasting  silence  of  the  young  researchers with  regard  to  the  animal issue was perceived either as indifference towards the suffering of the animals or as  inability  to  publicly  confess  their  unease  while  discussing  this  issue  among themselves. On the other hand, when they finally revealed their struggles regard‐ing  animal  experimentation,  their  unease with  animal  experimentation was  per‐ceived as so tremendous that the lay people asked themselves why they went into research in the first place, in the fashion of “they should have known when they got involved”. Also,  smooth ways of  communication perceived as a  façade hiding  the speaker’s “true”  interests were negatively evaluated by the lay people, and led to personal mistrust  towards  these  persons.  The main  objective  for  the  lay  partici‐pants when engaging with this issue was to find out “what is the motivation behind this”, and they did not expect an answer: “If you are addressing the people person‐ally, then they often have no answer, and probably there is not really an answer, is there” (L1/eP/43).xcvi  The way ethical questions about animal experimentation were addressed by both parties  at  the  Round  Table  could  be  indicators  of  a  shift  in  science‐society  rela‐tions.  In  the  context  of  animal  experimentation—and  this was  different  in  other 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contexts at  the Round Table—the researchers emphasized  that  scientific work  is not different from other societal domains, and that scientists are “normal” people. They “disenchanted” their own practice in order to depict it as a cultural endeavor having the same legitimacy as, for instance, the killing of animals for food. The lay participants, on the other side, evaluated research by asking for inner motivations and emotions with regard to animal experimentation. They were less interested in rational explanations, and more interested in personal accounts.  
Discussion: Beyond facts—From the authority of knowledge to the authentic­
ity of knowledge­producers  For the lay participants, the case of animal experimentation was a means to make sense of the work of the participating researchers in particular, but also of genom‐ics and science in general. The mice were concrete objects for the lay participants in the rather complex field of genomics, which was regarded as opaque and miss‐ing  many  material  references  present  in  other  technologies.  As  one  of  the  re‐searchers expressed this after the Round Tables: “DNA is too far away, isn’t it? It is too abstract too. It is not really graspable. But the animal, you can see it, the mouse that  squeaks  there”  (S4/eP/21).xcvii  Therefore,  the  mice  allowed  for  a  down‐to‐earth discussion of ethics in genomics that was elsewhere regarded as too complex both in its epistemic content and in its entanglements with society. For the lay par‐ticipants,  too many players were  involved  in  the  game,  and  they were unable  to identify a central actor “steering” the whole development—a wish sometimes ex‐pressed  by  them,  although  they  believed  that  there  could  be  no  such  central authority able  to govern genomics. Their  implicit  assumption was  that:  if  the  re‐searchers were able  to conduct animal experimentation  in accordance with com‐mon  societal moral  standards,  then  this might  save  scientific  development  from being corrupted and taking morally questionable trajectories.  The  lay participants’ problematization of  the use and  status of mice  in genomics can be  interpreted as an articulation of more general reservations about genome sciences and the way technosciences are governed in our society (Michael 2001). While particular concerns of the lay people regarding the researchers’ treatment of mice quickly disappeared after  the visit  to  the mice  stables,  the general  reserva‐tions about genomics actually  increased throughout the discussions at the Round Table. This raises some questions regarding stereotypical science policy expecta‐tions  for  techniques of public engagement, which often assume a  linear develop‐ment from less trust to more trust over the course of the engagement event. How‐ever, as the discussions at the Round Table show, public trust is not simply a ques‐tion of more or less, but rather one of developing more complex and even ambiva‐lent  opinions. While  science  policy  often  demands  univocal  public  acceptance  of “science”,  the  setting of  the Round Table allowed  for a more  fine‐grained under‐standing of “research” in its multiple facets (Latour 1998). Rather than re‐enacting the  myths  of  science,  the  Round  Table  contributed  to  the  understanding  of  re‐search as a deeply social enterprise. 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In the prior empirical chapters, I analyzed the main ethical issues that emerged at the  Round  Table,  focusing  predominantly  on  their  ethical  content.  This  chapter focuses on  the discursive processes and  the  “micro‐politics” of  the discussions—that  is, how  did  the participants discuss ethics? To  focus on  this aspect of public engagement is relevant for a couple of reasons.  First,  dominant  evaluation exercises of public  engagement  and participatory  set‐tings (Rowe and Frewer 2000, 2004; Rowe, Marsh, and Frewer 2004) widely ne‐glect the procedural and performative character of public engagement, and are not very sensitive to what happens in such settings between the different participants (Felt et al. 2009; Harvey 2008). They concentrate predominantly on the outcomes of public engagement as one measure of its effectiveness. However, the “outcome”, in  terms  of  what  people  think  about  the  setting  itself  and  its  contextualization within a wider moral, social, political, cultural, economic and technoscientific envi‐ronment,  is  strongly  influenced by  the particular discursive actions  in  the public engagement setting and the way they change over time. Therefore, to understand what public engagement does and to contextualize its “outcomes”, a more detailed view of the actual processes within is needed.  Second, participation and engagement settings are not “white rooms” in which dif‐ferent pre‐existing positions, values and arguments are reported and mutually ac‐knowledged, but actively framed fora in which positions are developed and negoti‐ated actively between the participants. The positions that emerge in such settings are much more than the sum of the different values each participant holds for her‐ or himself. Hence, the “nature” of a public engagement setting is to a great extent defined by the actual micro‐politics of the event.  Third, the larger context of public ethical debates and the presumptions of profes‐sional ethics often suggest idealized visions of how ethical debates should be led. In particular, among the discursive norms of professional ethics is the idea that the best argument should prevail in the end and result in a consensual decision about how to deal with morally controversial issues. This idea is accompanied by the as‐sumption  that  experts  lead  a  rational  discourse  while  the  wider  public  engages with moral issues in a way that is too emotional. As Bogner and Menz (2005) have shown for the negotiations in the Bioethikkommission beim Bundeskanzleramt, the normative idea of a rational discourse is not even realized in an expert committee, 




while the members of this committee simultaneously continue to demand a more “rational”  and  “informed”  discourse  in  the  public.  However,  “politics”  cannot  be bypassed by demanding a more “rational” discourse. Thus, it is important to shed some light on discursive games and micro‐political processes, as they are an inte‐gral part of an ethical debate—and not its enemies.   In the following chapter, I will describe two forms of micro‐politics that framed the discourses on ethical issues at the Round Table. I will start with what I call the poli­
tics of labeling, that is, how certain arguments are signified and thus placed into a certain context, which defines their relevance and the validity with regard to ethi‐cal questions and thus can serve to disqualify arguments as well as to sanitize cer‐tain  statements.  The  second  form  of  politics  I will  analyze  here  is  the politics  of 





As we decided in our research project to accompany a real scientific research pro‐ject  within  a  dedicated  genomics  program,  the  composition  of  the  researchers’ group was already given. Thus, we had researchers who to some degree knew each other. On the other hand,  the  lay participants did not know each other  in the be‐ginning. This fact provided the researchers a head start in terms of the social struc‐ture of  the setting, as they could start as a given “imaged community” (Anderson 1983). The lay participants, on the other hand, first had to establish themselves as a  more  coherent  group  through  the  assessment  of  their  common  interests.  The experience  of  sharing  common  interests  was  a  crucial  resource  for  them  to  see themselves  as  a more  coherent  group.  In  this  regard,  being  allowed  to  enter  the mice stables was pivotal (see chapter 8.4). The initial reluctance of the researchers to  grant  access  to  the  animal  housings  constituted  them  as  a  collective  with  a common  agenda,  and  also  created more  explicit  differences  between  lay  partici‐pants and researchers. The lay’s self‐perception as a group of increased the longer the discussion process lasted, and in the end many of the lay participants referred to the group as “we”.  The  researchers  perceived  themselves  as  part  of  an  epistemic  community  (Haas 1992)  already  before  the  Round  Tables  started.  Thus,  they  shared  rather  stable common assumptions of what science  in general  is, how research practices work and what relations to society are like. The enculturation process of science educa‐tion provided them a series of narratives as resources for the discussions with the lay participants. Thus, they could more easily employ ready­made narratives in the engagement process. They could easily access these narratives  in the discussions and provide responses to all kind of questions of the lay participants. The lay par‐ticipants, however, did not have such common narratives that allowed them to in‐stantly respond to or even challenge the researchers’ assumptions. They first had to work  them out  in  a  lengthy  process,  so  that  they were  only  gradually  able  to form  a  more  coherent  collective  with  a  common  agenda.  The  lay  participants’ dominant vision of responsibility is a good example of this learning process (chap‐ter 8.1). Finally, the lay participants not only had to accommodate each other and develop shared  narrative  resources,  they  also  had  to  get  used  to  the  public  engagement setting  itself. Many  of  the  lay  participants were  not  trained  to  argue  in  a  larger group.  The  researchers  seemed,  compared  to  the  lay  people,  better  equipped  to engage  in  a  discussion;  however,  even  among  them  there were  huge  differences between the younger ones and the senior researchers. 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Given these differences, the question was how could the participants be taken seri­
ously  in  the discussion? This question  came up especially  for  the  lay participants, both  implicitly and explicitly. The researchers assumed that  they would be taken seriously in the discussion, as it was their research, their practice and their profes‐sion  that was at  stake. For  the  lay participants,  the question of being  taken  seri‐ously  revolved around  the question of  expertise and  the balancing of knowledge and ignorance. As such, the performance of expertise was often seen as a requisite for qualified participation in the discussion. Thus, the first two to three Round Ta‐ble  sessions  were  characterized  by  the  lay  people’s  frequent  requests  to  clarify some  factual  information. This  could be  interpreted  to mean  that  the  lay partici‐pants did not see themselves as prepared to be qualified participants in a discus‐sion. At  this stage of  the discussion,  the  lay participants also did not  feel well ac‐quainted with arguments on the basis of values. The lay participants’ factual que‐ries illustrated their wish to demonstrate expertise, as they seemingly saw this as the  expected  and  proper  feedback  to  the  researchers’  accounts.  Demonstrating expertise took also place by not asking questions, as a silent “proof” that the state‐ments of the researchers had been understood. Thus, demonstrating technical expertise in the domain of the researchers was one discursive strategy employed by the lay people in order to be taken seriously and to be acknowledged as equal discussion partners. Moreover, expertise as such was regarded as an  important  legitimizing reason  to participate;  thus,  the  lay partici‐pants often performed expertise they held from their professional backgrounds. It was not so much relevant to have particular expertise in science, but rather to per‐form any kind of expertise.  The display of expertise was crucial especially in the beginning of the Round Table discussions.  Gradually,  there was  a  shift  from  performing  technical  expertise  by requesting additional information to the promotion by the lay participants of their own values, and thus a shift to social and ethical expertise. Increasingly, and espe‐cially after they had been empowered by the participation of the ethicist as a guest at  the  fifth Round Table,  the  lay participants were more  confident  to  argue on a moral basis. However, expertise remained a crucial  factor for the lay participants to  be  able  to  contribute  substantially  to  a  debate,  as  they,  for  example,  used  the ethicist as a proxy for expressing their concerns, because he was seen as more able to challenge the researchers owing to his epistemic authority as an ethicist. While the appreciation of expertise was high during the initial phases of the Round Table and even later, in the Round Table devoted to the lay participants’ reflection on the whole process, it was the lay’s uptake of expert knowledge that was problematized by one of the participants: The danger—and what is interesting for me, or what one has to ask—if I look at  it,  is: Are we  still  lay people? Are we now spent  to possibly  take part  in such a talk again? Are we still unbiased enough to take on such a task if there is a next question, a next project? … if we are more formed in our response behavior  than  a  totally  unselected,  so  to  speak,  real  lay  group?  And  that 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would  also  now be,  so  to  speak,  the  question  if  I  say,  okay, with  regard  to many questions  lay are  supposed  to participate,  then  I  ask myself have we consumed the voluntary lay somewhere along the road and got professional lay? (L6/RT7/2/148)xcix What is interesting in this quote is that this lay differentiates between “unbiased” and “consumed” lay. He sees only fresh lay as legitimate participants of public par‐ticipation, while he and the other lay participants can already be regarded as “ex‐perts” disqualified from participation, and indicates a transformation process from facts  to unbiased values as  resources  for  legitimate public participation over  the course of the Round Tables. This ambivalence regarding the characteristics of lay is also present  in normative  imaginations of  lay publics  in science policy. On one hand, the call for citizens to be educated and informed before they can legitimately take part  in decision‐making processes in science and technology has been wide‐spread within the framework of PUS since the 1980s. However, there is a certain tension with perceptions of citizens, as Alan Irwin (2006) has noted for public en‐gagement exercises in Britain (e.g., GM Nation?). Here, science policy is concerned with the “representativeness” of the citizens taking part in public engagement, and thus  often  prioritizes  the  “open‐minded”  and  “innocent”,  which  means  that  the citizens should not have too much expertise in the issues discussed. In particular, certain forms of expertise are sought to be excluded—for example, representatives of self‐help groups. In the lay people’s negotiations of expertise, two different ra‐tionales met: With  regard  to  the micro‐politics of  engagement  settings,  expertise was regarded as a pivotal resource to be able to challenge the assumptions of re‐searchers. However, with regard to the societal embedding of public engagement, lay people holding a great deal of expertise may disqualify themselves for partici‐pation, as they might already be biased in a certain direction. 
9.2.   The politics of labeling 
Many features of the discussions of ethical issues were characterized by a politics 
of labeling. This term describes a discursive politics that aims to govern the discus‐sion  process  by  attributing  the  issue  at  stake  to  a  certain  societal  domain  or framework. This framework then defines the way the issue can be discussed, that is, who is concerned with the answering of the question, what elements are rele‐vant  to  a  “rational”  discussion  in  this  domain,  what  kind  of  “solutions”  are  re‐garded as reasoned, and so forth. Such politics were enacted at the Round Table by explicitly and implicitly invoking attributions and categorizations such as “ethical”, “scientific”, “economic” or “social”, and hence introducing a certain set of potential values and a notion of who could hold the expertise to be able to participate in the discussion.  Thus,  labeling  both  opened  up  and  limited  possible  negotiations  of what was at stake. On one hand, the politics of labeling made certain issues nego‐tiable at the Round Table; on the other hand, it often led to a closure of ethical de‐bates, as it shifted the responsibility for discussion elsewhere. 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Ethics and morality One of the main characteristics of the “ethical” discussion at the Round Table was the uncertainty of all involved participants if a certain discussion could be defined explicitly as an ethical one. This was because the participants went into the discus‐sion without a well‐elaborated idea of what “ethics” was exactly, as well as because “ethics” was mostly  assigned  to  the  domain  of  professional  experts  in  that  field. This has  to do with  the dominant way ethics  is performed  in society, which pro‐motes  the notion  that ethics demands sophisticated expert knowledge as well as certain institutional conditions in order to successfully participate in a societal de‐bate.  Thus,  the  participants  at  the Round Table  often performed  a  self‐exclusion from ethics by not regarding  themselves as able  to contribute  to  this debate  in a “legitimate” way.  At the Round Table, the participants often avoided labeling their arguments explic‐itly as ethical ones, but felt more comfortable when discussing values. The difficul‐ties the participants had in terming something ethics resonate with my own diffi‐culties  in  analyzing  the  ethical discussions  at  the Round Table  (see  chapter 1.3). Ethics is an “empty signifier” (Laclau 1996) that provides a basis for a global pro‐ject that is held together by the signifier itself. Ethics as an empty signifier is a hy‐brid of a particularity (professional ethics has rather clear definitions of what eth‐ics  is  and what  it  is  not)  and  a  universality  (the  societal  proliferation  of  ethics, which multiplies the meanings of ethics).38 Thus, the uncertainties regarding ethics cannot be attributed  to  the participants’  ignorance or  to a methodological weak‐ness of  this dissertation. Rather,  it  is a societal phenomenon that needs to be ex‐plained.   At the Round Table, a discussion of the “values” promoted by science in contrast to values that (should) prevail  in society set  in very early  in the discussion process. The participants hesitated to label their own way of discussing morality and values “ethics”. This  changed, however, during  the  fifth Round Table, where  the ethicist took  part  as  a  guest.  In  his  introductory  statement,  he  explicitly  referred  to  the prior discussions of  the participants: “I also already discovered the first  traces of an ethical problem awareness in the protocols. That means one seems to have the vague feeling that there might be something that could be ethically worthy of dis‐cussion”  (E/RT5/1/37).c  In  the  following,  he  redefined  the  participants’  discus‐sions as ethical ones. Thus, the participants were now able regard their way of ar‐guing as “ethical”. This was expressed also by the sheer number of times “ethics” was  said by  the participants at  this Round Table. Thus,  empowered by  the pres‐ence of the ethicist, all participants felt more confident  in explicitly  labeling their talk ethical. However, this also demonstrated that ethics was still seen as an expert domain, as the participants needed an expert whose “authority” could transfer the legitimacy to speak ethically to the participants.  
                                                38   Wullweber (2008) uses the concept of the empty signifier for nanotechnology. 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What  “ethics”  was  mostly  remained  undefined  throughout  the  discussions.  The participants saw ethics as something that was handled by specific experts in soci‐ety, and thus distanced from their own values. The difficulties concerned the con‐tent of  the discussions, where most of  the participants were unable  to  elaborate more  specifically what  counts  as  an  ethical  issue.  Ethics was  thus  rather  under‐stood as a particular form of discourse. Many of the lay participants claimed at the introductory round at the first Round Table that they participated in order to dis‐cuss ethics. This claim can be read as a political statement to the researchers, aim‐ing at a proclamation that “other” aspects than scientific ones should play the lead part  in  the  discussions.  Hence,  ethics  worked  as  the  “empty  signifier”  around which  all  discussions  revolved.  No  one  dared  to  fill  the  empty  space with more concrete content, as  there was  too much unease about  the exact nature of ethics and  its  institutional  language as an expert domain. Thus,  the participants  instead relied on a discussion of a diverse set of “values”, with which they felt more com‐fortable.   
Basic and applied research Another important facet of the politics of labeling was much more explicit: the dis‐tinction  between  basic  research  and  applied  research  or  application, which was evident in particular in the narratives of the researchers.39 The main feature of the researchers’ definition of basic research was  its distance  from application.  “Basic research” meant the production of scientific knowledge for the purpose of the ad‐vancement of knowledge itself. Often its unpredictability was emphasized (episte‐mological  definition).  Regarding  the  intentional  dimension,  the  researchers  cited curiosity  as  the main  driver  for  going  into  research.  Regarding  the  institutional definition of basic research, the researchers emphasized the ideal of academic re‐search carried out at universities; for example, one researcher stated, “Universities of applied sciences do not conduct [basic] research in my eyes” (S8/RT3/2/146).ci Disclosure norms were also of high relevance, for the researchers expressed a duty to disclose all outcomes to the community and the public. Further, “basic research” was assigned  to a specific place  in knowledge production,  that  is,  the  laboratory. While the researchers did not refer explicitly to particular disciplines that counted as “basic”, the presence of a laboratory as well as the method of experiments was a crucial criterion for being “basic research”. On one hand, this was seen as rooted in the democratic principle of the “freedom of research”. On the other hand, research‐ing without an application in mind also provided a pool of ideas that were seen as preconditions for “surprising” new technologies. The researchers often denied par‐ticipation in applied forms of technologies, because such a way of knowledge pro‐duction was seen as  irreconcilable with their understanding of research that was clearly based in scientific norms (Merton 1973).  
                                                39   For the use of this distinction in science policy see Calvert (2004), who identified six differ‐ent  ways  to  define  basic  research:  epistemological  definitions,  intentional  definitions,  dis‐tance  from  applications,  institutional  definitions,  disclosure  norms,  and  substantial  defini‐tions (scientific fields). 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As  a  consequence,  and  by  introducing  the  labels  “basic”  and  “applied”,  the  re‐searchers  introduced  two  different  forms  of  ethics.  Basic  research  was  mostly characterized  by  an  absence  of  ethics  that  addresses  and  includes  relations  be‐tween  science  and  society.  The  only  viable  form  of  ethical  thinking  in  basic  re‐search was a scientific ethos concerning the means of knowledge production and the  internal organization of  science. For  the  “applied”  side,  a different version of ethics was  applied.  This  time,  society  alone was  concerned with  ethics.  Sympto‐matic of the politics of labeling research as “basic” or “applied” was the reaction of a researcher to a statement of the invited ethicist, where he posed a series of fun‐damental questions showing that any science contains value assumptions and thus is ethically relevant: I do not understand  that at all …  that research practically entails moral ar‐guments to receive money. It does not do that. We are writing purely scien‐tific proposals to receive money, and there is not a single ethical argument, there is not a single moral argument … I believe this entanglement between research  …  [and]  application:  Our  research  is  absolutely  not  application‐oriented,  and possibly  it  annoyed me  a  bit  that  the  entanglement  is  rather present … but that is not our research. (S7/RT5/1/61)cii What this quote demonstrates is how the assignment of different labels—basic and applied—worked  as  a  delimitation  of  an  ethical  discussion  “in  here”  and  “now” because  the  researchers did not  consider  themselves  concerned with ethics. The ethical  relevance was  ascribed  only  to  a  different  kind  of  research  (which  I will address below under the heading of the politics of delegation, chapter 9.3). While other elements of  the politics of  labeling  supported  the  idea  that ethics  could be discussed  at  the Round Table,  this  particular  one mostly  served  to  avoid  ethical debates,  as  it  displaced  ethical  questions  elsewhere. However,  this  strict  separa‐tion of “basic’” and “applied” also prompted lay participants’ reactions that hinted at the ethically problematic nature of such a distinction:  I find it rather difficult just … to justify basic research with the pure purpose of satisfying the human thirst for knowledge. So, if I say “We are doing it, we want more knowledge, that is a kind of basic need”, then I find it personally rather difficult to justify killing animals for this purpose. (L13/RT5/4/313)ciii  The lay participant notes that, if “basic” research does not consider itself to share societal moral standards and thus ethical arguments, it also must not violate socie‐tal moral  ideas through its production of knowledge. As soon as it does, different goods  (new  knowledge  and  the  killing  and  suffering  of  animals)  have  to  be  bal‐anced.  Hence, the introduction of the distinction between basic and applied research pre‐dominantly inhibits the process of opening up the issue of research as a question of ethics. By referring to this distinction, the researchers could too easily bypass criti‐cal  lay  questions,  in  particular with  regard  to  the  future  consequences  their  re‐search might have in society. 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Hierarchies between “facts” and “values” Another game of labeling concerned the attribution of the terms “fact” and “value” to certain strands of the discussion. Referring to “facts”—be they scientific or so‐cietal  facts—was  one  of  the  central  resources  for  framing  the  discussions.  The Round Table therefore became a space where “values” met “facts” in many differ‐ent  constellations. To possess  the  “right”  facts  about  a  specific  topic  allowed  the discussion to be guided in a specific direction, or often even to be closed. An ethical problem put on the table was quite frequently “solved” by introducing the “right” information. By mobilizing facts, a problem could be reframed in such a way that ethically motivated doubts had no place anymore. Thus, labeling something a “fact” was a flexible resource for the researchers in order to pursue their interests.  Much more  important  than the  lay‐expert hierarchy that was performed through this  politics  of  facts,  another  hierarchy  established  itself:  the  hierarchy  between values and facts. That arguing on the basis of facts was ranked higher than arguing on  the basis  of  values was  a  common assumption  that  both  lay participants  and researchers shared. At the Round Table, the fact‐value hierarchy was to a certain degree  “naturalized”  and  remained  unquestioned.  There was  implicit  agreement that  facts  speak  for  themselves  and  that  the  right  kind  of  knowledge  overrules value‐based ethical objections.  This evidently also had an  important  impact on  identifying what an ethical  issue was and on whether it could be discussed. Here’s an example from the Round Ta‐ble: The lay participants wondered what makes research worth funding and what criteria are drawn upon  in making such decisions:  “Does one  rather consider  in‐sights and knowledge, or is it economic interests that are in the foreground? Does the  end  justify  the  means?”  (L2/RT5/3/131).civ  Comparing  research  on  malaria and lipid disorders was thought to demonstrate that economic  interests played a crucial  role  in  defining  public  research  agendas.  Thus, malaria  research was  as‐sumed  to be neglected because  “there  is not  so much potential  and not  so many sick people, of course” (ibid).  In the eyes of the public,  this was clearly an ethical question,  because  they  asked  for  the  researchers  how  they  would  balance  eco‐nomic interests and social justice. One researcher responded: Unfortunately,  that  is not  true. There  is  a huge EU project  at  the Technical University. They are working only on malaria. This  [project] has,  I  think,  8 million Euros. But … it  is not done for the people who are there [in nations affected with malaria] but of course for the tourists. Because their numbers are high enough, so it pays off for the EU to fund this. [They] receive twice as much money for malaria as we do for lipid research. (S6/RT5/3/133)cv Stressing that the lay participants built their argument on the wrong facts, while at the same time possessing the right ones, makes it possible to close the ethical ar‐gument. Interestingly, the researcher was confirming the moral argument the lay‐person made—that research money  is apparently granted according to economic relevance—but  the  lay participant  felt  that  she was discredited by  the  “fact”  the 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researcher provided. This simultaneously devalued her moral argument, so that in the  following discussion  she was unable  to provide other evidence,  and  thus  the debate  on  this  issue was  closed  rather  quickly.  By mobilizing  their  professional knowledge, the researchers upheld hierarchies and promoted a model in which, if people have the “right” knowledge, certain ethical questions are not at stake any‐more. As this example shows, there was a general implicit assumption even by the lay participants of  the necessity of using “the right  facts”, even when building on abstract value‐based arguments. The next example demonstrates much more explicitly the deployment of “facts” as a way  to  close a debate on moral positions.  I  exemplify  this with a discussion of whether obesity was to be regarded as a medical condition or if—as the laypeople often argued—it could also be addressed in a broader, psychosocial way or by life‐style changes. The researchers conceptualized obesity as a purely medical problem linked with an assumed societal desire for being slim as well as with the “fact” that diets and changes  in  lifestyle rarely  lead to the desired effects. Thus, “It does not work!” was a recurrent claim made by different researchers. This line of argument rendered  alternatives  to  genome  research  hardly  credible.  One  layperson  ques‐tioned this understanding of obesity as a societal problem: “and there is the saying ‘The  fat are  jovial.’ … They do not want  to  lose weight at all”  (L4/RT5/2/379).cvi Here, the researchers were able to provide the right “facts” in order to translate a value‐based problem into a scientific one by introducing two sets of knowledge. On one hand, the researcher acted as a “lay sociologist” by claiming social “facts”, for example,  the apparent need of people to become slim. On the other hand,  the re‐searcher referred to scientific  “facts”  in order  to  transfer  the  lay participant’s ar‐gument of obesity as a matter of personal values into the domain of “nature” and thus  of  “non‐choice”:  “Excuse me,  but  obesity  is  not,  is  not  only  a  psychological problem. It is not about whether someone is happy and fat. It is unhealthy even if one is happy with it” (S6/RT5/2/416).cvii As this explanation still turned out to be too vague and too unconvincing, she introduced medical “facts” to the discussion: Fact is that 50% of people have too many kilos—that is fact. Whether a par‐ticular person thinks she may be too fat or if she really is, that is an individ‐ual problem. Fact is, half of people would live healthier if they would reduce their weight. And 20% have  to  reduce massively. That  is  fact,  and whether they  are  psychologically  happy with  it  or  not,  that makes  no  difference  in obesity being unhealthy. (S6/RT5/2/449)cviii After this statement, the discussion on this ethical issue stopped instantly, and the debate shifted  to another  topic.  In  this debate,  the researchers successfully man‐aged to rule out value‐oriented dimensions of obesity provided by the laypeople by redefining  the  framework  in  which  obesity  was  seen  to  be  a  problem.  The  re‐searchers prioritized  a biomedical  notion of  “health”  over  “happiness”  as  a  com‐mon  value  for what  it means  to  lead  a  good  life.  By  employing  fact  talk,  the  re‐searchers managed to exclude the value talk of the lay participants; however, the value  assumptions  of  the  researchers—health  as  an  uncontested  societal  goal—
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were  carried  and masked by  the  enrolment  of  “facts”. On  the  other  hand,  as  the example of malaria research showed,  the  lay people also connected moral claims with what counted as “facts” in their eyes. This demonstrates the entanglement of facts and values in arguments, in which they must be carefully balanced and man‐aged. The researchers seemed more successful at playing this game.  
Private and public ethics Another micropolitical mechanism that shaped the debate on ethical issues at the Round Table was  the distinction between moral positions  that were  regarded as “private” and those that were made “public”. This was mainly the case with regard to issues that were regarded as extraordinarily sensitive, such as the case of animal experimentation. Here, two different ways of dealing with private and public ethics came to the fore: first, the implicit absence of certain ethical positions in the more “public” plenary discussions coupled with the articulation of the ethical matter in other spaces that were regarded as more “private”; and second, the explicit refusal to discuss certain issues in “public” as they were considered personal matters.  The  first  set  of  micro‐political  practices  focuses  on  the  non‐said  or  on  “absent presences”  (Law  2004).  The  latter  term  stresses  that  frequently  ethical  issues seemed to be on the participants’ minds when discussing at the Round Table, but, for a complex set of reasons, they did not explicitly address them. Absent presence was made evident by the way discussions in the peer group meetings (laypeople or researchers)—where potentially controversial ethical issues were discussed—did or did not make it into the plenary. The peer groups were perceived as sufficiently socially robust to allow rather delicate issues to be openly addressed. Being among a collective that seemingly shared the same values allowed participants to consider the space more “private”, and thus to address ethically sensitive matters. The  lay participants and researchers developed an  implicit understanding of what  issues from the peer group should go into the plenary. While it is not astonishing that the researchers developed this capacity, as they were used to perceiving themselves as a group that shared the same values, interests and epistemology, it is remarkable how this took place for the lay participants as well. They seemed to constitute an “imagined”  (Anderson  1983)  and  “epistemic  community”  (Haas  1992)  of  non‐scientists, a perception strong enough to allow for quite strong internal openness. The  plenary,  on  the  contrary, was  seen  by  both  groups  as  a much more  socially fragile setting in which people preferred not to address certain ethical questions in order not to endanger the mutual relationship.  To give an example, in the peer group discussion of ethics, the laypeople identified animal experimentation as a crucial ethical topic. In this setting, some of them had rather  distinct  positions;  for  example,  one  layperson  stated  that  he  was  against animal experimentation in general. When presenting the outcomes of this discus‐sion  in  the plenary,  the  issue of  animal  experimentation  remained unarticulated. While the lay participants never explicitly discussed and agreed to self‐silence on this issue, they had implicitly decided not to share their position as they expressed 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it  in  the peer  group.  The  interviews with  the participants  after  the Round Table meetings  supported  this,  as  one  layperson  argued,  “[in  the  plenary]  there  were however two fronts so to speak, I would say, two opposing parties I call it for now. And this inhibition was overcome when they [the researchers] were not here any‐more.  There  was  a  more  casual  and  more  direct  talking  to  each  other” (L4/eP/67).cix Not only the laypeople but also the researchers addressed issues differently in the peer  group.  In  the  researchers’  peer  group  there  was  a  debate  on  the  status  of animals in society. As mentioned in an earlier chapter (8.3), they identified a para‐dox in the treatment of animals: Society does not see the need for ethical discus‐sions when killing animals  for  food, but does see the need for ethical discussions about animal experiments in research. As one researcher put it: “There were two among  [the  lay] who  say,  yes,  they  don’t  eat meat …  because  they  have  pity  on animals. But they are consistent at least. I think someone who eats meat is not al‐lowed to be upset with animal experiments that are done according to the highest standards.  And  this  I  think  is  an  important  argument  concerning  animal  experi‐ments, not only if but also how” (S6/RT5/sgS/427).cx However, this argument was not made  explicit  in  that way  by  the  researchers  in  the  plenary  discussions,  but much more  cautiously,  in  order  not  to  endanger  the  setting  perceived  as  rather fragile.  Besides the absent presences of certain ethical issues as a mechanism that shaped the way ethics was discussed  in our engagement  setting,  a  second, more explicit differentiation between public and private ethics was at work. In the discussions of animal  experimentation,  some  researchers  aimed  to  explicitly  displace  ethical questions from the public into the private. This move was accompanied by a shift‐ing of the questions from a more collective level to an individual one. As described in chapter 8.3, on the construction of individual and collective identities, the pro‐ject management aimed to set up a collective norm for the treatment of mice in the laboratory that said that, in principle, every member of the group must be ready to kill animals for experiments, in order not to create morally good and bad individu‐als. A young researcher responded to this account by re‐labeling the issue from a collective norm to a matter of private attitude: “So, I do research with them … and I vaccinate them too, but I certainly kill no mice. So, that [is] actually a personal atti­
tude of mine” (S5/RT5/4/88; emphasis added).cxi Thus, the issue of animal ethics was regarded as a very private matter that could not be discussed on the level of collective norms. The perception of (animal) ethics as an extremely private matter was further emphasized by the fact that it took until the fifth Round Table before the young researchers were able to articulate their concerns. The personalization of ethics was not only present in relation to the lay participants. Even with other researchers such a discussion was difficult, as the following quote exemplifies: S6: Would  you  like  to  ask  for  a  discussion  [about  animal  experimentation] with the project coordinators? So strange this now [sounds] …  … 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S5: I believe it is always easier if you talk directly with someone who is in the same context, for example, if someone is at the same department and doing the same thing, so that you discuss directly on site. (RT5/4/359‐371)cxii The  lay  participants  and  the  researchers  shared  the  assumption  that  there  is  a space of ethics that is reserved for a more “private” dealing with ethical questions. It  is  important,  for  public  engagement  settings,  to  reflect  about  how  different spaces are perceived and whether they are understood as “private” or “public,” and to  find ways  to organize a  translation between  these  spaces. This micro‐political mechanism, too, is an ambivalent one. On one hand, it often impedes a more open discussion, especially on matters that are regarded as emotionally sensitive. On the other hand, “private” spaces for ethics allow for a discussion that otherwise would remain unarticulated. Such a difference of ethics in practice is thus relevant for the way ethics is discussed in the public sphere. There, virtually every ethical issue is situated on the same, mostly rationalistic, level, and thus the existence of “private” spaces, whose functioning is highly dependent on their distance from unemotional ways of debating ethics, is often neglected.  
Inflation and deflation of ethical arguments The last micro‐political mechanism shaping the ethical debate at the Round Table that I want to discuss here is somewhat different from the politics of labeling ana‐lyzed  above.  Here,  no  different  labels  were  attached  to  discussion  strands,  but rather the argument at hand was either inflated—that is, extremely generalized—or  deflated—that  is,  broken  down  to  anecdotal  evidence.  Thus,  this  mechanism consisted of  switching between  levels  of  abstractness  and  concreteness with  the aim of  either  supporting  the  assumptions of  the  speaker or devaluating  those of other participants.  The  first  example  concerns  the  inflation  of  an  ethical  argument.  In  a  discussion with the invited ethicist, a post‐doc repeatedly insisted on the difference between basic research and applied forms of knowledge production, with the former free of ethical concerns and motives. The ethicist responded: E: That  [the distinction between basic  research and application]  is only ac‐ceptable for society … that it is financed if society has the opportunity to de‐cide how to deal with research. S7: No, to deal with the application, not to deal with research.  … E: And there society must have the ability to decide … otherwise we dismiss any idea of democracy. S7: No, no,  then we dismiss the  idea of the freedom of research. And then I need  no,  and  then  I  could  close  down  the  university  in  a  moment. (RT5/2/140‐150)cxiii 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Here,  the  ethicist  tries  to  challenge  the  assumption of  the  researcher by  arguing that  society  should participate  in making decisions about how to deal with basic research.  Then  he  inflated  the  argument,  saying  that  if  this  not  the  case we will abandon democracy. The researcher, however,  countered with  the same strategy by saying that if society decided on basic research we would abandon “freedom of research”. After this short dispute, the discussion did not continue on the issue of whether  and  how  society  can  and  should  participate  in  basic  research,  but switched to another topic. Both ethicist and researcher used an inflation strategy in order to prevail in the discussion. But this discursive strategy led to “impossible choices” (either basic research or democracy; either societal participation in basic research or  freedom of research) that only work as rhetorical devices but do not pose “real” choices.  Second, arguments made on a more general level were often “deflated” by provid‐ing  anecdotal  evidence  in  order  to  “prove”  that  the more  general  argument was wrong. The example comes again  from the  fifth Round Table on ethical  issues of genomics. After peer group discussions, the lay participants summed up their de‐liberations on the issue of the responsibility of science and with regard to the con‐sequences of scientific knowledge. Their argument was that in principle everyone, including the researchers, should take on responsibility (see also chapter 8.2). The lay  participants  suggested  thinking  about  scientific  responsibility  in  a  reflexive way to handle the moral uncertainties of innovation processes. In her response, a researcher  framed  the  question  quite  differently.  Her  argument was  that  an  as‐sessment of future technologies could not work in general, but could only apply to a few exceptions: “That only will work out if I invent the slingshot. Then it is fore‐seeable  that  somebody’s  head  will  be  hit  by  a  stone  and  he  will  then  die” (S6/RT5/2/25).cxiv Her argument was that technology assessment was only possi‐ble in cases of applied research and technologies. For basic research, it is different:  Mr.  Pasteur, when  he was  discovering  penicillin—discovering  by  chance—did  not  know  that  multi‐resistances  would  emerge  …  That  means  the  as‐sessment is difficult, in the same way as assessing positive applications … the laser was not  invented  so  that  I  could have a  laser beamer … and  scan my eyes or whatever. … These are applications that were totally unforeseeable. That was not invented because of an application; that was actually a totally different product. … Per se, I can assess then what all I could have done with it: That, I believe, is asking too much. (S6/RT5/2/25)cxv This  researcher  breaks  down  the  lay’s  argument  for wider  societal  reflection  to anecdotal  evidence,  in  order  to  “prove”  that  the  argument does not  apply  to  the kind of research the participating researchers conduct. This was typically accom‐panied  by  an  individualization  of  the  assessment  process.  It  was  impossible  for Pasteur himself to assess the entire nature of his discoveries. She then inflated the anecdotal “proof” again to a rather general level of argumentation:  if I want to be on the safe side that nobody is misusing it—my technology—then I have to say we should stop at the current state of technology … and we 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prohibit research and development in general. Then I can be sure that there will  be  no  negative  effect  emerging  from  a  research  outcome.  Otherwise  I cannot prevent it. That is the only possibility to make sure that nothing bad emerges. … nothing beneficial emerges either, but nothing new and bad will emerge. (S6/RT5/2/29)cxvi The  evidence  drawn  from  the  stories  of  Pasteur  and  the  laser,  and  the  re‐introduction of  the reframed argument on a general  level, made  it  impossible  for the lay participants to uphold their argument, which was made on a more general, this  is,  institutional  level. Thus,  switching between different  levels of argumenta‐tion  turned  out  to  be  a  prominent  rhetorical  feature  of  the  discussions  at  the Round Table. This micro‐political mechanism worked to impede a continued ethi‐cal debate, as it often led to the closure of ethical questions.  
9.3.  The politics of delegation 
The second set of micro‐political strategies I discuss in this chapter is the politics of delegation. This  refers  to  the attempts by participants  to  shift  expertise about what was to be regarded as an ethical issue, as well as responsibility, to somebody else. Thus, ethics was delegated elsewhere, with the effect that ethical issues were rendered  non‐negotiable  in  the  setting  of  the  Round  Table  itself.  The  politics  of delegation was generally characterized by a model of the division of labor between science and society, wherein science takes on specific tasks, especially the produc‐tion of new knowledge, and society  is concerned with handling the ethical reper‐cussions of scientific knowledge. The ethical work was partly assigned to experts within science; however, this task was attributed to “soft” sciences, while the task of the natural sciences was seen solely in the production of facts.  This  politics  of  delegation  is  rooted  in  rather  classical  notions  of  science  and  its norms  (Merton  1973),  and  is  in  contrast  to  newer  understandings  of  science‐society  relations  that  abstain  from  a  strict  separation  of  societal  functions  but rather emphasize science’s entanglement with society (Gibbons 1994; Gibbons et al. 1994; Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001). The lay participants clearly preferred this  later  idea  of  a  shared  responsibility  between  science  and  society.  However, they too subscribed to the division of labor model with regard to ethics. Their ra‐tionale was not a Mertonian notion of science, but rather a certain degree of dis‐trust  of  the  self‐regulation  abilities  of  science  and  their  assumed  failure  to  con‐structively contribute to a reflexive dealing with ethical questions.  In the following I will discuss the mechanisms of social delegation of ethics (to ethi‐cal experts, to law and regulation, and to “negative others”) and of temporal dele­
gation  of  ethics  (shifting  ethical  questions  “downstream”  or  “upstream”).  These two dimensions of the micro‐politics of delegation are not mutually exclusive, but often appear closely intertwined. 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Social delegations of ethics: Experts According  to  the division of  labor model  to which many of  the participants  sub‐scribed,  the  task  of  discussing  and deciding on  ethical  questions was  often dele‐gated  to  professionals  ethicists.  Throughout  the  discussions,  all  participants  ar‐gued that experts—that is, both people and institutions seen as holding epistemic authority over ethics—were better equipped to deal with ethics. While researchers and  lay participants often agreed on  this,  their  reasons were quite different. The main rationale of the researchers was that the division of  labor model supported their distinction between basic research and applications, which protected “basic research” as an autonomous space of action. Attributing ethics to specialists—and not embedding it in the daily practice of basic researchers—reinforced the bound‐ary between basic and applied  research. This was explicitly expressed  in a  small group discussion among the researchers: [The ethicist] should do that, he actually is an ethicist … because we are sci‐entists  in  the  field of molecular biology, and  that’s why we do  that. We are not  expecting  ethicists  to  do  our work,  and  that’s why  the  ethicists  should not expect us to do theirs. (S6/RT5/sgS/1) The laypeople implicitly subscribed to this expert model too. While they called for a certain self‐responsibility of each individual researcher, they also did not rely on the  researchers  to  critically question and  reflect upon  their own practices. Thus, they  stressed  the  necessity  for more  institutionalized  forms  of  ethical  reflection and responsibility. The reasons for establishing special institutions concerned with ethical questions, however, were not rooted in maintaining the boundary between basic  and  applied  research,  but  rather  in  its  critique.  The  researchers  were  re‐garded as unable to reflect “objectively”, as the lay people did not buy into the idea of basic research, but saw the work of the participating researchers as already too strongly entangled with economic and political interests. Thus, more independent institutions were seen as necessary to complement regulatory institutions: “I think that, foremost, artists and philosophers and ethicists are our control organs if the medical  professionals  and  technicians  do  not  reflect  on  themselves” (L2/RT7/1/556).cxvii However,  this did not necessarily mean  that  the  lay partici‐pants  unconditionally  trusted  currently  existing  ethics  bodies,  as  they  were  not regarded  as  “representative”  enough  to  reflect  common  societal  values. The  rea‐sons why the lay people would rather have delegated ethics to experts also lie  in the fact that they were regarded as having the same authority as other scientists, and thus able to challenge the assumptions of the researchers.  
Social delegations of ethics: Regulation and law This  micro‐political  discursive  mechanism  describes  the  translation  of  ethical question into legal questions as a way to displace ethics elsewhere, as the question is transformed from one to which everyone can respond to one that only legal ex‐perts and political decision‐makers can address. It also shifts the responsibility for 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engagement from “in here” to society, as law is considered a domain that builds on a societal consensus. This mechanism was employed in various ways at the Round Table. The mechanism shifts the ability to act and to define norms from oneself to others who cannot be controlled, and thus responsibility for norms cannot be as‐sumed.  One way of delegation to law was to refer to the “laws of science”. This frequently took  place when  ethical  arguments  from  the  lay  participants  questioned  the  re‐search practices of the participating researchers.  In what followed, they often re‐ferred to the norms and laws of science as an excuse for behaving the way they did. For example, it was argued that “what we research is worth being researched, re‐searchers in the US have decided” (S6/RT5/2/306).cxviii Another frequent example of  the  unwritten  laws  of  science  was  the  peer‐review  and  publication  system, where  only  that  research  attracts  sufficient  attention  that  is  published  in  “top journals”.  These  define  the  relevancies  in  a  specific  field.  It was  argued  that  sci‐ence’s economy of attention defines norms of success and failure, and these norms are not open for interpretation by individual researchers if they aim to prevail  in the field. The message of this was that the lay people were addressing the wrong actors with their concerns. The  second  example  of  the  delegation  to  law  concerns  the  shifting  of  an  ethical question to regulation in a classical sense. To highlight this I will use a discussion on animal experimentation. A layperson raised the question whether it is morally acceptable  to kill animals  in basic research where there  is no explicit benefit but only  the  “pure purpose of  satisfying  the human  thirst  for knowledge”  (L13). The reaction from the researchers was: S6: But you are not allowed to do that! There are regulations. … You don’t get a free ticket to do all animal experiments. Every time we, for example, want to make a certain knockout‐mouse with a certain gene, we have to apply for, explain … what kind of function that gene has, and what our presumption is, and why we need that. L13: And according to which criteria is that decided then, whether that is ok or not? S6: That’s a good question, I have no idea. You have to ask the person from the ministry, he knows that. I don’t know, do you know? (RT5/4/315‐319)cxix  In her answer the researcher argues that she does not need to deal with this ethi‐cal  question,  as  legal  permission  is  always  required  for  mice  experiments.  It  is regulated  and  thus  regarded  as  unproblematic.  What  is  legally  permissible  is equated with  the  assumption  that  there  is  no  ethical  problem  and  therefore  no need for an extended ethical discussion—or at  least  that  the  lay people were ad‐dressing  the wrong actors. This  argument managed  to  end  the  ethical debate on the decision criteria for animal experiments almost instantaneously. It also exem‐plifies the readiness to reduce complex and multilayered ethical  issues to regula‐tory problems. For  the researchers,  this reduction meant a simplification of  their 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practice, which was also reflected in the researchers’ demand to ethics to deliver clear‐cut guidelines rather than opening up questions. There is also a temporal aspect in this: The delegation of ethics to law suggests that society has already agreed upon certain rules and norms independently from the researchers.  Once  regulations  are  in  place  and  research  practices  comply  with them, the reopening of this “black‐box of ethics” seems neither necessary nor use‐ful.  
Social delegations of ethics: “Negative others” The creation of “negative others” (Birke, Arluke, and Michael 2007) was a common feature of  the  ethical  discussion  at  the Round Table.  “Negative others”  are  those actors and practices  that do not  comply with  the moral  standards articulated by the  participants  at  the  Round  Table.  As  elaborated  in  a  previous  chapter  (8.3), these “negative others” of the researchers may be located either outside, mostly in foreign  countries,  or  even  inside  the  research  project  in  the  form  of  those  col‐leagues  who  conduct  animal  research.  In  creating  “negative  others”,  the  ethical question is delegated to these actors, because the ethical critique does not apply to oneself but must be considered by those who do not meet ethical standards. The creation  of  “negative  others”  implies  a  rather  flexible method  of  boundary work and identity construction, because who counts as “other” is dependent on the cri‐teria  that  characterize  the  “otherness”.  For  example,  if  one  addresses  science  in general with a ethical concern, the “negative other” disappears within science and may be located in industry, for instance in the pharmaceutical industry. The “nega‐tive other” may be also part of  the  scientific  enterprise, but  situated  in a  foreign country  that  is  regarded  as  less  ethically  advanced  than  Western  science.  The flexibility of the “otherness” thus provides insights in the contextualized construc‐tions of “science”, “good science” and “bad science”, as well as more individual sci‐entific identities.  At  the  Round  Table,  “negative  others”  often  served  to  delegate  ethical  concerns elsewhere. As this discursive strategy was used quite often on a diverse set of  is‐sues, I will select some prominent examples from the Round Table discussions. A particular manifest “otherness” that served to deflect ethical concerns was the re‐searchers’  distinction  between  “basic  research”  and  “applied  research”.  This  dis‐tinction was  the main  feature  of  the  researchers’  epistemic  cosmology,  and  thus served to explain a wide range of matters. The researchers situated themselves on the “basic” side, which they regarded as the ethically safe side. Ethical considera‐tion  were  assigned  to  those  who  are  concerned  with  “applications”.  The  basic‐applied model acted in such a strong way that all application‐oriented features—patenting, public justifications employing usefulness arguments—of the research‐ers’ project could be ignored.  More  concretely,  the  researchers  depicted  “foreign”  research  (in  China  or  South America),  other  branches  of  science  (human  cloning,  green  biotechnology)  and 
 ‐ 171 ‐ 
domains outside of basic science (industry research on pharmaceuticals) as “nega‐tive others”, which allowed them to display their own practices in a rather positive light. In order to draw ethical boundaries (Wainwright et al. 2006) they provided examples of what they were not prepared to do, that is, conducting animal experi‐ments  for  cosmetics  and  cloning  humans.  This  qualified  their  personal  practice with  animal  research,  and  thus  delegated  ethical  concerns  and  the  reflection  on them to those who were involved in these amoral practices.  
Temporal delegations: Shifting ethics downstream and upstream Based on the assumption that there is a “right” moment for ethics, while in other moments ethical reflection does not apply, the researchers developed a particular model of when ethics should be discussed. Against the backdrop of the distinction between basic and applied science, the main argument developed in a number of statements was  that  ethical  consequences  of  research would  have  to  be  treated either before or after the actual research process—understood as “basic”. In other words, ethical questions were displaced or delegated “downstream” or “upstream” with respect to an innovation process imagined as linear (Godin 2006). Thus, the linearity of the innovation process provided an underlying structure allowing them to temporally shift ethics elsewhere. Temporal delegation also allows for affirming the importance of ethics while arguing that the right moment is not now: “Ethical considerations, yes, but not now!”  When  explaining  the  aims  of  their  (basic)  research,  the  researchers  employed  a narrative of ordering research with the effect that ethical considerations were dis‐placed  “downstream”. Following  the statement of  the  laypeople  that only  the ex‐tensive promises of future applications would secure the generous funding of the field, one researcher argued: within our research aims we have classified it like this: we have direct aims, which are ours  in  the  laboratory. Our direct aim  is  to  identify genes and to clarify metabolic pathways … Then there are indirect and long‐term aims … And the long‐term aims would be to reduce obesity, to reduce arteriosclero‐sis, heart attacks, cancers and so forth. But these indirect and long‐term aims are not our aims. These are only societal aims, which are realized by others. We do not do them ourselves. We cannot even do it. (S6/RT5/2/314)cxx By  introducing a distinction between  “direct”  and  “indirect” or  “long‐term” aims, the researchers tried to establish a boundary between a space where ethics is rele‐vant and a space where it is not. Following the logic of this distinction, ethical con‐siderations  were  shifted  downstream  to  those  whose  intention  was  to  produce concrete applications that were related to societal health problems. The research‐ers argued that, even if their research was somehow driven by societal aims, these were  not  immediately  linked  to  their  present  work.  Somebody  else  would  take these steps. Here, the particular model of the innovation process makes it possible for them to reach multiple aims: On one hand, basic research and applications are 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linked  enough  to  allow  for  promising  future  benefits  to  legitimize  present  re‐search. On the other hand, basic research and applications are distinct enough to displace  reflection  about  the  societal  consequences  to  the  application  end of  the innovation process. Thus,  future and present are tied together  in particular ways in order to end up on the ethically “safe side”.  While a strict separation between basic research and social accountability would de‐legitimate their work in terms of the public funding it receives, introducing two different  sets of  aims allows  them  to  justify  the  funding of  their  research. Public funding  in research  is seen as an  investment  in  the  future by policy‐makers. The model of direct and  indirect aims makes  it possible  to  simultaneously  justify  the spending of public money (indirect aims) and to preserve the autonomy of science in  the  form of  basic  research  (direct  aims). As  the present  knowledge  is  seen  to enter society only in the future through the work of others, no need is perceived to discuss  ethical  concerns  at  present.  Furthermore,  as  future  applications  remain unclear, facts necessary to make an ethical evaluation are seen as missing. Ethics is pushed downstream,  to  a moment when  concrete  applications  can be discussed, and society is then responsible for considering the ethical trade‐offs of the applica‐tions. The  temporal delegation was  further underpinned by  the  individual  researcher’s inability  to  assess  the  full  range  of  ethical  problems  his  or  her  research  might cause.  The  researchers  often  switched  the  level  of  argumentation;  that  is,  trans‐forming  more  general  arguments  into  micro‐narratives  that  mainly  referred  to small  episodes,  individual  researchers,  elements  of  history  and  anecdotal  cases served  to  uphold  the  border  between  basic  and  applied  research,  as  well  as  to demonstrate that upstream discussions of ethical problems were hardly possible. For example, during a discussion of the ethical aspects of the production of the fis‐sion bomb, where it was argued that a debate was necessary already during basic research,  a  researcher  replied:  “When  is  in  time?  …  before  Niels  Bohr  learned about  the  structure  of  atoms,  is  that  in  time? Or  before  the  [Manhattan]  Project started?” (S6/RT5/2/188).cxxi As the lay people demanded to paddle upstream, the researcher asked “Where do we have to stop? … Niels Bohr, the atom model … be‐cause we would not have been allowed to develop this? Or does  it start with  the Manhattan Project itself?” (ibid, 192).cxxii Finally, she rhetorically asked “Is Darwin responsible for euthanasia?” (ibid, 200).cxxiii Starting from the example of the figure of the individual researcher being unable to assess the full consequences of his or her  research,  this  argument was  extended  to  science  and  society  as  a whole.  As neither the individual researcher nor society can have sufficient knowledge at any point in time, nobody can prevent unintended negative consequences of research. Consequently, the ethical debate could be closed by arguing that dealing with ethi‐cal consequences of research should happen further downstream—when concrete applications are foreseeable.  While ethical reasoning was often delegated to the future, the shifting of ethics to past decision‐making also occurred at the Round Table. Downstream ethics closed 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ethical debates “now” because there would be plenty of time (and sufficient facts) available in the future. Shifting ethics “upstream” also led to a closing of the debate, because it was assumed that societal value questions had already been clarified in the past. The example  from the Round Table takes up a discussion where the re‐searchers legitimized their work by constructing research as a rather passive en‐deavor that only “responds” to societal demands. In that light, dedicated research programs were perceived as an “offer” where science only “jumps in” to “help out”.   We are not  those who  initiate  these projects,  but we are  those who accept the offer, and, in order to somehow send this responsibility a bit away from us again … the society has  to reflect  then what we do with  it. Society has,  I believe, beforehand—under whatever circumstances—made up its mind and developed these projects. (S7/RT5/2/490)cxxiv In  the  researchers’  narrative,  the  responsibility  for  the  social  consequences  is shifted away from science. It is society that has to reflect on ethical issues. The ex‐istence of dedicated research programs demonstrates for the researchers that so‐ciety has already done so. Under what conditions this has been done, who partici‐pated in the decision making process, is not regarded as their concern.  This micro‐political mechanism  also  reflects  and  comments  on  the way  ethics  is dealt with in society. In this wider context, the question of when we should discuss ethical issues is highly relevant and contested. A common feature of political ethics in  the  form of ethics  committees  is  that  they often  react  to  facts  released by sci‐ence. In doing so, ethics aims to compensate for past value decisions (Levidow and Carr 1997). Ethical reasoning is conducted on the basis of those facts, while ethi‐cists often refuse  to act on “speculations” about  the  future because  facts are cur‐rently not available. On  the other hand,  the  implicit values and assumptions em‐bedded  in  existing  innovation  regimes  are  barely  opened up by  institutionalized ethics,  for  example,  posing  the  question whether we  need  this  technology  at  all (Wilsdon and Willis 2004).  Both the politics of  labeling and the politics of delegation reflected wider societal presumptions about the relations between science and society, as well as the role of  ethics  in  society. This particularly became evident  in  the way  the participants avoided  the  term  “ethics”,  mirroring  societal  practices  in  which  ethics  is  domi‐nantly seen as an expert domain. Thus, at the Round Table, lay‐expert hierarchies between  the  participants  and  the  invited  ethicist were  re‐performed.  They were also performed through the division of  labor model between science, society and ethics. Here, the re‐activation of more traditional understandings of the role of sci‐ence (and society)—the researchers’ understanding of “basic research”—aimed to absorb  the  impositions  and  uncertainties  of  new  modes  of  producing  scientific knowledge in which science and society are much more intertwined. Thus, the re‐searchers’  aim was  to  preserve  a  safe  space  to  guarantee  the  “autonomy”  of  re‐search, which was seen as endangered. The most relevant issue concerns the tem‐poral politics of ethics,  that  is,  the question of when ethical  issues of science and technologies  should be discussed. Here,  current  innovation regimes  that have al‐
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In  this  chapter,  I will  analyze  the  participants’  ex  post  evaluations  of  the  ethical discussions  at  the  Round  Table  and  investigate  what  the  participants  “learned” from this experience and to what extent it made a difference for them. Against the backdrop of the dominant evaluation schemes of public participation, where rela‐tively little voice is given to the participants’ own criteria of assessment, this is an important  question.  Furthermore,  the  effectiveness  of  public  participation  exer‐cises  is  often  assessed within  the  framework  of  a  deficit model  of  public  under‐standing of science—that is, did the laypersons receive the message as intended by the organizers? In these contexts, “learning” often assumes two particular notions: Is the public now “better informed” on technoscientific issues? And did the experts, scientists  and  science  policy‐makers  learn  to  communicate  their  complex  ideas effectively  to  the  public?  That  is,  public  participation  predominantly  follows  an educational  paradigm  that  strongly  discriminates  between  those who  know  and those who do not know. Many aspects of the evaluation of public participation can be questioned, however.  The notion of “learning” used  in this dissertation seeks to go  in a different direc‐tion. “Learning” is understood as a mutual process of interaction between all par‐ticipants  that  may  trigger  changes  in  the  participants’  attitudes.  Consequently, “learning”  is not defined as an uptake of  factual  information, but  rather as social learning of what it means to directly engage with researchers, and vice‐versa with lay people. In such a process, different and situated value systems are negotiated that may lead to a transformed understanding of “science” as well as the “public”. Here,  the  respective  “body  language”  of  the  participants  is  considered  together with the exchanged knowledge itself. Thus, by “learning” is meant the exchange of knowledge and experiences in their social dimensions that may result in changed attitudes towards the respective “other” and also towards the  individual and col‐lective self. Furthermore,  the knowledge and experiences gained  in  the course of the engagement are not necessarily  connected with a higher degree of  certainty. While this may be the case with respect to certain aspects, uncertainties may also increase. Another important aspect of the learning process is that the setting itself must be included, as it is not a neutral means to communicate something else; the setting  also  communicates  itself.  In  the  sense  of  Marshall  McLuhan’s  (1994)  fa‐mous one‐liner, one could say that the medium is the message too. That is, people are not only making sense of  the content of  the engagement setting—in our case genomics and science  in general—but are also making sense of participation and engagement in relation to wider political contexts and their experiences with these contexts.  The main assumption that guides the analysis in this chapter is that what changed over the process of the Round Table was not so much the image of ethics itself, but 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How did  the  lay participants perceive  the way  the  researchers addressed ethical issues during the Round Table? The dominant bottom line was that most laypeople noted  that  the  researchers did not engage much with ethical questions  in and of their  work.  They  identified  a  set  of  different  reasons  for  the  researchers’  non‐engagement with ethical questions. Some  lay argued  that ethics was regarded as “other” to science: Ethics is not part of the core activity of science, and thus it re‐quires additional efforts to pose ethical questions to oneself: “My impression was that it  is however something rather rare, that is, that it  is not an essential part of the scientific practice that one is occupied with these things. This impression came up in simply in talking with the scientists” (L13/eP/203).cxxvii Thus, the research‐ers developed strategies to avoid being confronted with ethical issues: “on ethical matters they have been a bit evasive, haven’t they” (L2/eP/159).cxxviii The lay par‐ticipants noted that the researchers perceived ethics as a kind of disturbance that could interfere with their work: What  I  took away  for myself  [from  the discussions]—and  this  corresponds with other experiences [with] devoted scientists—is that … this idea of ask‐ing  oneself  this  [ethical  question]  is  felt  as  an  interference,  felt  as  time‐consuming,  power‐consuming,  and  as  counterproductive,  because  if  I  pose too many questions I no longer do things so easily. It is, I believe, a really es‐sential point  in ambitious  research,  that  I do many  things  in  the  first place and then reflect afterwards. (L6/eP/152)cxxix Ethics was seen by this and other lay as a critical reflection that—if consequently carried out—impedes  scientific progress and  collides with  the  requirements and constraints of the scientific system that allows the researchers to progress in their careers. Thus, while the lay participants’ arguments expressed a great deal of criti‐cism of the researchers, with the demand that they should personally take on more responsibility,  they also expressed empathy and understanding  for  the  research‐ers’ positions: You  have  already  heard  it:  they  conduct  research,  I  do  not  know  for  how long, and then eventually something comes out. This [means] of course many frustrations. … They go  through many  things. Patience, and  then  it goes up and down, and  if someone then comes and says:  “Well, morally please, and what are you doing there, think about it eventually what you are doing there, in what direction it might go, this could get out of hand and so and so”. And then they have to start discussing … that is indeed prohibitive for the work. (L2/eP/183)cxxx 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Drawing these statements together, the lay people’s more general assumption was that to behave ethically and to behave according to the science system’s rules for success  and  failure  are mutually  exclusive. A  researcher  can only decide  for  one side—to be ethical or to be successful in science. The lay people’s allegation of the researchers’ disengagement with ethics was supported by some statements of the researchers  themselves,  in which they,  too, regarded ethics and science as mutu‐ally exclusive: “that is indeed the dilemma of science, isn’t it, that we actually have not so much time to wait on ethical discussions with our work” (S4/eP/168).cxxxi This quote accounts for the multiple requirements researchers are confronted to‐day. On many instances, the researchers emphasized that ethical reflection should be more central, however, ethics often conflicts with other requirements of science as a system.    However,  there were huge differences  in the way the ability  for ethical reflection was ascribed to specific researchers in the accounts of the lay participants. Some of them saw engagement with ethics only by the project leaders, while the other re‐searchers were  “only doing  their  job”. The assumption was  that  the  “professors” had the time for ethical reflection, while the younger researchers were “reckless”, as they only sought to pursue their career. This assumption was seen as enforced by  hierarchical  structures  wherein  younger  researchers  have  fewer  choices  but need to do what’s necessary. Only a minority of the lay participants saw a deficit of ethical  reflection on  the  side of  the  “professors”. The  lay participants  in  the way ethics was discussed also  felt  the hierarchical structure of  the group of research‐ers. One lay participant particularly observed an interesting difference in the way different researchers engaged with ethical questions: regarding the researchers, I noticed that there were hierarchical basic struc‐tures. …  if something went beyond their own field,  the call  for  the ultimate boss was there, and he already anticipated this, and he talked in principle for all others. And actually concrete questions were only answered freely or di‐rectly by single low‐ranked people if they were about concrete experiences. (L6/eP/128)cxxxii The  lay argues  that  the more established researchers were entitled  to  talk about “ethics  in general”, while  the younger researchers could only provide statements on “ethics in particular”.  While  the  lay  participants  criticized  the  researchers’  disengagement  with  ethics during the Round Table,  they also perceived that this way of dealing with ethical question did not change during the Round Table:   I actually felt this always, that the opinions of the scientists from the differ‐ent  groups  would  not  change.  They  expressed  their  opinions,  exchanged [them] and that was it … what opinion the public actually has, what I actually do, that, I believe that is secondary [for the researchers]. (L14/eP/187)cxxxiii The lay argues that what the lay people argued in the discussions made no differ‐ence to the researchers. As the lay people perceived the Round Table as a setting 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for mutual  engagement,  they  expected  a  certain  readiness  on  the  side  of  the  re‐searchers to take up the lay people’s arguments. This evaluation of the lay people can  be  underpinned  by  the  fact  that  in  the  ex  post  interviews  the  researchers barely mentioned the  lay people’s ethical arguments, but were much more  inter‐ested  in  the  discussion with  the  “real”  ethicist,  as well  as  in  hearing  the  ethical viewpoints of their colleagues, especially related to the question of animal experi‐mentation.  This may mirror  a  learned  asymmetry  in  science‐society  interactions rooted  in  traditional  models  of  science  communication,  in  which  the  lay  are thought  to  be  the  listeners while  the  researchers  talk.  It  shows  that  a  unidirec‐tional understanding of science communication is still present in the minds of the researchers.  While both researchers and laypeople pointed to a  lack of ethical engagement on the side of the researchers, there was disagreement on the reasons and the impli‐cations.  The  lay  participants  surely  expressed  some  understanding  of  the  re‐searchers’ position, but also saw their statements as excuses in order to be able to continue work  untroubled.  The  lay  clearly  called  for more  ethical  reflection  and individual  responsibility by scientists. The researchers,  too,  in part  identified  the lack of engagement with ethics as a deficit; however, it was displaced to a question of education in the early career or ascribed to the constraints of the scientific sys‐tems. The ethical disengagement could also be explained by the difficulties of the researchers  in relating wider ethical questions to their own practice, especially  if they regarded their research as producing “basic knowledge” that is per se not able to do harm. Here, the difference between “ethics in general” and “ethics in particu‐lar”  was  opened  up.  “Ethics  in  general”  included  questions  that  fundamentally challenged the work of  the researchers with regard to their aims and the kind of responsibility they might have for society. The discussion of “ethics in general” was left  to the more experienced senior researchers, who were seen as better able to represent the ethics of science. The younger researchers, on the other hand, were seen as entitled to provide more personal accounts of “ethics in particular”, that is, moral questions that occur in scientific practice.  Turning  to  the  researchers’  ideas on  the public and ethics,  the  image of a poten‐tially adversarial public to be encountered at the Round Table was constantly pre‐sent in the statements of the researchers in the ex ante interviews. This was espe‐cially  true  for  the researchers’ expectations with regard  to an anticipated debate on animal experimentation: “there you are partly strongly offended. Because that is indeed an issue that is not very appreciated in the population” (S1/eA/79).cxxxiv In  particular,  those  who were  directly  involved  in  animal  experimentation—the younger researchers—identified ethical discussions on animal experimentation as a controversial issue for the upcoming discussions. In their ex post accounts of the debates on animal ethics at the Round Table, they came to an ambivalent conclu‐sion. While they thought that they had managed to persuade the public in the par‐ticular ethical question of animal experimentation, they saw themselves as having failed to establish the lay participants’ wide‐ranging trust of them as researchers. 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In retrospect,  the researchers claimed  that  they had managed  to change  the par‐ticipants’ ethical attitudes towards animal experimentation. They assumed that all participants  were  against  animal  experimentation  before  the  discussion  started, and that they were gradually convinced about the necessity of animal experimen‐tation. And  what  was  surprising  to  me  in  a  certain  way  was  that  the  approach changed before the people were in the animal housings and in the laborato‐ries and afterwards. That is, there were still people then who said that they do not totally agree with this. But it was not like that anymore, I would say now by and large, it was not so definite anymore. (S7/eP/203)cxxxv The change in the lay people’s attitudes was reached by opening the doors of the laboratory and the mice stables, and thus, for the researchers, “transparency” and a  rational  way  of  argumentation  were  the  main  cornerstones  of  convincing  the public of  their aims and basic values. The ex post  reflections, however,  showed a rather asymmetrical engagement with ethical questions.  In general,  the research‐ers  expressed  less  interest  in  the  ethical  positions  of  the  laypeople  than  the  lay participants did with regard to the researchers. Thus, the ethical views of the pub‐lic on animal experimentation were one of  the view exceptions. The researchers’ aim was to persuade the public of their own values rather than to engage with the lay participants’ ethical arguments. Consequently, they did not reflect in the ex post interviews on the ethical positions of the lay participants that had been extensively discussed  at  the  Round  Table,  but  evaluated what  had  happened  against worst‐case expectations that are much more present in wider societal and media debates. For example, a sub‐project leader said that he was glad that no “Frankenstein” sce‐nario was brought up at the Round Table.  This reflects the presence of public science stereotypes in the researchers’ minds and  the  anticipation  that  these  public  images would  be  part  of  the Round Table debates. Thus, the researchers engaged with an imaged public and their assumed hypercritical attitudes rather than engaging with the arguments that were  in fact brought up during the Round Table by the lay participants. The researchers evalu‐ated  the  ethical  arguments  of  the  lay participants  against  ideal‐typical  images  of scientific  values  they  held,  rather  than  openly  engage with  the  ethical  reasoning that really took place at the Round Table.  However, when looking at  the  lay participants’ statements and reflections, a con‐trasting image emerges. At least in the ex ante  interviews, there were no lay who argued fundamentally against animal experimentation. Most of them did not even mention  animal  experimentation  as  an  issue.  But  the  lay  participants’  attitudes towards animal experimentation changed as much as the researchers claimed. For the lay participants, the issue of animal experimentation was an issue of “transpar‐ency”, “authenticity” and “trust” rather than a purely ethical one (see chapter 8.4).  Apart from the issue of animal experimentation, there was another area in which the researchers articulated  interest  in  the ethical positions of  the  lay people. For 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one researcher who was more concerned with the managerial tasks of the research consortium, the interaction with the lay participants was of great relevance: what we often believe is that we communicate this very well, or that we can communicate this very well, that this is the right way …. And there is surely much potential  for  learning,  that  I have  to admit. And second concerns  the interaction: we often have this belief that if the arguments are good enough then  everyone  will  share  the  opinion.  That  this  opinion‐making,  however, runs so emotionally, that the arguments maybe come in the tenth place and that  we  cover  this  emotional  aspect  poorly,  that  we  approach  the  whole thing very rationally because we have overall a rational approach and [we] do not pose this emotional question at all … And there we have to—I am not yet  sure how one  can  implement  this  and how one  can  learn  this—but we should broaden our knowledge by all means. (S6/eP/27)cxxxvi Based  on  her  role  in  the  research  group,  she  reads  the  discussions with  the  lay people in a particular way; that is, she asks what can be learned from the interac‐tions in order to communicate more effectively so that the public can be addressed in  their own  terms. Of  course,  this way of  learning has a  strong  instrumental di‐mension,  aiming  to  develop  better ways  to  convince  the  public  of  the  goals  and benefits of  research. This was closely related  to  the researchers’ wish  for  the  lay people’s unconditional trust of science in general as well as of the researchers par‐ticipating in the Round Table in particular, which was not seen as realized through the engagement: although we spent much  time  together,  I did not have  the  feeling  that  they [the  lay participants]  felt  that we were people who could be  trusted  in  the way  [we] work.  I did not have  the  feeling. But until  the very end  I  actually had the feeling that they found that we were indeed quite nice but that there must absolutely be someone looking over our shoulders. (S6/eP/65)cxxxvii 
10.2.  Reappraising the role of ethics: Meta­language or 
idle talk? 
The participants experienced and performed ethics in different ways at the Round Table.  They  had  to  engage with  the  issues  themselves  outside  of  expert‐led  dis‐courses, but also could discuss issues with the invited ethicist. Hence, the question is what  role  they  now—after  the  Round  Tables—ascribe  to  ethics.  Interestingly, most participants claimed that their image of ethics had not been influenced by the discussion  at  the  Round  Table.  This  is  because  “image  of  ethics”—the  way  this question was phrased in our ex post interviews in order to allow for a rather open response—meant different things to them. What the participants often meant was that they had not changed their basic values, for example, their skepticism towards animal  experimentation.  However,  what  changed  to  a  great  extent  during  the Round Table was  the  lay people’s  appraisal of  the way  science  in general  and  in 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particular works, and in what ways it is related to other societal contexts such as politics and the economy. This led to re‐defined evaluations of the role ethics, as a way  to deal with  technoscientific questions, might play  in  society.  In  this  regard, some relevant changes—or learning processes—can be observed. The same over‐all observation holds  for the participating researchers. For example, both partici‐pating post‐docs claimed that their image of ethics had been widened through the discussions at  the Round Table, but  they simultaneously said that  it nevertheless had not changed  their actual  research practice, because  “we do not make animal experiments directly”  (S2/eP/231).cxxxviii Thus, apart  from the question of animal ethics, it was extremely difficult for the researchers to connect the ethical discus‐sion with concrete laboratory practice. While they had gained a widened perspec‐tive  on  ethics  during  the Round Table,  ethics was  still  located  at  the margins  of what was thought of as the core work of research.  Many of  the  lay participants,  especially,  described ethics  as  a  complex, wide and integrative  field  after  the Round Table  discussions.  This  indicates  a  change  over the course of the Round Tables, as they were not able to express their thoughts on ethics  in  that way  beforehand.  Based  on  his  experiences with  the  discussion  on responsibility (see chapter 8.2), a lay argued in the ex post interview:  There I became aware of the scope of this moral dimension for the first time, and  I  think  the others  felt  the same way. And  therefore  [ethics] was so ex‐tremely interesting for me, because the knot was cut. I have always tried to somehow find the rub in this process [who is concerned with social respon‐sibility], but I think it is not there but one has to reflect upon the matter on this meta‐level and then the knot is perhaps cut somehow. … So I hit it only then, that this circle like I have sketched it out is there. But I believe that the circle  as  such  is  not  able  to  dramatically  change  without  the  meta‐level changing,  the  moral  preconditions,  the  ethical  preconditions  changing. (L13/eP/161‐179)cxxxix This lay puts great hope in the ability of ethics to “cut the knot”, as he expresses it; that  is, ethics as an overarching  language and technique could eventually resolve dilemmas of conflicting interests, in his eyes. Hence, this positively evaluated ver‐sion of ethics has an  integrative  function  for  society. Ethics was seen as a  “meta‐language”, that is, a common tongue able to re‐unite the diverse sub‐parts of soci‐ety that have fallen apart. These accounts were sometimes accompanied by roman‐ticizing narratives of a better past, where for example science was much more in‐tegrative,  not  yet  split  into  disciplines,  and where  ethics was  an  integral  part  of every  science.  Ethics,  here, was  supposed  to  provide  a  kind  of  language  that  al‐lowed  for  communication  between  different  actors,  allowing  them  to  negotiate common societal values and goals. In this view, ethics serves as a societal govern‐ance mechanism  that  steps  in  as  other  domains  fail  to  address moral  questions. Thus, ethics was regarded as a kind of “soft” law‐making that parallels traditional political law‐making but compensates for its shortcomings, as state law‐making is bound to partisan politics and the representation of particularized interests. 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However, the narrative of ethics as a wide and complex matter that addressed val‐ues on a  “meta‐level” also had a  flip  side, described by both  lay participants and researchers to the same extent. This narrative describes ethics as idle talk. Ethics, so  the  argument was, was  only  talk,  not  leading  to  concrete  outcomes  and  thus providing no  answers  to pressing questions  and  the need  for  guided  action. The meta‐linguistic  character  of  ethics was  this  time  interpreted  as  a weakness  that abstracts  too much  from  concrete practical  problems  and  also does not  produce outcomes able to sanction moral misbehavior. … because  they all  became blinded by  routine,  and  they all have  their  eco‐nomic interests, their positions to hold, and their assignments, or further re‐search  in  the area  that was assigned  to  them. And  thus  they will not say … here  we  meet  the  limit,  here  I  simply  cannot  go  further,  will  they? (L11/eP/237)cxl This and other lay participants stressed the inability of ethics to effectively control what  researchers do. Ethics did not allow  for  setting boundaries  that  restrict  re‐searchers  from  transgressing  moral  thresholds.  The  participants  also  criticized that  ethics  in  general,  as well  as  ethics  as discussed  at  the Round Table,  did not lead  “to a  real outcome such as  in mathematics”  (L10/eP/31),cxli  thus comparing ethics to an imagined precision and ideal vision of the natural sciences. They also described ethics  as  a  “popular  sport”cxlii  and  said  it had  the  “character of  a mind game.”cxliii  For  another  lay  participant,  ethics  was  partly  “just  splitting  hairs” (L8/eP/119).cxliv In sum, many lay participants employed metaphors of ethics that questioned its character as a real engine for societal change and instead pointed to ethics  as  a  virtual  game  that  does not  lead  to  real  changes  in  the practice  of  re‐search and science.  Many of the researchers came to the same conclusions when reflecting on the way ethics was discussed at  the Round Tables. Often,  their point was “that one  is dis‐cussing entirely in circles and actually reaches no end” (S5/eP/157).cxlv Ethics was regarded “as a book that one reads when one has time” (S6/eP/19).cxlvi Rather than endlessly maintaining a discussion, the researchers expect from ethicists (and eth‐ics)   more of a guideline and more concreteness … I would like that, if experts are concerned with something, for example, assessing what is a good procedure, that  finally  a  concrete  recommendation  comes out. Only  to  raise  questions is—for me viewing it from a natural scientific perspective—not what I would define as a goal. (S6/eP/141)cxlvii Explicitly referring  to her background as a  “natural scientist”,  this researcher ex‐pects  substantial  outcomes  from ethics  in  the  form of  guidelines  that  deliver  in‐structions for practical actions at the bench. This points to the arguments of the lay people that the researchers largely avoided critically reflecting on their own prac‐tices.  For  the  lay people,  following  “ethical  recipes”  in order  to be on  the  ethical 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Despite the overall positive evaluation of the ethics debate by the lay participants, concerns were raised about  their ability  to  take part equally  in such a discourse. On one hand, they were able to challenge the researchers’ fact‐like value assump‐tions many times during the discussion and hint at  the  incoherencies of  their ar‐guments. On the other hand, many lay participants questioned their own ability to take part in an ethics debate in the ex post interviews: I  come more or  less  as  a  lay  and ask a knowledgeable person,  and we will never escape from this basic relation: He is the researcher who investigates lipases and  I  am  the one  from  the public.  If  somebody whose profession  is another one in which he is also good is juxtaposed on an equal footing, and he says:  “I’m the ethicist and now we are  talking”,  then there  is not  the as‐pect of “I now explain to you what genome research is”, but then there  is a different level … That is, I believe, what is simply more difficult to be sponta‐neously able to do, what is easier if the other has, so to speak, this authority in the first place. (L6/eP/160)cxlviii This  lay participant—who was  a medical  doctor with  some  research  experience, and thus not completely alien to the world of science—identifies knowledge defi‐cits on the side of the lay people and their missing “authority” in terms of expertise as  important obstacles that  impeded an equal discourse on ethical questions. For him, it is not so decisive to have special knowledge in the field of the researchers, but rather to have any expertise on any scientific field that qualified for participa‐tion in the debate. Expert authority is seen as a requirement of talking to research‐ers  “at  eye‐level”.  Some  other  lay  participants  also  expressed  discomfort  when asked to provide an opinion about the ethical debate at the Round Table: “Now I do 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not know if I can express my opinion on ... how I evaluate qualitatively these dis‐cussions or confrontations between scientists from different areas of science [be‐tween genome researchers and the  invited ethicist]” (L14/eP/187).cxlix They con‐nected the ability to participate in such a discussion process to the question of how far scientific knowledge was understood. The lay participating at the Round Table did not regard themselves as having that knowledge, and thus the participation of ordinary people  in  institutional bodies on ethical questions was  regarded as  “fu‐tile”. Based on a deficit model of public understanding of science and the assump‐tion that “authority”  is a decisive factor to be  listened to  in a debate,  the  lay par‐ticipants self‐marginalized public contributions to ethical debates in society. Many lay participants did not trust that the public was able to lead a discourse on ethical issues. The role of the public was seen—based on their experiences at the Round Table—as  rather  limited.  Their  claim  often was  that  the  public  should  be  better informed, or that those who deliberate on ethical issues should listen to the public, as “the public cannot take on the responsibility” because the “public is no expert” (L14/eP/339).cl Classical hierarchies between experts and lay people, as well as assumptions about science‐society relations, were still present and framing the ethical discussions. To have expert knowledge—some kind of expertise—was seen as a prerequisite  for participating in a debate, as the possession of knowledge was closely related to the social authority to speak up in public discourses. As a consequence, some saw the invited  ethicist  as  a  proxy  promoting  and  defending  the  lay  participants’  ethical concerns against  the  researchers. This was  connected  to  concrete experiences at the Round Table:  For  example,  at  the  fifth Round Table,  the  ethicist  took up  the arguments  the  participants  had  made  in  prior  Round  Tables  and  explicitly  re‐framed them in terms of ethical arguments. As a professional, he was more able to oppose  the  researchers’  counter‐arguments.  Also,  all  senior  researchers  missed this Round Table for different reasons. For the  lay people,  the senior researchers were  the  main  advocates  of  science  as  a  purely  epistemic  endeavor  rejecting  a moral dimension of research. Many lay participants expressed disappointment that the  senior  researchers  did  not  participate  at  this  particular  Round  Table,  as  the ethicist was regarded as being able to resist their rhetoric. At the next Round Ta‐ble, with  the  senior  researchers present  again but without  the  ethicist,  some  lay participants  tried  to  reiterate  the  ethicist’s  ethical  arguments;  however,  the  de‐bates could be deflected and closed rather quickly by the senior researchers. This experience led to the conclusion that the help of a professional ethicist is needed to be able to stand one’s ground in an ethical debate with researchers. The accounts of  the  lay participants hint at  the ambivalent role of  the  invited ethicist as an ex‐pert at the Round Table. On one hand, he provided discursive resources for the lay people  and was  able  to  speak  in  the  name of  the  lay  participants  as  a  proxy  for their concerns. However, as Callon (1986, 216) notes, “To speak for others is first to silence those in whose name we speak”. Thus, based on the experience they had, while often seeing themselves as much more capable to personally reflect on ethi‐
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Many participants highlighted that ethics should ideally have an integrative func‐tion  in  society  in  order  to  identify  common  values  that  allow  for  robust  socio‐technological development and prevent particularistic interests from prevailing in the governance of science. However, this desire left open who actually should and can decide what technoscientific trajectories society should take. For the research‐ers, relying on their basic narrative of the separation of basic research and applied research, it was clear that only science should govern itself. Only once applications are “ready” is it up to society to decide upon their use. Who exactly should do this, and on what terms, was not further explored by the researchers, as it was not re‐garded as  their  concern anymore.  Sometimes,  they  referred  to  individual prefer‐ences for markets as a way of deciding what applications should be approved for societal use. For the lay participants, on the other hand, it became increasingly un‐clear during the discussions at the Round Table who actually should govern tech‐noscientific  trajectories  in  society  (Fochler 2007).  For  them,  the question was,  if science proclaims its unconditional freedom of research, who, then, can set ethical boundaries  if  society  considers  certain  technological  developments  unwanted  or even dangerous? Their view of the network nature of technoscience and its entan‐glements with other societal domains, such as the economy, gave rise to the  idea among  the  lay  participants  that  there was  real  demand  for  an  identifiable  actor who would control these developments. However, there was no consensus among them about who this might be: So,  I  experienced  from  the  beginning  that  there was  again  the  question  of regulation, of rules: Who defines boundaries? Who sticks to limitations? Who is  in  control  of  compliance with  limitations?  That  I  experienced  again  and again as an important point that came not only from me but also from many 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other sides … And the answer is this, which remained for me so to speak: We do not know who does it. There is actually no one who does it. Somehow it is a self‐organizing process. (L6/eP/156)cli This  statement  strongly  emphasizes  the  desire  for  a  centralized  actor  powerful enough to set up and control commonly binding rules. Ethics is not seen as being able to provide the definite answer to this question; in fact, for this lay participant it  remains unanswered. The  lay participants’  statements,  then, describe  the diffi‐culties that emerging technologies pose to the public understanding of politics, and thus challenge current political procedures, but without having an alternative an‐swer.  The necessity  of  a  central  actor was  also  challenged by  one  of  the  partici‐pants:  everyone  should  actually  have  to  take  on  responsibility.  …  for  sure,  some now say that we would need an institution somewhere above that is respon‐sible, but everyone has to do it himself because this institution simply does not exist and never will. Therefore, everyone who does this [conducting re‐search] should ask himself to what extent this is still okay. (L12/eP/333)clii The assumed impossibility of a central actor suggests the importance of individual responsibility. Most of  the other  lay, however, believed  in  the necessity of a cen‐tralized  actor  governing  science  and  society.  One,  for  example,  suggested  “relig‐ion”, but most of the others preferred more secular solutions, such as expert round tables where professionals from different domains would meet and work out rules. Another lay participant was in favor of politics, understood in the narrow sense of state‐oriented politics: “Of course, in many cases today a good politics cannot by‐pass contacts with science, it would have to include this, but the final responsibility can only lie there [in politics]” (L11/eP/334).cliii Others explicitly denied the ability of politics and politicians to perform a leading role: “And it is my feeling that there is not an ethical dimension that politicians have in their hands and say, ‘Yes, I will take  care  that’,  but  that  it  somehow—be  it  for  financial  reasons—is  so  that  they [the scientists] do not go [abroad]” (L6/eP/84).cliv Here, politics as a central actor is  described  as  malleable  by  the  interests  of  industry.  The  lay  participants  pre‐dominantly  longed  for  a  central  actor who would  take  the  lead  in governing  sci‐ence  according  to  common  societal  ethical  standards.  However,  they were  quite unsure who this actor might be and if there could be such a central actor in princi‐ple. Ethics  in  its multiple meanings  at  the Round Table was not  seen  as  able  to  take care of a socially and ethically robust knowledge politics, as it was seen rather as a deliberative  tool  and  not  as  a  means  for  binding  decision‐making.  Ethics  as  a means to govern science only works in an ideal version of society where everyone is  ready  to  take  on  responsibility  and  to  reflect  on  possible  consequences.  This ideal was not seen as having any chance to be realized, and thus remained a nor‐mative demand only. Hence, the lay participants expressed the need for a central actor that would take care of ethical socio‐technical development. This central ac‐tor was too hard to identify for the lay people. With a few exceptions, politics in a 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they were able  to engage with ethics  in a differentiated and  reasoned way, al‐
though  also  sometimes  struggling  with  it.  The  engagement  with  ethics  at  the 
Round  Table  produced  a  range  of  irresolvable  ambivalences  and  questions, 
which, overall, drew an incoherent picture of what ethics was at the Round Ta‐
ble. While the discussion could be read in terms of a deficit model of public un‐
derstanding  of  ethics,  wherein  the  participants  failed  to  use  well‐established 
frameworks of professional ethics due to a lack of appropriate knowledge, such a 







lay  ‘ethical’  knowledge  could  be  a  valuable  resource—even  for  ethicists—to 
question taken‐for‐granted assumptions about ethically relevant issues. 
  The project started with the assumption that a different kind of public engagement setting would  trigger  alternative ways of  discussing  ethical  and  social  aspects  of genomics.  Our  question was what  kind  of  “ethics”  could  emerge  if  ethical  issues were discussed in a more bottom‐up way, outside of expert framings. Our “experi‐ment” resulted in a quite complex picture of lay ‘ethical’ knowledge, which on one hand took up many elements of the wider societal discussion on ethics, but which on the other hand was quite subversive to dominant framings of ethics. My argu‐ment here is to take lay ‘ethical’ knowledge much more seriously in public ethical policies. Because lay ethical epistemologies are largely incompatible with existing ethics regimes, institutionalized ethics has to initiate change in its procedures and behavior.  So  far,  it  has  been  able  to  deflect  public  concerns  by  referring  to  its authority, which  is based  in an epistemological hierarchy of  lay and expert  treat‐ments of ethics: It has been the public that has to change, that is, that has to incor‐porate the experts’ framing before legitimately being able to participate in “ethics”. I argue that it is rather expert ethics that has to change its framing, by developing more advanced means  to give voice  to  lay epistemologies on ethical  issues.  Such changes would trigger a loss of authority by virtue of the “expert” role, but lead to 
 ‐ 191 ‐ 
a  gain  of  authority  by  virtue  of  a  broader  involvement  of  public  concerns.  I will discuss  three  hypotheses  that  can  be  drawn  from  the  analysis  of  lay  ‘ethical’ knowledge.  My first hypothesis is linked to the uncertain nature of what ethics is. At the Round Table, different, often conflicting, visions of ethics were brought to the table by the participants, which were highly dependent on the context of the discussion as well as  the  experiences  and  backgrounds  of  the  participants.  These  ethical  concepts defined  a  framework  in  which  ethical  arguments  were  made  sense  of,  but  also were themselves subject to ethical questioning. Ethical arguments were embedded in theories of the social and the political as reference points lending sense to ethics. The participants’ dealing with the label “ethics” also reflects the uncertain nature of ethics. In general, they felt more confident talking about “values”. Explicit “eth‐ics” was rather assigned to other domains outside the setting of the Round Table, in  particular  to  expert‐led  discourses.  Thus,  the  participants  performed  “ethics” implicitly,  and  self‐distanced  themselves  from  explicit  ethical  discourses.  In  a manner similar to that described by Michael (1992) on “science”, the participants on  one  hand  regarded  ethics  as  an  abstract  entity  distant  from  themselves,  to which they positioned themselves partly as “ignorant” (“ethics‐in‐general”). On the other hand,  they  connected  “ethics”  to  phenomena  in which  they were  involved, and to which they were able to contribute substantially (“ethics‐in‐particular”), but only  in form of a “value” discussion. Thus,  there was a tension around ethics, be‐tween ethics as  “other” and ethics as part of  their own experiences. This  reflects ethical expert notions on the difference between “ethics” and “morality”. From the experiences at the Round Table, this distinction is not only an epistemic one, but, when enacted  in societal practice  involving non‐experts,  it works as a way to ex‐clude certain positions from the ethical debate.  The  tension  between  the  practices  of  dominant  institutionalized  ethics  and  the way most  lay  participants  at  the  Round  Table  imagined  ethics  in  society  can  be described  in  the way  Jasanoff  (2003c) has described  current political  regimes of innovation: Currently, policy‐makers perform “technologies of hubris”, which are characterized by  a  blindness  towards  ambiguity  and uncertainty.  They pre‐empt political decisions by creating high entry barriers  for  legitimate positions that do not fit into dominant discourses, and they are limited in their capacity to internal‐ize  challenges  that  arise  outside  their  framing  assumptions.  This  description  of “technologies of hubris” nicely fits the way dominant institutionalized ethics is per‐formed. As  an  alternative  to  these  “technologies  of  hubris”,  Jasanoff  suggests  so‐called “technologies of humility”, which are characterized by (1) methods for revis‐ing  the  initial  framing  of  issues,  (2)  citizen  participation  in  the  analysis  of  their vulnerability  to  regain  their  active  status,  (3)  distribution,  and  (4)  the  design  of avenues  through which  society  can  collectively  reflect  on  the  ambiguity  of  their experiences. Ethics as a  “technology of humility”  is akin  to  the concepts of ethics many participants at the Round Table advocated. Lay ‘ethical’ knowledge makes a strong case  for  reflecting  in a more detailed way on  the multiple  roles and prac‐tices of ethics and carefully balancing between different visions of the role of ethics 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in  society.  Lay  ethical  epistemologies  are  characterized  by  inherent  ambiguities about the nature and role of ethics. These ambiguities, however, are not only local properties of the discussions at the Round Table, but reflect wider societal incon‐sistencies of ethics. Thus,  the participants’  accounts of  these ambiguities provide fruitful resources for rethinking dominant practices in ethics. My second hypothesis regards the role of expertise in ethical reasoning and its re‐lations to lay ‘ethical’ knowledge. So far, the relation between lay and expert ethics has been characterized by clear boundaries with the result that the public has not been regarded as having a particular voice  in ethical decision‐making on science and  technology, which has  instead been handled by experts. At  the Round Table, the role of ethics experts was perceived as ambivalent. The researchers attributed authority  to ethicists by a division of  labor model; however,  in  this model ethics was not meant to interfere with basic research beyond existing legal frameworks that  govern  knowledge production.  The  researchers’  deflection  of  ethics  and  the lay people’s experience  that  they often  failed  to challenge  the researchers’ moral presumptions, as well as a lack of trust in the researchers’ abilities of critical ethi‐cal reflection, resulted in a call  for professional ethics to undertake this task. The lay people regarded ethicists as proxies for their concerns. However, the authority that  the  lay participants  ascribed  to  ethicists does not necessarily  correspond  to the practices of institutional ethics, which is often regarded as the handmaiden of R&D interests. For the lay participants, rather than denoting the “real” practices of institutionalized ethics, “ethics” served as a placeholder for a different engagement with science and technologies that involve questions of societal values to a higher degree. In particular, expert ethics was seen as a place that assembles a wide range of potential moral issues of science and technology that are then opened up for a wider societal discussion. Thus, the lay participants’ expectations imply a notion of ethical expertise contrary to many social science accounts of this issue, that is, eth‐ics as a rather “thin” discourse (Evans 2002) that  imposes  its narrow framing on public meanings (Wynne 2001), for example a single vision of the role of citizens, as well as a way to bypass democratic legislation processes (Tallacchini 2006). In short, the lay participants’ expectations of institutionalized expert ethics were of a different nature  than  its  actual practice;  therefore,  the  confidence of  the  lay par‐ticipants in expert ethics was based not on how it “is” but rather how it “ought” to be.  Ascribing huge authority to ethical experts resulted in a devaluation of the lay par‐ticipants’  own  arguments,  which  they  often  considered  not  “ethical”  but  only “moral”,  and  thus  which  in  their  own  eyes  did  not  enjoy  sufficient  authority  to counter  the researchers’ arguments. Hence, my hypothesis  is  that  the  lay partici‐pants’ participation in the discussion suffered not a lack of arguments, but rather a self‐ascribed lack of authority. This also had an impact on the evaluation of lay par‐ticipation  in ethics on a more general  level beyond  the Round Table discussions. While the lay participants did regard themselves as able to challenge the research‐ers  on  the  grounds  of  implicit  and  explicit  values  embedded  in  the  researchers’ accounts,  they expressed  some unease about  the  contributions of  the public  in  a 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societal  debate  on  ethical  issues. Mirroring  the  distinction made  by  professional ethicists  between  “ethics”  and  “morality”,  the  lay  participants  did  not  regarded normal  citizens  as  able  to  overcome  their  individual  experiences  on  value  ques‐tions  and  thus  to  provide  “ethical”  arguments  that  could  be  authorative  to  re‐searchers. Hence, the lay participants simultaneously expressed the wish for par‐ticipation and called for experts. The question is, what does this mean for institu‐tional ethics,  the practices of which often stand  in sharp contrast  to  the expecta‐tions and hopes of  the  lay participants at  the Round Table? The outcomes of my analysis indicate the necessity of a changed role of ethical expertise in society; that is,  ethics  should not  so much enact  the  role of  framing ethical  issues  in  terms of academic priorities, but should help to enable a wider discourse on ethical issues that  seeks  the  inclusion of  voices  that have not been heard  so  far. This does not mean that institutionalized ethics would become subject to “moral populism”, but it would necessitate an advanced reflection on how public moral concerns can be translated into political decision‐making processes.  The  third hypothesis  concerns  the question of whether  “ethics”  is opening up or closing down ethical questions. The question of “opening up” or “closing down” has been  quite  prominent  in  literature  on  public  participation  (Wilsdon  and  Willis 2004; Stirling 2008). At the Round Table, different visions of ethics conflicted ac‐cording to whether the role and aim of ethics was thought to be to install a fixed set of norms for  individual and  institutional behavior—and thus to end delibera‐tions—or to act as a means to make problems subject to deliberation—and thus to open them up. For many of the lay participants, ethics was seen as a place of con‐tinued deliberation that accompanies the whole innovation process. Public ethical deliberation should step in early in the innovation process, and thus re‐open ques‐tions that are already seen as closed and taken for granted. While the deliberative role  of  ethics was  clear  to  the  lay  participants,  it was  rather  obscure  to  them  in what  ways  this  would  influence  and  govern  innovation  processes.  For  the  re‐searchers,  on  the  contrary,  ethics had mainly  the  function of  closing down ques‐tions for good. On several occasions they expressed the wish that ethicists provide them a fixed set of principles in the form of guidelines that they would be able to practically consider in their research, thus suspending the need for continued re‐flection on the possible consequences of their work. This also explains their move to set ethics and law equal, as the latter also presents a normative fact where fur‐ther  reflection  seems pointless. On  the  other  hand,  after  the Round Table  all  re‐searchers mentioned the importance of a continued ethical discussion in science as well as with the public. Here, the question is how these two visions of ethics relate to each other. However, the Round Table was a place where these conflicting no‐tions of ethics as opening up and closing down were brought into a debate. While the Round Table could not provide a definite consensus or solution on this issue, it provided a  set  of  arguments  that  should be  considered  in  the  societal debate on ethics, where  this  question  of  the  role  of  ethics  is  not  often  addressed.  Drawing from the discussions at  the Round Table,  the question of opening up and closing down is a useful tool to reflect upon wider societal dealing with ethical questions, 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My main  hypothesis  in  this  section  is  that  the  discussions  at  the  Round  Table 
suggest a need to move beyond a narrowly defined ethics that compensates for 
past  decisions  and  towards  an  ethics  of  innovation  in  a  much  broader  sense. 













made  answers,  but  is  more  modest  in  defining  “problems”  and  in  providing 
frames to be considered as common, and asks rather what the question at stake 
might  be  in  the  broader  context  of  a  debate  over  how  society  should  address 
technoscientific futures. 
 
 Recent  studies of  the way  innovation  is governed suggest  that  the current domi‐nant  regime of  risk governance  fails  to  address broader questions of public  con‐cerns and culture, and thus suffers serious deficits in contributing to a more robust innovation  policy.  The  main  argument  of  the  critics  is  that  public  involvement comes into play at a rather late stage, leaving space only for questions of technical risk (Felt and Wynne 2007; Wilsdon and Willis 2004; Wilsdon, Wynne, and Stilgoe 2005).  Institutionalized  forms of  ethics  are  integral  parts  of  the  risk  governance approach, as a kind of “moral risk assessment”. The division of labor between risk assessment and ethical evaluation fosters the idea that technical features of emerg‐ing  technologies  can  be  treated  separately  and  independently  from  questions  of values, and thus reinforces the division between “facts” and “values” as one of the main sources of public conflicts on science and technology.  This distinction was also a key feature of the ethics discussions at the Round Table, and often turned out to be an “argument” capable of closing down deliberation on ethical issues (see chapter 9). On the other hand, the researchers’ insistence on the “factish”  nature  of  their  knowledge  production  triggered  lay  participants’  objec‐
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tions,  and  thus widened  ethical  issues  not  only with  regard  to  future  impacts  of possible technologies on social values systems but also with regard to innovation regimes  already  in  place,  and  therefore with  regard  to  past  value  decisions  em‐bedded  in  institutional  practices.  The  participants’  treatment  of  this  issue  is  a strong argument for re‐opening already settled—and thus black‐boxed—decisions as explicit ethical questions  in which a wider range of people should participate.  In short, the argument is that the new relations between science and society (as well as changes in “science” and “society”) need to be addressed by a different type of “ethics”  that  transgresses  and  redefines  its  present  competences.  I  call  this  new type of engagement with ethical questions an ethics of innovation, which is in line with  the call  for a  “governance of  innovation”  in a recent report of  the European Commission  entitled  Taking  European  Knowledge  Society  Seriously  (Felt  and Wynne 2007). The expert group argues that regimes of risk governance fail to ap‐propriately respond to the public’s unease about science. The roots of public mis‐trust are systematically misinterpreted using a deficit model; that is, the public is thought to be in need of education in a “proper” understanding of science (Wynne 2007; Felt and Wynne 2007). “Risk” and “science” are often taken as unambiguous concepts  by  policy‐makers who  do  not  take  into  account  that  these  things  have different meanings for different people.  The main features of this suggested ethics of innovation is that it should include a wider range of actors in the debate and simultaneously broaden its scope. The eth‐ics of  innovation marks  a  clear departure  from  the  current dominant practice of the “ethics of compensation” (Levidow and Carr 1997), the aim of which is to com‐pensate for past value decisions embedded in current innovation regimes. Institu‐tionalized  ethics  usually  draws  the  lines  and  defines  limitations  for  given  tech‐nologies, but rarely considers and evaluates the innovation regimes that underlie these  technologies,  or wider  cultural  understandings  of  innovation  as  a  complex process. Furthermore, such a scheme fosters the idea that past value decisions are reversible by means of institutionalized ethics.  The shift towards an ethics of innovation was suggested by the way a wide range of ethical issues were discussed at the Round Table: First, the distribution of social responsibility for research outcomes was a major issue for the participants. While the  regulation  of  research  provides  a  legal  answer  to  this  question  in  concrete rules and norms, the moral dimension of this question was still unanswered for the participants,  especially  for  the  lay people. While  such  a discussion  is  seldom  the subject of opinions of  institutionalized ethics on specific technologies, the discus‐sion at the Round Table showed that this question needs to be posed continually with every new technology, particularly  if research is said to be  increasingly car‐ried out in the context of application (Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001).  Second, concrete applications of the researchers’ work were subject to discussion at  the  Round  Table,  in  the  form  of  the  “fat  pill”.  However,  the  focus was  not  so much on the specific ethical aspects of the fat pill once introduced in society, but on  the more  basic  ethical  question  of  who  defines  what  counts  as  a  “problem”. 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and premature  co‐operation of  social  science and ethics. While  I welcome dia‐






how  practices  of  proof  and  objectivity  as  well  as  styles  of  public  knowledge‐
making are  constructed  (Jasanoff 2005).  I will  argue  that  there  is  an  important 
political  dimension  behind  the  debates  on  interdisciplinary  method,  namely  a 
struggle for public authority. My argument is that if the social sciences are willing 
to collaborate with ethics in the form of empirical ethics, they must keep well in 
mind  the  epistemic  differences  as  well  as  the  discrepancies  in  the  politics  of 
each.  
 
 The  issues  addressed  in  this  thesis  are usually  seen as  the domain of  ethics.  For quite  some  time,  ethics has had a quasi‐monopoly on  the  evaluation and assess‐ment of ethical dimensions of science and technology. While the lament of the dis‐engagement of social sciences from ethical questions is quite old (Fox 1976), it has not been until recently that an increased mutual  interest between social sciences and ethics has emerged. This happened in two ways: First, ethical and moral prac‐tices were discovered as a relevant field of study for the social sciences, especially anthropology and ethnography that engaged with ethical practices at the bedside to explore the concrete meaning of esoteric concepts like dignity (Marshall 1992; Parker 2007; Hoeyer 2004). However,  this  focus  is also accompanied by an  igno‐rance of  the  larger‐scale  institutional and policy contexts  in which ethics  is prac‐ticed, which have been addressed only in a few studies. More recently, other fields of  social  science—for  example,  sociology  and  STS—have  jumped  on  the  band‐wagon and engaged with the institutional dimensions of ethics, resulting in an in‐creasing body of studies that take serious ethics not only as a way of reasoning but also  as  an  often  authorative  discourse  shaping  social  relations  (Evans  2002; Tallacchini  2006;  Jasanoff  2005;  Kelly  2003;  Salter  and  Jones  2005;  Salter  and Salter 2007).  Second,  ethics  itself  expressed  a  need  to  open  itself  towards  social  science,  al‐though in a rather particular way. Thus, in this last section I will assess the mutual 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interest of social science and ethics, and argue that the current discussion between ethics and social science suffers substantial deficits. The relations between ethics and  the  social  sciences  as  academic  disciplines  are mostly  addressed  under  the paradigm  of  “empirical  ethics”,  a  new  field  that  suggests  that  social  science  and ethics  can  be  reconciled  by  investing  in  the  development  of  an  interdisciplinary 
methodology that allows both disciplines to contribute to knowledge production on normative  issues.  I will  argue  that  the mutual  engagement  of  social  science  and ethics on methodological issues—while surely fruitful in particular contexts—can take on a problematic  aspect when considering  the wider  contexts of  the  role of ethics  in society, because such a  frame  tends  to obscure  the political dimensions inherent  in ethics.  I make  two arguments: The discussion of methodology can be seen as a struggle  for public authority,  in which the access to people’s hearts and minds  is  a  crucial political  resource  to  legitimate particular normative decisions. Second, there are different visions of what it means to be “empirical” in the social sciences  and  ethics.  In  ethics,  the  empirical  is  predominantly  understood  in  the sense  of  proved  facts  having  an  alibi  function  for  legitimizing  normative  rule‐making.  I start with the argument that, in empirical ethics, empiricism is supposed to lend authority to ethical expertise in a public struggle for who is authorized to speak for common values.  This  can  be  related  to  an  assumed  “crisis  of  expertise”  that  has accompanied debates over  technological  controversies over  the  last  year,  for  ex‐ample  the BSE crisis, as well as  the debates over GMOs  in many European coun‐tries.  As  a  response,  there  have  been  calls  for  a  democratization  of  expertise (Gerold  and  Liberatore  2001), which  suggests  that  a  broader  inclusion  of  public views would be able to re‐establish trust in expert‐led decision‐making. It’s not my concern here whether this crisis  is real or only a matter of  the self‐perception of experts,  based  on  a  few  incidents  while  expertise  predominantly  enjoys  good health. My assumption  is  that  the call  for a democratization of expertise  finds  its particular articulation in ethics in the form of “empirical ethics”, which can be seen as an attempt to gain societal  legitimacy while maintaining expert authority over ethical  issues. From the point of view of ethics,  the social sciences hold a certain public authority by being “empirical”,  that  is, being able  to represent society and public values with its methods.  In the social sciences, public values are held by smaller and larger proportions of the  population—to  be  carefully  distinguished  from  the  “published  opinions”  put forward  in media discourses, which do not necessarily  represent public  opinion. Public  opinion  is  regarded  as  conferring  legitimacy  to  political  decision‐making (Noelle‐Neumann 1979). In ethics, however, what counts as commonly shared mo‐rality  is not necessarily related to  the values held by members of  the public. The body of norms shared in society is derived from a set of principles on which it  is 
assumed that everyone could agree. Thus, for ethics, public opinion on moral issues as such does not confer  legitimacy  in normative rule‐making. What “ought”  to be must be  rooted  in well‐reasoned arguments,  and not  in asking people what  they find  right  or wrong  (Crosthwaite  1995).  However  to  go  “empirical”  is  seen  as  a 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crucial dimension for the advancement of ethics. Borry et al. (2005) argue that eth‐ics is now more prone to empirical work because of dissatisfaction with a founda‐tionalist  interpretation of applied ethics,  strong  integration of clinical ethicists  in the medical  setting  and  the  rise  of  the  evidence‐based  paradigm.  Ives  (2008,  5) argues that “in having ‘encounters with experience’, we can make our ethical and philosophical deliberations more applicable, more useful, and more real.”  Thus,  many  advocates  of  empirical  ethics  express  dissatisfaction  with  standard ethical methods, which fail to make ethical analysis more “real”. However, in all the writings on empirical  ethics—be  it  from  the  social  sciences or  ethics—one point seems  to be missing. That  is, being more  “real”  is not only a matter of appropri‐ately representing “facts”. Being more “real” also means that the suggestions pro‐vided by ethics experts are realized, that is, that (political) influence is deployed in concrete  social  environments.  Thus,  in  that  sense,  the  debates  around  empirical ethics can be read as a struggle for public authority over societal norms and values. Institutionalized  ethics  bodies  in  particular  have  gained  great  power  in  defining what an ethical issue is and what kind of solutions should be employed to compen‐sate  for  the  impacts  on  the  rights  and  dignity  of  the  individual. However,  in  the course of the shift from classical state government to more inclusive forms of gov‐ernance, such as public engagement, the question of the political legitimacy of pub‐lic decision‐making is posed again. Legitimacy today rests on an appropriate rep‐resentation of society—not as an impersonal structure or system, but rather as a body of citizens who have rights and duties in the political process. It is rather dif‐ficult  for  theory‐  and  principle‐based  ethics  to  provide  such  a  scheme;  thus,  it seeks  to  include  empirical  findings  in  order  to  uphold  the  authority  of  ethics  in defining what  counts  as  common morality.  If  so, my  argument  is  that  “empirical ethics”  is not merely a methodological and interdisciplinary struggle between so‐cial science and ethics, but has a clear political dimension. Thus, “public authority” has  two different meanings: on one hand, authority over public meaning, and, on the  other,  authority  that  is  gained  from  the  public.  These  aspects,  too,  have  not been carefully separated in the debates. The ignorance of ethics of these aspects of “empirical ethics” also has to do with its self‐perception as a critical voice in bio‐medical developments, where  “modern bioethics has adopted  the  role of  a disci‐pline that critically observes all kind of developments in modern society. It seems, for  example,  that modern  bioethics  now  fulfils  the  critical  role  toward medicine and health care that medical sociology fulfilled in the seventies of the 20th century” (Dekkers  and  Gordijn  2005,  271).  This  argument  is  contrasted  by  critiques  that regard ethics as a handmaiden of economic and research interests. The second argument I want to make is that empirical ethics seeks to enroll social sciences  in  ethical  reasoning.  However,  the  question  is  how  precisely  ethics  is imagining  such  a  collaboration.  The basic  assumption  is  that  normative  ethics  is often missing facts crucial to ground normative rule‐making. Thus, the assistance of social science is sought to support ethics in assembling the necessary empirical data. In seeking that assistance, ethics defines a particular vision of what it means to  do  empirical  work:  The  empirical  is  defined  as  the  counterpart  to  normative 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reasoning, based on  the meta‐ethical distinction between  “facts”  and  “values”,  or “is” and  “ought”  (Borry,  Schotsmans,  and Dierickx 2005). Thus,  “empirical”  is  set equal with “facts” and the “is”. Particularly revealing  is one of the  latest  fashions, named “evidence‐based ethics” (Goldenberg 2005), suggesting that empirical data of social relations enjoy the same status as the facts provided in “evidence‐based medicine”.  One of  the key  features of  the empirical social science—in particular  the qualita‐tive  social  sciences, which  are  the  reference  point  for my  argument—is  that  the rather hermetic distinction between “facts” and “values”, or empirical and norma‐tive, does not exist. In putting the social sciences in the empirical corner, the ability to  take a  legitimate normative approach  is denied  to  the social  sciences, because ethics is only importing the descriptive content from the social sciences and not its normative arguments. However,  the assigned role of  the social sciences as a sup‐plier of  “facts”  is  contrary  to  the attempts of  social  science  to position  itself  as a normative enterprise. Recent discussions in sociology and STS have aimed to posi‐tion  these disciplines as normative  institutions,  that  is,  institutions  that advocate for particular norms  that  are  regarded as  crucial.  For  example, Burawoy  (2005), President of the American Sociological Association, called for a “public sociology”, to work “in the defense of civil society”. A particular normative task that STS schol‐ars should take on is to contribute to a democratization of technological culture, as Bijker (2003) argues. The task of public STS intellectuals is to show that all science and technology are value‐laden, and thus to make all science and technology sub‐ject to political debate (Bijker 2003; see also McKenzie Stevens 2007). Hence, STS claims  that  all  scientific  knowledge  carries  implicit  and  explicit  norms,  and  that one  cannot  get  rid  of  them  by  sorting  out  what  is  “fact”  and  what  is  “value”—something that empirical ethics claims to be able to accomplish. Some currents in STS  argue  for  greater  democratization  of  technoscientific  cultures.  Other  STS scholars have directly engaged in policy processes and have actively argued for a greater political engagement of STS (Webster 2007). Thus, while empirical ethics assumes  that  social  science  is  and  should  be  only  “descriptive”,  it  is  already  a rather normative enterprise.  The  experiences  at  the  Round  Table  suggest  the  necessity  to  take  seriously  the ethical practices and discourses that take place in everyday contexts. The “empiri‐cal” should not be considered another source of more or less objective and value‐free data or “facts” in the course of normative rule‐making. Rather than opting for increased collaboration,  I suggest  that  the social sciences and  in particular ethics must develop a more reflective understanding of their entanglements with the po‐litical world. Thus, I suggest taking the term “empirical ethics” seriously and asking what  ethics does  in  societal practices. Both  social  sciences and ethics have  to be aware of their political roles when discussing the empirical. The empirical is never simply given, nor can it be considered a fact. It is made, and thus a more reflective engagement with  the  performative  dimension  of method  seems  required. While there is a certain truth in the ethicists’ claim that the social sciences are often un‐aware of their normative assumptions in their analyses, ethics also has to consider 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that  the world  cannot  so  easily  be  separated  into  “is”  and  “ought”,  and  that  this distinction has a strong influence on the way science is governed in current inno‐vation regimes. However, the discussion of “empirical ethics”, as one of interdisci‐plinary methods,  will  not  go  far  unless  its  political  dimension  is  addressed  in  a more open way. 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                                                i … die ‚BürgerInnenkonferenz’ zu einem fixen Instrument bei der Behandlung bri‐santer Themen zu machen. ii Nanotechnologie als neue Technik wirft keine grundsätzlich neuartigen ethischen Fragen auf. iii Innovation ist dabei Motor der wirtschaftlichen Prosperität und bildet eine soli‐de Basis für die soziale und kulturelle Weiterentwicklung dieser Gesellschaft. Diese Tatsache ist der Öffentlichkeit zu wenig bewußt und sollte der Bevölkerung durch ein Bündel entsprechender Maßnahmen verdeutlicht werden. iv Instrumente partizipativer Demokratie sind freilich keine überzeugende Alterna‐tive.  Sie  berufen  sich  auf  ‚das  Volk’,  das  in  plebiszitären  Kampagnen  immer  neu erfunden wird,  um Politik  als mediale  und  emotionalisierte  Veranstaltung  zu  in‐szenieren.  …  Die  Forderung  nach  stärkerer  Einbindung  der  Öffentlichkeit  in  die bioethische  und  biopolitische  Debatte  ist  demokratiepolitisch  nachdrücklich  zu unterstützen, stößt aber auf erhebliche Schwierigkeiten bei ihrer Einlösung. In der pluralistischen Gesellschaft gibt es nicht ‚die’ Öffentlichkeit, sondern unterschiedli‐che Öffentlichkeiten, die einander nur zum Teil wahrnehmen und sich nur selten zu der einen großen Öffentlichkeit zusammenführen lassen. v Was ‚die’ Öffentlichkeit denkt, ist schwer zu erfassen. Der Versuch, in diese ‚Black Box’ einzudringen, ist das Arbeitsfeld der Meinungsforschung, die freilich auch nur Konstrukte von Öffentlichkeit liefern kann. vi  Allerdings  sei  dabei  wichtig,  dass  die  systematische  Herangehensweise  in  der Reflexion  nicht  verloren  gehe.  Ethik‐Diskussionen  sollten  nicht  auf  ‚Stammtisch‐Niveau’ ausgetragen werden. vii Das Problem, an dem wir arbeiten, ist die neue Seuche, und zwar das ist die Fett‐leibigkeit und der Grund, warum wir so wenig davon wissen, ist, dass es schwer zu fassen ist:  es ist eine sehr komplexe Erkrankung. viii  Als Grundlagenforscher  sind wir  immer noch –  interessiert mich  zumindest  – einmal primär schon der Erkenntnisgewinn – ich will wissen, wie Fettstoffwechsel funktioniert ... ix … wir haben sozusagen über diese Programme von der Öffentlichkeit das Ange‐bot gekriegt, wir als Öffentlichkeit bieten euch viel Geld für etwas, was uns interes‐siert. Und wir haben uns eingeklinkt. x Also, wenn man, wenn Sie schauen, wie viele Leute die Brigitte‐Diät kaufen oder solche Dinge oder bei Slim Fast mehr oder weniger. manchen  ist es anscheinend ein Bedürfnis. Wenn Sie, also wenn Sie am Regal vorbeigehen mit Frauenzeitschrif‐ten, steht überall am Titelblatt  irgendeine neue Diät. Auf den Bestsellerlisten der Sachbücher ist die South‐Beach Diät an erster Stelle und die Atkins‐Diät an zweiter Stelle und zwar Monate lang. xi  ... die Definition von Krankheit  [ist]  für mich auch  fragwürdig, und dann  ist als nächstes dann gekommen, na ja, wir wissen, dass ein Großteil von denen, die, der 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                                                Adipositas eine genetische Erkrankung  ist. Wenn  ich  jetzt sage, also, ein Großteil der Bevölkerung ist adipös, das Ganze ist eine genetische Erkrankung, dann spre‐che ich den Großteil der Bevölkerung per Definition auf einmal krank. xii  Eigentlich  in  einer Wohlstandsgesellschaft, wo  ein  riesiges  Angebot  an  vielem gibt,  ich,  als  Übergewichtige,  auf  etwas  verzichten muss,  was mir  schmeckt.  Ich glaube, dass dieser psychische Bereich … auch eine Rolle spielt. Was mir schmeckt, muss ich verzichten, um mein Gewicht zu reduzieren … Also, einerseits … ich habe das Dilemma, auf etwas zu verzichten, und andererseits haben wir das riesige An‐gebot, diese verführerische Kraft des Angebotes. Und wo finde ich jetzt die Mitte? Und das hat schon mit der Psyche etwas zu tun. xiii Und zwar glaube ich, dass, nicht alle, keine Frage, aber ein sehr großer Teil der Bevölkerung eine sehr ähnliche, nicht die gleiche, aber eine sehr ähnliche Auffas‐sung von gutem Leben hat. xiv Andererseits gibt’s sozusagen [das] Argument, Leute und so, die sagen, es gibt also nichts Schlimmeres als diesen Jugend‐, Schlankheits‐, Abnehmwahn … Und es gibt ja das Sprichwort, … die Dicken sind gemütlich. Also sind das sozusagen keine Argumente, die man gegen das hernehmen kann, dass  ich sage,  ich will gar nicht dünner oder ich will gar nicht schlank werden. Die wollen gar nicht abnehmen. xv Jetzt gibt es verschiedene Möglichkeiten, wie ich das lösen kann. Der Einfachste ist, … ja, geh ins Studio, mach ein bisschen einen Sport und iss ein bisschen weni‐ger, ein Apferl am Tag, wird dir  ja wohl reichen, ned! … das funktioniert anschei‐nend nicht,  sonst hätten wir das Problem nicht, wenn das  so  einfach  auch wäre. Eine kurzfristige Änderung ist in den meisten Fällen in irgendeiner Form zu errei‐chen,  nur  langfristig  funktioniert  es  einfach  nicht.  Das  heißt,  es  wäre  das  Ge‐sündeste, es ist das Beste, es ist vor allem das Billigste, und trotzdem funktioniert es nicht. Das heißt, es muss andere Möglichkeiten geben. xvi … wir möchten einmal diese Fett spaltenden Gene finden, die wir nicht kennen. xvii Und dann kann man nicht mehr so schnell damit aufhören. Und ich denke, mit der Fettpille wäre es dasselbe, weil natürlich nicht alle schlank sein wollen, ja. Ich meine, [in] manchen Kulturen sollen die Frauen gar nicht schlank sein. Und wenn jetzt die Fettpille dort auf den Markt eben geworfen werden würde gemeinsam mit westlichen oder europäischen Schönheitsidealen, würde das wahrscheinlich fatale Konsequenzen haben. xviii  Jetzt macht man die Genforschung  in Fettstoffwechselstörung, man  findet ein Medikament, das behebt oder irgendein Verfahren, es muss ja nicht unbedingt ein Medikament sein, sondern Verfahren, wo man das beheben und beherrschen kann, und die Leute werden schlank, das hat den Erfolg, dass die Krankenkassa sich viel Geld erspart. Und dann könnten’s ja ‐ und jetzt kommen wir zu Ethik – dann könn‐ten’s auf die Idee kommen, dass man das verwenden muss. xix Es wird aller Voraussicht nach nie so sein, … dass jeder in der Früh seine Fettpil‐le  einwirft  und  alle  rennen  herum  mit  Idealmaßen.  DAS  wird  aller  Voraussicht nach, dass es ganz nebenwirkungsfrei geht …, und ich nehme das vorbeugend ein Leben lang ‐ solche Medikamente gibt’s quasi nicht. … wenn ich eingreife in einen Stoffwechselweg, dann bringe ich viel durcheinander, immer. Ich kann versuchen, das zu minimieren und meine Nebenwirkungen herabzusetzen, aber dass  ich ein 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                                                vorbeugendes Mittel  habe,  das wirklich  so  effizient  ist,  das  ist mehr  als unwahr‐scheinlich. xx Schaut man da  jetzt mehr auf Erkenntnis und Wissen oder sind wirtschaftliche Interessen im Vordergrund? xxi … die Gesellschaft, die das Geld gibt, die hat ja nicht die Malaria. xxii  …  wo’s  in  ganz  Europa  nur,  ich  weiß  nicht,  500  Erkrankte  gibt.  Da  gibt  die Pharmaindustrie für die Forschung überhaupt nichts aus, weil da ist kein Geschäft zu machen. xxiii  …  hier  Unterscheidungen  [zu]  treffen  ...  in  der  Grundlagenforschung  ist  das nicht der Fall und soll auch nicht der Fall sein, um Gottes Willen. xxiv Wo  ich  als  Steuerzahler  irgendwie  das  Empfinden  habe,  ich  finanziere  einen Riesen‐Apparat und  ich erwarte mir etwas davon  ‐ da muss etwas  rauskommen, was mein Leben besser macht, weil es ist ja mein Geld dann, ja. xxv Das Gesundheitswesen will  eine Tablette haben, dass die Stoffwechselstörung runtergeht, dass die Kosten runtergehen. Das ist ja noch immer gut. Dann gehen’s runter, nur … dann würden wir verpflichtet diese Pille alle Tage zu nehmen. Da ist Zwangsverpflichtung, … du musst alle Tage zwei Sortis schlucken, weil usw. … Und das ist meiner Meinung nach ein Ethikproblem. Muss ich den zwangsverpflichten, dass  er nicht dick wird,  oder  ist  es  seine  freie Entscheidung, dick  zu  sein? Ob er vielleicht dafür die gewisse Selbstbehalte bei der Krankenversorgung oder Sozial‐versorgung dafür selber zahlen muss, ist vielleicht diskussionswert, aber wo bleibt die Freiheit? xxvi … wenn er viel isst, zahlt er ja auch viel Mehrwertsteuer. xxvii Ja, du kannst ja im Endeffekt genauso entscheiden, dass du jetzt kein Fast Food isst oder kein  fettes Essen, wie du dich entscheiden kannst später, was weiß  ich, nicht die Fettpille zu essen. xxviii  Das  heißt,  die  Verhaltensänderungen  sind  eine  sehr  problematische Angele‐genheit  und  damit wird’s  absolut  notwendig  sein …  hier  in  anderer Weise  auch einzugreifen. xxix Ja, das ist der Anfang eigentlich, nicht bei dem Arzt oder nicht bei dem Forscher die Verantwortung suchen, sondern für sich selbst die Verantwortung. Warum bin ich dorthin gelangt, einen Arzt aufzusuchen? Das ist das Problem. Warum habe ich zugenommen? Weil  es  so viel,  riesiges Angebot an diesem und  jenem gibt? Nein, weil vielleicht etwas mit meiner Disziplin nicht funktioniert. Also, nicht der andere ist schuld. xxx Die Eigenverantwortung für sich selber … das zu lernen, Eigenverantwortung zu tragen, einmal in kleinster Form für mich selber, dann für die Familie, und die Ge‐sellschaft  kommt  erst,  ja,  wesentlich weiter,  nicht.  Also,  für mich  selber,  für  Ge‐schwister, Familie, Freunde dann, und dann kommt  irgendwann die Gesellschaft. Aber das Ganze, die Keimzelle ist die Eigenverantwortung. xxxi … wir haben uns das so gedacht. Zum Beispiel McDonalds auf  jeden Burger … oder  irgendwelche Firmen, die halt … ungesunde Produkte herstellen … also der Kunde zahlt halt mehr, ist egal, 50 Cents mehr für den Burger, so und so. Und diese 50  Cents  dieser  Fettsteuer  gehen  natürlich  an  sinnvolle Dinge, wie  zum Beispiel 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                                                Vorsorgeförderung  der  Gesellschaft,  Forschungsförderung  und  Verhaltensände‐rung. xxxii … weil ich halt einfach als Forscher ganz stark trenne zwischen dem, was ich im Labor  mache,  wo  ich  vom  Gesetz  her  gezwungen  bin,  das  abzuschotten,  nichts rauszulassen,  dafür  zu  sorgen,  dass  meine  Mutanten,  dass  alles,  was  damit  ist, wirklich  im Labor  ist, und erst dann, wenn’s zerstört  ist und mir kein Unheil an‐richten kann, nach außen kommt, ich in einem ganz einem anderem, in einer ganz einer anderen Position bin, als ein Pflanzenphysiologe, der seinen Mais auspflanzt, als ein, irgendeine Firma, was auch immer, die gentechnisch manipulierten Kartof‐feln, Tomaten oder was auch immer rausbringt, aufs freie Feld, wo ich unmittelbar, nicht nur als Konsument, sondern auch in meiner Umwelt damit konfrontiert bin. Aber  ich als Natur‐,  als Laborwissenschaftler, wenn  ich mich  so bezeichnen darf, bin in einer ganz einer anderen Position. xxxiii …  ich will wissen, wie Fettstoffwechsel  funktioniert und mich  interessiert  es wahnsinnig, wie dieser Fettstoffwechsel mit Diabetes zusammenhängt. xxxiv  Ich  habe  da,  bei  unseren  Forschungszielen  haben wir  das  so  unterteilt,  und zwar wir haben die unmittelbaren Ziele, die unsere sind im Labor. Unsere unmit‐telbaren Ziele  sind Gene  finden und  Stoffwechselwege  aufklären. Dann  gibt’s  die mittelbaren  Ziele  und  die  langfristigen  Ziele. Mittelbares  Ziel  könnte man  sagen, jemand greift das auf, um zu forschen, ob man bestimmte Substanzen entwickeln kann, mit denen dieses Gen oder die Produkte daraus so manipulieren kann, dass jemand dünn oder dick wird oder auch um eine ganz eine Krankheit heilen. ... Und die langfristigen Ziele wären dann eben die Reduzierung der Fettleibigkeit, Redu‐zierung von Arteriosklerose, Herzinfarkt, Krebserkrankungen, etc. Nur, diese mit‐tel‐ und langfristigen Ziele sind nicht die Ziele von GOLD. Die sind die gesellschaft‐lichen Ziele, die andere dann auch machen, die machen wir nicht selber. Wir könn‐ten es nicht einmal machen. xxxv … der Laser ist nicht erfunden worden, damit ich einen Laserbeamer habe und … meine Augen abscannen lassen kann. ... Das sind Anwendungen, die total unab‐sehbar waren, das ist nicht wegen einer Anwendung entwickelt worden … per se, man kann dann sagen, ich kann dann abschätzen, was ich alles damit machen wer‐de können. Das ist glaube ich, zu viel verlangt. xxxvi  …  es wird  immer  die Möglichkeit  geben,  die  Dinge  negativ  einzusetzen.  Die Frage ist dann, muss es die Forschung sein, die ich unterbinde oder sollen’s mögli‐che negative Anwendungen sein, die ich versuche zu unterbinden? xxxvii Ist Darin schuld an Euthanasie? xxxviii Jemand, der Kampfgase haben möchte, wird eh nicht drauf warten, dass wer anders  das  entwickelt  und  der  das  Beiprodukt  nehmen  kann.  Er  wird’s  im schlimmsten Fall selber machen. Also, ich kann, jemand, der negative Motive vor‐aussetzt,  den werde  ich  dadurch,  dass  es  verboten  ist,  ja  sowieso nicht  abhalten davon. xxxix  Es wird  eigentlich  überall  verlangt, wenn man  um  ein  Projekt  ansucht,  dass man auch ein Formular ausfüllt, in dem genau steht, was man an ethisch relevan‐ten Sachen vorhat, und warum man genau das machen will usw. Also, es wird ei‐gentlich sehr streng überwacht. 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                                                xl … quasi moralisch geboten … Fettstoffwechsel zu beforschen. Es  ist einfach ein Problem,  es  sterben  die  meisten  Menschen,  die  häufigste  Todesursache  auf  der ganzen Welt, also die unterernährten Länder da mit eingerechnet, ist einfach Aus‐wirkungen von Fettleibigkeit. xli Und jetzt ist für mich irgendwo ein bisschen die Dialektik ein bisschen schwierig – einerseits Wissensgewinn im Sinne von Grundlagenforschung zu wollen und an‐dererseits einen gewissen spürbaren Begeisterung irgendwo auch, da die Anwen‐dung in Form von Medikamenten, … von diversen Firmen zu sprechen, die Vision zu haben,  es  gibt da  eine Pille. Also, …  irgendwo habe  ich  Schwierigkeiten  abzu‐nehmen, dass es wirklich nur um das Wissen geht, nur um die akademische For‐schung geht. xlii … wenn ich halt an der Universität womöglich lehre oder so, dann bin ich doch irgendwie  in  hervorragender  Stellung,  und  dann muss  ich  schon  irgendwo  auch, eben Verantwortung übernehmen oder ein Bekenntnis abliefern oder,  ja,  einfach über den Dingen stehen. Da kann ich nicht  irgendwo vielleicht daheim einmal  im stillen Kämmerlein mir Gedanken machen sondern da muss ich schon Position be‐ziehen auch zu grundlegenden Fragen. xliii Was macht die Politik, sie setzt eine Kommission zusammen und lässt sich bera‐ten, oder? xliv Die Politik ist letztlich ein Instrument auch oder wird auch von der Wirtschaft, glaube ich, vor sich hergeschoben. xlv … wir nähern uns wieder diesem Kreislauf, der aus Politik, Medien, der Gesell‐schaft an sich, den Forschern, der Wirtschaft und den Ethikern besteht, die, ja, die immer mehr die Verantwortung aufeinander schieben. xlvi ... wo jeder im Prinzip seine eigenen Parameter optimiert ... xlvii Weil der Politiker, … weil was macht der? Der ist genauso jemand wie wir, der ist  ja  auch  kein  Fachmann  und  damit  er  eine  Entscheidung  treffen  kann,  lädt  er Wissenschaftler ein, die ihn beraten. Und da sind wir dann schon wieder im Kreis, nicht? Der Politiker  schafft  die  rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen  für den Wissen‐schaftler, der seinerseits wieder den Politiker beratet, damit er diese Rahmenbe‐dingungen  schaffen  kann.  Und  so  geht  das  im  Kreis  herum  und  letztendlich  ist dann niemand mehr verantwortlich. xlviii … die Frage der Verantwortung wird  ja  immer erst  im Moment der Katastro‐phe gestellt. xlix … wir haben diese Frage der Verantwortung diskutiert,  und auch wir  sind  zu keinem eindeutigen Ergebnis gekommen. l … Verantwortung tragen wir im Prinzip alle. li … diese Frage nach der Verantwortung, das heißt, die Frage zu verhindern, dass irgendwas besonders Schlimmes passiert, vielleicht am besten dadurch zu verhin‐dern wäre, dass man am Weg, den man geht, konsequent  fragt, ob das, was man macht richtig oder falsch ist. Das heißt, dass die Gesellschaft in gewisser Hinsicht dafür sorgt, dass der Weg, den die Gesellschaft geht, permanent kritisch hinterfragt wird. 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                                                lii …  regelmäßigen Denkanstöße  von  außen,  das heißt,  dass  es  gewisse Personen oder Organisationen  gibt,  die  einfach  kritisch  hinterfragen,  ob  das, was  passiert, das Richtige wäre. liii Wir haben Mäuse als Modelltiere, die sehr gut zu verwenden sind, weil sie leicht, relativ leicht zu halten sind, und weil sie dem Menschen schon sehr nahe kommen, und der Hefe. Das Problem, das ich immer habe, ist: Je einfacher mein System ist, desto leichter kann ich damit arbeiten, aber desto weiter ist es natürlich vom Men‐schen entfernt. liv … die Gene, die für diese Eiweißstoffe codieren, kann ein Tier ausknocken. Was auch geht, er kann den, die Zellen im Tier veranlassen, das Protein über zu expri‐mieren, das heißt, jetzt macht die Zelle viel mehr Eiweiß als sie sonst machen wür‐de. Also man kriegt grundsätzliche biologische Informationen und auf der anderen Seite kriegt man eine Information darüber, welche Rolle spielen die Enzyme, wenn der ganze Fettstoffwechsel nicht richtig läuft. lv  Ja natürlich schon einerseits aufzeigen, was machen wir eigentlich, warum ma‐chen wir  es, welche  Ziele.  Also  dass wir  es  nicht  einfach machen, weil wir  Spaß daran haben  irgendwelche Tiere abzutöten, also was durchaus nicht gegeben  ist, sondern  dass wir  halt wirklich  ein  Ziel  verfolgen, was wir  natürlich  für  sinnvoll sehen  und was wir  natürlich  auch …  rübergeben will  an  andere, … Medikament gegen Arteriosklerose eventuell in Zukunft mal zu finden, finde ich, ist ein Ziel, das wahrscheinlich alle sehr interessant finden oder so geht es mir ja auch, dass einem dann ja die Leute sagen: das ist interessant und sie möchten es haben und wir sol‐len uns beeilen. Was dann halt letztendlich kommt. Und dann einfach aufzuzeigen, dass  auch Genomforschung  in  diese Richtung  gehen kann,  also  auch positive  Sa‐chen für den Menschen bringt. lvi  …  die  Mäuse,  die  sind  unser  Primärkapital,  nicht.  Sie  können  sich  vorstellen, wenn ein Postdoc drei Jahre lang arbeiten muss, damit es zu so einer Maus kommt, die hat einen enormen Wert im Labor. Das ist also nichts, mit dem wir leichtsinnig … Es kostet eine gigantische Menge Geld. Die [Mäuse] sind, also, das wahre Gold, das wir dann im Endeffekt besitzen. Das heißt, die sind normalerweise besser ver‐sorgt als die Dissertanten oder … andere Mitglieder des Labors. lvii Im Prinzip ist es ja ein bisschen meine Familie. Ja, die Mäuse bekommen dann so zwischen fünf und zehn Junge auf die Welt. Und,  ich bin  jetzt auch natürlich sehr neugierig, und ich habe schon geschaut im Tierstall und fast täglich gehe ich hinein weil am Anfang sind die Mäuse ohne Haare ganz fleischige kleine blinde Knöllchen. Und, sobald sie dann die Haare haben wird es für mich spannend weil dann ist es nämlich  so  wenn  die  Mäuse  schwarz  sind,  ist  es  für  mich  schlecht  und  für  die schwarze Maus schlecht. lviii … weil beim Menschen gehe ich ja auch so vor. lix Es arbeitet dann  ja  im Prinzip auch nicht wirklich  jeder mit den Mäusen. Aber man sollte zumindest prinzipiell dazu bereit sein. … Na ja, es wird dann immer da‐zu führen, dass es die Gutmenschen gibt im Labor und die Mäusemörder. Und das ist  ...  gruppendynamisch  sicher  sehr  ungünstig.  …  prinzipiell  soll’s  nicht  so  sein, dass es dann welche gibt, die sich als moralisch reiner betrachten als andere. Also, dafür, für solche Spannungen ist in einem Labor sicher kein Platz. 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                                                lx …  ich sage, wenn  jemand so reagiert  „wann kann  ich endlich meine erste Maus da... [umbringen]”, der braucht einen Arzt. Der hat in einem Labor nichts verloren. Ich kenne keine Person, die mit großer Lust und Liebe sich freut, wenn sie das er‐ste Mal  in den Tierstall geht um eine Maus zu töten. Das  ist  in  jedem Fall ein ge‐wöhnungsbedürftiger, wenn auch notwendiger … Schritt. Ähnlich wie, ich das sage immer  auch bei  jenen Personen  [die]  viele Hühner  im Laufe  ihres  Lebens  essen, aber sich schwer tun, ein Hendl zu töten: Theoretisch, konsequenterweise, müsste man sagen wenn ich es esse, dann müsste ich auch fähig sein, es zu töten. lxi … ich kann nur sagen aus eigener Erfahrung: … ich habe immer mit Tieren gear‐beitet und meine Problematik war eine Zeitlang transgene Tiere. … Und habe am Anfang also diese Hürde auch nicht übersprungen. [Ich] habe also selbst für mich gesagt: „… das kannst du nicht tun. Muss man wirklich Mäuse genetisch modifizie‐ren?“ Und habe dann erst also im 91er Jahr oder 92er Jahr begonnen damit. Also da sieht man schon, man macht sich natürlich auch selbst Gedanken und nicht alles, das dann später fast zur Selbstverständlichkeit wird, ist am ersten Tag eine Selbst‐verständlichkeit. lxii … weil man’s einfach muss, weil das zur Arbeit dazu gehört, was man dann wie‐der verarbeiten muss. lxiii Und das ist halt einfach das, was … vom Anfang meines Studiums bis heute im‐mer  noch  und wahrscheinlich  auch  in  Zukunft wird’s  immer wieder was  geben, denke ich mir. lxiv  Ich  habe  zum  Beispiel  sehr  viele  Bekannte,  die  im  Gefängnis  arbeiten.  Da herrscht auch eine andere Sprache. … Das ist, meiner Meinung nach, normal, also, das zieht sich durch alle Bereiche ‐ man stumpft ab gegen das, mit dem man arbei‐tet. lxv  In  China  gibt’s  diese  Regelung  nicht.  Und  in  China  wurde  dieses  Experiment dann auch durchgeführt. lxvi  …  dem  chinesischen  Forscher,  der  nach  unseren  Standards  sein  unerlaubtes Tierexperiment macht, bleibt  theoretisch wirklich nur ein Schlupfloch  ‐  er publi‐ziert’s  in einem chinesischen  Journal. … Nur  in der Praxis hat’s heutzutage keine Bedeutung, denn ... diese Journale liest niemand. lxvii Also, ich finde, jemand, der Fleisch isst, darf sich nicht über Tierversuche aufre‐gen, die am bestmöglichen Niveau sind. lxviii … dass  sie eben, die  immer narkotisiert  sind, und dass die halt  immer gleich umgebracht werden,  dass  die  nicht  einmal  quieken  können,  so  schnell  geht  das, dass die das eh nicht mitkriegen. lxix … so angenehm wie möglich für die Tiere zu machen. lxx … man kann einen bestimmten Leidensdruck, der kurzzeitig ist, sehr wohl viel‐leicht  vor  sich  selbst  rechtfertigen,  dann wenn das Tier  sofort  stirbt.  Bei  diesem Versuch allerdings hat sich’s um einen Zeitversuch gehandelt, der über 24 Stunden gegangen ist. … Die Versuche sind absolut international üblich. Ist nicht was, was verboten wäre, aber wir haben uns halt intern drauf geeinigt, … dass wir die nicht machen. lxxi [Es wird] immer mehr gängig, dass die Publisher verlangen, die Genehmigungs‐nummer des Tierversuchs. … dass diese Versuche auch durchgeführt werde durf‐
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                                                ten. Also, es  ist auch bei den Publikationsorganen  inzwischen üblich, ähnlich wie das bei Humanversuchen ja schon längere Zeit der Fall ist, dass die Ethikkommis‐sion nachweislich damit beschäftigt war. lxxii Das waren eigentlich eher so dann die Gespräche  in den Pausen beim Kaffee. Wo’s dann so gefragt haben, nicht nur, ob man jetzt mit Mäusen arbeitet? … Gott sei Dank, habe ich immer gesagt, nein, ich bekomme sie fertig faschiert. [lacht] lxxiii … ich habe eigentlich einmal in einem Tierphysiologiepraktikum einen Frosch umgebracht und habe dann gesagt, ich mache das nie mehr wieder. Das reicht mir. Ich habe nur gedacht, ich muss das einmal ausprobieren, wie’s mir dabei geht und habe dann  für mich einfach  festgestellt,  okay,  ich möchte also nicht mir höheren Tieren. lxxiv … nachdem ich erfahren habe, dass eben dort auf dem Institut Mausforschung, Tierversuche  betrieben werden, war  für mich  klar,  ich  bringe  sicher  keine Maus um. Also, ich forsche damit … ich impfe sie, aber ich bringe sicher keine Maus um. Also, das [ist] eigentlich eine persönliche Einstellung von mir … es gibt einen eige‐nen Tierstall. Sie haben eh gesehen, wie das funktioniert. Es gibt dort Leute, die das machen, und wenn ich’s nicht machen muss, ich will es nicht machen. Also, das ist meine persönlich Einstellung. lxxv … eigentlich der Henker, der’s verantwortet trotzdem. lxxvi Überrascht hat mich dann eher auch die Reaktionen einer gewissen Kollegin, die dann überrascht war, als ich sagte, dass wir als Jungwissenschaftler uns schon ethische Gedanken darüber machen. … Weil es ist ungelogen, dass wir’s verarbei‐ten müssen. Und je nachdem, was es ist, ist es auch ziemlich heftig für uns, das zu verarbeiten. … vor einem Monat oder so hatten wir einen Versuchsreihe, die auch für mich  relativ  schwierig war mit  Tieren, wo wir  zu  dritt  zusammen  gearbeitet haben, wo wir wirklich einige Tage einfach nur zusammen gesessen haben, immer wieder drüber geredet haben. Andere konnten sich  schon gar nicht mehr zu uns setzen. Einfach, weil wir’s  selber  für uns verarbeiten mussten. Und  ich war dann eher  überrascht,  dass  die Kollegin  da  so  sehr  erstaunt war. Weil,  ich  denke mal, also für mich ist es halt auch wichtig, … dass wir uns da, sowohl ethischer, als auch … vom Handling her, Gedanken drüber machen, was wir da tun, und da nicht ein‐fach nur gedankenlos an die Arbeit gehen. lxxvii … Was mich  jetzt eben beunruhigen würde, wie die große Laserkanone, was ich nicht gesehen habe. Die haben’s echt nicht gehabt. lxxviii … wo Regale drinnen stehen und Käfige. lxxix … dass man will etwas verbergen. lxxx Es wird ja immer interessanter, weil man es nicht darf. lxxxi  Wir  haben  sicher,  also,  die  ganz  braven  tausend  Mäuse  gesehen.  …  [diese] furchtbar anzuschauenden Mäuse haben wir natürlich eh nicht gesehen. Ja, gut, das passt da für mich sozusagen auch in das Bild, dass halt das sehr, sehr positiv dar‐gestellt worden  ist.  Aber wie  gesagt,  ich  verstehe  das  natürlich.  Also,  ich würd’s wahrscheinlich  genauso machen, wenn  jemand  zu mir  kommt,  und will  sich  das alles  anschauen.  Dann werde  ich  ihm  auch  nur  die  schönen  Sachen  zeigen  oder erzählen. 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                                                lxxxii … dass halt Tierversuche auch dazu gehören. … es war ganz normal. Eben, ich habe mir dann eher gedacht:  Ja, was macht  ihr eigentlich so ein Theater um den Tierstall? lxxxiii … ich glaube eh nicht, dass sie unbedingt was zu Verbergen haben, aber sie hat vielleicht immer das irgendwie vermittelt mit ihrem Gehabe. lxxxiv Da habe ich schon Schlimmeres gesehen, muss sich ganz ehrlich sagen. lxxxv Ich meine, ja, sind halt viele Mäuse eingesperrt und das ist eben alles im künst‐lichen Licht und durch die Versuche natürlich werden einige Mäuse sterben müs‐sen, und diese Mäuse werden da die Gene … werden ausgeschaltet. … Und das war dann für mich nicht so tragisch. lxxxvi Sehr gefallen hat mir auch die Gruppendynamik, die sich entwickelt hat, wie die Wissenschaftler uns absolut nicht den Mäusestall zeigen wollten. Also, das war irgendwie witzig. Da waren wir uns auf einmal alle sehr, sehr einig. lxxxvii  Ich war erstaunt, dass die Mitglieder der Öffentlichkeit den Besuch  im Tier‐stall  eher  als  positiv  bewertet  haben.  Ich  finde,  der  Tierstall  ist  nicht  besonders schön, und es gibt Tierställe, die für die Mäuse sicher angenehmer sind. … Wobei ich das Gefühl hatte am Ende der Diskussion waren die meisten eigentlich davon überzeugt, dass es notwendig ist, und dass wir wirklich versuchen andere Metho‐den zu verwenden außer Tierversuchen. lxxxviii  … wie  geht’s  einem,  dass man  diese  schwarzen Mäuse …  eliminieren muss ganz einfach? lxxxix … da ist der Puls auf 180. xc … es gehört zu meiner Arbeit, ich habe mich dafür entschieden. xci Man kann zwar sagen, dass man mit der Zeit vielleicht ein bisschen abgestumpft wird, aber ich glaube man kann das wirklich nur selber machen, wenn man … für sich selber, die Sinnhaftigkeit sieht. Wenn ich jetzt etwas machen würde, von der Arbeit,  wo  ich  nicht  überzeugt  wäre,  dass  das  wichtig  ist,  dann  wäre  das  nicht denkbar dann die Tiere zu töten. xcii … einen sehr persönlichen Kommentar heute abzugeben auf meine Frage, weil ich die Erfahrung gemacht habe, die Wissenschaftler sprechen eigentlich nie über Persönliches. xciii … zu seinen Mäusen hingezogen gefühlt hat. xciv … dass man ihm natürlich jetzt immer vorhaltet, er bringt die Mäuse um. Wenn man das von der anderen Seite betrachtet, muss man sagen, müssten wir alle Vege‐tarier  sein, wenn wir uns wirklich dagegen verwehren  ‐  ich  stelle  es aber nur  in den Raum, denkt im Prinzip wahrscheinlich auch keiner drüber nach, wenn er das Abendessen genießt. xcv … entweder ist es ihnen wirklich egal, oder sie trauen sich vielleicht nicht sagen, dass sie wirklich Krisen haben. Wobei  ich das nicht glaube, weil  irgendwann mit der Zeit wird alles Routine. Sonst, sie wissen ja vorher, was sie erwartet, wenn sie dort arbeiten wahrscheinlich. Sie müssen es ja nicht machen. Weil ich glaube nicht, dass man dorthin geht und dann weiß man gar nicht, was man dort  tun muss. … diese Leute freiwillig gemacht, na? 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                                                xcvi … wenn man die Leute persönlich darauf anspricht, dann haben sie oft selber auch keine Antwort und wahrscheinlich gibt es auch nicht wirklich eine Antwort, na? xcvii DNA ist zu weit, ned. Das ist also zu abstrakt auch. Das ist nicht wirklich fassbar wirklich, ne. Aber das Tier, das sieht man halt, ned, die Maus, die da fiept. xcviii … dass wir ganz normale Menschen sind. xcix Die Gefahr, und das, was für mich interessant ist oder was man fragen müssten wenn  ich  mir  jetzt  mal  anschaue,  sind  wir  jetzt  noch  Laien?  Sind  wir  jetzt  ver‐braucht  vielleicht  noch mal  an  einem  solchen  Gespräch  teilzunehmen?  Sind  wir jetzt überhaupt noch unbefangen genug, solch eine Aufgabe wahrzunehmen, wenn sich eine nächste Frage, ein nächstes Projekt stellt? … ob wir sozusagen jetzt schon geprägter sind in unserem Antwortverhalten, als eine völlig unselektionierte sozu‐sagen echte Laiengruppe. Und das wäre  für mich  jetzt auch sozusagen die Frage, wenn … ich sage, okay, bei vielen Fragen sollen Laien mittun, dann frage ich mich, ob wir bereitwillige Laien irgendwann einfach aufgebraucht haben und Berufslaien kriegen? c … ich habe in den Protokollen auch schon die ersten Spuren von ethischem Pro‐blembewusstsein  entdeckt. Das  heißt, man  scheint  das  vage Gefühl  zu haben,  da gäbe es etwas, was ethisch diskussionsbedürftig wäre. ci Fachhochschulen forschen in meiner Wahrnehmung nicht. cii … das ich überhaupt nicht verstehe, … dass die Forschung praktisch moralische Argumente bringt, um Geld  zu erhalten. Und das  tut  sie nicht. Wir machen  reine wissenschaftliche Anträge, um Geld zu erhalten, und da ist kein einziges ethisches Argument, da  ist kein einziges moralisches Argument ….  ich glaube, … diese Ver‐quickung zwischen Forschung … [und] Anwendung. Unsere Forschung ist absolut nicht  anwendungsorientiert,  und vielleicht hat mich das  einfach ein bisschen ge‐stört,  dass  diese  Verquickung  sehr  stark  da  ist  …  aber  das  ist  nicht  unsere  For‐schung. ciii …  ich  tu mir dann genau an dem Punkt besonders  schwer die Grundlagenfor‐schung zu rechtfertigen als reinen Zweck der Befriedigung des Wissensdurstes des Menschen. Also, wenn ich sage, wir machen das, wir wollen mehr Wissen, das ist so ein  Grundbedürfnis,  dann  täte  ich  persönlich mich  besonders  schwer,  an  diesen Zweck zu rechtfertigen, dafür bringen wir Tiere um. civ Schaut man da jetzt mehr auf Erkenntnis und Wissen oder sind wirtschaftliche Interessen im Vordergrund? Heiligt der Zweck die Mittel? cv Das stimmt jetzt leider nicht, es gibt auf der TU jetzt ein Riesen EU‐Projekt, die arbeiten  jetzt  nur  an  Malaria.  Das  hat  glaube  ich  8  Millionen  Euro.  …  aber  der Grund ist, es wird nicht für die Leute, die dort sind … gemacht, sondern natürlich für die Touristen, ja. Also, weil die jetzt genug hohe Zahl haben, damit sich das aus‐zahlt für die EU das zu fördern. Kriegen doppelt so viel Geld, wie wir für die Fett‐forschung für Malaria. cvi  Und  es  gibt  ja  das  Sprichwort …  die Dicken  sind  gemütlich. … Die wollen  gar nicht abnehmen. 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                                                cvii  Entschuldigung,  also  Fettleibigkeit  ist  kein,  ist  nicht  nur  ein  psychologisches Problem. Es geht nicht damit da, ob glücklich und dick zu sein. Es ist trotzdem un‐gesund, auch wenn man glücklich ist damit. cviii Fakt ist, dass 50% der Leute zu viel Kilos haben, das ist Fakt. Ob sie sich das ein, ob das sich jetzt eine bestimmte Person einbildet, sie sei so dick oder wirklich zu dick ist, das ist ein individuelles Problem. Fakt ist, die Hälfte der Leute würde ge‐sünder leben, würden sie etwas abnehmen. Und 20% müssten massiv abnehmen. Das  ist Fakt, und das kann  ich nicht durch, das kann  ich, ob die  jetzt, ob’s denen jetzt psychologisch gut geht oder nicht gut geht, ändert nichts daran, dass Fettlei‐bigkeit ungesund ist. cix … es waren ja doch sozusagen zwei Fronten, sage ich jetzt einmal, zwei gegneri‐sche  Parteien,  nenne  ich’s  jetzt  einmal.  Und  da  ist  dann  sozusagen  die  Hemm‐schwelle weggefallen, wenn die nimmer mehr da waren. Ist sozusagen viel  locke‐rer und viel direkter miteinander geredet worden. cx … [da] waren dann zwei dabei, die sagen, ja, sie essen kein Fleisch … weil ihnen tun die Tiere leid. Aber die sind wenigstens konsequent, ja. Also, ich finde, jemand, der Fleisch isst, darf sich nicht über Tierversuche aufregen, die am bestmöglichen Niveau sind. Und das, finde ich, ist ein wichtiges Argument bei den Tierversuchen, ist nicht nur ob, sondern auch wie. cxi Also,  ich  forsche damit …  ich  impfe sie, aber  ich bringe sicher keine Maus um. Also, das [ist] eigentlich eine persönliche Einstellung von mir. cxii  S6: Würdet’s  ihr  euch  von uns  als  Projektkoordinatoren …  eine Aufforderung zur Diskussion wünschen? So abwegig das jetzt [klingt] …  S5: Ich glaube, es ist auch immer leichter, wenn du direkt mit jemanden redest, der im gleichen Umfeld ist und zum Beispiel wenn man am gleichen Institut ist und das gleiche macht, dass du gleich direkt vor Ort redest. cxiii  E:  Das  [die  Unterscheidung  zwischen Grundlagenforschung  und Anwendung] ist doch  für die Gesellschaft nur dann akzeptabel …. dass man’s  finanziert, wenn die  Gesellschaft  die  Möglichkeit  hat,  über  den  Umgang mit  dieser  Forschung  zu entscheiden.  S7:  Nein,  über  den  Umgang  der  Anwendung,  nicht  über  den  Umgang  der  For‐schung.  ...  E: Und da muss die Gesellschaft entscheiden können … anders verabschieden wir uns  von  jedem  Gedanken  von  Demokratie.“  S7:  „Nein,  nein,  dann  verabschieden wir  uns  von  der  Freiheit  der  Forschung.  Und  dann  brauche  ich  keine,  und  dann kann ich die Universitäten gleich zusperren. cxiv Das wird dann funktionieren, wenn ich eine Steinschleuder erfinde, dann ist es absehbar, dass jemand dann einen Stein gegen den Kopf kriegt, und der wird dann sterben. cxv Der Herr Pasteur hat, wo er das Penicillin entdeckt hat, durch Zufall  entdeckt hat,  nicht  gewusst,  dass  dadurch Multiresistenzen  entstehen.  …  Das  heißt,  diese Abschätzung  ist  eine  Schwierigkeit,  genau  so  die  positiven  Anwendungen  abzu‐schätzen. … der Laser ist nicht erfunden worden, damit ich einen Laserbeamer ha‐
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                                                be und meine Augen abscannen  lassen kann oder was auch  immer. Das sind An‐wendungen,  die  total  unabsehbar  waren.  Das  ist  nicht  wegen  einer  Anwendung entwickelt worden, das war eigentlich ein ganz anderes Produkt. … ich kann dann abschätzen, was ich alles damit machen werde können: Das ist glaube ich, zu viel verlangt. cxvi … wenn ich auf Nummer sicher gehen will, dass niemand das missbraucht, mei‐ne Technik, dann muss ich sagen, wir behalten den Stand der Technik … und wir verbieten Forschung und Weiterentwicklung generell. Dann kann ich sicher gehen, es wird nirgends aus  irgendeinem Forschungsergebnis ein negativer Effekt  raus‐kommen. Ansonsten kann  ich das nicht unterbinden. Das  ist die einzige Möglich‐keit, wie ich sicher gehen kann, dass nichts Schlechtes entsteht. … es kommt auch nichts Gutes raus, aber es wird nichts neues Schlechtes entstehen. cxvii …  ich  finde,  dass da  vor  allem Künstler und Philosophen und Ethiker unsere Kontrollorgane  sind,  wenn  schon  die  Mediziner  nicht  selber  und  die  Techniker nicht nachdenken. cxviii … das, was wir forschen, forschungswürdig ist, entscheiden ForscherInnen in den USA. cxix  S6: Das dürfen  Sie nicht,  also,  es  gibt  ja Vorschriften … Sie  kriegen nicht den Persilschein, dass Sie alle Tierversuche machen können.  Jedes Mal, wenn wir z.B. eine  bestimmte  Knockout‐Maus  machen  wollen,  mit  einem  bestimmten  Gen, müssen wir einen Antrag stellen, darlegen, was wir, was dieses Gen für eine Funk‐tion hat, und was wir vermuten, und wieso wir das brauchen. L13: Und an welchen Kriterien wird das dann gemessen, ob das jetzt okay ist oder nicht? S6: Ist eine gute Frage, ich habe keine Ahnung. Müssen Sie den Herrn vom Ministe‐rium fragen, der weiß das. Ich weiß nicht, wissen Sie das? cxx … bei unseren Forschungszielen haben wir das so unterteilt, und zwar wir ha‐ben die unmittelbaren Ziele, die unsere sind im Labor. Unsere unmittelbaren Ziele sind Gene  finden und Stoffwechselwege aufklären. … Dann gibt’s die mittelbaren Ziele und die langfristigen Ziele. … Und die langfristigen Ziele wären dann eben die Reduzierung  der  Fettleibigkeit,  Reduzierung  von  Arteriosklerose,  Herzinfarkt, Krebserkrankungen,  etc.  Nur,  diese mittel‐  und  langfristigen  Ziele  sind  nicht  die Ziele  von  GOLD.  Die  sind  die  gesellschaftlichen  Ziele,  die  andere  dann  auch ma‐chen, die machen wir nicht selber. Wir könnten es nicht einmal machen. cxxi Wann  ist  rechtzeitig? … bevor Niels Bohr den Atomaufbau geklärt hat,  ist das rechtzeitig oder bevor das [Manhattan‐]Projekt gestartet ist? cxxii Wo muss man aufhören? … Niels Bohr, das Atommodell …  weil er hätte ja das nicht entwickeln dürfen? cxxiii Ist Darwin schuld an Euthanasie? cxxiv Wir sind also nicht die, die diese Projekte initiieren … sondern wir sind dieje‐nigen, die das Angebot annehmen, und, um diese Verantwortung wieder irgendwo von uns ein bisschen wegzubringen … die Gesellschaft muss sich dann Gedanken machen, was wir damit machen. Die Gesellschaft hat sich, glaube ich, vorher schon, unter  welchen  Voraussetzungen  auch  immer,  jetzt  schon  drüber  Gedanken  ge‐macht und diese Projekte entwickelt. 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                                                cxxv Ich habe sehr stark versucht, zu verstehen, was ist die individuelle Motivation der Beteiligten, … wer ist überhaupt beteiligt an dem, was dort passiert ausgehend von dem, was die Wissenschaftler machen. cxxvi  …  hat  sich  eher  vielleicht  die  Einschätzung  der  Öffentlichkeit  verändert,  als zum Thema. cxxvii Mein Eindruck war der, dass das doch etwas eher etwas seltenes ist, also, dass das  nicht  ein  fester  Bestandteil  der  wissenschaftlichen  Tätigkeit  darstellt,  dass man sich mit diesen Dingen beschäftigt. Der Eindruck ist für mich entstanden ein‐fach im Gespräch mit den Wissenschaftlern. cxxviii … bei den ethischen Dingen sind sie uns dann ein bisschen so ausgewichen, ned.  cxxix Was ich für mich [von den Diskussionen] mitgenommen habe, das ist ‐ und das deckt sich mit anderen Erfahrungen [mit] Vollblutwissenschaftlern ‐ dass … diese Dimension, sich dies [ethische Fragen] zu fragen, als Störung empfunden wird, als Zeit  raubend,  Kraft  raubend  empfunden  wird  oft  und  als  kontraproduktiv  weil wenn ich zu viele Fragen stelle, mache ich viele Sachen nicht mehr so einfach. Das ist,  glaube  ich,  ein  ganz  wesentlicher  Punkt  in  einer  ambitionierten  Forschung, dass ich viele Dinge erst einmal mache und dann hinterher hinterfrage. cxxx Sie haben eh gehört, die forschen,  ich weiß nicht wie lange. Und dann kommt einmal was heraus. [Das bedeutet]  ja wahnsinnig viele Frusterlebnisse. … Die ha‐ben einiges mitzumachen, ned. Geduld und dann geht es immer so auf und ab und wenn dann wer kommt und dann sagt: ‚Na, bitte moralisch und was Sie da machen. Jetzt denken sie einmal nach … was sie da arbeiten, in welche Richtung das gehen könnte, das könnte so und so entarten.’ Und dann müssen sie zum Diskutieren an‐fangen … das ist ja hemmend für die Arbeit. cxxxi … das  ist  ja das Dilemma der Wissenschaft,  ned, dass wir  eigentlich nicht  so viel Zeit haben auf die ethische Diskussion warten zu können, ned, auch mit unse‐ren Arbeiten. cxxxii  …  bei  den  Forschern  habe  ich  schon  gemerkt,  dass  es  hierarchische  Grund‐strukturen gibt. … wenn es über das eigene Feld hinaus … der Ruf nach dem letzt‐endlichen Chef da war, beziehungsweise der dem oft schon vorgekommen ist und im Prinzip primär für auch andere gesprochen hat. Und eigentlich nur sehr konkre‐te  Fragen  frei  oder  direkt  von  Einzelnen  niederchargierten  Leuten  beantwortet wurden, wenn es um konkrete Erfahrungen geht. cxxxiii … ich habe das eigentlich das immer gespürt, dass die Meinungen werden die Wissenschaftler aus verschiedenen Gruppen also nicht ändern. Sie haben ihre Mei‐nungen gesagt,  [sie] ausgetauscht, und das war es. … was  [für] eine Meinung die Öffentlichkeit überhaupt hat, was ich eigentlich mache, das, ich glaube, dass das ist im Hintergrund [für die Wissenschaftler]. cxxxiv … da wird man zum Teil auch sehr stark angegriffen. Also das ist ja ein Thema, was gerade in der Bevölkerung negativ aufstößt. cxxxv  Und was  für mich  doch  in  gewisser Weise  überraschend war,  dass  sich  das geändert hat am Zugang, bevor die Leute wirklich  im Tierstall waren und  in den Labors waren und nachher. Das war, also es hat dann immer noch Leute gegeben, die gesagt haben … sie sind damit überhaupt nicht einverstanden. Aber es war al‐
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                                                les nimmer so, würde ich jetzt im Großen und Ganzen sagen, es war nicht mehr so eindeutig. cxxxvi … was wir oft glauben, dass wir das sehr gut vermitteln oder dass wir das gut vermitteln können, dass das der richtige Weg ist, dass das ganz anders ankommt. Und da ist sicher noch viel Lernpotential, das muss ich schon sagen. Und das zwei‐te, was diesen Umgang angeht: wir haben oft diesen Glauben, dass wenn die Argu‐mente gut genug sind, dann ist  jeder dieser Meinung. Dass das aber so emotional eigentlich  abläuft  diese  Meinungsbildung,  dass  die  Argumente  an  zehnter  Stelle vielleicht kommen und dass wir diesen emotionalen Aspekt viel zu wenig abdec‐ken, dass wir sehr rational an das Ganze herangehen, weil wir einfach einen, insge‐samt einen  rationalen Zugang haben, und  [wir] diese emotionale Frage gar nicht stellen … Und da müssen wir ‐ ich bin mir noch nicht sicher, wie man das umsetzen kann, und wie man das lernen kann ‐ aber da sollten wir auf  jeden Fall noch was dazu lernen. cxxxvii … obwohl wir soviel Zeit miteinander verbracht haben,  ich nicht das Gefühl gehabt habe, dass sie [die Laien] das Gefühl haben, wir sind Menschen, denen man vertrauen kann,  in dem was sie arbeiten. Das Gefühl hatte  ich nicht.  Sondern bis zum  Schluss  hatte  ich  eigentlich  das  Gefühl,  dass  sie  zwar  finden,  dass wir  ganz nett sind, aber es muss unbedingt jemanden geben, der uns auf die Finger schaut. cxxxviii … wir machen keine Tierversuche, direkt. cxxxix Und da  ist mir erstmal die Tragweite dieser moralischen Ebene bewusst ge‐worden und ich denke, das  ist anderen auch so ergangen. Und deswegen war für mich [Ethik] so wahnsinnig interessant, weil er diesen Knoten gelöst hat. Ich habe immer versucht, irgendwie den Haken in diesem Prozess [welcher Bereich ist zu‐ständig für gesellschaftliche Verantwortung] zu finden, aber ich denke, dort ist er nicht  zu  finden,  sondern man muss  auf  dieser Meta‐Ebene  über  die  Sache  nach‐denken und dann löst sich vielleicht irgendwo der Knoten. … Also ich bin ja dann erst darauf gekommen, dass dieser Kreis, wie ich ihn skizziert habe, da ist. Aber ich glaube, dass der Kreis an sich nicht in der Lage ist, sich dramatisch zu verändern, ohne dass sich die Meta‐Ebene verändert, dass sich eben die moralischen Voraus‐setzungen, die ethischen Voraussetzungen verändern. cxl … weil die werden alle betriebsblind und die haben alle ihre wirtschaftliche In‐teressen,  ihren Posten zu halten und die Aufträge oder  in dem Bereich weiterzu‐forschen,  der  ihnen  vermittelt wurde.  Und  daher werden  sie  nicht  sagen …  hier sind wir an solche Grenzen gestoßen, hier kann ich einfach nicht mehr weiterma‐chen, ned. cxli … zu einem wirklichen Endergebnis so wie in der Mathematik. cxlii Volkssport. cxliii Gedankenspielcharakter. cxliv Diskussion um Kaisers Bart. cxlv … dass man voll im Kreis diskutiert und eigentlich zu keinem Schluss kommt. cxlvi … wie ein Buch, das man liest, wenn man dann Zeit hat. cxlvii … mehr eine Anleitung und mehr Konkretes … ich hätte schon ganz gern, dass wenn sich Experten mit was beschäftigen, z.B. um festzustellen, was eine gute Vor‐
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Hintergrund:  In der politischen Steuerung von Wissenschaft nehmen “Ethik” und “Partizipation” einen zentralen  Platz  ein.  In  der  politischen  Praxis  hingegen  ist  das  Verhältnis  dieser  beiden Ansätze  zueinander  weitgehend  ungeklärt.  Während  partizipative  Ansätze  eine  weiter reichende Einbeziehung von Akteuren und Interessen versuchen (insbesondere von “Lai‐en”), beruht “Ethik” weitgehend auf Expertenwissen. Die epistemische und politische Au‐torität von Ethik wird mit dem Unterschied zwischen Ethik, als vernünftige und systemati‐sche Reflexion von moralischen Annahmen, und “Moral” als unhinterfragte Zuordnung von “gut” und “schlecht”, gerechtfertigt.  
Ziele: Das Ziel dieser Dissertation  ist  zu analysieren wie  “ethische Laien”, d.h. Mitglieder einer weiteren  Öffentlichkeit  und  GenomforscherInnen  mit  ethischen  Themen  und  Fragen  in einen  interaktiven  Setting  umgehen—d.h.  ohne  die  Involvierung  von  EthikexpertInnen. Dabei  sind  drei  Dimensionen  zentral:  Welchen  ethischen  Themen  und  Fragestellungen haben die ethischen Laien als besonders relevant erachtet? Was sind die diskursiven und mikropolitischen Muster  in  einer  solchen  Ethikdebatte? Welche  Erfahrungen wurden  in den Verhandlungen um ethische Themen gemacht und welchen Sinn generieren die Dis‐kussionsteilnehmerInnen für sich daraus?  
Theoretische Herangehensweise:  Die theoretische Perspektive ist im Feld der soziologischen Wissenschaftsforschung ange‐siedelt,  insbesondere  in  der  Theoretisierung  einer  veränderten  gesellschaftlichen  Wis‐sensproduktion  und  eines  sich  veränderten  Verhältnisses  von Wissenschaft  und  Gesell‐schaft  (“mode  2  science”),  des Weiteren  kritische  Public  Understanding  of  Science‐  und Partizipations‐Ansätze sowie sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschung, die sich kritisch mit der institutionellen Dimension von Ethik auseinandergesetzt hat. Auf dieser Grundlage  führe ich das Konzept von “lay ethical knowledge” ein, welches von einer hierarchischen Unter‐scheidung  von  “Ethik”  und  “Moral”  Abstand  nimmt  und  den  Kontext,  in  welchem  Ethik verhandelt und somit Bedeutung erzeugt wird, betont.   
Methoden:  Die Dissertation beruht  auf  einem Forschungsprojekt—“Reden wir über GOLD!—in wel‐chem ein Partizipationssetting geschaffen wurde, wo sich Laien und ForscherInnen regel‐mäßig über einen längeren Zeitraum hinweg trafen – den sog. “Runden Tischen”. Das Pro‐jekt versucht Partizipationsansätze mit der Diskussion von ethischen Fragestellungen zu verbinden. Die Diskussion am Runden Tisch wurde mit qualitativen sozialwissenschaftli‐chen Methoden (Grounded Theory) analysiert.    
Resultate:  Die qualitative Untersuchung hat gezeigt, dass sowohl die teilnehmenden BürgerInnen als auch die ForscherInnen einen reflektierten und kontextbewussten Umgang mit ethischen Themen und Fragestellungen gezeigt haben. Diese sind dergestalt, dass sie die authorative Art der Expertenethik durchaus  in Frage stellen. Die TeilnehmerInnen des Runden Tisch thematisierten andere Themenfelder als institutionalisierte Standardethik. Trotzdem, ihre Einschätzungen von Ethik sind relativ ambivalent und spiegeln somit den weiteren gesell‐schaftlichen Umgang mit Ethik. Des weiteren weisen die Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass gän‐gige gesellschaftliche Ethikpraktiken, welche versuchen vergangene Wertentscheidung zu 
kompensieren  und  eine  Teilung  zwischen Risiko‐  und Moralaspekten  einführen  zu  kurz kommen,  wenn  es  darum  geht,  auf  weiter  reichende  öffentliche  Bedenken  hinsichtlich Innovationsprozessen zu reagieren.   
Schlussfolgerungen:  Das ethische Wissen von Laien eignet sich dazu, den Umgang von ExpertInnen mit Ethik in Frage  zu  stellen.  Laienethik  ist  eine  kritische Ressource  um  als  selbstverständlich  ange‐nommene Rahmungen in der moralischen Steuerung von Forschung zu hinterfragen. Die TeilnehmerInnen gingen auf reflektierte Weise mit ethischen Fragestellungen um, was die Hierarchie zwischen “Ethik” und “Moral” in Frage stellt, um als Kriterium für die Einbezie‐hung in eine ethische Debatte zu dienen. Der Umgang der TeilnehmerInnen mit ethischen Fragen legt nahe, dass eine anderer Um‐gang mit Ethik von Nöten wäre um den veränderten Bedingungen von Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft gerecht zu werden. Während Standardethik immer versucht,  für vergangene Wertentscheidungen zu kompensieren, schlage ich eine “Ethik der Innovation” vor, welche im Innovationsprozess viel früher ansetzt und selbstverständliche Annahmen zur Disposi‐tion stellt. 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